BṚHADĀRAṆYAKOPANIṢAD-BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA

(BUBV 1.4)

Puruṣavidha Brāhmaṇa

ज्ञानकर्मफलं चैतत्कर्मकाण्डप्रचोदितम् ।
आत्मैवेत्यादिशास्त्रेण सृष्ट्यादौ कर्तृतोच्यते ॥१॥

And,[1] this reward of knowledge and[2] (ritual) activity is what is told (lit. prescribed) in the section on ritual activity. (Now) in the scripture (beginning with the) words 'Ātman alone' is told (i.e. discussed) the nature of the agent in respect of creation etc. [1]

[1]This is for *ca* which is merely stylistic flourish.

[2]This can be alternatively taken as *vā* 'or'. SP and NKL both explain the compound *jñānakarmaphala* as *kevalasya jñānasya* and (*jñānasya*) *karmasamuccitasya phalam*. The earlier portion of BU up to the end of 1.3 spoke of the fruit of the combination of knowledge (about the nature and effect of rituals) and ritual activity, viz. attaining the nature of Prajāpati (or the Ātman, the Sūtrātman). This is so understood in BUBV 1.5.11.

SP points out: This portion, viz 1.4ff. is intended to convey that Prajāpati is in respect of the act of creation etc. of the world an independent agent — this is clear from *tad dhedam* ... (1.4.7). (Actually this is stated in the very next verse).

जगदुत्पत्तिसंहारस्थित्यादौ जगदात्मनः ।
क्रियाधीफलभूतस्य स्वातन्त्र्यमुपवर्ण्यते ॥२॥

(That is to say:) Here is described the independence of the Ātman of the world, who has become the very fruit of activity and knowledge[1], in respect of the origin, destruction and sustenance etc.[2] of the world.[3] [2]

[1]The inversion *kriyādhī* for *jñānakarman* is due to metrical exegency; cf. *kriyājñāna* in just the next verse.

[2]The word *ādi* means: control (*niyamana*) etc., according to SP.

[3]NKL states that *parātman* as understood from *tad ddeham* is the Prajāpati (i.e. Sūtrātman) and therefore the statement in this verse holds good — this is the meaning of *jagadātman* mentioned earlier.

स्तुत्यानया च वेदोक्तक्रियाज्ञानस्तुतिर्भवेत् ।
कृता विवक्षितं त्वत्र सर्वमप्येतदीरितम् ॥३॥
वैदिकं साधनं ज्ञेयं ज्ञानकर्मात्मकं पुरा ।
महानर्थफलायैव न मोक्षायेति निश्चितिः ॥४॥

By this (statement of) praise is to be understood the praise of the ritual activity and knowledge which is taught in the Veda[1]. However, the intended (meaning) here is that all this which comprises knowledge and ritual activity and the means (towards happiness etc.), as (earlier) stated in Veda (i.e. this scripture), (viz. it) culminates (in reality) in great calamity and not in liberation — this is the decision. [3-4]

[1]This has a reference to *tad dheham* in 1.4.7 which follows, though a general term *veda* is used. This is the purpose of the statement about the independence of the Ātman mentioned in note 2 on verse 1 above.

वैदिकं साधनं सर्वमविद्योत्थत्वकारणात् ।
तीव्रानर्थफलायेति ब्रह्मविद्याधिकारतः ।
विवक्षितो ऽर्थो यत्नेन तद्वैराग्यविधित्सया ॥५॥
यतो ऽविरक्तः संसारान्नात्मज्ञानाय कल्पते ।
तदेतदात्मतत्त्वं हि पदनीयमितीरणात् ॥६॥
पुत्रादिभ्यस्तथा प्रेयानिति वक्ष्यति सादरम् ॥७॥

Since every means (to happiness etc.), which is taught in Veda, results into acute calamity on account of its having an origin in ignorance (and) since this is a topic of the knowledge of the Brahman, therefore, the purpose is to state (the nature

the agent), specifically with a desire to advise (lit. prescribe) aversion to that[1]; [5]
since one, who is not averse to transmigratory existence, is not eligible (lit. able) to acquire the knowlege of the Ātman and (there is in this Śruti) the statement 'This very truth of the Ātman is to be known ...';[2] [6]
and also the Śruti will say with great regard that (that Ātman) is dearer (to one) than a son etc.[3] [7]

[1]Namely, ritual activity. SP refers to CU 5.3.8: *tasmāj jugupsata*.
[2]The first line of verse 6 states a pre-requisite for acquiring the knowledge of the Ātman, viz. aversion to transmigratory existence and the second line implies a question: Does not *vairāgya* arise on acquiring the fruit of *jñāna* and *karman*? Where then is the need to state what is said in the first line? Cf. BU 1.4.7: *tad etat padanīyam* ... The word *padanīya* can be translated as 'to be attained', i.e. *ātmatattva* is considered to be related to *puruṣārtha*. But, verbal roots in the sense of movement convey the sense of knowing also; cf. *tad etad eva prakṛtaṃ gamanīyam* (BUB p.134).
[3]Cf. BU 1.4.8.

Verses 8ff. refer to the sādhanacatuṣṭaya as stated in BSB: They are nityānityavastuviveka, ihāmutrārthabhogavirāga, śamadamādisādhanasaṃpat and mumukṣutva.

वेदोक्तं निखिलं पुंसः सत्त्वशुद्धिफलं स्मृतम् ।
कर्म ध्यानादिकं यत्नाच्छ्रेयो ऽर्थिभिरनुष्ठितम् ॥८॥

The entire activity such as meditation etc. that has been stated in the Veda is known to result into the purification of the mind[1] of a man (and) it is performed by those who wish for happiness, with every effort.[2] [8]

Verse 8 states that *karmakāṇḍa* etc. does not directly lead one to liberation, yet it is indirectly conducive to it — thus, meditation etc. (even its impression or desire, as the word etc. points out) causes the purification of one's mind.
[1]SP states that *sattva* is *antaḥkaraṇa*. Yet, it is better under-

stood as *citta*.

[2]SP supports this by citing some passages from Śruti and Smṛti respectively: *yena kenacana yajeta* and *yasyaite catvāriṃśat saṃskārāḥ* (both untraceable).

सम्यक्संशुद्धधिषणः संसारं वेत्ति तत्त्वतः ।
दृष्टसंसारतत्त्वश्च वैराग्यं संसृतेर्व्रजेत् ॥९॥

He, who has fully purified his mind[1], knows the transmigratory world in its true nature and he, who has known (lit. seen) the true nature of the transmigratory world[1] comes to have aversion to worldly life. [9]

The verse states the process of *karman* → *tattvaśuddhi* → *saṃsāratattvadṛṣṭi* → *vairāgya*.

[1]The word *dhiṣaṇa* means a sense-organ with which one comes to know and it is used here as a synonym for *sattva*. See note 1 on the preceding verse.

आविरिञ्चाद्विरक्तो हि संसारान्निविवृत्सति ।
न चोक्तज्ञानकर्मभ्यः सा निवृत्तिः प्रसिद्ध्यति ॥१०॥

Indeed, he who has turned averse to transmigratory world, beginning with Hiraṇyagarbha, wishes to turn away from it. And this turning away is not possible to achieve from knowledge and action as stated (in the preceding sections).[1] [10]

[1]SP supports by citing *nānyaḥ panthāḥ vidyate 'yanāya* (*Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 3.8; 6.15): *nāsty akṛtaḥ kṛtena* ... (*Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 1.2.12).

वाङ्मनःकायकर्मभ्यस्तत्साध्यकटुकत्वतः ।
व्युत्थायानर्थनिःसारसाधनान्यनुमार्गति ॥११॥

After rising above the actions of speech, *manas* and body for the disagreeableness in what is acquired through them, he looks for the means of warding away the undesirable (results). [11]

This is a statement of the means to liberation. It is the right knowledge (*samyagjñāna*) which arises on one's hearing etc. that is preceded by renunciation.

नित्यान्यपि च कर्माणि तत्संस्कारफलाश्रयात् ।
परित्यजति सर्वाणि कृत्स्नसंसारदोषदृक् ॥१२॥

(And) also, seeing the undesired effects in the entire transmigratory world, he gives up all the obligatory rites, for they are related to the fruits produced from (even) their impressions (or desire). [12]

Activity prescribed in scriptures is useful for liberation only at certain stages; it does not function as a direct means; rather, it causes defects or undesirable effects. Therefore, it has only to be given up.

संसारवह्निजं दुःखं संभावयति ना परम् ।
भूयो दुःखं किमन्यत्स्यान्नित्यानुष्ठानहानितः ॥१३॥

A man[1] considers misery resulting from the fire in the form of transmigratory world to be very great; indeed, what other misery can there be if not (that which results) from abandoning (the performance) of the obligatory rites? [13]

As the Smṛti says *akurvan vihitaṃ karma* ... (*Manusmṛti* 11.44), it is not proper to keep from performing the obligatory rites, because that would cause obsruction (*pratyavāya*) to one's collecting merit.

[1]The word *nā* is understood in the sense of *śuddhadhīḥ*, *viraktaḥ*, and therefore *adhikārī* for acquiring the knowledge of the Brahman.

मुक्तेर्बिभ्यत इत्यादि तथा च श्रुतिशासनम् ।
तन्मूला च स्मृतिः साक्षाद्वेदानित्यादिका स्फुटा ॥१४॥

And, to this effect, there is an instruction in the Śruti, *mukter bibhyataḥ 1*... Moreover, threre is (a statement in) some Smṛti,

which has its root in the Śruti,[2] that clearly states (the same) in the words: to the Vedas etc. [14]

[1]The quotation is untraceable.
[2]This shows equal authoritativeness of the Smṛti.

अविज्ञातं परं तत्त्वं जनिमत्कारणं श्रुतौ ।
आन्त्यात्कार्यात्तदेव स्यात्सर्वकार्यविशेषणम् ॥१५॥

[Verses 15-21 refer to the Brahman, the cause of the world.]

In the Śruti (it is said) that the highest Reality, which is (generally) not known,[1] is the cause of what has a birth (or origin) and that alone would be the producer of all effects ending with the final of them[2]. [15]

[1]Because the highest Brahman is in reality *avikārya* 'not undergoing any modification' and it is really the ultimate cause.
[2]This refers to the earth. See SP: *antyaṃ kāryaṃ pṛthivī tatparyantaṃ sarvasya kāryasya vyāvartakaṃ sūtrādyātmanā param eva brahmety arthaḥ.*

तेन तेनात्मकार्येण स्वात्माभासतमोवधिः ।
विशिष्टः ससृजे विष्णुस्तेजोबन्नादि मायया ॥१६॥

Viṣṇu,[1] affected by the limiting adjunct[2] of ignorance (lit. darkness) in the form of the semblance of Himself[3] (and) distinguished (lit. qualified) by each one of His own products, has created[4] fire, water, food etc. by his own power (Māyā). [16]

This verse describes the creation by Viṣṇu. Viṣṇu, affected by *upādhi*s, is the creator (*sraṣṭṛ*), the protector (*pālayitṛ*) and the withdrawer (*saṃhaṭṛ*) of the universe. This is a verse expressive of Sureśvara's Ābhāsavāda.

[1]According to SP, only Viṣṇu is mentioned here for avoiding the notions of different gods being responsible for each of creation, sustenance and destruction. Only He is the creator etc. It should

be noticed that Sureśvara, under the influence of his time, mentions Viṣṇu for the Brahman. Or, possibly, he resorts to the etymological explanation of Viṣṇu from the verb root √*viṣ* 'to pervade', in the sense of 'pervader'.

[2]In *tamovadhiḥ* 'having the limiting adjunct of darkness', *avadhi* is to be taken to mean ***upādhi***; cf. *avadhiśabditopādhinā* (SP) and *svasya ātmanaḥ avadhiḥ yasmin ajñāte tad eva tamaḥ* (NKL).

[3]SP explains the word ***svātman*** as *cid-dhātu* 'one's own (basic) element, viz. *cit* ', which is Self. This is an indication of Sureśvara's Ābhāsavāda.

[4]The use of the Ātmanepada in *sasṛje* is in Vedic fashion. This reflexive use shows how the creation is but illusion (*mithyā*)— it indicates absence of any object apart from the creator.

अविद्ययास्य स्रष्टृत्वं कूटस्थस्यापि सर्वदा ।
यथावस्तुधियः सूतेः प्राङ्नित्यं तेन तन्मतम् ॥१७॥

On account of ignorance is this One said to be the creator, even though He is ever immutable. And since the production of (the universe) is from this thought of the things as are going to be, it is for that reason (known to be) ever eternal. [17]

ज्ञानकर्मादितन्त्रं सत्सूत्रं जज्ञे ततो विभोः ।
ज्ञानक्रियाशक्तिमद्यद्यत्रेदं जगदाहितम् ॥१८॥

[Here follows in verses 18-21 a statement of the process of creation from the Brahman.]

Being controlled[1] by knowledge and action etc.[2], the existent Sūtrātman[3] was born from the (all-)pervading[4] — that which was possessed of the powers of knowledge and activity[5] (and) in which rests this world.[6] [18]

[1]It literally means: dependent on ...

[2]The word *ādi* means *vāsanā* (SP).

[3]The Sūtrātman is *apañcīkṛtapañcamahābhūtatatkāryātmakaṃ liṅgam*.

[4]The word *vibhu* means *avyākṛta brahman*.

[5]*jñānaśaktimat* is Hiraṇyagarbha and *kriyāśaktimat* is Prāṇa — these two are the aspects of the Sūtrātman.

[6]The Sūtrātman is minute and cannot be a substratum of the world; but cf. *vāyunā vai gautama sūtreṇāyaṃ ca lokaḥ* (BU 3.7.2) which states that the Sūtrātman – identified there as Vāyu, viz. Self (Ātman) – supports everything. That the Sūtrātman is a substratum is made known by the visible gross effects.

विराडपि ततो जातस्त्रैलोक्यात्मकदेहवान् ।
यथोक्तज्ञानकर्मभ्यां मनोर्जन्म ततो ऽपि च ॥१९॥

Also, from that (Sūtrātman) was born Virāj[1] having a body in the form of the three worlds. And there was the birth of Manu also[2] from that (Virāj), on account of (his) knowledge and activity as stated before. [19]

[1]Virāj is *pañcīkṛtāpañcamahābhūtatatkāryātmaka*. Cp. note 3 on the preceding verse.

[2]The word *ca* implies all the creation which proceeded from Manu and also that it is controlled by knowledge and action.

या महाप्रलयात्सृष्टिः सा विरिञ्चस्य वक्ष्यते ।
आन्तरप्रलयाद्या तु विराजो ऽधीयमुच्यते ॥२०॥

Whatever creation arises from the great dissolution (lit. deluge), is said (to be) from Viriñca (the Sūtrātman[1]); (and) that after the intermediate dissolution is said to arise from Virāj. [20]

Verses 18-19 clarified the relation of the Sūtrātman and Virāj to a certain extent. But the origination of Virāj mentioned in verse 19 from the Sūtrātman was already explained in BUBV 1.2 (Aśvamedha Brāhmaṇa). But where can we see the origination of Manu etc. from Virāj? — to this an answer is given in the second line. Also, BU 1.4.3: *sa imam evātmānaṃ dvedhāpātayat* 'He (Virāj) parted this very body into two.' is also expressive of the same.

[1]Viriñca is the Sūtrātman who has two powers; see verse 18 note 4.

स वै शरीरी प्रथमः स वै पुरुष उच्यते ।
आदिकर्ता स भूतानां ब्रह्मा ऽग्रे समवर्तत ॥२१॥

It is said: He is the first embodied being, he is Puruṣa. The (god) Brahman, the first creator of all beings, existed before.[1] [21]

This is *Mārkaṇḍeyapurāṇa* 45.64; *Vāyupurāṇa* 1.4.68; *Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa* 1.3.24.

[1]That is, in the beginning of all creation.

प्रत्यग्भूतः परार्थेभ्यो यो ऽनन्यानुभवं प्रति ।
प्रथते स इहात्मेति जगत्यस्मिन्निगद्यते ॥२२॥

[Verese 22-30 are *udbhāṣya*; Sureśvara's addition to what Śaṅkara said on *ātmaivedaṃ agra āsīt*.]

That is described in this world as the Ātman who, residing in each being[1] apart from other objects[2], reveals himself in the experience of every being as in none other. [22]

[1]Translation follows the reading in the AnSS edition. The NKL edition reads: *pratyag-rūpaḥ* instead of *pratyag-bhūtaḥ*. Possibly that is better, meaning; 'who has the form of the inner self of every being'.

[2]These stand in the relation of cause and effect.

आत्माभासैकसंसिद्धेस्तदज्ञानसमुद्भवम् ।
आत्मैव भण्यते मोहात्तदात्माव्यतिरेकतः ॥२३॥

On account of the existence of only the semblance of the Ātman, all that results from the ignorance about that Ātman is called the Ātman on account of illusion itself and not apart from that Ātman. [23]

This is yet another indication of Sureśvara's Ābhāsavāda; cf. verse 16 above.

एवेत्यवधृतावेतदात्मीयार्थनिषेधकृत् ।
मन्वादि जन्मनः पूर्वमात्मैवेदमभूज्जगत् ॥२४॥

The word *eva*, which is used for the sake of restricting the meaning, is expressive of the denial (of the world) of things which have the nature of the Ātman. This world whose beginning[1] is Manu was before its origin only the Ātman. [24]

The first line explains the intention of the word *eva* of *ātmaivedam* and the second line paraphrases *ātmā eva idam āsīt*.

[1]SP explains *ādi* of *manvādi* as *ākāśa* etc. and also takes *manvādi* as the qualifier of *jagat* ! The NKL edition reads *manvādijanmanaḥ* as one word. In that case, *ādi* can stand for *ākāśa*; but this seems to be unintended, for Sureśvara refers to the creation beginning with Manu is clear also from verse 30 below.

अध्यात्मादिविभागे स्यादात्मात्मीयादिभेदधीः ।
तस्मिन्नसति सा न स्यादपेक्षाविरहाद्विभोः ॥२५॥

Cognition of distinction such as Ātman and what belongs to Ātman would be (possible) when, there is division made of things as those resting in body etc. But in the absence of that (division, such creation) would not be there, for in the case of the all-pervading (Ātman) there is (total) absence of any relationship (to another). [25]

At the initial stage there are no distinct entities as the Ātman and *idam* (viz. *jagat*) and therefore the Ātman does not know the existence of *jagat*. If the Ātman were to know it as some existent, that would mean the Ātman has *bhedadhī*, i.e. the Ātman is the knower and *jagat* is the object of its knowing. Then there would be duality even at an initial stage. Here Sureśvara emphasises that *bhedadhī* is possible only with reference to *adhyātmādivibhāga*.

मिथोपास्तव्यपेक्षं हि नामरूपादिमज्जगत् ।
प्रत्यङ्मात्रप्रमाणं स्यात्परागेवैति चित्रताम् ॥२६॥

This world, which is made up of name, form etc. and as such has set aside any mutual relationship, would indeed have (only) the inner/individual self as the means of knowing it. Or rather, outside (the Self[1]) only, it assumes variety. [26]

[1]Following the preceding verse, this verse explains the relation of the Ātman and the objective world (if it existed). Also it explains away the possible argument that the absence of any variety of objects before creation meant nihilism (Sūnyavāda). Also note that NKL reads *parāg evaiti citratām*. The AnSS edition does not present a happy reading. The word *parāṅ* is an adjective.

अपामार्गलतेवायं विरुद्धफलदो भवः ।
प्रत्यग्दृशं विमोक्षाय संसाराय पराग्दृशाम् ॥२७॥

This mundane world[1] yields, like the *apāmārga* creeper[2], fruits of opposed nature. For those who consider it as only the inner/individual self, (this transmigratory world) ends in liberation (and) for those who see it apart from the self it results in (further) transmigratory existence. [27]

[1]*bhava* 'mundane existence' is *saṃsāra* according to SP. It means existence in this world which might end either in liberation or in rebirth.

[2]Refer to SP and NKL regarding *apāmārgalatā* (*Achyranthes aspera/bidentata*). Better NKL: *apāmārgamañjarī yathā agrata ārabhya adhaḥ spṛśyamānā susparśā sukhakarī bhavati vaiparītyena duḥsparśā duḥkhakarīty arthaḥ.*

व्याकृताव्याकृतं विश्वं प्रत्यक्प्रत्ययमात्रकम् ।
मोहोत्थाहमितिज्ञानाद्व्यारत्यादिमद्भवेत् ॥२८॥

All this (i.e. world), manifest and unmanifest, is only to result into the awareness of the individual self, but on account of the awareness, 'I (am this).'[1], which arises from infatuation,

it comes to have fear, displeasure etc. [28]

This verse restates the latter case, resulting into *saṃsāra*.
[1]'I am this.' implies 'This is mine.'; cf. *ahaṃ mameti vijñānam* in the next verse.

अहंममेतिविज्ञानं विद्यया ध्वंसितं यदा ।
तदा ऽद्वये दृशौ दृष्टे न भयादि तमोहतेः ॥२९॥

When this awareness[1], 'I am this (and) this is mine.', is destroyed by the lore (of the Ātman)[2], then, the seer, who is without any duality,[3] being seen, there does not exist fear etc., for there has been the removal of darkness. [29]

[1]This is knowledge based on subject-object relationship.
[2]The word *vidyā* is for *ātmavidyā*.
[3]Or alternatively, who does not have a second.

इदं धीनामगम्यं यच्चित्रं सत् प्रथते हिरुक् ।
मन्वादि सृष्टेस्तत्पूर्वमात्मैवाभूदिदं जगत् ॥३०॥

This (world), which is understood as the object of knowledge and (as having a) name (etc.), extends afar, being full of variety. This world, beginning with Manu[1], is, before (its) creation, only the Ātman.[2] [30]

[1]Cf. verse 24 note above.
[2]This implies: and nothing else.

एतावद्वास्तवं वृत्तं मोहोत्थं भण्यते ऽधुना ।
कोशपञ्चकतां यातः प्रत्यगज्ञानतो यतः ॥३१॥
स एष परमो ऽप्यात्मा कामाविद्याद्युपप्लवात् ।
संवृत्तः पुरुषाकार इत्यनुक्रोशतीव नः ॥३२॥

[Verses 31-34 are the explanation of the word *puruṣavidhaḥ*. Here, Sureśvara explains Ātman as Paramātman 'Supreme Self'.]

This much is described as the nature of the thing[1] (which

is) (ever) existent. Now is described (the nature of) what arises from ignorance, since the individual self has assumed the five sheath state[2]. [31]

This[3] highest Ātman also becomes possessed of the shape of a man because of the obstructions of desire, ignorance etc. and therefore shows compassion on us, as it were.[4] [32]

The Śruti *puruṣavidhaḥ* helps us in getting release from bondage — in this way, it emphasises that whatever man experiences is nothing but the appearance of the Ātman.

[1]This refers to the Ātman, i.e. Brahman.

[2]The five sheaths are: *ānanda*, *prāṇa*, *manas*, *vijñāna* and *anna*.

[3]Translation follows the reading *sa eṣa* in the AnSS edition. The NKL edition reads *sa eva*. But both SP and NKL do not give any indication about the reading.

[4]This indicates that *puruṣavidhatva* of the Ātman is not real (*mithyā*).

आनन्दाद्यन्नपर्यन्तान्कारणेतररूपिणः ।
पुरुषादिप्रकारांस्तान्प्रत्यक्तत्वानलक्षयत् ।
पुरुषविध इत्युक्त्या ह्यूर्ध्वं चैवं प्रवक्ष्यते ॥३३॥

Since (the Śruti) has pointed out (or described) in the statement *puruṣavidhaḥ* the (various) forms, beginning with a Puruṣa, of the one who assumes those forms of things, viz. the causes and others (i.e. effects), beginning with *ānandamaya* (and) ending with *annamaya*,[1] as having the nature of the individual self; (and) that this (is so) will be explained later[2]. [33]

[1]*puruṣavidha* = *puruṣākāra* = *kośapañcaka*; cf. note 2 on the preceding verse. And among the five sheaths, the first *ānandamaya* is a causal sheath, the last *annamaya* is a sheath of the nature of an effect, and the three sheaths (*prāṇamaya*, *manomaya*, *vijñānamaya*) are sheaths of the nature of both cause and effect.

[2]This refers to the context of *anna* in the next Brāhmaṇa (traditional scholars call it Saptānna Brāhmaṇa), viz. BU 1.5.3.

वाङ्मनःप्राणकोशांस्त्रीन्विराडन्नमयः स्वयम् ।
तद्धेदमिति चानन्दो नैवेहेति तथोच्यते ॥३४॥

[The words *ūrdhvaṃ ca* of the preceding verse are clarified in verses 34-36 below.]

(In the Śruti it is later stated that) the three sheaths of *vāk*, *manas* and *prāṇa* are (but) Virāj, who himself comprises food. It is said (already) in the Śruti passage *tad dhedam* that this is referred to as *ānanda(maya)*; and so also in the passage *naiveha*. [34]

The Śruti passages and *pañcakośa*s can be thus co-related: *mano vācaṃ prāṇam* ... (BU 1.5.3) refers to *manomaya*, *vijñānamaya* (*vijñāna* = *vāk*) and *prāṇamaya*; *ānandamaya* to *tad dhedam* (BU 1.4.7) and *naiveha kiṃcanāgra āsīt mṛtyunaivedam āvṛtam āsīt* (BU 1.2.1).

अग्निर्मूर्धेति च तथा मन्त्रेणापि प्रकाशितः ।
सामानाधिकरण्यं च तद्धेदमिति युक्तिमत् ॥३५॥
पृथिव्याद्यक्षरान्तश्च प्रश्नो वाचक्नवस्तथा ॥३६॥

In the Mantra *agnir mūrdhā* ...[1] is explained (the nature of the Ātman) to be likewise (viz. *annamaya*). And this mention (of the Ātman and the five sheaths) in the same substratum[2] as stated in *tad dhedam* is (supported) with reason. [35]
So also the question of Vācaknavī, which begins with the word *pṛthivī* and ends with the word *akṣara*[3], (will state) the same. [36]

The Vārtikas on *ātmaivedam* ... *puruṣavidhaḥ* are concluded here. It is Virāj that is understood by the word *ātman*, and, before getting another body, it only existed and from that are created all discrete beings and things; the beings take human forms (in particular), (thus) having a head, hands etc.

[1]Cf. *agnir mūrdhā cakṣuṣī candrasūryaṃ diśaḥ śrotre vāg iva vṛtāś ca devāḥ* (*Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 2.1.4).

[2]The word *sāmānādhikaraṇya* is explained in SP: *bhinna-*

pravṛttinimittānāṃ śabdānām ekasminn arthe pravṛttiḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyam iti sthiter ity arthaḥ.

[3]BU 3.8.8-9.

प्रत्यग्दृष्ट्यनुविधाहंप्रत्ययैकप्रमाणकः ।
सो ऽनुवीक्ष्यात्ममोहोत्थदृष्ट्याविद्योत्थरूपकम् ॥३७॥

[Verses 37-39 are the explanation of the words *so 'nuvīkṣya* of BU 1.4.1.]

(Virāj[1]) has the only (one) authoritative means of knowing in the experience of 'I' which is permeated by the awareness of the inner self. The words *so 'nuvīkṣya* is a metaphorical form of expression arising from ignorance, i.e. the awareness originating in the ignorance (about the nature) of the Ātman. [37]

[1]Śaṅkara has used Virāj in the sense of the Ātman, viz.individual/inner self. In this verse, Sureśvara adopts Śaṅkara's view. Already, Sureśvara has explained Ātman as Paramātman 'Supreme Self' (NKL). Cf. introductory note to verses 31-34 above.

यदभ्यस्तं पुरास्याभूदहमेवेदमित्यदः ।
दर्शनं तदपेक्ष्यायमनुशब्दः प्रयुज्यते ॥३८॥

This prefix (lit. word) *anu*[1] is used (in the Śruti) with reference to whatever was then, i.e. earlier, repeatedly uttered (in the state of a sacrificer) in the awareness, 'I myself am this (Virāj).' [38]

[1]*anu* requires something to have occurred before; but there did not exist such a knowable object before Virāj. Hence this explanation is given. Sureśvara has thus answered away a difficulty on linguistic ground: The word *anu* expresses either the subsequence or nearness of something to another; how then was this expression *anuvīkṣya* used by the Śruti *so 'nuvīkṣya nānyad ātmano 'paśyat so 'ham asmīty agre vyāharat tato 'haṃnāmā- bhavat ... athānyan nāma prabrūte yad asya bhavati* (BU 1.4.1)?

अहमेवेदमस्मीति दर्शनं यत्सुभावितम् ।
तत्फलं यत्तदन्वीक्ष्य नात्मनो ऽन्यद्ददर्श सः ॥३९॥

After having thought about whatever was the fruit of that which was well thought over, i.e. awareness 'I myself am this.', he did not see anything else than the Ātman itself. [39]

Here is described the fruit or result of *anvīkṣaṇa*; *anvīkṣaṇa* is only *īkṣaṇa*.

तस्मादर्थान्तरासृतेरेकपिण्डात्ममात्रतः ।
नापश्यदपरं किंचित्सो ऽहमित्यभ्यधादथ ॥४०॥

[Verses 40-42 are the explanation of *anyad ātmano 'paśyat so 'ham asmīty agre vyāharat*.]

Due to non-production of anything other than that (Virāj[1]), he (Virāj) did not see anything else than merely himself as one whole (lump) and, therefore, in that instant,[2] he uttered *so 'ham* 'I am he.' [40]

[1] *tasmād arthāntarāsūter* is *virāḍdehād bhinnasya dehasyānupapatteḥ* (NKL).

[2] SP: The word *atha* refers to *agre* in the Śruti. Cf. SP: *svavyatiriktādarśanānantaryam athaśabdārthaḥ*.

त्रैलोक्यात्मकदेहात्मा नापश्यदपरं पृथक् ।
भिन्नार्थानभिसंबन्धात्प्रतीच्येवास्य धीरभूत् ॥४१॥

The embodied Ātman having the form of the three worlds[1] did not see any other (thing) as distinct. On account of the absence of contact with any distinct thing (i.e. object), he became aware of the inner self. [41]

This is the explanation of the word *atha* in the previous verse.

[1] Variant reading in AnSS *-dehāt sa nātmāpaśyat*; accordingly, the translation would be: That Ātman did not see anything else

(as) different from his own body in the form of the three worlds ...

सशब्दं दर्शनं यादृक्प्रागभ्यस्तं तथैव सः ।
व्याजहार फलावस्थो ह्यहमित्यात्मवाचकम् ॥४२॥

[The preceding verse is explained further in the first line.]

(And) in the same way as he was earlier used to see himself, viz. possessing (the capacity for) the word[1], he, who resided in the state of the result[2], declared about himself, 'I (am) he, (the sacrificer).'. [42]

There is an attempt here to explain as to how there was on the part of Virāj the awareness of himself, viz. the inner self, and his own body (the last *pāda* of verse 41, *pratīci dhīr ābhūt*).

[1]NKL reads: *saśabdadarśanam*; translation follows this reading. The reading in AnSS would lead to this translation: He is just like that as is repeatedly studied (in the Śruti).

[2]*phalāvastha = yajamānāvastha*, identified with Prajāpati.

उपासनार्थं नामास्य तस्योपनिषदित्यतः ।
अतो ऽहमित्यनेनैव ह्यात्मनात्मानमभ्यधात् ॥४३॥

From the Śruti (statement) *tasyopaniṣat* (is understood the word) *aham* for the name of him (viz. Prajāpati); (which is so used) for the sake of (recitation in) worship.[1] Therefore, in this statement 'I am he.', 'he' refers to himself of his own accord. [43]

'How is the name *aham* used for Prajāpati?' — this is explained in this verse. The name comes from Upaniṣadic usage (NKL puts it as *rahasya*). This means: No word other than *aham* can express or refer to the Ātman.

[1]For *upāsana*(*ā*), see our book [Vol.4:1991] Introduction.

अहमित्यभ्यधादग्रे यस्मादात्मानमात्मना ।
अहंनामाभवत्तस्माद्विराडेष प्रजापतिः ॥४४॥

Since, in the beginning (i.e. in the earliest/first moment) he expressed himself by (the word) *aham*, of his own accord, therefore, this Virāj, Prajāpati became known by the name *aham*. [44]

This is the explanation of *ahamnāmābhavat*.

तत्कार्यगेण लिङ्गेन ज्ञापयन्कारणाभिधाम् ।
तस्मादपीति वक्त्येतां प्रसिद्धिं लोकसाक्षिकीम् ॥४५॥

The Veda, which informs about the name of the cause by means of (i.e. citing, the) characteristic of his (=Prajāpati's) effect, utters the words *tasmād api* (and thereby) expresses the popularly accepted notion in this statement.[1] [45]

This is the explanation of *tasmād api*.

[1]BU, which follows *tasmād api*, viz. *etarhy āmantrito 'ham ayam ity evāgra uktvāthānyan nāma prabrūte yad asya bhavati* 'Being addressed, one first says 'It is me.', and then conveys one's other name (which one might bear).'

यथोक्तमहिमः कस्मात्संवृत्तः पुरुषो विराट् ।
इति हेतूपदेशाय स यदित्यादि भण्यते ॥४६॥

In order to explain as to why Virāj of the greatness thus described[1] became a man, there follows the statement *sa yat* ... [46]

Since it is difficult to explain why the word is used in a Smṛti for Virāj, though it contradicts the Śruti *sa vai puruṣa ucyate*, therefore, the verse answers away that difficulty.

[1]The word should have been *yathoktamahimā*! Cf. SP: *nakāralopaṃ vaikalpitam manyante*.

मिथो जिगीषतां पुंसां ज्ञानकर्मादिसाधनैः ।
पुरा देवात्मतां यो ऽगात्प्लुष्टास्तेनेतरे जिताः ॥४७॥

Whosoever amongst the men, formerly wishing to conquer one

another by means of knowledge, action etc., became for them *deva*[1] and by him were others burnt (as it were)[2] and conqured. [47]

This gives the meaning of the Śruti passage *sa yat puruṣo ... tasmāt puruṣaḥ*.

[1]The definition of Puruṣa is understood here thus: *pūrvam auṣat* which conveys the meaning of the Śruti *sa yat ... auṣat* (BU 1.4.1). And this Puruṣa is Virāj. This is Brāhmaṇical derivation from the verb root *purā-√uṣ* 'to burn'!

[2]Cf. SP: *dagdhavaj jitāḥ*. See the next verse.

वैराजपदसंप्रेप्सोर्यजमानमहाजनात् ।
एनांस्यौषद्यतो ऽग्रे ऽतः संवृत्तः पुरुषाभिधः ॥४८॥

Since he formerly burnt (all) sins of (lit. amongst) a multitude of sacrificers that was wishing to secure (*prepsu*) the status of Virāj, therefore, later he became known by the name Puruṣa. [48]

The meaning of *tasmāt puruṣaḥ* is stated; this supports the etymology given in the preceding verse.

औषत्स्वान्पाप्मनः पूर्वं ज्ञानाद्यतिशयाग्निना ।
वैराजपदलिप्सुभ्यस्तेनासौ पुरुषाभिधः ॥४९॥

(Since) having first burnt his own sins by the fire of the excellence of knowledge etc. (he did so afterwards) for the sake of those who wanted to get the status of Virāj, he became known by the name of Puruṣa. [49]

Now this verse also goes to support it on the basis of the Śruti. It takes into account the Śruti *sarvān pāpmana auṣat* (BU 1.4.1) and seeks to affirm that the name *puruṣa* for Prajāpati was not merely a fancy or metaphor.

यथोक्तोपासनफलं वक्ष्यामीत्युत्तरं वचः ।
ओषतीत्यादिकं ज्ञेयं वेदोपासीत यः सदा ॥५०॥

[Verses 50-52 are the explanation of *oṣati ha vai sa taṃ yo 'smāt pūrvo bubhūṣati ya evaṃ veda.*]

With the intention, 'Let me declare the result of the worship already stated.', there follows the later statement *oṣati* ... (In this) it is to be understood that one who knows the object of knowing is one who ever worships it. [50]

This verse states the purpose of the Śruti, *oṣati ... ya evaṃ veda.*

यो ऽसावतीन्द्रियो ऽग्राह्यः सूक्ष्मो ऽव्यक्तः सनातनः ।
सर्वभूतमयो ऽचिन्त्यः स एव स्वयमुद्बभौ ॥५१॥

He himself[1] appeared (in a human form) by his own wish (*svayam*), who is beyond the sense-organs, imperceptible, subtle, unmanifest, eternal,[2] comprising all beings and incomprehensible. [51]

[1]This is following the reading *eva*; also one in the *Manusmṛti*. The variant reading *eṣa*, followed by NKL, would entail the translation: This, thus known, (Virāj) appeared ... The nature of Virāj is thus clarified by a citation from *Manusmṛti* 1.7. This one is so subtle that he is beyond the sense-organs ...

[2]Alternatively, existing from the days of yore.

पुरुषो ऽस्मीत्युपास्त्यर्थं पुरुषार्थो ऽयमुच्यते ।
ओषतीत्युक्तितः साक्षाद्गुणोपास्तिफलश्रवात् ॥५२॥

[This is the concluding Vārtika on BU 1.4.1.]

This end of human endeavour is stated for the sake of worship, in 'I am Puruṣa.'. (This is so,) on account of the statement '(He) burns.' which is the direct statement (lit. hearing) of the result of the worship of some qualities etc. [52]

The purpose of this verse is to point out that the worship of Virāj, that possesses the qualities of Puruṣa, leads one to become

one with the Sūtra (i.e. Virāj) itself.

Verses 53 - 104 are regarding BU 1.4.2 and verses 53 - 70 in particular are the explanation of that the fruit (i.e. result) of knowledge and action is transmigratory.

अभिष्टुतं प्रयत्नेन फलं यज्ज्ञानकर्मणोः ।
एवंमहिममप्येतत्संसारं नात्यवर्तत ॥५३॥

Whatever fruit of knowledge and action has been praised with effort/care as having this potentiality[1] has not transgressed/ overcome the transmigratory existence. [53]

The purpose of BU 1.4.2: *so 'bibhet* is stated. The fruit of knowledge and action may be anysoever great; it is related to transmigratory existence! Not to liberation.

[1]The word *evammahima* is, like *yathoktamahima* in verse 46 above, ending in a vowel.

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यविज्ञानविरहादन्यसाधनः ।
यावत्किंचित्फलं नादः सर्वानर्थनिवृत्तये ॥५४॥

On account of the absence of accurate knowledge of the real nature of the inner self, Prajāpati has taken to other means of knowing; whatever be its fruit, (viz. transmigratory existence), that is (indeed) not for warding away all evils/disasters.[1] [54]

[1]There ever remains the fear/sorrow of transmigration, even if a person has become the Sūtra or Virāj.

निरस्तातिशयं कर्म ज्ञानं चाप्यापि बालवत् ।
यतो ऽबिभेदविद्यावानतो ऽसावस्मदादिवत् ॥५५॥

Since, even after accomplishing action and acquiring knowledge, (both of) which surpassed excellence, he became afraid like a child; therefore, he was possessed of ignorance like (all of) us. [55]

A view like the following could be held: The status of Prajāpati which is of the nature of the fruit of knowledge and action is characterized by pure knowledge and, therefore, there cannot be transmigration. To this, there is an answer in this verse.

न ह्यविद्यामनादाय वस्तुयाथात्म्यसंश्रयात् ।
कश्चिद्बिभेत्यबिभेच्च तेनाविद्वान्प्रजापतिः ॥५६॥

No person would be afraid, since he has taken resort to the (knowledge) of the true nature of the thing (viz. Ātman), unless he had taken to ignorance; and (it is said) 'He was afraid.', therefore Prajāpati must be (taken as) an ignorant being.[1] [56]

[1]SP comments: That Virāj was afraid was stated, in pursuance of the method of Anvaya. The present verse states the same thing, following the method of Anvaya.

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यविद्यैव निःशेषपुरुषार्थकृत् ।
इत्येतत्प्रतिपत्त्यर्थं विराट्स्थानस्य कुत्सनम् ॥५७॥

In order to understand that only the knowledge of the true nature of the inner self brings about the fulfilment of all human aims, there is blame given to the state of Virāj . [57]

This verse answers one's fear that the preceding verse might appear contrary to the statement (which was made before) about the excellence of Virāj and what gives blame to the same Virāj.

यतो ऽबिभेद्विराट्पूर्वमेकाक्यस्मीति मूढवत् ।
तस्मात्तत्कार्यभूतो ऽज्ञ एकाक्यद्य बिभेति ना ॥५८॥

Since, like an ignorant person, Virāj became afraid, feeling thus 'I am alone.', therefore, a person, who is only a product of him and ignorant, becomes afraid (when) alone (even) today. [58]

The meaning of *tasmād ekākī bibheti* is stated. This leads one to infer that the fear in the effect (i.e. a human being) leads

to the conclusion that fear is found in the cause, viz. Prajāpati.

एवं भयाभिभूतः स ईक्षांचक्रे ऽथ लोकवत् ।
भयाहेतु यथातत्त्वदर्शनं कृतवान्विभुः ॥५९॥

Thus, overpowered by fear, he then thought in the manner of a person in the world. (And) then the pervading Ātman acquired[1] that knowledge (i.e. sight) of the truth as what is not the cause of fear. [59]

This is the meaning of *sa hāyam īkṣāṃcakre*. The second line conveys that Prajāpati becomes possessed of the knowledge of the truth, that which cannot be the cause of fear.

[1]That is, understood.

स्रजीव कल्पिताहिर्ना तत्रासादाकुलेन्द्रियः ।
आलोचयेद्यथातत्त्वं भीध्वस्तौ तद्वदीश्वरः ॥६०॥

As a man, who has first taken (or seen) a serpent in the place of a garland, is, owing to fear, disturbed in (all) his sense-organs and would later find out the true nature of the thing (which he really saw) when there is removal (lit. destruction) of (his) fear; so also did the Lord (Virāj, Prajāpati). [60]

The simile *lokavat* (of the preceding verse) is explained here with an illustration.

आलोचयन्यथातत्त्वमपास्तध्वान्ततद्भवम् ।
अनन्यानुभवं साक्षाद्ददर्शैकात्म्यमात्मनि ॥६१॥

Thinking well about (or finding) the truth as it is and having (thereby) removed the ignorance (lit. darkness) and its effect, (he) directly perceived the uniqueness in respect of (himself or) the Ātman, the experience of which was unique. [61]

The result of *ālocana* stated in the preceding verse is explained.

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यविज्ञानशिखिप्लुष्टमहत्तमाः ।
आप्ताशेषपुमर्थो ऽथ सो ऽमन्यत ततो विराट् ॥६२॥

When[1] that Virāj, who had consumed (i.e. burnt) the great darkness (of ignorance) by the fire of the knowledge of the truth about the inner self and who had thus acquired all the ends of human endeavour, (then) thought (of having achieved the end of human endeavour[2]. [62]

The result of *aikyasākṣātkāra* above is stated.
[1]The words *atha*, *tataḥ* can be replaced by *yat*, *tat* respectively.
[2]Read SP: (*amanyata*) *ātmānaṃ kṛtārtham.*

देहेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिभावाभावादिसाक्षिणम् ।
प्रत्यञ्चं मदिति प्राह तद्दृष्ट्या नेक्षते द्वयम् ॥६३॥

Virāj declared in the sentence *mad* ... that the inner self, who is the witness of the origin and the loss of the body, sense-organs, *manas* and the intellect, is (not different) from himself. (And) on account of that sight (i.e. knowledge), he does not see duality (*dvaya*)[1]. [63]

The meaning of *yat mad anyan nāsti* 'since there is nothing else than myself,' is stated in the first three *pādā*s. The last *pāda* conveys the fruit of the knowledge of the meaning of the word *mat*.
[1]It literally means: pair, i.e. himself as the seer and another thing as the object of seeing.

प्रतीच्येव यदेहात्मा प्रत्यगात्मानमीक्षते ।
अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां ब्रह्मास्मीति तदेक्षते ॥६४॥

When a person[1] here[2] sees himself (i.e. the individual self) in his inner self by the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka, he comes to think 'I am Brahman.'. [64]

[1]The word *ātman* refers to one who is eligible for the knowledge of Truth.

[2]That is, in his pursuit of the knowledge of the truth.

प्रत्यग्दृष्ट्या तदज्ञानतज्जं नैवेक्षते स्वतः ।
ब्रह्मप्रतीचोरैकात्म्यात्तद्दूरीकृत्य गर्जति ॥६५॥

By the sight of the inner self[1] he does not at all see in himself any ignorance about that and the result thereof; on account of the oneness of the Brahman and the inner self, he drives it (ignorance) away and speaks aloud ('I am Brahman.'). [65]

The purport of *kasmān nu bibhemi* 'what am I afraid of?' is thus stated.

[1]That is, on acquiring the knowledge of the true nature of it.

प्रत्यक्तां मदिति प्राह त्वन्यन्नास्तीति चैकताम् ।
कस्मादिति च हेतूक्तिर्भीत्याचिक्षिप्सया परम् ॥६६॥

(Prajāpati declared in the words) 'from me' (originates) 'characteristic as the inner self' and[1] (in the words) 'there is nothing else', the uniqueness (of himself). Further, in the word 'on what account', (he made) a statement of reason — with a wish to avert any fear. [66]

This explains the sentence *mad anyan nāsti.*

[1] *tu = ca.*

प्रत्यक्ता ब्रह्मणो यस्माद्ब्रह्मता चात्मनः स्वतः ।
एवं सति कुतो मे भीरिति विद्वांस्त्रपायते ॥६७॥

Since the characteristic of the inner self (originates) from the Brahman and the characteristic of the Brahman (only) from itself, therefore, i.e. such being the case, the knower (Prajāpati himself) feels ashamed at the thought, 'whence can there be my fear?'. [67]

ब्रह्मविद्यामृते नान्यद्भयहेतुविनाशकृत् ।
संभाव्यमिति नः प्राह तत एवेति च श्रुतिः ॥६८॥

And[1] the Śruti has thus declared to us in the words, *tata eva* ... that anything else than the knowledge of the Brahman could not be considered as a (possible) destroyer of the cause of fear. [68]

Here is clarified *tata evāsya bhayaṃ vīyāya*.

[1]SP understands *ca* as implying the *anubhava* of the learned but NKL adds the Smṛti (*Gītā* 18.12) to this effect: *aniṣṭam iṣṭaṃ miśrañ ca trividhaṃ karmaṇaḥ phalam*— this latter is somewhat difficult to explain.

प्रत्यगज्ञानमेवैकं भीतिहेतुर्भवेद्यदि ।
तत एवेति वचनं तदेवं स्यात्समञ्जसम् ॥६९॥

The statement *tata eva* ... would thus be reasonable, if only ignorance (about the true nature) of the inner self is the sole cause of fear. [69]

कस्माद्ध्यभेष्यदिति च पूर्वोक्तार्थसमर्थनम् ।
श्रुत्याकारि कुतो भीतिर्ध्वस्ताज्ञानतदुद्भवे ॥७०॥

The Śruti has justified the earlier stated purport in the words 'Of what indeed was he afraid?',[1] (since there would have been a doubt:) whence could there be fear,[2] when ignorance and its effect were destroyed?'. [70]

[1]*kasmād dhy abheṣyat* is justified by *tata eva*; thus there is no repetition— it is merely a reaffirmation.

[2]SP adds 'in the case of a knower of the Brahman (or, of the true nature of the inner self)'.

प्रजापतेराविरभूत्कुत एकत्वदर्शनम् ।
शास्त्राचार्यादितद्धेतोरसत्त्वात्तदसंभवः ॥७१॥

[Verses 71-76 put a possible objection with various reasons that the knowledge of the truth cannot dawn on Prajāpati.]

How could (there come to Prajāpati) the awareness of the uniqueness, for it would be impossible in the absence of the cause of it (viz. that awareness) such as scriptures, teacher etc.[1] [71]

It has been so far stated that the fear is destroyed by the knowledge of the oneness of Prajāpati and the Brahman. Yet, the objector says that the knowledge does not dawn on Prajāpati, for there is no cause of it.

[1]The word etc. refers to renunciation, *śamadamādi.*

अन्यानपेक्षं तदभूदिति चेन्नैवमिष्यते ।
अस्मदादेरपि तथा प्रसङ्गः स्यान्न चेक्ष्यते ॥७२॥

If it be held that (the awareness) resulted without an expectation of any other (factor), this is not acceptable, for such an awareness would then result in the case of us all; and it is not so held (by anyone). [72]

A possibe view could be thus: The knowledge of Prajāpati does not depend on any other factor, viz. Śruti, teacher etc. But it does not sustain, since the knowledge of the truth is held as arising from hearing the Śruti; only for this reason, it is differentiated from our ordinary knowledge.

मतं जन्मान्तराभ्याससंस्कारोत्थमिदं यदि ।
नैरर्थक्यप्रसक्तिः स्यात्सम्यग्ज्ञानस्य सर्वतः ॥७३॥

And if it be accepted that this awareness has arisen from the impression of repeated thought about it in the previous life[1], there would result total uselessness of the proper knowledge[2]. [73]

[1]The opponent's argument could be: A sacrificer rises to the state of Prajāpati and becomes aware of the uniqueness of his own. This is the effect of the impression of hearing the Śruti etc. in his previous life while he was a sacrificer.

[2]Namely, knowledge arising from hearing the Śruti sentence etc.

in the case of all, for that would mean this knowledge does not produce its immediate effect, viz. removal of ignorance and consequent liberation.

दग्धाशेषान्तरायस्य विराजो ऽपि महत्तमः ।
नाधाक्षीदात्मविद्या नः काशाविद्यापनुत्तये ॥७४॥

If even in the case of Virāj who had consumed all the obstructions (to the knowledge of the true nature of the Ātman), the lore of Ātman did not burn away the great darkness, what hope[1] (could we entertain) for the removal of ignorance? [74]

This entails the uselessness of *vākyārthajñāna*.
[1]That is, certainty.

अन्त्य एव तमोघाती प्रत्ययश्चेन्मतं यदि ।
स्यादनैकान्तिको हेतुरन्यान्त्येष्वसमीक्षणात् ॥७५॥

If only the final knowledge (or experience) is held to be the destroyer of darkness, this cause would lead to diverse conclusions since it is not noticed in other final (experiences). [75]

If what occurs to one as the final knowledge is alone held responsible for liberation, then any knowledge which occurs to one finally would be *mokṣaphalada* (that which brings about the fruit of liberation); but this is not so. Liberation has not resulted in the case of the sacrificer from the final experience of his previous life. Thus *antyatva* in *antyajñāna* is *anaikāntikahetu*, i.e. it would lead to diverse effects, not to some one definite effect.

नान्त्यो ऽविद्यापनुद्बोध इति सर्वत्र गम्यताम् ।
ऐकात्म्यवस्तुबोधित्वादुपान्त्यप्रत्ययो यथा ॥७६॥

Let it be noted everywhere that the final knowledge (at the end of one's endeavour) is not the remover of ignorance, exactly in the same way as its previous knowledge; also the final

knowledge, being informative of the uniqueness of the thing (viz. Ātman), (cannot be the remover of ignorance in the same way as its previous knowledge). [76]

While verse 75 has refuted *antyapratyaya* as the remover of ignorance, thanks to its finality, this verse refutes its *jñānatva* to be the remover of ignorance, that knowledge (*jñāna*) of the last moment cannot be the cause of liberation, for it is similar to its other previous knowledges which, as knowledge, have not resulted into liberation.

Verses 77-90 are Sureśvara's answer to the objection.

स्याद्वा सत्साधनोत्पत्तेर्लोकवज्ज्ञानमात्मनः ।
यथेह कार्यकरणैः पुण्यकर्मोद्भवैर्नृणाम् ॥७७॥
प्रज्ञा मेधा स्मृतिः स्थैर्यं ज्ञानादाववसीयते ।
वैशारद्यं तथैव स्याद्विराजो ऽपि महाधियः ॥७८॥

(This is to the contrary:)[1] There might be the knowledge of the Ātman due to the rise of good means, as (is noticed) in the world; as in the case of men, intelligence, power of grasping, memory, firmness and clarity culminate into knowledge etc. through the instruments of action which have originated from (earlier) holy acts, so also (would they be) in the case of the highly intelligent Virāj. [77-78]

The first line of verse 77 is explained in the following three lines (viz. the second line of verse 77 and verse 78). The first line of verse 77 refutes the objector's view that there does not arise any knowledge on the part of Prajāpati.

[1] *vā* is *pakṣavyāvṛttyartha* (cf. SP).

ज्ञानमप्रतिघं यस्य वैराग्यं च जगत्पतेः ।
ऐश्वर्यं चैव धर्मश्च सहसिद्धमिति स्मृतिः ॥७९॥

Thus it is stated in a Smṛti[1] 'In the case of the Lord of the world, (the four, viz.) *vairāgya*, *aiśvarya*, *dharma* and unbounded (or, unobstructed) knowledge are born together

with him.' [79]

Here is a citation to prove the clarity of Prajāpati's knowledge. Prajāpati and his knowledge etc. co-exist.

[1]Though Sureśvara calls it, it is *Vāyuprāṇa* 1.1.3: *jñānam ... dharmaśca siddhicatṣṭayam* (*cp. also the same text 1.5.23-24*).

सहैव सिद्धं चेज्ज्ञानं भीतिहेतोरसंभवः ।
ध्वान्तापध्वंसिरविणा न तमः सह जायते ॥८०॥

If (one said that) knowledge is natural to (or inborn for) Prajāpati, (the situation would be:) There is no possibility of the rise of (any) fear, for darkness never comes into existence together with the sun that destroys darkness. [80]

If knowledge is already existing together with Prajāpati there cannot be any room for fear. The objection is based on the Smṛti (viz. Purāṇa) which declares the *sahasiddhatva* of ignorance, viz. there would be the contradiction of the Śruti *so 'bibhed* ... Cf. *Raghuvaṃśa* 5.13: *sūrye tapaty āvaraṇāya dṛṣṭeḥ kalpeta lokasya katham tamisrā.*

नैवमन्योपदेशार्थप्रतिषेधपरत्वतः ।
सहसिद्धगिरस्तस्मान्नैष दोषः प्रसज्यते ॥८१॥

This is not so since the statement about the natural origination of Prajāpati's knowledge is intent (only) on denying the (possibility of) instruction by any other person (to him); therefore, this fault[1] does not become contingent. [81]

The intention of the description in the Smṛti about the *sahasiddhatva* of Prajāpati's knowledge is properly explained (by the Siddhāntin); he holds that the Smṛti also is as much authoritative and purposeful as the Śruti. Thus, he nullifies the supposed contradiction of the Śruti and the Smṛti.

श्रद्धातात्पर्यशुश्रूषाप्रणिपातादि साधनम् ।
विद्याजन्मैकहेतूनां वैफल्यं चेन्न तद्यतः ॥८२॥
गुणवद्दोषवद्रूपविकल्पितसमुच्चितम् ।

विद्याजन्मैकहेतुत्वाल्लोकवत्स्यात्समञ्जसम् ॥८३॥

If (one said:) Faith being devoted (to the teacher), desire to hear (from the teacher), salutation (to him) etc.[1] are the means (and therefore) there is uselessness of various (productive) causes (that are adduced as) giving rise to knowledge; (we say:) That is not so, because — [82]
the entire combination (of the means) made up of what has merit, what has demerit and what is understood (lit. imagined) by its form is reasonable, as in the common world, for it gives rise only to knowledge.[2] [83]

Verse 82 implies opposition to Śāstras, e.g. *gurum evābhigacchet, tad viddhi praṇipātena* ... as the basis of the objection to be discussed.

[1]The word etc. refers to *śama* and others, viz. *śamadamādi-sādhanasampat*.

[2] *vidyā = vijñāna* 'common knowledge'. This conveys the usefulness of instruction in the practical life; that is the purpose of *gurūpadeśa*.

रूपादिज्ञानसंभूतौ तद्धेतूनामनेकधा ।
विकल्पो दृश्यते लोके तथेहापीति निश्चितिः ॥८४॥

For the rise of the knowledge of form etc. there is noticed in the world variety (lit. numerous divisions) of causes of it (viz. knowledge of form etc.) So also (it is noticed) here (in the case of the knowledge of the uniqueness); this is the decision. [84]

The word *lokavat* in the previous verse is clarified here.

गुणवद्दोषवत्त्वं च तथैव च समुच्चयः ।
प्रबोधोत्पत्तिहेतूनां दृष्टो बोधादिकार्यकृत् ॥८५॥

It is noticed that in the case of the causes for the rise of the knowledge (of the uniqueness of the Ātman) there is merit, fault and (also) combination of them[1] which are the causes of the rise of the knowledge[2] etc. [85]

Not only *vikalpa* (stated in the preceding verse) but *guṇavattvādika* are seen (NKL).

[1]This refers to *śraddhā*, *tātparya* etc. mentioned in verse 82 above.

[2]*rūpādidhīkāryānurodhī ca samuccayādiḥ* (SP); i.e. the word *ādi* means: behaviour (*vyavahāra*).

वृषदंशादयो रात्रौ नेत्रगोचरसंगति-
मात्रेण रूपं वीक्षन्ते नापेक्षन्ते ततो ऽपरम् ॥८६॥

A cat etc. do see the form (of an object) during night by mere contact of that which falls in sight.[1] They do not expect any (means) other than that. [86]

This has a reference to *vikalpa* mentioned in verse 84. SP refers it to the option regarding the performance of a *homa* before or after sunrise.

[1]This is based on the experience of the cats' catching mice etc. even in the dark of the night. The cat stands for other beings who are active in the night. Not a properly scientific reason!

अतीतानागताद्यर्थज्ञानोत्पत्तौ च हेतुताम् ।
योगिनां मन एव स्यादस्माकं सर्व एव तु ॥८७॥

In the case of the Yogins it is *manas* that becomes the cause for the rise of the knowledge of the objects of the past, the future etc.; but in our case, all (viz. the combination of all the means of knowing is the cause). [87]

vikalpa 'variety (or, numerous divisions)' in the above discussion is clarified by reference to the Yogins as against common men.

दोषवद्गुणवत्त्वेन विकल्पो ऽनेकधा पुनः ।
मातृमानप्रमेयाणां गुणवद्दोषवत्त्वतः ॥८८॥

Variety is multifold on account of (the common knowers) being possessed of merit, demerit etc. and also on account of the knower, the means of knowing, the object of knowing being

possessed of excellence and fault. [88]

Yet further explanation is offered of *vikalpa*. NKL explains merit etc. of *mātṛ*, *māna* and *meya*.

नातिक्रान्तभवे त्वासीद्ब्रह्मविद्या प्रजापतेः ।
इत्येतद्गम्यते ऽविद्याभयारत्यादिमत्त्वतः ॥८९॥

Indeed, Prajāpati did not have the knowledge of the Brahman in his past life — this is inferred from his being possessed of ignorance, fear, want of delight etc.[1] [89]

When Prajāpati was a sacrificer (*yajamāna*), there was not on his part the knowledge of the true nature of the inner self (or the Brahman). This is clarified by citing the reason for it in the second line.

[1]The word etc. stands for hunger and the like.

विद्यायां चेन्न मोक्षो ऽभूत्कस्याशा नो वृथा भवेत् ।
मोक्षे भयश्रुतेर्नार्थस्तत्र को मोह इत्यतः ॥९०॥

If there did not result liberation (for one), after one acquired the knowledge of the true nature of the Brahman, whose hope (for it) would not be in vain? If there was heard (the existence of) fear[1] in (the state of) liberation, what would be the purpose (served by the Śruti) 'What ignorance (would) there (be) ...?'[2]? [90]

[1]NKL reads *mokṣe 'bhayaśruteḥ* ! Also, NKL's construe of the verse is difficult to follow.

[2] *Īśopaniṣad* 7.

The destruction of fear on the part of Virāj has resulted from the knowledge of its oneness with the Ātman. On the contrary, the objector holds that the destruction of fear in Virāj is caused by the knowledge of the uniqueness of itself. Now will follow the objection in verses 91 to 102 and the answer to it in verses 103

and 104.

एकाकिनो विराजो वाविद्यासंवीतचेतसः ।
पूर्वजन्मोत्थसंस्काराद्भयमाविरभूदिह ॥९१॥

(Or perhaps such is not the case:[1] Here) in the case of the lonely Virāj,[2] whose mind was wrapped (lit. woven) with ignorance, there arose fear on account of the impression arising (i.e. continuing) from (its) previous life. [91]

Firstly, the objector states the purpose of *so 'bibhet.*

[1]The word *vā* is there to object to Sureśvara's view and to declare the beginning of an objection.

[2]That is, which existed without the manifestation (of any second object).

भयप्रध्वंसिनं हेतुमीक्षांचक्रे ऽथ जातभीः ।
मत्तो यन्नान्यदस्तीति ह्यथ कस्माद्बिभेम्यहम् ॥९२॥

He, who was overcome with fear, thought over the cause which would destroy (his) fear, (viz. thus expressed in the sentence:) 'Since there is nothing else than myself, what then I am afraid of?' [92]

The first line states the meaning of *sa hāyam* etc. and the second line states that of *yan mad anyan nāsti.*

एक एवाहमस्मीह द्वितीयाद्धि भयोत्थितिः ।
द्वितीयो न मदन्यो ऽस्ति कस्माद्धेतोर्भयं मम ॥९३॥

Here (i.e. in this world) I am the only one. (And) there (can be) the rise of fear (only) due to the existence of some second (person). A second person other than myself does not exist. Therefore,[1] what should I be afraid of? [93]

This is the paraphrase of the thought in the second line of verse 92 above.

[1]This is for *iti* which is explained by SP as *īkṣāsamāptyartha.*

तत एव विराडैक्यविज्ञानादेव तद्भयम् ।
वीयाय न परज्ञानादतो ऽरतिरपीष्यते ॥९४॥

Only from that, i.e. by means of the knowledge of (his own) uniqueness, Virāj overcame that fear, not by means of the knowledge (the non-existence)[1] of another apart (from himself). Therefore, (his) want of delight is also understood (i.e. expressed). [94]

The meaning of *tata evāsya* ... is stated.
[1]This can also mean the highest, i.e. Ātman = Paramātman.

एकाक्यस्मीतिविज्ञानात्त्रैलोक्यात्मैकगोचरात् ।
अगाद्भयं यतो ऽतो ऽभूदरतिस्तस्य कामिनः ॥९५॥

Since he was afraid on account of that knowledge 'I am all alone.' which has within purview himself as the only object, in the three worlds; therefore, there was want of delight on the part of him, who had desire, [95]

The fear-removing knowledge of the oneness of Virāj with the Ātman might also remove his want of delight; yet it was not there! Only the feeling of loneliness caused the want of delight.

सम्यग्विज्ञानविध्वस्ताविद्यायाः कुतो ऽरतिः ।
ध्वस्तान्ध्यस्यापि सा चेत्स्यादनिर्मोक्षः प्रसज्यते ॥९६॥

(This was so because,) where could (at that time) be there the want of delight which would result from the destruction of (ignorance) by the right knowledge (viz. knowledge of the true nature of the Ātman)? And if it be said that (want of knowledge) was there even in the case of the one, whose darkness was destroyed, then it would be contingent that there is no liberation ! [96]

This verse answers a possible doubt that there can be want of delight on the part of Prajāpati owing to his not keeping from

sacrificial activity. That is to say, the knowledge of the oneness (cf. verse 94 above) does not remove Prajāpati's fear.

नाविद्याघातिविज्ञानाद्भयध्वस्तिरभूद्विभोः ।
अरत्युद्भूतिलिङ्गेन ह्ययमर्थो ऽवसीयते ॥९७॥

In the case of the all-pervading (Virāj), the removal of fear did not follow from the knowledge which destroyed (his) ignorance; indeed, this thought can be gathered from the characteristic, viz. the rise of the want of delight. [97]

It is concluded that the removal of the fear of Prajāpati does not result from *parajñāna*.

न चेहावसरो ऽस्त्यस्य सम्यगज्ञानस्य कश्चन ।
पिण्डसृष्टौ प्रवृत्तायां नाकस्माज्ज्ञानगीः शुभा ॥९८॥

Also, there is not any chance for (the rise of) of the right knowledge (of the true nature of the Ātman) whatsoever. When there has begun (the statement about) the creation of beings,[1] a sudden statement about the rise of knowledge is not welcome. [98]

The first line says that it is not the case that the removal of fear on the part of the Virāj has resulted from *parajñāna*. Then, the second line says that there is no scope for the statement of *parajñāna* when the matter of creation of Manu etc. is on hand.

[1]The argument pertains to avoidance of discontinuity of the topic (*prakaraṇaviccheda*)— this is thus clarified: *piṇḍaśabdena manvādideho gṛhyate*; *akasmāt prakaraṇavicchedaṃ viney arthaḥ* (SP).

प्रक्रियानुचितं वस्तु सुसाध्वपि समीरितम् ।
अकालकुसुमानीव नैव प्रीतिकरं सताम् ॥९९॥

Indeed, even an extremely well-expressed (idea) which is unsuitable in some (particular) process of thought [1] does not

bring delight to the good, (even) as untimely blossoming flowers (do not bring delight.) [99]

[1]That is, context.

[2]Sureśvara thus illustrates the thought of BUB: *viśiṣṭaphalam api paraikyajñānam avasaradustham viduṣām na hṛdayaṃgamam.*

मिथुनारतिमोहादेः प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यवेदिनः ।
आगमैस्तु निषिद्धत्वात्कुतस्तस्येह संभवः ॥१००॥

Since it has been denied by the Śrutis that, in the case of the knower of the true nature of the Ātman, there exists a couple (pair/duality), viz. want of delight and ignorance etc.[1], how can there be then the existence of that (i.e. of one who has desires etc.) here (in the state of Prajāpati/Virāj)?[2] [100]

[1]The word etc. stands for a second object, its characteristics and so on.

[2]That is, when there is the context of the origin of Prajāpati.

आत्मक्रीड आत्मरतिः क्रियावानिति चागमः ।
तथात्ममिथुन इति यस्त्वात्मरतिरित्यपि ॥१०१॥

And there is the Śruti statement 'He (viz. the knower of the real nature of the Ātman) plays with himself, takes delight in himself, and thus acts (alone); and also he is paired only with himself.'; so also there (the Śruti statement) *yas tv ātma-ratiḥ* ... [101]

कार्यकारणसंबन्धः साविद्यस्यैव युक्तिमान् ।
अपूर्वानपराद्युक्तैर्न ध्वस्तान्ध्यस्य युज्यते ॥१०२॥

The cause and effect relation can reasonably be spoken of in the case of only the one who is overpowered by ignorance. It is not mentioned (lit. employed) in the case of one whose darkness (viz. ignorance) is destroyed; (this is so,) on the basis of the statements (in the Śruti) about *apūrva*, *anapara* etc. [102]

There is another reason why it is said that the knowledge of Virāj is the destroyer of fear; but not *parajñāna* (is the destroyer of it).

अप्युत्पन्नात्मबोधानामधिकारासमाप्तितः ।
अरत्यादि यथा दृष्टं तथैव स्यात्प्रजापतेः ॥१०३॥
अप्रविष्टस्वभावस्य सशब्देन परिग्रहात् ।
स एष इत्यत्र वाक्ये नैवाकस्मिकशब्दनम् ॥१०४॥

[To the elaborately stated view of the objector, Sureśvara makes an answer in the following two verses.]

(The answer to this is:) The fact is that, as we see want of delight etc. in the case of those who have not acquired the knowledge of the Ātman up to the end of the period of their performing duties which are enjoined (on them), so also it is that it could be in the case of Prajāpati as well. [103]

Since in the sentence, *sa eṣa* ..., the word brings in (the idea of the Brahman) which has not entered into (i.e. undergone a change into) its own modification, there is thus not a sudden[1] mention (of the Brahman). [104]

SP points to Vaśiṣṭha and Vāmadeva and others who continued to perform their duties, even after attaining the knowledge of the Ātman.

There was a reference to 'untimely blossoming flowers' (verse 99); that meant untimely or uncalled-for discussion. This verse answers away that point. The Brahman, stated in *yan mad anyan nāsti*, intends to praise the Brahman. By the word *sa* of *sa eṣa iha praviṣṭaḥ* (1.4.7) there is praise of the Brahman. So also in *tad dheham* (1.4.7) — this is *prastutaparāmarśa* (*eva*) (NKL).

[1]It means: unreasonable.

असंतोषाक्षमाहेतोश्चेतसो या ऽनवस्थितिः ।
सा विध्वस्तात्ममोहस्याप्यरतिः संबभूव ह ॥१०५॥

[Verses 105-118 are Sureśvara's Vārtika on BU 1.4.3. The creation of Manu and human beings is explained.]

That unsteadiness of mind (of Virāj) which had its cause in the absence of satisfaction, the absence of forbearance, (in other words), the want of delight did[1] result in the case of him (Prajāpati) whose ignorance of the inner self was destroyed. [105]

The meaning of the word *arati* in the beginning of BU 1.4.3: *sa vai naiva reme* 'he did not feel pleasure at all' is explained.

[1]This is the force of *ha* which is *avadhāraṇārtha* (SP).

यतो ऽरतिग्रहग्रस्तधिषणो ऽभूत्प्रजापतिः ।
एकाकी तेन तत्सृष्टावेको न रमते नरः ॥१०६॥

Since Prajāpati had his intellect overpowered by (the clutches of) the evil being, viz. *arati* 'want of delight', a man[1] in his creation (also) does not feel delight when he is alone. [106]

This explains *tasmād ekākī na ramate*. Note NKL: *kāryagatam aramaṇaṃ kāraṇasthasya gamakam.*

[1]*naraśabdenāvidvān manuṣyatvādyabhimānavān ucyate* (SP).

श्रौत्यानया प्रसिद्ध्या तु कार्यलिङ्गैश्च कारणम् ।
सदानुमिन्वते सांख्यास्तथा चान्ये ऽपि वादिनः ॥१०७॥

The Sāṃkhyas (even) infer (the existence of Puruṣa or Prajāpati) the cause from the characteristics of the effect and also from this well known statement of the Śruti. And the propounders of different views also[1] (infer) in the same way. [107]

In verse 106, it is said that *arati* found in the effect is derived from that which had occurred in the cause. Such a view is held by others (i.e. the Sāṃkhyas and the Naiyāyikas etc.) who hold that the cause is inferred from its characteristics persisting in its

effects.

[1]The word 'also' refers to the thinkers who do not hold *svabhāvavāda* in respect of creation (SP). This is, according to the Vedāntin, *bhrānti* 'wrong understanding' (NKL).

अरत्यपनुनुत्सुः सन्स द्वितीयं यथारुचि ।
विराडैच्छदृते ऽविद्यां नेच्छेशस्योपपद्यते ॥१०८॥

Virāj, who was desirous of driving away the want of delight, wished for (some) second according to his choice; (for) indeed, without ignorance, a desire cannot be (considered as) reasonable on the part of that Lord. [108]

Here is stated the meaning of *sa dvitīyam aicchat*. It is before the rise of the knowledge of the Ātman that the ignorant has any desire.

सो ऽरत्यतिग्रहाविष्टस्तदपध्वस्तये विराट् ।
संसक्तजायापुंमानो यावांस्तावान्बभूव ह ॥१०९॥

That Virāj, who was overpowered by the evil being (in the form) of the want of delight became possessed of that measure which a man and wife together in union (are known to have) in order that the want of delight be destroyed. [109]

This explains *sa haitāvānāsa*.

स्त्रीपुमांसौ परिष्वक्तौ यावन्मानौ बभूवतुः ।
स तावत्परिमाणो ऽभूद्योगेन परमेश्वरः ॥११०॥

By his Yogic power[1] that highest Lord became possessed of that measure which a man and wife have, when engaged in union. [110]

This explains *yathā strīpumaṃsau saṃpariṣvaktau*. The NKL edition reads *strīpuṃsau sampariṣvaktau*.

[1]The word *yoga* is explained in SP: *dhyānakarmatadvāsanāsahitasaṃkalpasāmarthya*; in NKL: *upāsanakarmasāmarthya*.

इच्छामात्रमरत्युत्थं पुंस्यलब्धस्थिति स्त्रियम् ।
प्रयुङ्क्ते योग्यतस्तस्यास्तदलब्धेवारतिः प्रभोः ॥१११॥

Mere desire, which has arisen from the want of delight, does not find (its fulfilment) in a man and, then, employs a woman because of her suitability (for effecting the fulfilment); therefore, there was want of delight on the part of the Lord when (i.e. since) he did not find that (viz. woman). [111]

An answer is given to the possible question: How is it possible to say he wished for a woman on the basis of the Śruti 'He wished to have a second one.'? Also, how is there the example of a woman?

उपस्थिते च मनसि तस्य योषिदभूत्क्रतोः ।
सत्यसंकल्पहेतोः स स्त्रीसक्त इव चाभवत् ॥११२॥

When (such a desire) appeared in his mind, there appeared (i.e. came out) a woman from the very thought of him whose thought (i.e. desire) always proves (i.e. shows to be) true and he became attached to the woman, as it were[1]. [112]

An argument can be made thus: There is the removal of the want of delight due to the contact with a woman — then why is not mentioned the birth of a woman? The first line answers it. The second line then states the reason, viz. the ever coming true of Prajāpati's desire. Therefore, after a woman was born from his mind, he has attachment towards her, as seen in the world.

[1]The words *strīsakta iva* can be alternatively translated as 'like one attached to a woman'.

मिथुनद्वारिका यास्य सृष्टिः सैवाधुनोच्यते ।
यतो ऽसाविममेवाथ द्विधात्मानमपातयत् ॥११३॥

Now is described that creation of his which came through the creation of a couple, because that one later on made this body[1] itself into two. [113]

This explains *sa imam evātmānam dvedhāpātayat.*
[1] *ātmānam = ātmadeham.*

इममेवेत्यवधृतेर्न विराजो द्विधाभिधा ।
यः स्त्रीपुंस्परिमाणो ऽभूत्स एवातो द्विधाकृतः ॥११४॥

Since there is the assertion *imam eva*, there is no mention of Virāj as divided into two.[1] And what was his modification in the form of woman and man itself became his division into two.
[114]

In the case of the act of parting into two, a single Virāj being the *kartṛ* 'agent' cannot have the nature of both *kartṛ* and *karman* 'object'. Hence, in order to answer away that difficulty the first line points to his being the *kartṛ* and the second line to the *piṇḍa* (viz. body — cf. the preceding verse) as the *karman*; and, therefore, there is no contradiction involved therein. This is the purpose of *sa imam eva dvidhā (ātmānam) apātayat.*
[1] That is (i) Virāj as he was born and (ii) Virāj who assumed the form of a couple in union (as referred to above in verse 110).

पातनादेव निर्वृत्तेः पतिपत्न्यौ जगत्यपि ।
योषिद्विदलवद्भाति पुंसः शक्त्यादिभागवत् ॥११५॥

Because there was the creation of man and woman from the division (of Virāj), therefore, in this world a husband and a wife (come into existence as two persons); (and) the woman appears as a part divided from the man like two parts of a shell etc.[1]
[115]

This is the meaning of the word *tataḥ* in BU 1.3.4.
[1] The word etc. refers to a bamboo and the like.

स्त्र्याकाङ्क्षो हि तु भागो ऽयं पुमाकाशस्ततः स्त्रिया ।
सम्यगापूर्यते व्योम शुक्तिसंपुटवद्ध्रुवम् ॥११६॥

This part of (Virāj) is indeed desirous of a woman and therefore it[1] is satisfactorily filled by a woman like the hallow

of a shell. [116]

This explains *tasmād ayam ākāśaḥ* in BU 1.3.4.
[1]The word *vyoman* means *pumākāśa* (NKL).

विराजमसृजद्ब्रह्मा सो ऽसृजत्पुरुषं विराट् ।
पुरुषं तं मनुं विद्धि यस्येयं मानवी प्रजा ॥११७॥

The Brahman created Virāj (and) that Virāj created a man. You should know that man to be Manu from whom[1] has proceeded this creation of human beings. [117]

In *dvedhā 'pātayat* it is intended to say that there was the creation of Manu and Śatarūpa. One should not doubt that the creation of them was not mentioned (*anukta*).
[1]Translation follows the reading in the AnSS edition, viz. *yasyeyam*. The NKL edition reads instead: *kasyeyam mānavī prajā* (to be translated as) 'The human race is (thus) the offspring of Prajāpati(= Ka)'.

तां स्त्रियं मैथुनेनाथ मनुः समभवत्तदा ।
स्वकर्मीभिर्नियुक्तः संस्तथा चोत्पाद्य कर्मीभिः ॥११८॥

Then[1] Manu united with that woman in a sexual intercourse, enjoined as he was in (the performance of) his own duties and also having created (offsprings) as his duties[1]. [118]

This explains *tāṃ samabhavat, tato manuṣyā ajāyanta* in BU 1.4.3.
[1]The word *atha* means: when Manu was together with Śatarūpa, i.e. after Prajāpati made himself into two: Manu and Śatarūpa.
[2]To tell the truth, we are not sure of our translation of *tathā cotpādya karmabhiḥ*.

भूरिजात्यभिसंबन्धो जन्यकर्मवशात्स्त्रियाः ।
मनोश्चैवं ससर्जेदमापिपीलिकमात्मनः ॥११९॥

[Verses 119 and 120 briefly state the meaning of BU 1.4.4.]

There is the connection of a woman as also of Manu with various species on account of the action(s) to be produced. Thus he (Virāj) created from himself this (world) up to an ant. [119]

The intention of *sā gauḥ* is thus brought out. And *evam ... ātmanaḥ* states the meaning of *evam eva yad idaṃ kiṃ ca mithunam ā pipīlikābhyaḥ tat sarvam asṛjata.*

द्वंद्वयुक्तं जगत्यस्मिन्यावत्किंचित्समीक्ष्यते ।
तदस्राक्षीन्मनुः सर्वं स्त्रीपुंद्वंद्वप्रयोगतः ॥१२०॥

Whatever is seen in this world as made up of pairs, all that has Manu created by employing the pair of man and woman. [120]

This explains the contents of the preceding verse. The creation of a cow etc. as said above is alone not meant. The creation of man and woman also is intended.

मनोः सशतरूपस्य पिण्डसृष्टिरिहोदिता ।
सोमाग्नीन्द्रादिका यापि साप्युक्तवदपेक्ष्य सः ॥१२१॥

[Verses 121-124 are the explanation of BU 1.4.5.]

Here is mentioned the creation of all beings (of this world) from (lit. of) Manu, who was united with Śatarūpa, (that creation) beginning with Soma, Agni, Indra etc.; (for) he (created) that also, having thought about it (in the manner) already stated. [121]

जगत्सृष्ट्वात्मनः साक्षाज्ज्ञानकर्मादिसाधनः ।
अवेत्सृष्टं जगत्स्रष्टा ह्यहं वावाखिलं जगत् ॥१२२॥

He (Manu/Virāj), who was possessed of the means (of creation), viz. knowledge and action, created the world from himself. He (fully) knew the world that was created and (thought to himself) I, the creator, am indeed (this) entire world. [122]

This explains *so 'vet ... sarvam asṛkṣīti.*

अहं वाव जगत्सृष्टं यतो ऽसृक्ष्यहमेव तत् ।
सृष्टिनामा मनुर्जात एतस्मादेव कारणात् ॥१२३॥

Indeed I am this world which is created, since I myself have created that. For this very reason, Manu became known by the name *sṛṣṭi.* [123]

This explains *tataḥ sṛṣṭiḥ abhavat.*

यथा मनुरिदं सृष्टमहमस्मीत्यबुध्यत ।
एवमन्यो ऽपि यो वेद सृष्टिकृत्स्यादसावपि ॥१२४॥

As Manu knew 'I am all this creation.', similarly would another person also, who (thus) knew, be the creator of (some) creation. [124]

This explains *sṛṣṭyām ...*, i.e. *phalavacanaśruti.*

BU 1.4.6 is to be explained hereafter. Verses 125-142 are the explanation of the creation of favouring fire etc.

सृष्टानामथ भूतानामग्न्यादिप्रमुखा इमाः ।
अनुग्रहीत्रीर्वक्ष्यामीत्यतः प्रववृते श्रुतिः ॥१२५॥

And then proceeded the Śruti (statement) 'I shall describe these helpful ones, viz. Agni etc. who are the principal (deities and) would be helping (the created beings).' [125]

The first line conveys the meaning of *athety abhyamanthat ... antataḥ.*

भेदादधिकृतेरेषामग्न्यादीनामनेकधा ।
भेदो वर्णेषु सर्वेषु ब्रह्मक्षत्रादिलक्षणः ॥१२६॥

Since in the case of Agni and others there is various distinction in respect of their fields of activity enjoined on them, therefore, in the case of them also, there is differentiation into all castes characterized as Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya etc. [126]

We see here the mythological trends: Gods also have among them division as the human beings have among themselves, viz. Brāhmaṇa etc. SP and NKL refer to Śākalya Brāhmaṇa as a pointer to this.

अनुग्राहकदेवानां सर्गोऽयं प्रस्तुतो महान् ।
तत्राग्नेरुदितोत्पत्तिर्न त्विन्द्रादेरिहोच्यते ॥१२७॥

This extensive creation of the favouring deities is begun (i.e. introduced) here. In that, the origin of Agni is stated, but (that) of Indra etc. is not so expressed. [127]

The creation of Indra etc. is not stated in that Śruti passage. The intention for so doing is stated in the next verse.

अविद्याधिकृतौ तेषां सृष्टिरूर्ध्वं प्रवक्ष्यते ।
कर्माधिकृतिसंबन्धप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमेव तु ॥१२८॥

Creation of them will be stated later at the time of enjoining some ritual activity (influenced by) ignorance (and that will be) in order to convey their relation to the injunction of action. [128]

Gods are subordinate to action which is of the nature of ignorance, therefore, some information about them is necessary for the performance of their action; they are not so related to knowledge.

तं सर्गमुक्तवत्सर्वमपेक्ष्येहोपसंहृतिः ।
अविद्वद्देवताभित्तिप्रतिषेधाय सांप्रतम् ॥१२९॥

Having kept in view that creation as the one stated (before)

there is here the conclusion (of the *kaṇḍikā* in the Śruti). It is proper (to have it there) for denying the notions of the not-knowing about the deities. [129]

An objection could be: If it is intended to state the creation of Indra etc., the concluding statement *eṣa u hy eva sarve devāḥ* would not be proper. The first line is an answer, viz. the Śruti statement *tad yad idam āhuḥ ... eṣa u hy eva sarve devāḥ* intends to deny multiplicity of gods — rather, it asserts the existence of only one deity in various forms.

गुणोत्पत्तिक्रियारूपस्तुतिनामाद्युपाधिभिः ।
बिभित्सन्ति स्वतो ऽभिन्नां देवतां मूढदृष्ट्यः ॥१३०॥

Those, whose sight is blinded (i.e. who do not see), seek to differentiate (into multiplicity) the god, who is not differentiated (into many deities), by means of (a number of) limiting adjuncts, viz. quality, origin, activity, form, praise, name etc.[1] [130]

There is the differentiation of but one god into many gods due to various factors responsible for distinction such as *guṇabheda* in *agnaye pāvakāya*, *agnaye śucaye* etc.; cf. SP: *karmabhedavat tad-antarbhūtadevatābhedaḥ*.

[1]The word etc. refers to some particular attribute, repetition etc.

यदिदं कर्मिणः प्राहुः कर्मभूमावमेधसः ।
अमुमग्निममुं सोमं यजेति यजिसंश्रवात् ॥१३१॥

What the ritualists, the ignorant ones,[1] have said in relation to ritual, viz. 'Offer to this Agni, to this Soma etc.', is on account of their resorting to the action of ritual or to the use of the verb root √*yaj*. [131]

The words *amuṃ yaja amuṃ yaja* are explained.

[1]They are ignorant about the real nature of one god or the highest Ātman.

यजेति लिङ्गान्निन्दैषा कर्मिणामेव गम्यते ।
न तु विध्वस्तमोहानां प्रत्यङ्मात्रैकशायिनाम् ॥१३२॥

It is understood from the characteristic word *yaja*[1] that this is merely a censure of the ritualists,[2] but not of them who have their ignorance destroyed and thus rest only in the inner self. [132]

[1]This stands for *amum agniṃ yaja, amum indraṃ yaja.*
[2]Because they understand the Ātman as otherwise, viz. differentiated in multiplicity of gods; cf. SP's reference to the Smṛti passage *yo 'nyathā santam ātmānam ...* (*Mahābhārata* 1.68.26).

यस्त्वात्मरतिरेव स्यादात्मतृप्तश्च मानतः ।
आत्मन्येव च संतुष्टस्तस्य कार्यं न विद्यते ॥१३३॥

But there is nothing to be done by that man, who would take delight in himself[1], who would be pleased in himself, and who would be satisfied with himself.[2] [133]

[1]The word 'himself' stands for the inner self which is not different from the Ātman (Supreme Self).
[2]This is a citation from *Gītā* 3.17. SP points out that this verse follows another, viz. *na hi kaścit kṣaṇam api ...* which could be misunderstood as a censure of those who possess knowledge about the Ātman.

उत्पन्नैकात्म्ययाथात्म्यभास्वद्विज्ञानभास्कर-
संप्लुष्टाविद्याबहुलतमसां कर्मनिह्नुतिम् ॥१३४॥
सर्वकर्माधिकाराणां निषेधं प्रत्यपीपदत् ।
पुराणः शाश्वतो विष्णुः प्रपन्नाय किरीटिने ॥१३५॥

The Lord, the ancient eternal Viṣṇu, declared to Arjuna the absence of action in the case of them whose thick darkness of ignorance is fully removed (lit. burnt) by the bright sun of knowledge whereby the awareness of the uniqueness, viz. of the true nature, has arisen and the complete denial of

all action and injunctions[1]. [134-135]

One would ojbect: In the *Gītā* passage cited in the previous verse, it is said that there is no action in the case of the liberated, but such is not the case with a knower. To this, these two verses are an answer; they bring out the purport of the *Gītā* passage.

[1]This indicates the various qualifications of a sacrificer.

मिथो भिन्नं यदाहुस्त एकैकं देवमध्वरे ।
तदसत्प्रतिपत्तव्यं यतो ऽभिन्नैव देवता ॥१३६॥

It should be taken as untrue (i.e. wrong) that they have described each of the deities of the sacrifices as different from another, since that deity is (in reality) not distinct (from the one divinity).[1] [136]

This explains *tan na* in BUB. This has a reference to *yad idaṃ karmiṇaḥ* ... in verse 131 above.

[1]The basis for this argument is: *viśvam bhūtam bhuvanaṃ citraṃ bahudhā jātaṃ jāyamānaṃ ca yat sarvo hyeṣa rudraḥ* (*Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* 10.16.1) and *ātmaiva devatāḥ sarvāḥ* ... (*Manusmṛti* 12.119 (SP).

भेदग्राहि न नो मानं घटादावपि विद्यते ।
किमु निःशेषभिन्नार्थव्यापिन्यात्मन्यसौ मयि ॥१३७॥

In the case of even a pitcher etc., we do not have such an authoritative means of knowing as grasps its distinction from another. How then can there be that in the case of the Ātman which pervades all the (so-called) different entities? That one (viz. Ātman) exists in me, (thus does one understand). [137]

The question is: There is difference in the individual selves in different bodies, how then could it be said that there is oneness of deities? There is no differentiation in the case of individual selves that could ever be grasped, since there is no authoritative means for grasping it.

नाभावरादिवद्विश्वमध्यात्मादिभागवत् ।
ओतप्रोतात्मना तस्थौ विराट्सूत्रादिवस्तुषु ॥१३८॥

As the spokes (of a wheel) etc. rest in the hub (of it), so also does (this world) which comprises division into bodily forms etc. remain in the things (lit. the existents), viz. Virāj, Sūtra etc., that run through it as woven length-wise and cross-wise. [138]

The Śruti alone can be the authority for accepting the absence of differentiation; here the Śruti intended is: *tad yathā arā nābhau samarpitāḥ* (Cp. BU 2.5.15; CU 7.15.1; *Kauṣītakyupaniṣad* 3.8).

विविधास्यैव सा सृष्टिरिति हेतुसमीरणम् ।
कारणं न विहायेह कार्यमन्यत्र वर्तते ॥१३९॥

There is a statement of a cause, viz. the varied creation is his; for here an effect does not exist apart from (lit. leaving) its cause. [139]

There is the assertion which explains the non-distinction of the deities: *eṣa u hy eva sarve devāḥ*. Here is stated a reason for this.

यत एवमतो देवाः सर्वे ऽपि स्युः प्रजापतिः ।
तस्यां तस्यामधिकृतौ तत्तद्रूपं प्रपद्यते ॥१४०॥

Since this is so, all the gods also are (lit. would be) only Prajāpati[1], (and) in respect of each injunction, (Prajāpati) assumes a different form[2]. [140]

[1]This is the sentence of assertion (*pratijñānāvākya*).

[2]All the world of gods in various forms is the effect of Prajāpati, i.e. not different from him — this clarifies the assertion.

एक एव तु विश्वात्मा मायया मोहयञ्जगत् ।
एकतां बहुतामेति कुम्भवन्मणिसंश्रयात् ॥१४१॥

Indeed one single Ātman (resting) in all, causing by his own power a sense of wonder in the (whole) world (remains) single or becomes many in the same was as a pitcher (appears one or many) by resorting to[1] some jewel. [141]

When Prajāpati is in contact with the effect here and there he takes the forms of this or that, viz. Indra, Varuṇa etc.

[1]That is, reflecting itself in its various cuts.

अभिन्न एव भूतात्मा प्रतिभूतसमाश्रितः ।
एकधा बहुधा चैव दृश्यते जलचन्द्रवत् ॥१४२॥

The Ātman (of all beings)[1], not being distinct (from them), is (yet) seen as one or many as it has assumed the form of that (or those) being(s), in the same way as the moon in water (in different places).[2] [142]

[1]This is Virāj.

[2]NKL cites a similar verse of the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*:

eka evānubhūtātmā bhūte bhūte vyavasthitaḥ /
ekadhā bahudhā caiva dṛśyate jalacandravat //

[variant of first pāda = *eva hi bhūtātmā*] Not traced. But see in *Yaśastilakacampū*, vol.2, p.273, *line* 9 (by Somadevasūrī, <a Jain work of the 10th cent. A.D.> Kāvyamālā 70, 2 vols., Bombay: Nirnayasagar Press, 1903 & 1916)

अत्र विप्रतिपद्यन्ते तदन्यात्मनिषेधिनः ।
हिरण्यगर्भ एवात्मा यः परात्मेति गीयते ॥१४३॥
संसार्येवेह स इति तथान्ये ऽपि प्रचक्षते ।
पक्षयोरनयोः श्रेयान्कः पक्ष इति चिन्त्यते ॥१४४॥

[Verses 143-148 confirm the nature of Prajāpati who is said to be of the nature of all gods. Prajāpati is understood in two alternatives: (i)He is transmigratory *saṃsārin*), (ii)he is non-transmigratory (*asaṃsārin*).]

In this regard, (thinkers) who (want to) deny the (existence of any) other Ātman, hold different opinions: Hiraṇyagarbha

himself is the Ātman who is described (lit. sung) as the highest Ātman; so also others say that he is but a transmigratory (being). (Therefore) it is now considered as to which of these two views is better (i.e. acceptable). [143-144]

The first alternative occurs in second half of the first and the second lines of verse 143, and the second alternative in the first line of verse 144.

विरिञ्च एव तु परो मन्त्रब्राह्मणवाक्यतः ।
इन्द्रमित्यादिमन्त्रोक्तिरेष ब्रह्मेति च श्रुतिः ॥१४५॥

From the sentence in the Mantra Brāhmaṇa (it is indeed[1] known that) Viriñca himself is the highest (Ātman). The statement of the Mantra is *indram* ...and the Śruti *eṣa brahma*.[2] [145]

[1]This is for *tu*.

[2]These are the basis for the first alternative: Cf. *indram mitraṃ varuṇam agnim āhuḥ* (*Ṛgveda* 1.164.46) and *eṣa brahmaiṣa indra eṣa prajāpatir ete sarve devāḥ* (*Aitareyopaniṣad* 5.3), cited in BUB.

एतमेके वदन्त्यग्निं यो ऽसावितिस्मृतेरपि ।
संसार्येव स विज्ञेयः श्रुतिमन्त्रस्मृतीरणात् ॥१४६॥

And[1] some state that he is Agni, (this) on the basis of (a verse in) a Smṛti[2] which begins with the words *yo 'sau* ...[3] They state that he has to be known as a transmigratory being, for there is the statement in Śruti, Mantra and Smṛti[4]. [146]

The second line supplies the basis for the second alternative mentioned above.

[1]This is the meaning of *api*.

[2]*Manusmṛti* 12.123ab: *etam eke vadanty agniṃ manum anye prajāpatim*.

[3]*Manusmṛti* 1.7.

[4]Śruti and Mantra are cited in the previous verse; Smṛti in this.

पाप्मदाहारतिभीतिमर्त्यत्वादिश्रुतेर्मितेः ।
हिरण्यगर्भमिति च स्मार्तान्यपि वचांसि नः ॥१४७॥

(This is to be said) on the basis of inference from the Śruti statement about the evil, burning want of delight, fear, mortality etc.[1]; (and also there are known) to us the statements of the Smṛti (such as) *hiraṇyagarbham* ... [147]

The first line shows the Śruti and the words signify the Śruti, *sa dvitīyam aicchat*. And the second line cites the Mantra, *hiraṇyagarbham* ...

ब्रह्मा विश्वसृजो धर्म इति कर्मफलात्मता ।
स्मृत्याप्यभाणि बहुशः कस्य संसारिरूपता ॥१४८॥

Also, the Smṛti has declared in many ways[1] the nature of Prajāpati[2] to be transmigratory existence, the result of (ritual) activiti(es), viz. Brahman, the creator of this world[3], and Dharma[4]. [148]

The basis of this verse is *Manusmṛti* 12.50ab: *brahmā viśvasṛjo dharmaḥ mahān avyaktam eva ca*. The word *mahān* stands for Prakṛti and *avyakta* for the Sūtrātman; but these last two are not mentioned by Sureśvara (though SP and NKL cite the full line and explain the same).

[1]Or alternatively, so many times.
[2]This is Ka.
[3]This is Manu and others (SP and NKL).
[4]This is Yama.

मिथोविरुद्धवादित्वाद्द्वयोरागमयोरपि ।
अप्रामाण्यप्रसक्तिश्चेन्न क्लृप्त्यन्तरसंश्रयात् ॥१४९॥

[In verses 149-153, in contradiction to the objector's view: Virāj is transmigratory, the Siddhānta is explained.]

If it is argued that there results in the case of the two sets

of Āgamas unauthoritativeness, on account of their making mutually contradictory statements,[1] (we say) 'no,' by resorting to another[2] mode of construing them. [149]

[1]The mutual contradiction lies in saying that Virāj, though non-transmigratory, undergoes transmigration on his own.
[2]That is, proper.

प्रत्यगज्ञानजानेकविविधोपाधिसंगतेः ।
विरुद्धार्थत्ववचसां स्यादेकत्रापि संभवः ॥१५०॥

It is possibile that statements expressing contradictory senses[1] can occur together (in a smooth construe) on account of the association of numerous and various adjuncts (in them) which have been understood (lit. resulted) from ignorance about the inner self. [150]

This is an explanation of *klptyantarasaṃśraya* in the preceding verse or of *kalpanāntaropapatti* in BUB. Either phrase can be called *saṃgrahavākya* i.e. *siddhāntasya saṃgrahena pratipādaka-vākya*.

[1]That is, they seem to convey contradictory senses.

अपास्ताविद्यातज्जत्वदस्थूलाद्युक्तिगोचरः ।
स्वाभासाविद्योपाधिः सन्साक्ष्यन्तर्यामितां व्रजेत् ॥१५१॥

Being within the purview of the statement 'not gross' etc., on account of having set aside ignorance and its effect and also being possessed of the limiting adjunct, viz. ignorance, which is but his own appearance[1], the seer can become one[2] within (a body). [151]

[1]This refers to Sureśvara's theory of Ābhāsa.
[2]It can be literally expressed thus, 'can attain the state of the one within'.

तथा हिरण्यगर्भत्वं बुद्ध्युपाधिः स एव तु ।
तमःसत्त्वरजोयोगाद्याति क्षेत्रज्ञतामजः ॥१५२॥

So also is the character of Hiraṇyagarbha possible, for he is only possessed of the limiting adjunct, viz. intellect and thus on account of his possessing (lit. contact with) *tamas*, *sattva* and *rajas*,[1] the unborn one becomes *kṣetrajña* 'knower of the field (i.e. body)'. [152]

[1]Cf. note on verse 148 above where reference is made to *mahat* (*mahān*) or Prakṛti.

अभिन्नबुद्ध्याभिन्नत्वं भिन्नधीभिश्च भिन्नताम् ।
एति चित्स्वतमोहेतोर्न किंचिदपि दुःस्थितम् ॥१५३॥

Sentience becomes (known as) non-different (from a person's self) and becomes different through knowing that it is not different (from that person's self) — (this happens) on account of the darkness (i.e. ignorance) of its[1] own; (in this) there is nothing like a bad statement (about the Truth). [153]

[1]It means: of sentience.

Verses 154-184 explain the Śruti 'atha yat kiñca ...' (BU 1.4.6).

अशनायावदुत्पत्तेरुत्पन्नाः प्राणिनो ऽखिलाः ।
अत्तारो ऽतो ऽन्नविरहान्नालं स्थानाय संहताः ॥१५४॥

Since the (entire) creation has proceeded from the one who had felt hunger, therefore all the beings have become eaters, and, in the absence of food, they are not able to stand intact[1]. [154]

[1]This is for *saṃhatāḥ*; though it could be alternatively translated as 'together', yet the togetherness of the beings is not intended.

तस्मात्सोमान्नसृष्ट्यर्थं परो ग्रन्थो ऽवतार्यते ।
यत्किंचेदं जगत्यस्मिन्नार्द्रं वस्तूपलक्ष्यते ।
रेतसस्तत्ससर्जेश उत्पन्नस्थितये ऽशनम् ॥१५५॥

Therefore, the subsequent portion (of the Śruti)[1] is introduced for the sake of (stating) the creation of Soma and (other) food. Whatever liquid (lit. moist) thing is (noticed) in this world, that the Lord has created from His semen, as food for the sustenance of the created (beings). [155]

This is: *atha yat kiṃcid ārdraṃ tad retaso 'sṛjata tad u somaḥ ... agnir annādaḥ* (BU 1.4.6).

जगत्कारणरूपिण्य आपो रेतोभिधा इह ।
सोम एवेत्यवधृतेरग्नीषोमव्यवस्थितिः ॥१५६॥

Here,[1] waters, which are of the nature of the cause of this world, are called the semen; from the restrictive words[2] *soma eva*, it is established that Agni and Soma (were created).[3] [156]

An objection on the basis of the Śruti *tā annam asṛjanta* (CU 6.2.4) is taken into account. The verse establishes that the universe is of the nature of Agni and Soma.

[1]That is, in the Śruti statement *tad retaso 'asṛjata*; cf. *apa eva sasarjādau* (*Manusmṛti* 1.8cd).

[2]Or alternatively, from the assertion.

[3]Supply: as the eater and the food.

नानाक्रियाभिसंबन्धादग्निः सोमश्च गम्यताम् ॥१५७॥
सोम एवेति तं विद्याद्यद्यग्निरपि हूयते ।
सोमो ऽप्यग्निरिति ज्ञेयो यदि तत्रापि हूयते ॥१५८॥

(And) let it be known that Agni is (called) Soma as well, on account of its relation to different (ritual) activities. [157]
One should know that when Agni also is offered (*hūyate*) it is to be taken as Soma and Soma also is to be taken as Agni if (Soma oblation) is offered in (i.e. unto) him. [158]

This argument rests on the position of Agni or Soma as the grammatical object in the statement about a ritual.

द्वेधा भिन्नं जगत्सर्वमन्नमन्नाद एव च ।
अन्नं चराचरं कृत्स्नमन्नादः प्राण उच्यते ॥१५९॥

This whole universe is divided into two, viz. food and eater of food; all the movable and immovable is food and Prāṇa (i.e. Hiraṇyagarbha) is called the eater of food. [159]

This verse intends to emphasise that the twofold world (viz. food and eater) culminates into being the Sūtra (Ātman) and, therefore, one who understands all this world as the Ātman is free from every blemish.

फलाभिधित्सयेदानीं देवसृष्टिविदः श्रुतिः ।
प्रवर्तते ऽथ सैषेति तत्स्तुतिस्तावदुच्यते ॥१६०॥

Now proceeds the Śruti about the knower of the creation of the god(s)[1] with a desire to state the fruit (of the Upāsanā[2]) (and) to begin with, there is made the statement *atha saiṣā* ... as the praise of it (*devasṛṣṭi/phala*). [160]

The verse states the purport of *saiṣā brahmaṇo 'tisṛṣṭiḥ ... bhavati ya evaṃ veda* (latter half of BU 1.4.6).

[1] *deva = anugrāhakadeva* 'favouring gods' (already mentioned in verse 127 above).

[2] That is, worship of the favouring god(s).

अनुग्राहकदेवानां या सृष्टिरुदिता पुरा ।
अतिसृष्टिरनुग्राह्यसृष्टेः सा स्यात्प्रजापतेः ॥१६१॥

The creation of the favouring gods which was earlier mentioned is (lit. would be) Prajāpati's *atisṛṣṭi* 'superior creation' in comparison with the creation of those who are to be favoured. [161]

This is the literal meaning of the sentence *saiṣā brahmaṇo 'tisṛṣṭiḥ*.

अश्रेयोभ्यो ऽनुग्राह्येभ्यः ससर्ज श्रेयसः सुरान् ।

यतो ऽतिसृष्टिस्तेनेयं यैषेहाग्न्यादिरीरिता ॥१६२॥

Since he creates the gods as superior to those who are to be favoured and as such inferior, therefore, this is superior creation (produced) by him, the one which is stated here with the word *agnyādi* in the beginning. [162]

This explains why the creation of favouring gods is superior creation (*atisṛṣṭi*).

मर्त्यो वा यजमानः सन्नस्राक्षीदमृतान्सुरान् ।
अतिसृष्टिरतः प्रोक्ता सातिसाध्वीति निश्चिता ॥१६३॥

Or rather[1], the sacrificer (viz. Hiraṇyagarbha/Virāj), (though) being mortal, created the immortal gods (i.e. this creation of immortal gods); therefore, it is called a superior creation and is decided as extremely good (i.e. excellent). [163]

This meaning of *atha martyaḥ sann amṛtrān asṛjata tasmād atisṛṣṭiḥ*.

[1]This is an alternative explanation for the superiority of the creation of gods.

प्रजापतिरिवैतस्यां सृष्टौ स्यात्सर्गकृन्नरः ।
यथोक्तसृष्टिविद्यः स्यात्तस्यैतत्फलमीरितम् ॥१६४॥

A man would be a creator as Prajāpati is in respect of this (superior) creation; he would be possessed of the knowledge of (effecting) creation — this is stated as the fruit of that[1]. [164]

This states the meaning of *atisṛṣṭyām hāsyaitasyām*.

[1]Namely, worshipping (or being devoted to) Prajāpati, thereby knowing 'I am Prajāpati.'.

अविद्यापटसंवीतचक्षुषामियदेव तु ।
वैदिकं साधनं ज्ञेयं ज्ञानकर्मस्वभावकम् ॥१६५॥
कर्त्रादिकारकापेक्षं विरिञ्चान्तफलप्रदम् ।

व्याकृतं तदशेषेण श्रुत्या व्याख्यायि यत्पुरा ॥१६६॥

It is to be known that, for those whose eyes are covered with the band of ignorance, only this much is the Vedic means having the nature of knowledge and action; [165]
it is expectant of the means of producing (effects), such as an agent etc., and it yields the result up to (the status of) Viriñca. That is expounded in its entirety in the Śruti, as is explained before. [166]

SP and NKL together point out that the knowledge and ritual activities (that is to say, knowledge about the ritual activities and the performance of them as well) would lead only to an impermanent result, i.e. the state of Hiraṇyagarbha, since they depend on a person (i.e. they are *kārakasādhya* or *puruṣatantra*). They do not lead to liberation which is *mānatantra* or *vastujñānatantra* 'dependent on the knowledge of the nature of Reality'. Also it is known that the state of Hiraṇyagarbha is affected by fear, want of delight etc. whereas liberation is not so affected.

अथैतस्य यथोक्तस्य साध्यसाधनरूपिणः ।
जगतो व्याकृतस्याभूद्बीजावस्थाविनश्वरी ।
तन्निर्दिदिक्षया यत्नात्प्रवृत्तैषा परा श्रुतिः ॥१६७॥
संसृत्यनर्थस्य यतो निदानं सैव नापरम् ।
यतो मूलमनर्थानामात्माज्ञानं जगत्यपि ॥१६८॥

Then, this subsequent Śruti passage now[1] begins with a specific effort with a wish[2] to say that this manifest universe which appears in the form of the ends (*sādhya*) and the means (*sādhana*), as stated before, came to attain the imperishable[3] state as the seed[4], [167]
since[5] that[6] itself is the root-cause of the undesirable result in the form of transmigratory existence and nothing else, and also since, in the world as well, the root of all untoward events is one's ignorance of about oneself[7]. [168]

Now is introduced BU 1.4.7, viz. *tad dhedam ... tarhy avyākṛtam āsīt*.

[1]That is, after stating the result (fruit) of knowledge and ritual.

[2]SP affirms that the state cannot be pointed out, though spoken of; (cf. *na sākṣān nirdeśyatvam anirvācyatvāt*).

[3]That is, endless, in the absence of knowledge of the Ātman. SP explains *avinaśvarī* could have an alternative reading *vinaśvarī* which meant *vidyayā naśvarī* 'perishable through knowledge (of the true nature of the Ātman)'(!).

[4]This is ignorance about the true nature of the Ātman and responsible for transmigration. It has the form of 'I am this body etc. ...,' which has the inner self as the semblance of the Ātman (*sābhāsapratyagavidyā*).

[5]In order to justify the preceding verse two reasons are mentioned here using twice *yataḥ*.

[6]This refers to *bījāvasthā* mentioned in the preceding verse.

[7]This is to say: Not knowing one's own status etc., one commits mistakes or follies.

तद्ध्वंसादेव निःशेषपुमर्थाप्तिरतो भवेत् ।
जिहासितस्यानर्थस्य हेतुः स्यात्सशरीरता ॥१६९॥

Therefore[1], there would follow acquisitioin of all of the ends of human endeavour only by the destruction of that (ignorance); (for) the condition of having a body[2] would be the cause of the undesirable end which is sought to be given up.[3] [169]

[1]That is, as understood from scriptures and worldly life also.

[2]Supply: as one's own (cf. *dehābhimāna*).

[3]This phrase precludes the involuntary absence of *kartṛtā* 'agency' etc. in sleep.

न वै सशरीरस्येति श्रुतेरध्यवसीयते ।
धर्माधर्मौ च देहस्य योनिरित्यागमाश्रयात् ॥१७०॥

(This) is concluded from the Śruti beginning with *na vai saśarīrasya* ... and by resorting to the Āgama[1]: Merit and demerit are (understood to be) the origin of this body. [170]

Once again there is a stress on the absence of the knowledge

about the nature of the Ātman; this sets aside the notion of temporary ignorance in sleep.

[1]CU 5.10.7: *tad ya iha ramanīyacaraṇāḥ ...*

विहितं प्रतिषिद्धं च कर्म मूलं तयोरपि ।
न ह्यक्रियस्य संबन्धो धर्मेणास्तीतरेण वा ॥१७१॥

(Again) action, both prescribed and prohibited, is the origin of them[1]. Indeed, in the case of one who is without action, there is no connection (whatever) with merit or the other (viz. demerit). [171]

[1]Namely, *dharmādharmau* of the preceding verse.

नाकारकस्य जगति क्रियया संगतिस्तथा ॥१७२॥
तद्भावभावहेतुत्वात्कारकत्वस्य कारणम् ।
रागद्वेषौ न तौ मुक्त्वा जगत्यन्यत्प्रवर्तकम् ॥१७३॥

So also, in this world, there is no association with any action of what is not instrumental to action, [172]
since the existence of that[1] is the cause of its[2] becoming[3]. Attachment and hatred are the cause of a thing being instrumental to some action, because, leaving them (aside, one finds) in this universe nothing else as productive of action. [173]

Verse 173a completes the sentence begun in the one-line verse 172. It implies the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka. Verse 173b and the word *rāgadveṣau* in the following line form the principal clause to become meaningful by the subordinate clause in the remaining part of the verse (*na tau ...*).

[1]This means: which is instrumental.

[2]This means: of an effect.

[3]That is, coming into existence.

स यथाकाम इत्युक्त्वा कृत्वादेः प्रसवं श्रुतिः ।
कामाभावे च तद्धानिं यो ऽकामश्चेति चावदत् ॥१७४॥

Having stated the words *sa yathākāmaḥ*, the Śruti[1] declares the origin of sacrifice etc. and then in the words *yo 'kāmaḥ* (it[2] has declared) the loss of it (viz. the sacrifice), in the absence of desire. [174]

[1]BU 4.4.5: *sa yathākāmo bhavati tatkratur bhavati, yatkratur bhavati tat karma kurute.*

[2]BU 4.4.6: *yo 'kāmo niṣkāma āptakāmaḥ ... brahmaiva san brahmāpyeti.*

साध्वसाध्विति चाध्यासौ मूलं विद्यात् तयोरपि ।
रागद्वेषौ यतो दृष्टौ नैवतें साध्वसाधुनी ॥१७५॥

That (a thing is) good and (another) bad[1] are but superimpositions and[2] one should know[3] attachment and hatred to be the root(-cause) of them, for two things, viz. good and bad, are not at all known (lit. seen) without (them[4]). [175]

[1]It literally means: not-good.

[2]The word *api* is used in the sense of *ca*.

[3]We follow the reading in the NKL edition and not *mūlaṃ vidyā tayor api* in the AnSS edition, for it does not convey a meaning which is suitable in the context — unless, of course, *vidyā* is taken for *vijñāna*(= *avidyā*).

[4]Namely, *rāgadveṣau*. This is understood by repetition of the word which stands midway between the two lines of the verse (*dehalīdīpanyāya*).

अन्तरेण प्रमेयार्थं नापि ते साध्वसाधुनी ।
साध्वसाध्विति वा ज्ञानं ज्ञातमेयस्य जायते ॥१७६॥

And (those two superimpositions this is) good and (this is) bad are not (possible) without any object to be known; or rather, even the knowledge of something as good or bad arises (only) in respect of some known object of knowing[1]. [176]

[1]'Object of knowing' for literal 'object to be known' for avoiding clumsy repetition of words in the translation, cf. NKL editor's

note: *jñātatvaviśiṣṭārtha.*

प्रमातृत्वादिसंबन्धो नासदात्मकवस्तुनि ।
नञ्घटाद्यर्थविज्ञानं सत्येव जगतीष्यते ॥१७७॥

In the case of a thing which is of the nature of non-existence there cannot be any connection of a knower etc.[1] in this world, the knowledge of an object as a non-existent pitcher etc. is entertained (i.e. understood) while there has/had been some existent (object). [177]

[1]*pramātṛtvādi*— *ādi* refers to *pramāṇa*, this is possible when there exists some *prameya.*

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यसंमोहमृते सत्त्वं न कुत्रचित् ।
प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यसंबुद्धौ न सत्तन्नासदुच्यते ॥१७८॥

There is no existence (of an object)[1] possible anywhere[2] except without ignorance of the true nature of the inner self. (And) when there is the awareness of the true nature of the inner self, there is a statement that there is no existent and no non-existent.[3] [178]

[1]This signifies non-existence also. SP points out: *sattvam asattvam ceti cchedaḥ*; for both these are intended as indicated in the second line.

[2]That is, at any time or place.

[3]This is to say: The expressions existent and/or non-existent would be possible only in worldly dealings (*vyāvahārikadaśāyām*).

असाधारणमज्ञानं प्रतीच्येव यतः स्थितं ।
एतत्प्रमेयमेवातः प्रमाणं नान्यदिष्यते ॥१७९॥

Since incomparable ignorance remains/exists only in the case of the inner self, therefore it has to be known[1] and no other means than this is accepted. [179]

[1]That is, it is indeed the object to be known.

एवं प्रमेयसिद्ध्यर्थं प्रवृत्तैषोत्तरा श्रुतिः ।
क्रियाकारकरूपे ऽस्मिन्व्यवहारे तमोन्वयात् ।
अक्रियाकारकं वस्तु पारोक्ष्यान्नैव लभ्यते ॥१८०॥

This subsequent Śruti proceeds to establish the object thus to be known, for there is connection with darkness[1] in this dealing[2] which comprises action and the means of (effecting it) and because the thing which is not of the nature of action and its means cannot be obtained (i.e. known) on account of its being beyond direct perception.[3] [180]

[1]That is, ignorance about the true nature of the inner self.
[2]This signifies the common world where, Śaṅkara has already pointed out in his Adhyāsabhāṣya (p.40), worldly dealings comprise *śāstrīya* and *laukika* dealings based on *pramāṇa* and *prameya*.
[3]It means: because of (its) imperceptibility; SP cites *parāñci khāni vyatṛṇāt svayaṃbhūḥ* ...(*Kaṭhopaniṣad* 4.1).

तद्ध्यदृष्टम् सदज्ञानकार्यं स्रगिव पन्नगम् ।
सर्वं बिभर्त्यसक्तं सदसक्तमिति च स्मृतेः ॥१८१॥

That, indeed, not being[1] seen, is (but) the product of ignorance and it bears (i.e. gives the impression of) all that is not attached to it like a garland (which gives the impression of) a serpent. (This becomes clear) from the Smṛti *asaktam* ...[2] [181]

[1]It means: no being perceptible.
[2]*Gītā* 13.14: *asaktaṃ sarvabhṛc caiva nirguṇam guṇabhoktṛ ca.*

अपूर्वाद्यात्मकं वस्तु यत्र साक्षात्प्रसिध्यति ।
तत्कात्स्न्र्याल्लभ्यते तत्र व्यवहारो न मोहजः ॥१८२॥

Where (however) the existent entity which is of the nature of *apūrva* etc.[1] is directly established (i.e. obtained) and that (an existent thing) is obtained (=grasped) in its fullness, there is no dealing produced from ignorance. [182]

SP says *asambhāvanādi-tiraskāreṇa* 'by setting aside the notion of impossibility'.

[1]This has a reference to the Brahman (=Ātman/inner self) which is *apūrva*, *anapara* etc.; cf. BU 2.5.19.

यथासिद्धानुवादेन पूर्वं नो ह्यभ्यधात्स्फुटम् ॥१८३॥

(This subsequent Śruti, viz. BU 1.4.7 now proceeds)[1] because the Śruti has not clearly declared to us earlier[2] (the nature of the thing for avoiding) it as a repetition of what is already established (in worldly dealings).[3] [183]

The objector's argument is: When BU 1.1-2 have already declared the nature of the thing (which is *upāsya*), why now the subsequent Śruti? To this, this is an answer.

[1]We have to understand *pravṛttaiṣottarā śrutiḥ* from verse 180 above.

[2]Namely, in the Aśva and Aśvamedha Brāhmaṇas which pertained to the worship of fire, cf. our book [Vol.3:1990].

[3]This implies: acceptance of duality in *upāsya* and *upāsaka*.

पदानीह तदर्थांश्च प्रसिद्धानेव लोकतः ।
आदाय कर्मशास्त्रं तन्निषेधविधिबोधकृत् ॥१८४॥

(Now) here[1] (we should remember that) the science of ritual takes words and the things signified by them as they are known from the world itself and then prescribes (for us) the prohibition or performance of the same.[2] [184]

[1]That is, while accepting instruction regarding the true nature of the Ātman.

[2]This is to say: The science of ritual does not pertain to *vastu* 'Reality'.

इतः परं वस्तुतत्त्वपरीक्षणकृतक्षणा ।
श्रुतिः प्रवृत्तातस्तावत्प्रमेयो ऽर्थो ऽत्र चिन्त्यते ॥१८५॥

[Verses 185-190 explain the purport of BU 1.4.7.]

Hereafter begins the Śruti[1] which has decided to examine the true nature of the thing[2]; therefore, here is considered the object to be known, to begin with[3]. [185]

[1]Namely, *tad dhedam ...*
[2]That is, Reality.
[3]SP points out: *tadadhīnatvād upaniṣatprāmāṇyasya.*

संसाराख्यमहाव्याधेः किं मूलमिति चिन्त्यते ।
तद्ध्वस्तये चिकित्सेयं तदा फलवती भवेत् ॥१८६॥

It is (now) considered as to what is the root of the great disease called transmigratory existence (and) this desire to discuss (lit. to know), (viz.) for the sake of the destruction of that (root). Only then it[1] would be fruitful.[2] [186]

[1]It means: the Śruti which disusses the root of transmigratory existence.
[2]Cf. NKL: *saṃsāraroganirāsāya nidānajñāne sati śravaṇādicikitsā phalavatī syāt.* Further, SP quotes *Caraka Saṃhitā* 1.2.36:

smṛtimān yuktihetujño matimān prtatipattimān /
bhiṣag auṣadhasaṃyogaiś cikitsām kartum arhati //

and NKL joins by quoting *Suśruta* 1.21.36:

saṃcayaṃ ca prakopaṃ ca prasaraṃ sthānasaṃśrayam /
vyaktibhedaṃ ca yo vetti doṣāṇāṃ sa bhaved bhiṣak //

ऊर्ध्वमूल इति तथा मन्त्रवर्णोऽपि विद्यते ।
गीतास्वपि तथैवैतदूर्ध्वमूलमितीरणम् ॥१८७॥

So also, (to this effect) there is the text of a Mantra[1], viz. *ūrdhvamūlaḥ*. In the *Gītā*[2] also, there is statement in the same way, viz. *ūrdhvamūlam ...* [187]

[1]*Kaṭhopaniṣad* 6.1: *ūrdhvamūlo 'vākśākha eṣo 'śvattaḥ sanātanaḥ.*
[2]*Gītā* 15.1: *ūrdhvamūlam adhaḥśākham aśvattham prāhur avyayam.*

अशेषानर्थमूलस्य प्रत्यगज्ञानरूपिणः ।
ध्वस्तौ ध्वस्तिरनर्थानां पुमर्थश्च समाप्यते ॥१८८॥

There occurs the destruction of all the undesirables when there is the destruction of the root of all the evils that is in the form of ignorance of the individual self[1] (and thereby) is obtained the end of human endeavour.[2] [188]

[1]Now *pratyak* is translated as the individual self wherever there is reference to a human being. Elsewhere it is translated as the inner self in contrast with the Supreme Self.

[2]The thrust of this is well brought out by SP thus: *jñānād ūrdhvam bandhadhir bādhitānuvṛttir ity uktatvāt* and also *na kevalam anarthadhvastir eva ... ānandaprāptir api.*

निरस्तातिशयानन्दरूपता प्रत्यगात्मनः ।
अथैष यो वै भूमेति श्रुत्यैव प्रतिपाद्यते ॥१८९॥

The Śrutis *athaiṣa...*; *yo vai bhūmā* ... itself[1] asserts the nature of the individual self as the essence of joy that has surpassed every (other) excellence. [189]

[1]In reality, these are two different statements in two different Śrutis *athaiṣa eva paramānandaḥ* (BU 4.3.32), and *yo vai bhūmā tat sukham* (CU 7.23.1).

स्वत आनन्दयाथात्म्यात्कुतो दुःखेन संप्लुतिः ।
तथापि निह्नुते शास्त्रं न लिप्यत इतीरणात् ॥१९०॥

Because, in its own right[1], it has the true nature of (only) joy, how then can it (viz. Ātman) be overpowered (lit. inundated) by misery? Even then,[2] the Śruti statement *na lipyate* ...[3] negates (the existence of sorrow). [190]

[1]That is, independently of any other cause.
[2]That is, despite this.
[3]*Kaṭhopaniṣad* 5.11: ... *na lipyate lokaduḥkhena bāhyaḥ.*

अज्ञातात्मैकसंसिद्धबीजावस्थमिदं जगत् ।
तदित्यनेनाभ्यधायि परोक्षार्थाभिधायिना ॥१९१॥

[Verses 191-210 explain the meanings of words of BU 1.4.7: *tad dhedaṃ tarhy avyākṛtam āsīt*.]

This world in the state of a seed that existed only in the form of the Ātman[1] and is referred to by the statement *tat* ..., which expresses an object beyond senses.[2] [191]

This verse intends to explain the Śruti-idea conveyed by words *tad dha*. This world already exists in the form of the seed though not known to people. The word *tat* is used to convey the world beyond sense perception.

[1]This has a reference to *sābhāsapratyagavidyā* understood in verse 167 above; it pertains to the Ātman, not known in its true nature.

[2]That is, *parokṣārthakena sarvanāmasaṃjñakena* (NKL editor's note on the basis of SP and NKL).

अव्याकृतस्य जगतो भूतकालाभिसंगतेः ।
सुखावबुद्धये हेति निपातो ऽत्र प्रयुज्यते ॥१९२॥

The particle *ha* is used here (in this sentence) for the easy understanding of the undifferentiated world which has been[1] through the time in the (long) past. [192]

[1]It literally means: which has gone together with ...

नामरूपादिविकृतं पराङ्मानैकगोचरः ।
सहस्रभेदवत्साक्षादिदमा जगदुच्यते ॥१९३॥

This world (which is) differentiated by name, form etc.,[1] is in the purview of[2] only that means which is operative in respect of objects beyond perception[3] (and) composed (lit. possessed) of thousand (and one) differences, is directly expressed by the pronoun *idam*[4]. [193]

[1]The word etc. refers to action (*karman*).

[2]Or alternatively, is the object of.

[3]This means Anumāna 'inference', for that grasps distant objects. Or alternatively, it might refer to the self-illumining Ātman (*parāñ*).

[4]Cf. the well-known *kārikā*: *idamaḥ pratyakṣagataṃ samīpavarti caitado rūpam, adasas tu viprakṛṣṭaṃ tad iti parokṣe vijānīyāt* (quoted by NKL editor). This justifies understanding Anumāna earlier, for that pertains to what is *parokṣa*.

सामानाधिकरण्यस्य तदिदंपदयोः श्रुतेः ।
कार्यकारणयोर्नित्यमभेदो ऽध्यवसीयते ॥१९४॥

Here is noticed the capacity for referring to one and same object (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) in the two words (viz. pronouns) *tat* and *idam*; for the oneness of (the two as) the effect and the cause[1] is (easily) understood. [194]

[1]These are *idam* (=*jagat*) and *tat* (=*brahma*); cf. the usually accepted notion of *kāryakāraṇayor abhedaḥ*— this *abheda* here is *sāmānādhikaraṇya*, viz. suitable to be expressive of only one object.

न क्रियाकार्यविरहे कारणं सिद्ध्यति क्वचित् ।
निष्क्रियं कारणं चेत्स्यात्तद्धन्नित्यं फलोत्थितिः ॥१९५॥

Indeed, nowhere is there any cause established (as existent) when the performance of an action (viz. production of an effect) by it is absent.[1] If it be said that a cause is (i.e. can be) non-operative, then there would ever be the existence of the effect. [195]

This verse denies the existence of a *niṣkriya-kāraṇa* 'cause without any action'.

[1]NKL edition reads *na kriyākāryavirahāt* and explains it as *kriyārūpakāryābhāvāt*. AnSS edition shows no awareness of this reading. Translation follows AnSS edition (*sati saptamī*).

तयोश्च युगपद्भावे न स्यात्कारणनिश्चितिः ।
क्रियान्तरप्रसक्तेश्च तत्कार्यत्वे ऽनवस्थितिः ॥१९६॥

If the two (viz. the cause and the action)[1] are held to be simultaneously existing, one would not be able to decide which (exactly) is the cause. And because it would involve the contingency of (accepting) another action (of the cause for producing the action). Further, that (itself) being an effect, there would result *infinite regress.* [196]

This verse denies *sakriyakāraṇa* 'cause accompanied by action'. This is possible in two ways: (i)Both cause and action exist simultaneously, and (ii)there is a sequence of them. The first possibility is discarded on the ground stated in the first half of the verse. The second possibility is considered in the second half. The argument here is: If the sequence is understood to be first the cause and then the action, even then the (later) action would expect some earlier action which, in its turn, would expect yet earlier action and so on — this is *infinite regress!*

[1]Cf. *kāryakāraṇa* in verse 194 above and *kriyākārya* in verse 195.

कार्यं चाक्रियमाणं सन्न कार्यत्वं समश्नुते ।
अकर्तृकं चेत्कार्यं स्यात्कारणं कार्यतां व्रजेत् ॥१९७॥

An effect (lit. action), (which is said to be) not being produced (lit. done), cannot attain the status (i.e. nature) of an effect. (And) if it were held that an effect is (produced) without (there being) an agent, then the cause itself would be (considered as) the agent. [197]

कारणत्वात्सदन्यस्य कार्यत्वाच्च सतस्तथा ।
अन्योन्याव्यतिरेकाच्च कुतो नाशादिसंभवः ॥१९८॥

Since it is the cause, it is real; since the other is an effect of that real (it also) is real. And since these do not exist apart (from each other), where (or whence) could there be their destruction etc.? [198]

It was earlier argued that the Brahman and the world are related as the cause and the effect. Therefore, their reality has to be argued. There should be *samānaguṇavattva* between a cause and its effect. If there would be *asamānaguṇavattva* between them, then it is not possible that an *asat* effect arises from a *sat* cause. Therefore, to say that there comes into existence the *asat* (=perishable) *jagat* (=effect) from the *sat* (=imperishalble) Ātman. The second line of the verse expresses rejection of the idea of their *real* difference (as two distinct things). The difference is merely indescribable or imaginary.

क्रिया वा तत्फलं वा स्यात्कारकं वा न किंचन ।
निरन्वयो ऽयं नाशः स्यादेषामन्यतमो ऽपि न ॥१९९॥

(An argument is made:) If action or effect or agent or any instrument of action does not exist, that would mean[1] destruction which does not have any subsequent to it.[2] (The Siddhāntin answers: In reality) there exists none of them. [199]

[1]The words 'that would mean' is 'there would be'.

[2]This is an argument of the Vaiśeṣikas. In this, they would imply an all-time existing absence of every thing. But, the Siddhāntin holds that *tad idam* suggests the continuous existence of the Brahman, i.e. permanence of the Brahman. This is in opposition to the Vaiśeṣikas' Asatkāryavāda.

क्रियायाः फलरूपेण ध्वस्तिर्नावस्थितेर्भवेत् ।
तेन तेन विशेषेण कारणं प्रथते सदा ॥२००॥

Since there is continued existence of a certain action in the form of its effect, therefore, there cannot be destruction. Ever does a cause extend itself[i] (in the form of its effect). [200]

The argument in the preceding verse is stated in this and the following verses (up to verse 203).

The first line explains away the first alternative of the Asatkāryavādins. In the second line, it is stated that the same

result (viz. *na abhīṣṭā dhvastiḥ*) would follow in the case of the other alternatives also. Only the real appears to be existing in one form or another — this is the Siddhāntin's view.

[1]That is, it extends its existence.

यथा जन्मादिकर्तृत्वाद्बीजं नैव विनश्यति ।
नाशे ऽपि तस्य नंष्टृत्वान्न नंष्टुः स्याद्विनाशिता ॥२०१॥

As the seed does not at all perish, by its being an agent of the birth etc.[1] (of a plant) and it (viz. the seed) is the destroyer (also) even in respect of its destruction[2], therefore, there is no perishability in (this) destroyer. [201]

This verse reaffirms the argument in the preceding verse by an illustration.

[1]The word etc. refers to the continued existence or growth of the plant.

[2]That is to say: The plant would perish but not the seed. It seems to be called the destroyer because the seed remains even when the plant perishes.

एवं चेन्न सतो नाशो नोत्पत्तिरसतस्तथा ।
अव्याकृताभिधानाच्च कार्यस्य स्यात्कदाचन ॥२०२॥

Such being the case, there cannot be the destruction of the existent (*sat*), nor (can there be) the origin of the non-existent; likewise, in the case of the effect, which has the name of what is not differentiated, also there cannot ever be perishability. [202]

The verse implies the non-manifest existence of the *sat* when its so-called effect has (it is said) perished.

तत्त्वबोधातिरेकेण न नाशो ऽन्यो यथा तथा ।
महतातिप्रयत्नेन ह्युदर्के ऽपि प्रवक्ष्यते ॥२०३॥

It will be stated with great care in the later portion of the text also, (as stated here before), that there is no other

destruction beside (that, viz.) the knowledge of the truth. [203]

Destruction is for the Siddhāntin *svarūpajñapti*. But there is no *niranvayanāśa* 'destruction involving no subsequent' as understood by the Asatkāryavādin. It is held that there is destruction only of bondage, together with desires, of the individual self. There is no destruction subsequent to *svarūpajñapti*; the *vastu*, viz. the Brahman continues to exist.

नामरूपाद्यभिव्यक्तेः प्राक्तनः काल उच्यते ।
तर्हीति ह्यनभिव्यक्तमव्याकृतगिरोच्यते ॥२०४॥

[The words *tarhi* and *avyākṛta* are explained.]

Time preceding (the moment of) manifestation (of Reality as having) of name, form etc. is mentioned (by the word) *tarhi* (and) by the word *avyākṛta* is mentioned the unmanifest. [204]

अविद्याकर्मसंस्कारास्तेजोऽक्ष्मासूत्रसंश्रयाः ।
खे लीनास्त्वस्तितामात्रा अव्यक्ताख्याः सहात्मना ॥२०५॥

Impressions originating in ignorance and (ritual) activity, which have resorted to fire, water, earth and wind[1] and[2] merged in sky, with mere existence (as their character)[3], have, together with the Ātman, the name of the unmanifest. [205]

[1]This is the meaning of Sūtra, cf. verse 148 above; cf. *vāyur vai gautama tat sūtram* (BU 3.7.2). NKL states: Sūtra signifies two elements!

[2] = *tu*.

[3]That is, in their subtle form.

कार्यकारणभेदेन प्रपञ्चो यः पुरोदितः ।
यश्चोर्ध्वं वक्ष्यते तस्मात्परस्तादेतदुच्यते ॥२०६॥

It is this (Brahman) which was explained earlier as this world comprising differences (such as) the cause(s) and the effect(s) and which will be later described as beyond that.[1] [206]

[1]Namely, the world.

प्रथते वैश्वरूपेण यतो ऽविद्यैव सर्वथा ।
अविद्यामात्रयाथात्म्यादतस्तद्भेदमुच्यते ॥२०७॥

Because only ignorance extends itself everywhere in a variety of forms[1], (therefore) on account of (its manifest) nature being mere ignorance, there is stated *tad dhedam*. [207]

[1]This verse states one more argument for establishing the identity of the cause and the effect; cf. verse 194 above.

[1]This is *prapañca* mentioned in the preceding verse.

मा भूद्व्याकृतधीः पुंसां नामरूपात्मवस्तुनि ।
ऐकात्म्यव्यक्तितो ऽन्यत्र तस्मादेवेति गीरियम् ॥२०८॥

Lest there be apprehension by men of the (variously) modified (Reality which appears before them) in the objects having the nature of name and form, i.e. elsewhere than in the manifestation of the uniqueness of the Ātman, there is made the statement *tasmād eva*. [208]

This justifies the restriction (*avadhāraṇa*) in *nāmarūpabhyām eva*.

सामानाधिकरण्योक्तिर्व्यक्तस्याव्यक्तसिद्धये ।
न हि कात्स्न्र्यमभिव्यक्तेर्व्यक्तस्याकात्स्न्र्यदर्शनात् ॥२०९॥

The Śruti statement, which contains two words, expressive of only one object, is intended for establishing the unmanifest becoming the manifest; indeed, fullness is not (understood) of the manifest, since the manifest is seen (in it) to be not full. [209]

This is to support the *sāmānādhikaraṇya* of *tat* and *idam*, even though *idam* refers to what is *parimita* and *tat*, to *aparimita*.

तद्वित्तिसाधनाभावात्कथं तदवगम्यते ॥२१०॥

The Śruti mentions the differentiated (world) by negating (the notion of) the knower etc.[1] (And) how can that become known since there is absence of the means of knowing it? [210]

The verse presupposes an objection regarding the means of ascertaining the nature of the unmanifest. There are alternatives; (i)*mānam asti* and (ii)*mānam nāsti*. The first and the second lines have refuted the first and the second alternatives respectively.

[1]This refers to *pramāṇa*.

विधूताशेषसंबन्धमनन्यानुभवात्मकम् ।
कूटस्थसंविन्मात्रैकं ब्रह्मास्मीतिस्वभावकम् ॥२११॥
अतिरोहितसंवित्कं सदानस्तमितोदितम् ।
निःसामान्यविशेषं तत्प्रत्यगात्मैकनिष्ठितम् ॥२१२॥
स्वतो ऽवबुद्धं तद्यस्मान्निरविद्यमतः सदा ।
संगतिर्निरविद्यस्य नाविद्याहेतुजैर्मलैः ॥२१३॥

[Verses 211-214 describe *nityānubhavasādhana*.]

That (Brahman) is such as has shaken off all relations (to various worldly objects), as is of the nature of having experience of none else (than itself)[1], as is immovable and mere sentience, and is aware of its own state (in the form) 'I am Brahman.', [211]
has its sentience never concealed (i.e. overpowered) by anything else[2]; as has never perished or originated; as is not possessed of any general or particular character[3]; as has remained only in the inner self[4]; [212]
(and) as is ever awake and is, therefore, without (any influence of) ignorance (on it). As such, there cannot be any association of it, that is devoid of ignorance, with sins/taints caused by ignorance. [213]

[1]The first line stresses that there exists nothing else than the Brahman.

[2]That is, since there exists none else than the Brahman.

[3]This is the same as *avyāvṛttānanugata*.
[4]That is, it is not different from the inner self.

एवंसवभावमप्येतदविज्ञातं स्वभावतः ।
तमोवृत्तमपेक्ष्यैतन्न तु यद्वास्तवं स्वतः ॥२१४॥

Though it is of this nature, yet, only by its very nature, it remains unknown. This is (so said) keeping in view the effect of darkness (i.e. ignorance) but it is not a real situation. [214]

There can be an objection: 'The Brahman is *nityabuddha*, then how is it that no one knows it?'. The answer is: Though the Brahman is *nityabuddha*, yet due to ignorance it remains usually unknown.

स्वानुभूत्यनुसारेण यथोक्तो ऽर्थो ऽवसीयताम् ।
मानहेत्वतिवर्तित्वान्नेह मात्रादिसंभवः ॥२१५॥

[Verses 215-220 explain that the unknownness of the Brahman is established by our usual experience.]

Let this thing, (which is) thus described, be ascertained in accordance with one's own experience. There is no possibility of having the means of knowing etc., because the Ātman is beyond the (usual act of) knowing. [215]

तस्मिन्नपहतध्वान्ते ऽप्यविद्या स्वानुभूतितः ।
स्वानुभूतिर्न वेद्मीति प्रागैकात्म्यप्रबोधतः ॥२१६॥

There is ignorance even on the part of that (Ātman) whose darkness (i.e. ignorance) is (by its very nature) far-removed (lit. destroyed); there is ignorance (as understood) from one's own (i.e. the individual self's) experience. There is on the part of one the experience, 'I do not know.', (but this is so) before (i.e. so long as there is not) the awareness of the uniqueness of the Self. [216]

ज्ञातात्मतत्त्वो जानाति त्रिकालं तदसंभवम् ।

अन्यतः संगतिः सेयमविचारितसिद्धिका ॥२१७॥

One who has known the true nature of the Ātman knows that it is in all the three periods of time impossible (to think 'I do not know myself.'); (and also that) this association with the other[1] is established by the absence of (proper) thought. [217]

[1] *anyaḥ* = *anyena* (NKL), i.e. *ajñānena*.

स्वभावव्यतिरेकाभ्यां ध्वान्तसिद्धेरसंभवात् ।
न चेत्प्रमाणतः सिद्धिरस्याव्याकृतरूपिणः ।
न चैकात्म्यस्वभावेन कुतस्तन्मानगोचरः ॥२१८॥

Because there is no possibility of existence of darkness (i.e. ignorance) unless (one accepts the existence of) the Ātman and the other. Also, if it is not possible to establish the existence of what has not appeared (manifested) in discrete forms or by its nature of uniqueness, how would it be within the ken of knowing? [218]

This asserts the inutility of the *mātrādi* in respect of Ātmajñāna.

तद्धेदमित्यनेनोक्तिर्व्याकृताव्याकृतात्मनोः ।
प्रमाणयोग्यतैवोक्ता न त्वैकात्म्यमितात्मता ॥२१९॥

By the sentence *tad dhedam* there is the statement of the two of manifest and unmanifest natures. (But) here is thus stated the possibility of its becoming known by some means of knowing and (there is) not (stated) the uniqueness (of the Ātman) and the limitedness (of the non-Ātman). [219]

The universe (*jagat*) was unmanifest and it is manifest now. The words *tad dhedam* are not for conveying the possibility of knowing the oneness of what is unmanifest (= Ātman) and what is manifest (= non-Ātman).

अव्याकृतमविज्ञातं प्रमाणाविषयं मतम् ।

प्रमाणानभिसंबद्धं प्रमाणाच्चेति साहसम् ॥२२०॥

(The Brahman) is understood to be unmanifest, unknown, non-object of the means of knowing, not connected with any means of knowing. And still to say that (it is understood) by the means of knowing is (but) folly[1]. [220]

[1]The word *sāhasa* means: thoughtless statement. SP does not explain it and NKL says *vyāhata* which means paradoxical.

अविज्ञातार्थगन्तृणि प्रमाणानीति वादिनाम् ।
सर्वेषामभ्युपेतोऽर्थः कुतोऽसाविति चिन्त्यते ॥२२१॥

Now is considered (a question:) By what[1] does it (become known) (even though) it is an object understood (lit. accepted) by all who state that the means of knowing pertains to (lit. reachs up to) object(s) that are not known?[2] [221]

[1]Or, 'on account of what?'. SP makes this clear thus: *sa ca kutaḥ sphurati svato vā parato vā parataś cen mānād vā sākṣiṇo veti vicārya nirdhāryam.*

ज्ञातो वाऽर्थोऽथवाऽज्ञात उभयं वा न चोभयम् ।
प्रमाणानां प्रमेयः स्यात्सर्वमेतद्विचार्यते ॥२२२॥

All this is discussed, viz. whether the object is known or not known or both (known and not known) or not both could be the object knowable by the means of knowing. [222]

There are here four alternatives mentioned regarding the nature of the object sought to be known. These are discussed in the verses hereafter.

मेयमानत्वसंभित्तौ न पश्यामो ऽत्र साधनम् ।
ज्ञातस्याव्यतिरेकित्वादज्ञातस्याप्यमानतः ॥२२३॥

As regards *meyatva* 'the character of an object to be known' and *mānatva* 'the character of a means of knowing', (we have

to say that) we do not see here any means of distinguishing (between the two), because what is to be known does not exist apart (from the means) and what is not known does not have any means of knowing it. [223

In the case of the Ātman, there is no distinction between *meya* and *māna*, unlike in the normal knowing-situation.

As intended by verse 221 above, there follows a discussion as to how an object to be known becomes known. First, the views of the Vaiśeṣikas and other logicians. The argument of the Vedāntin is: If they hold *meya* as *jaḍa* (and they do so), then, *māna* also being *jaḍa*, how could one distinguish between the two? If again the *meya* and *māna* are accepted by them as *viṣaya* and *viṣayin* a question can be asked: Whether the *meya* is already known or unknown? The first half of the second line of the verse answers away the first alternative and the second half, the second. The answers are clarified in the next two verses.

जगत्यर्थो हि यः कश्चिज्ज्ञात एव स बुद्धिवत् ।
मानादेव स विज्ञात इत्येतत्स्यात्कुतो ऽमितेः ॥२२४॥

In this world,[1] whatever be the object of knowing, that has got to be known (i.e. existent for becoming known) even like the intellect (itself)[2]; that[3] would become known only by that knowing one[4] (— hence we ask:) How can it be (objected to) on the ground of the absence of the object of knowing? [224]

This explains *jñātasyāvyatirekitva*.

[1]This refers to worldly dealings (*vyavahārabhūmi*).

[2]*buddhi* 'intellect' reveals itself; it does not remain unknown, for it is in contact with the inner self.

[3]This refers to the object of knowing which is mentioned earlier.

[4] = *māna*— this refers to the knower, the inner self.

मानातिरेकासंसिद्धेर्मेय एव तथा न किम् ।
न हि दीपान्तराद्दीपो भारूपत्वं प्रपद्यते ॥२२५॥

So also, since it cannot be established that the object to known exists apart from knowing, why should it not become similarly known[1]? Indeed, a lamp does not attain the nature of a lamp from another lamp. [225]

[1]That is to say: Like *jñāna*; it is self-evident; it cannot remain unknown.

ज्ञातरूपातिरेकेण नान्यद्रूपं समीक्ष्यते ।
एवं चेन्मानतो मेयो विज्ञात इति का प्रमा ॥२२६॥

Thay do not accept (or grasp) any form apart from the form which has been known. If this is so, how can it be right knowledge (to hold) that an object tof known is known from knowledge? [226]

न चापर उपायो ऽस्ति मेयसद्भावसिद्धिकृत् ।
मानेभ्यस्तत्फलासूतेरन्धकारप्रनृत्तवत् ॥२२७॥

There is no other means[1] of establishing the existence of what is (the object) of knowing (in Vedānta) since there would not result any fruit from the (known) means of knowing, exactly as (from) the act of dancing in darkness.[2] [227]

This verse presupposes an objection that the *jaḍa* object can be known by some means of knowing.

[1]That is, other than the usually accepted means of knowing.

[2]This would lead to the absence of any dealings (*sarvavyavahāralopa*).

स्वत एव प्रसिद्धश्चेत्प्रमेयो ऽर्थस्तथा ऽपि न ।
अनन्यायत्तसंसिद्धेर्मेयत्वं किंनिबन्धनम् ॥२२८॥

If it be held that the object to be known is established as existent on its own (i.e. in its own right), (we answer:) Even that is not the case; (for we ask:) In what is rooted the character of the objects' capacity to be known whose existence does not depend on another? [228]

Here is denied another alternative objection, viz. the *jaḍa* can be known in its own right or, by itself.

निःसाधनो न साध्यो ऽस्ति नासाध्यं साधनं क्वचित् ।
तुल्यशक्तिमतां नापि मिथो ऽपेक्षा ऽस्ति कुत्रचित् ॥२२९॥

There cannot be any *sādhya* (object) which is without a *sādhana*, nor can be there any *sādhana* which is without its *sādhya* (object). And, there is no mutual expectancy on the part of two (*sādhya* objects) having equal capacity also.[1] [229]

[1]SP points out that *api* 'also' suggests *anavasthā* as the result if a knowledge of some *sādhya* is held to depend upon that of another.

नासिद्धयोः स्वतो ऽपेक्षा सिद्धयोश्चापि नेष्यते ।
नापेक्ष्यापेक्षकत्वं हि लोके ऽप्यतिशयं विना ॥२३०॥

Two objects which are not self-established do not have expectation (of each other[1]); so also two objects which are self-established do not expect (anything) of each other. For, in this world, we do not indeed find the relation of something as expected and something (else) that expects, unless there is a certain excellence (in the object desired.) [230]

This verse answers a question whether two *jaḍa* objects get established by each other, be they *svataḥsiddha* or *svato 'siddha*. Two possibilities are discussed here, the third is considered in the next.

[1]It literally means: of themselves. SP refers to the son of a barren woman and a sky-flower as instances.

नापि सिद्धः स्वतो ऽसिद्धं नृशृङ्गवदपेक्षते ।
तथा ऽसिद्धः स्वतः सिद्धं नात्यन्ताभावरूपतः ॥२३१॥

So also, one self-established[1] (object) does not expect another (object which is) not established[2], like a man (expecting) a

(non-existent) horn. Similarly, what is not self-established does not expect what is established because it itself has the form of absolute non-existence[3]. [231]

[1]This refers to an existent object.
[2]That is, non-existent object.
[3]For example, a man's horn.

अपेक्षते चेत्सिद्धो ऽसौ नासिद्धो ऽपेक्षितुं क्षमः ।
येनातो ऽज्ञानतः सिद्धिं स्वतःसिद्धो ऽप्यपेक्षते ॥२३२॥

If it is held that if a (self-established) thing expects (some *māna*), then (it has to be said that) a non-existent (object) does not expect (it). Therefore, since (this is so), even a self-established (object) expects to be established by ignorance.[1] [232]

[1]NKL reads: *yenāto jñānataḥ* for the reading of the AnSS edition *yenato 'jñānataḥ*(?). Possibly, *ajñānataḥ* suggests that falsely conceived *pramāṇaprameyavyavahāra*?

विश्वेश्वरो ऽपि प्राहैतत्प्रपन्नाय किरीटिने ।
भावाभावत्वमज्ञानादतद्वत्येव कल्पितम् ॥२३३॥

The Lord of the world declared this to Arjuna who (approached) Him (as a pupil), viz. that the state of Reality and non-reality is experienced (i.e. imagined) (by all) in what does not possess (the character of) that, due to ignorance. [233]

SP points out that all *pramāṇaprameyavyavahāra* is like *rajju-sarpa(jñāna)*.

नासतो विद्यते भावो नाभावो विद्यते सतः ।
उभयोरपि दृष्टो ऽन्तस्त्वनयोस्तत्त्वदर्शिभिः ॥२३४॥

The non-existent has no being (and) the existent never ceases to be; the truth of both has been seen by the seer of the

truth. [234]

This is *Gītā* 2.16.

ज्ञेयं यत्तत्प्रवक्ष्यामि यज्ज्ञात्वा ऽमृतमश्नुतें ।
तथा न जायत इति विध्वस्ताशेषकल्पनम् ॥२३५॥

'I shall explain the nature of that which is to be known and, having known which, one attains immortality.'[1]. So also, (the statement of the Lord), *na jāyate*[2] ... declares the entire (cluster of) imaginary suppositions (that are) destroyed (i.e. set aside). [235]

[1] *Gītā* 13.12.
[2] *Gītā* 2.20.

वासुदेवः सर्वमिति प्रत्यक्षश्रुतिपूर्वकम् ।
अहं कृत्स्नस्य जगतः प्रभवः प्रलयस्तथा ॥२३६॥

(So also He declares) '(I), son of Vāsudeva, am all this.'[1], which has a direct statement of the Śruti as its forerunner[2] and, later, (He states), 'I am the origin and merger of the entire universe.'[3]. [236]

Kṛṣṇa described in these verses of the *Gītā* is the Paramātman. And, according to SP, the statement of Kṛṣṇa is preceded by the direct statement of the Śruti (*pratyakṣaśruti*), viz. *aitadātmyam idaṃ sarvam* (CU 6.8-16).

[1] *Gītā* 7.19.
[2] This refers to *idaṃ sarvaṃ yad ayam ātmā* (BU 2.4.6).
[3] *Gītā* 7.6.

सत्यज्ञानादिरूपस्य प्रत्यगात्मन एव च ।
कारणत्वं सुविस्पष्टं श्रुतौ हि बहुशः श्रुतम् ॥२३७॥

Indeed, in the Śruti, it is many times clearly heard that it is only the individual self, which is of the nature of truth, knowledge etc., that is the cause of the universe. [237]

In the preceding verse, the CU is taken into account and here the *Taittirīyopaniṣad*, for pointing out the *śrutimūlatā* of the statement of Kṛṣṇa. In other words, the *Taittirīyopaniṣad* is the Śruti conveying the same idea as in the *Gītā*. That is: Kṛṣṇa declares *aham* (*pratyagātman*) as the creator, sustainer and destroyer and this same idea is already conveyed by the Śruti (*Taittirīyopaniṣad*:) *satyaṃ jñānam anantam brahma*, *yo veda nihitaṃ guhāyām* (2.1); *tasmād vā etasmād ātmana ākāśaḥ saṃbhūtaḥ* (2.1); *idaṃ sarvaṃ asṛjata* (2.6); and *yato vā imāni bhūtāni* ... (3.1).

अज्ञातात्मातिरेकेण ब्रुवतः कारणं तथा ।
सम्यग्ज्ञानान्न मुक्तिः स्यान्न ज्ञानं वस्तुनुत्क्वचित् ॥२३८॥

There cannot be liberation (which results from) the right knowledge in the case of one who states that the cause (of this universe) is apart from the Ātman that is not known (to him). Nowhere does (such) knowledge (as his) negate the existence of the real (object)[1]. [238]

This is a remark about those, like the Sāṃkhyas, who hold, in opposition to the Śruti, that the world is caused by some other thing, like Pradhāna etc.

[1]Namely, the Ātman.

कर्मभ्यो ऽपि न मुक्तिः स्यात्कर्मापि न हि वस्तुनुत् ।
तस्यानित्यफलोत्पत्तौ प्रभविष्णुत्वकारणात् ॥२३९॥

Even by ritual activities there cannot be (attainment of) liberation. Indeed, action also cannot negate the real object, for it is capable of causing the rise of the impermanent fruit.[1] [239]

[1]This implies the incapacity of *karman* for effecting the permanent result, viz. liberation.

कूर्मलोमादिवच्चेत्स्यादबुद्धत्वं तथा ऽपि वः ।
स्वतः सर्वज्ञतैव स्यान्न वस्त्वज्ञातमस्ति हि ॥२४०॥

(If the objector says:) As in the case of the hair of a tortoise etc.[1] there could be unknownness (i.e. absence of the knowledge) (about the nature of the Ātman), in your (view); (we answer:) There is (lit. would be) only omniscience (of the Ātman which is) on its own account[2]; for, the (real) thing[3] is not unknown.[4] [240]

[1]The word etc. implies the milk of the tortoise; this signifies non-existent objects.

[2]That is, not caused by any other thing.

[3]Namely, the Ātman.

[4]Cf. Śaṅkara's assertion in the Adhyāsabhāṣya (p.81): *sarvo hy ātmāstitvam pratyeti* ... This sets aside the idea of holding Anumāna as necessary for knowing the Ātman in the way of the Sāṃkhyas who require it for knowing the Pradhāna.

न च मानात्प्रसिद्धिः स्यात्कूर्मलोमादिवस्तुनः ॥२४१॥
ज्ञातार्थव्यतिरेकेण मानानां मानता यतः ।
मेयार्थापह्नुतिश्च स्यान्नाज्ञातमिति जल्पतः ॥२४२॥

And one would not be able to establish a thing like the hair of a tortoise etc. with (the help of) the means of knowing since (it would mean that) the means of knowing the character of the means of knowing (even) in the absence of the known (i.e. existent) object(s) and also there would result the negation (lit. concealment) of the object to be known for one who states that there is not (any object which is unknown). [241-242]

The argument regarding the hair of a tortoise is still the basis for argument. The question is: 'How can this non-existent object become known?' Neither knowledge nor false impression about it is possible.

ततश्च वेदसिद्धान्तसंत्यागः कारणादृते ।
न भिद्यते प्रमेयो ऽर्थो मानाद्येषां च वादिनाम् ।
तेषां दुःशकमत्यन्तमबुद्धार्थावबोधनम् ॥२४३॥

From that there follows, without any reason,[1] abandoning of the doctrine of the Veda[2]. And, in the case of those who argue that the object to be known cannot be distinguished from the means of knowing[3], it is extremely difficult to get to know what is not known.[4] [243]

Earlier, as implied in verse 222 above, there was a discussion about the view that the object to be known by philosophical query is a directly perceptible object. This was the view of the realists, viz. the Sāṃkhyas. Now, follows a discussion of the views which are like the Buddhists' opinions — the third alternative. In this verse, there is reference to the view that there is no distinction between *māna* and *meya*.

[1]Or, for no reason.

[2]The authoritativeness of the Veda is accepted in the field of Dharma. Therefore, the contingency would be in denying the authority of the Veda which is accepted as *ajñātārthajñāpaka*.

[3]This is the view of the Yogācāra Buddhists.

[4]It is implied that every argument is based on the relation between *māna* and *meya* as two distinct objects.

ज्ञानमेयप्रभेदो ऽपि मानस्य स्वार्थरूपिणः ।
बौद्धराद्धान्तसक्तिः स्यात्स्वार्थस्य क्षणिकत्वतः ॥२४४॥

And, when a distinction (is accepted) between the means of knowledge and the object to be known even while that means of knowing has (i.e. is) to be taken as having the form of its object, there would result inevitable acceptance of the Buddhist doctrine, on account of the fact that its (viz. of the *māna*) object of knowing has (only) momentary-existence. [244]

The argument is: *māna* and *meya* are distinct, but the latter was not known (as existent) until the *māna* became operative. But while there results the knowledge of the object, the means of knowing has ceased to exist. Thus there results *kṣaṇikatvavāda*, as acceptable even to one who holds the *māna* and *meya* as reals.

This argument is adduced after accepting the need of *vyava-*

hārasiddhi.

स्वार्थं प्रत्येव संसिद्धेः परार्थस्येह वस्तुनः ।
स्वप्नादिवदनात्मार्थो मृषा स्यात्क्षणिको ऽपि वा ॥२४५॥

Since, in worldly dealings, every object which exists for the sake of another[1] gets established (only) with reference to its own object[2], the object which is non-Ātman would be either futile like one in a dream etc. or (it would be) momentary.[3] [245]

[1]The word *padārtha* is paraphrased by SP as *meya artha* and by NKL as *jaḍa artha*. Possibly this refers to the view that *jñāta* and *jñāna*(=*māna*) are both *jaḍa*— cf. the concept of the Saṃkhyas: *saṃghātasya parārthatva.*

[2]This refers to the object of knowing. (Or, *ajaḍa* Ātman).

[3]The argument is: If this *svārtha* also were *jaḍa*, then it has to be considered at the time of its being known by the means as non-existent, and that would resemble the view of the Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika Buddhists.

न च सौगतसिद्धान्तस्तत्सिद्धौ मित्यभावतः ।
मेयमानैकतो ऽभावादज्ञातत्वस्य तत्क्षणे ॥२४६॥

And (in this regard we do) not (hold) the doctrine of the Buddhists (as correct) owing to the absence of the knowledge which leads to establish that,[1] on account of (the fact that) there could not be oneness of the object of knowing and the means of knowing[2] there would be unknownness of the object at the moment (time)[3]. [246]

[1]Namely, the object to be known (*jñāta* which is also *jñeya*).

[2]*meyamānaikataḥ*=*meyamānaikatvataḥ*.

[3]Supply: of knowing it.

अथाभ्युपेयते ऽज्ञातः प्रमेयाव्यतिरेकतः ।
एकत्रापि प्रमाणत्वप्रसिद्ध्यर्थं क्षणात्मनि ॥२४७॥

Well then (*atha*) it is accepted that the character of being unknown is apart from the object to known, in order that its nature of being the means of knowing becomes established even while it is as momentary in nature. [247]

This is the argument of a Vijñānavādin — a concessional acceptance for the sake of arguing that the means of knowing is informative (*jñāpaka*) of an earlier unknown object.

मानात्मके ऽपि मेये ऽर्थे यद्यबुद्धत्वमिष्यते ।
अज्ञातत्वापनुन्मानात्किमन्यदिति कथ्यताम् ॥२४८॥

If, in respect of the object to be known which is of the nature of the knower (lit. a means of knowing), it is held that it cannot be known, then let this be told: What else is there, apart from the means of knowing, (so that it is capable of) removing the unknownness (of the object to be known)? [248]

This is in answer to the Buddhist concessional argument stated in the preceding verse.

स्वतो वा परतो वेदमज्ञातत्वं भवद्भवेत् ।
स्वतश्चेत्तत्तमोवत्स्याज्ज्ञातत्वं रज्जुसर्पवत् ॥२४९॥

This character of being unknown would be either self-established or established by another (means). Then, if it is self-established, it would be (ever) accompanied by (lit. possessed of) darkness[1] (and) the character of being known (would be) like that of the serpent in a rope. [249]

[1]That is, what is *ajñāta* would ever remain so.
[2]It means: it would be false apprehension.

अथान्यतस्तदज्ञातं किंरूपं वस्त्वतीर्यताम् ।
मानादवगतं तच्चेन्मैवमव्यतिरेकतः ॥२५०॥

Now, if (it is held that) it remains unknown owing to another (factor), let it be told me as to what form it[1] has? And

if it is (said to become) known by some means, let it not be said so, for it does not exist apart (from the thing). [250]

This has a reference to the fourth alternative: *na cobhayam* mentioned in verse 222 above. It means: the object of knowing remains unknown owing to non-knowing and also becomes known owing to knowing — not on account of its own nature!

[1]It means: the object of knowing, viz. Reality.

अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां यथोक्तो ऽर्थः प्रसिध्यति ।
ताभ्यां विना कुतो ऽज्ञायि त्वेवंरूपमितीर्यताम् ॥२५१॥

The object which has been so far discussed gets ascertained by the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka[1] (and) from what other than these two (viz. Anvaya and Vyatireka) is known such a form (of object) — tell me. [251]

This is the explanation of the verse 250. The theory of an opponent does not establish the nature of Reality. This method is not applicable to the means of ascertaining the nature of Reality. AnSS reads *tvevaṃ rūpam* (!)

[1]Cf. see our book [Vol.1:1982] Introduction, for the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka.

न चेह वास्तवं रूपं तदध्यासेन बाध्यते ।
रज्जुसर्पधिया लोके न रज्जुरिति धीवृतिः ॥२५२॥

And further, here,[1] the real form of the thing is not stultified by a superimposition (of anything on it). In this world, the knowledge 'this is a rope' is not anywhere concealed[2] by the knowledge 'there is a serpent' in the place of a rope. [252]

This verse refers to two possible views regarding the nature of the object which is not known: Its unknownness is (i)imaginary, or (ii)real. The first possibility has not to be considered at all! The second is answered by the whole verse.

[1]That is, in *vyavahāra*.

[2]That is, stultified.

स्वसंवित्तित्वमात्रे च न तमःसंभवः क्वचित् ।
तथाभ्युपगमे तस्य नापनुत्तिः कुतश्चन ॥२५३॥

And, there cannot be any time[1] a possibility of ignorance when the object to be known is held to be what has the nature of mere sentience of one's own; for, that view being accepted, there cannot be its stultification on account of anything.[2] [253]

Accoding to SP, this refers to the view of the Yogācāra Buddhists, incidentally.

[1] = *kvacit*.

[2]Or, for any reason.

दुर्बलानां विरुद्धानां बलवद्भिरपाक्रिया ।
विरुद्धैरेव दृष्टा सा तदैकात्म्ये कथं भवेत् ॥२५४॥

It is noticed that removal[1] of the weak in opposition is effected only by the strong ones (who are) opposed (to them). How can that[2] be in the case where there is uniqueness of that[3]? [254]

It seems that the verse refers to the view that real ignorance is removed by some sudden knowledge of Reality; but this does not have to be answered since the generally accepted maxim is not relevant upon matter in hand.

[1]That is, setting aside or disproving.

[2]This refers to *apākriyā* explained in note 1.

[3]It means: self-illuminating Reality or sentience.

बाध्यबाधकयोर्योगः स्वशक्त्यनपहारतः ।
यो ऽन्यथा संगतिं ब्रूते चर्मवद्वेष्टयेत्स खम् ॥२५५॥

Whatever connection we notice between *bādhya* and *bādhaka* knowledges occurs on account of the non-removal of their own essence (i.e. strength); (and, therefore) he who holds that

the connection (between unknownness and knownness) can exist in some other way would be trying to wrap the sky with some skin.[1] [255]

[1]It refers to an impossible task. A skin does not lose its capacity to cover something and the sky also does not get covered (i.e. does not lose its expanse) — yet the connection between the two as the wrapper and the wrapped is not at all possible.

नच जाड्यातिरेकेण ह्यविद्या काचिदिष्यते ।
अविद्यां गमयित्वेति श्रुतितो ऽप्यवसीयताम् ॥२५६॥

Ignorance[1] (or any absence of proper knowledge) is not understood (to be) apart from (some) non-sentience. Let this be concluded also from the Śruti 'Having dispelled (i.e. overcome) ignorance ...'. [256]

This verse adduces one more argument for holding any association of the unknownness of the real with sentience.

[1]It literally means: non-sentience; but the second line refers to it as *avidyā*.

[2]Cf. BU 4.4.3: *evam evāyam ātmedaṃ śarīraṃ nihatya avidyāṃ gamayitvā anyam ākramam ākramyātmānam upasaṃharati.*

अज्ञातं न यथा मानान्मिथ्याधीसंशयौ तथा ।
न्यायः पुरोदितः सर्वो यस्मादस्ति तयोरपि ॥२५७॥

As what is unknown does not get established by any means of knowing, so also do not wrong knowledge and doubt get established (by any means of knowing), since, in the case of these two also, there holds good the method of thought[1] already stated. [257]

[1]Namely, the object to be known (in this case) is not such as can be established by any means of knowing.

अपि सर्वप्रमाणानामज्ञातत्वादिसिद्धये ।
नेक्ष्यते ऽन्यतमं मानं स्वतःसिद्धं न चापि तत् ॥२५८॥

Further, not any one of all the means of knowing is capable of establishing the unknownness etc.[1], so also that, viz. any of the means, is not self-established. [258]

This is to argue that *avidyā* is not self-established (*svataḥsiddha*) either.

[1]The word etc. refers to *mithyādhī* and *saṃśaya* mentioned in the preceding verse.

न तावदिह संभाव्यं प्रत्यक्षं तदसंभवात् ।
विषयेन्द्रियसंबन्धविरहात्तदसंभवः ॥२५९॥

Here (i.e. in this inquiry), the direct perception (of Reality) is just not to be considered (as the means of knowing it), since the possibility of direct perception cannot arise — (this) impossibility of that is owing to the absence of any connection between the object of reality and the sense-organs. [259]

Reference was made to the means of knowing (in verse 257 above). Therefore, there is yet further discussion whether that means is external (*bāhyapratyakṣa*) or mental (*mānasa*) or inferential. This verse is to deny the first alternative.

न च दुःखादिधीवत्स्याज्ज्ञातस्यैवानुभूतितः ।
प्रत्यक्षार्थवदेवैषा मिथ्याधीरनुभूयते ॥२६०॥

And (that unknown thing) would not be (possible) like the experience (i.e. awareness) of misery etc.[1] for the reason that there is experience of only that which is known. This knowledge, which is (according to us) false, is experienced entirely like an object of direct perception.[2] [260]

Here are discussed the second and third alternatives mentioned just before.

[1]This is to say that *mithyādhī* is not imaginary.

[2]Experience is the result of some knowledge. At the most, the object known in that knowledge can be inferred from it, but not

anubhūti which is *pratyakṣa* 'direct perception'.

प्रत्यक्षादिफलं ज्ञानं कथं तस्य प्रमेयता ।
माफलं न च मेयस्थं क्रियाफलवदिष्यते ॥२६१॥

Knowledge[1] is the result (lit. fruit) achieved by direct perception etc. How can that have the character of an object to be known? The result of right knowledge is not taken to exist in the object to be known like the result of an action.[2] [261]

[1]Namely, the character of what is known (*jñātatva*).
[2]For example, the act of cutting results into a thing's division into two (at least); this division is seen in the thing cut.

अपि मानाभिसंबन्धो मेयार्थेनैव युक्तिमान् ।
नाफलस्य तु मात्रैव ह्यतो ऽन्यत्र वृथा श्रमः ॥२६२॥

And, further, it is reasonable to hold a relation of a means of knowing to only an object to be known. As against this, the result of knowing (has connection) indeed only with the known; (accepting it[1] to exist) elsewhere (than in the knower) would mean an effort (of knowing) for nothing. [262]

[1]That is, the result of knowledge.

माफलस्य तु मेयत्वे प्राप्नोतीहानवस्थितिः ।
प्रमाफलाभिसंबन्धः किंमान इति कथ्यताम् ॥२६३॥

But, (if it is accepted that) the result of knowledge has the character of an object to be known, then here follows *infinite regress*. It has to be explained[1] as to what is the means (that brings the awareness of) the relation between knowledge and its result. [263]

[1]It literally means: let this be pointed out.

इहापि चानवस्थेति नानुमातो ऽत्र युज्यते ।

न च रागादिसंसिद्धौ मानव्यापार ईक्ष्यते ॥२६४॥

Therefore, it is not proper to employ inference[1], since, here (in this case) also, there arises *infinite regress*. And, indeed, in the case of the rise of attachment etc. one does not expect any function of the means of knowing. [264]

[1]Namely, to understand from the characteristic in the form of some effect (called the result) its relation to some means (which has produced it).

रागादेर्नापि चाभावो भावात्तदनुभूतितः ।
न च कश्चित्फले भेदो मेयमानप्रमातृषु ॥२६५॥

As for attachment etc. also, there is no non-existence of the same, as it proceeds from experience. And, in respect of a result, there is no difference (in relation to) the object of knowing, the means of knowing and the knower. [265]

मानकार्यं फलं चेत्स्यान्न स्यात्तन्मातृमानयोः ।
तदभावे च माभावात्कुतस्तत्स्यात्प्रमां विना ॥२६६॥

If the result[1] were (to be taken as) the effect (or product) of knowing (activity), then it would not exist in the knower and the means of knowing since, in the absence of them, there is the absence of knowledge. How could that (effect of knowing) follow (exist) when there is no knowledge? [266]

[1]Namely, knowledge.

प्रमात्रादेरभावे च नाप्यभावः प्रमेष्यते ।
सुषुप्ते मातृपूर्वत्वात्सर्वमाव्यापृतेरिह ॥२६७॥

And, while there is the absence of the knower etc., one would not entertain non-existence to be *pramā*, because in deep sleep everything of knowing activity is preceded by a knower (etc.).[1] [267]

[1]That is, even if there is no apparent activity of any knower there is a complete process of knowing.

न प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्यामतो ऽर्थापत्तितो ऽपि न ।
न हि दृष्टं श्रुतं वर्ते सार्थापत्तिः प्रसिद्ध्यति ॥२६८॥

It cannot be known by direct perception and inference, not also by *arthāpatti*, for *arthāpatti* cannot get established (lit. be effective) indeed without what is seen or heard. [268]

सादृश्यासंभवाच्चेह नोपमानस्य संभवः ।
मिथ्याज्ञानादिसंसिद्धौ न चाभावो ऽपि शङ्क्यते ॥२६९॥

Because there is no possibility of (there being) its[1] similarlity (with any other thing); there is no possibility of any analogy (for knowing it). And (the idea of) its absence also cannot be entertained in respect of the experience of false knowledge etc. [269]

[1]This means: of what is unknown.

अत्यन्तापूर्वदृष्टे ऽर्थे प्राङ्नाद्राक्षमिमं नगम् ।
प्रत्यभिज्ञायते साक्षाद्दृष्टपूर्वो यथा तथा ॥२७०॥

As in the case of an object which was never seen before (there arises only such awareness as) 'I have not seen this mountain.' and there arises the recognition, this one is like that as one had directly perceived earlier. [270]

This verse intends to point out how some unknown thing becomes known even if it cannot be established by any known means of knowing, its existence and non-existence.

न च मात्रादिसद्भावस्तस्यात्यन्तमदृष्टतः ।
न प्रमाणान्न चाभावात्प्रत्यभिज्ञात इष्यते ॥२७१॥

There does not exist any knower etc., for it is absolutely unseen; nor is there any recognised means of knowing[1]; not can it be taken (as a thing to be) recognised just because of the non-existence (of any directly perceptible object).[2] [271]

This verse denies recognition of the unknown as implied by the preceding verse.

[1]The NKL edition reads *na prāmāṇyāt* for *na pramāṇāt* of the AnSS edition. But NKL itself does not offer any help to decide if this is correct.

[2]Which is responsible for recognition as in the illustration of the preceding verse.

तस्मात्प्रमाप्रमाभासाप्रमाणानामशेषतः ।
स्वार्थानन्यप्रमाणात्स्यात्प्रसिद्धिस्तमसस्तथा ॥२७२॥

Therefore, (right) knowledge, what appears as knowledge[1] and absence of (right) knowledge — all of these can get established only on account of the unique means (of knowing) itself[2]; so also is darkness (i.e. *avidyā*) established (by that). [272]

This is the conclusion: *avidyā* can be known only through experience, because it is not knowable by any accepted means of knowing and has the character which is not known (as similar to that of any other thing known); cf. SP: *ajñātatvāder aprameyatvād anubhavād eva taddhir ity upasamharati.*

[1] = *ābhāsa.*

[2]It means: the inner/the individual self which is that means.

आन्तरं मेयमाश्रित्य स्वतःसिद्धमनन्यमम् ।
भावाभावादिमद्विश्वं सर्वमेतत्प्रसिध्यति ॥२७३॥

All this universe[1] which is made up of existence and non-existence etc.[2] gets established only by resorting to the object to be known which is within (every being or thing), self-established, and having matchless knowledge. [273]

[1]It means: the universe under discourse, viz. *mātṛ*, *meya*, *māna*
[2]The word etc. refers to their modifications (*pariṇāmas*).

मेयार्थानभिसंबन्धान्न यथावस्तुधीरियम् ।
ज्ञातत्वात्तदभावो ऽपि प्रात्यक्ष्यान्नेष्यते स्मृतिः ॥२७४॥

[Verses 274-280 discuss that false knowledge is established by experience in case knowledge does not correspond to the object.]

This knowledge of the thing, not arising in the absence of the contact (of intellect) with the knowable things and the absence of them,[1] is not taken as remembrance on account of their being known and directly perceptible.[2] [274]

[1]That is, their character as non-essence.
[2]Hereby is discarded the Ākhyātivāda.

इदं रजतमित्येवंरूपं वस्तु न कुत्रचित् ।
न शुक्तौ रजतज्ञानं नेदंता रजते ऽस्ति नः ॥२७५॥

(There is) not anywhere a thing which is taken as 'this is silver.', for, there is no knowledge of silver in a shell and, for us, the character of being this thing (viz. thisness) does not exist in silver. [275]

An example of *mithyājñāna* is *idaṃ rajatam*. The questions raised are: This form (*rūpa*) qualified as it is,— does it belong to (i)the shell?, (ii)silver itself?, (iii)only the speaker's mind (*buddhi*)?, (iv)some other place?, or (v)some other moment? The second line answers the first two questions. The next verse answers the rest. This refers to the Anyathākhyātivāda.

तदन्यत्र द्वयाभावात्साक्ष्यादावपि नेष्यते ।
न नेहार्थावबोधो ऽस्ति मिथ्याज्ञानत्वकारणात् ॥२७६॥

Elsewhere than in those two (viz. silver and shell), (i.e.) where the two are absent, is it not taken to exist in the knower[1] etc.[2] also. Again, it is not that there is no knowledge of the

thing which has the nature of being the cause of false knowledge.[3] [276]

[1]That is, *buddhi.*
[2]The word etc. means: place and time.
[3]This is according to the Anirvacanīyakhyāti.

मिथ्याज्ञानादिसंसिद्धौ क उपाय इतीर्यताम् ।
सम्यग्धीतो ऽथ तत्सिद्धिर्न तस्या मेयसंगतेः ॥२७७॥

(The opponent remarks:) Let it be told as to what is the means of establishing this as false knowledge etc. (If[1] it is asked:) Is it established by (lit. from) right knowledge?[2], (then the answer is:) No, since that[3] is related to (or associated with) what is to be known.[4] [277]

[1]This is to be understood thus: *atha ... cet*— this refers to the possibility of *mithyājñāna* being *mānasa pratyakṣa.*
[2]It means: knowledge of the thing as it is.
[3]It is *samyagdhī.*
[4]False knowledge cannot be associated with it (i.e. any object to be known)! For, if it were so, false knowledge would also be right knowledge — it would cease to be false.

मेयप्रमामृते कार्यं मानानां नान्यदिष्यते ।
न च सत्त्वादिमात्रेण रूप्यादिमितिसंभवः ॥२७८॥

No other purpose than the right knowing of the objects of knowing is expected of the means of knowing[1]; and also there is no possibility of the knowledge of silver etc. by mere existence (of them) etc.[2] [278]

This further clarifies the thought in the preceding verse.
[1]This presupposes an objection that even *mithyājñāna* could be an object of *samyagdhī.*
[2]This means the capacity of an existent shell which arouses the impression of its similar, viz. silver, and also its shining.

तस्यासाधारणात्मोत्थविज्ञानविषयत्वतः ।
तस्माद्रजतसंस्कारसंस्कृतात्स्वान्ततः स्मृतिः ॥२७९॥

That (false knowledge)[1] being an object of specified knowledge[2] that has arisen from what has the unusual nature[3], there is a remembrance from that which has acquired the impression of silver etc.[4] within.[5] [279]

This is the reason for the statement in the preceding verse.

[1] *idaṃ rajatam iti jñānam.*

[2] Knowledge requiring subject-object relation (*prapañcajñāna*).

[3] This is not the knowledge of common experience.

[4] This is *bhrānti*. SP points out that this *mithyājñāna* cannot be considered as some kind of *anumāna*. It cites:

svīkāre vibhramāṇāṃ syāt svīyasiddhāntabādhanā /
anabhyupagame teṣām āśrayāsiddhir uddhatā //

Tattvapradīpikā p.63, *lines* 1-2. (*Tattvapradīpikā = Citsukhī with Nayanaprasādinī of Pratyagrūpa*. ed. by Raghunāth Kāshīnāth Shāstrī, Bombay: Nirnayasagar Press, 1931)

[5] There is no such cognition as 'This is like silver.'; but it must have been within and therefore the cause of *mithyājñāna*.

प्रथते ऽविकृतात्मैकनित्यदृष्टेः परात्मनः ॥२८०॥
ज्ञानज्ञात्रतिरेकेण तमस्यपि न विद्यते ।
मेयं वस्तु ततो ऽज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षं सप्रमातृकम् ॥२८१॥

False knowledge becomes evident on account of the highest Ātman which has ever the knowledge of himself as unmodified[1] (by anything else). [280]
An object of knowing does not exist as apart from knowledge and the knower even in darkness. Therefore, ignorance is an object of direct perception and has a knower (of it). [281]

[1] That is, unaffected.

न हि संविदनारूढः प्रमात्रादिः प्रसिध्यति ।
संविन्मात्रैकयाथात्म्यात्प्रमात्रादेरनात्मनः ॥२८२॥

[Verses 281-299 discuss that ignorance along with the knower is established by experience.]

A knower etc. that has not mounted (=is not connected with) knowing does not get established for the reason that the true nature of knowing consists only in knowing itself, and also on account of the fact that the knower etc. are (but) the non-Ātman(s). [282]

This verse explains how while knowing the immutable Ātman there is existence (or need) of the knower etc. (*mātrādi*) which are declared as *jaḍapadārthas*.

ज्ञातो ऽयमर्थो ऽज्ञातो वा धीरियं कर्तृसंश्रया ।
स्मृतिः सा न यथावस्तु तेनासावप्रमोदिता ॥२८३॥

That this thing has become known or remained unknown — this knowledge has its basis in its agent and that (basis) is not memory[1] (of it) as the thing is; therefore, that is called ignorance. [283]

[1]SP paraphrases *smṛti* as *bhrānti*, i.e. superimposed *kartṛtvādi*.

न हि वस्त्वनुरोध्येतज्ज्ञाताज्ञातत्वलक्षणम् ।
रूपं वस्त्वपरिज्ञानसमुत्थं ज्ञातृसंश्रयम् ॥२८४॥

This form which is characterized as being known and/or unknown does not follow (=is not in accordance with) the thing (=Reality) as it is, it has (really speaking) arisen from the absence of the (right) knowledge of the thing and has the support in the knower[1]. [284]

[1]To whom the act of knowing is attributed.

ज्ञाताज्ञातविभागो ऽतः स्वतःसिद्धात्ममातृकः ।
संविदा ज्ञाततासिद्धिर्मितेरपि न मात्मना ॥२८५॥

Therefore, the division (of things) into known and unknown

has its origin in the self-established Ātman. It is on account of knowledge that its character (as a thing known) gets established; and knowledge also does not (get established)[1] by what is (called) right knowledge. [28

[1]That is, become known as knowledge.

वस्त्वज्ञातं समुद्दिश्य तत्प्रमित्सन्ति मानिनः ।
ज्ञातत्वकार्यतश्चातः सिद्धं तत्फलतो ऽथवा ॥२८६॥

Keeping in view the unknown thing, those (persons), who have the means of knowing, seek to know it (and) (that unknown thing) gets established by its being known (by some means of knowing) or by its being the effect[1] (of its knowledge by some means of knowing it) but (*ca*) that is not so;[2] (it is known) by its being the result of experience. [286

The idea is: *jñātatva* and *ajñātatva* would belong to two moments of time and the Brahman cannot be said to be related to them Therefore, only *anubhavagamyatva* has to be accepted.

[1]*jñātatvakāryatvataḥ* is cryptic for *jñātvataḥ kāryatvataḥ* (*ca*).

[2]Cf. SP: *uktakalpadvayadūṣaṇadyotanārthaś cakāraḥ.*

यतो ऽज्ञातत्वसंसिद्धिर्ज्ञातत्वस्यापि चाञ्जसा ।
तत एव च मानत्वं संविदर्ते न तत्त्रयम् ॥२८७॥

Since unknownness and also, of course, knownness (thus) get established smoothly, there follows from the same their being the means of knowledge; there cannot indeed be the three without the (real) knowing one. [287]

[1]Cf. NKL: *ajñātatvaṃ jñātatvam mānatvaṃ ca.*

षष्ठगोचरवन्नेदमज्ञातत्वं समीक्ष्यते ।
न च प्रत्यक्षवत्सिद्धं स्वानुभूतिसमाश्रयात् ॥२८८॥

This character, viz. being unknown, is not considered to be like what is (within the scope of) the sixth (sense-organ)[1]

Nor does it get established like what is directly perceptible, since it has resorted to one's own experience. [288]

[1]The object of the sixth organ means a non-existent object, for there is no sixth organ and also its object. See our book [Vol.1:1982] p.280.

प्रमात्रादिविविक्तार्थमनुभूयोत्थितस्ततः ।
नावेदिषमिति प्राह स्वानुभूत्यनुसारतः ॥२८९॥

A person, who has awakened from (sleep) after having experienced various objects, viz. the knower and others, as discrete (objects), says in accordance with his own experience 'I did not know.' [289]

[1]This verse explains how, in deep sleep, one sees various objects only to find after waking that there was in reality nothing whatever experienced.

प्रमात्राद्युत्थितेः पूर्वं चिदन्यानन्वयात्तमो-
विशेषणा चिदेवैका स्वानुभूत्यैव गम्यते ॥२९०॥

Before the rise (from ignorance), with ignorance as its attribute, since there was no connection of anything else than sentience that persisted, there was the knower etc. which in reality was sentience itself, (and) that (sentience) becomes known by experience alone. [290]

This explains the difference between experience of Reality and experience even in the waking state.

आसीदिदं तमोभूतमप्रज्ञातमलक्षणम् ।
अप्रतर्क्यमविज्ञेयमित्येतत्स्वानुभूतितः ॥२९१॥
प्रथते यः स्वयं साक्षादज्ञातत्वादिभूमिषु ।
स प्रमेयः स्वयंज्योतिः प्राक्प्रसिद्धेः प्रमातृतः ॥२९२॥

This (world) was (only) darkness, unknown, not having any characteristics (which would help any inference), beyond any

guess, unknowable[1] — this (is known as true) from experience. [291]

The one, who himself continues to be present, in (all) those states of unknownness etc., is to be known; the self-illumined, (as existent even) before there was awareness of the knower etc. [292]

[1]This is Manu's statement; *Manusmṛti* 1.5a-c.

एष एवानवगतः स्वतो ऽवगततत्त्वकः ।
एतावन्मात्रसंव्याप्तेरज्ञानादेः पुरा मितेः ॥२९३॥

Before right knowledge (occurs), this one whose real nature is undersood from itself is itself unknown on account of ignorance etc. whose extent is only this much. [293]

यथेह घटविज्ञाने घटाकारो ऽनुभूयते ।
ज्ञातृतत्साक्षिणौ चैवं नाज्ञाने साक्षिणो ऽपरम् ॥२९४॥

As here[1] the shape of a pitcher is experienced (i.e. becomes known) when there is a specified knowledge[2] about the pitcher, so there are not in ignorance a knower and the experience of it (existing) apart from the experiencer himself. [294]

[1]That is, in our worldly dealings.
[2]Namely, information known.

अज्ञातत्वं न मानेभ्यो ज्ञातत्वं तत्कृतं यतः ।
तैरप्यज्ञातता चेत्स्यात्कातिशीतिर्मितेर् भवेत् ॥२९५॥

Because the nature of being unknown (in the case of the Ātman) does not (originate from) the means of knowing and the nature of being known is caused (i.e. effected) by the same, therefore, what could be the excellence of the right knowledge if with those means of knowledge also the Ātman continues to have unknownness? [295]

स्वानुभूत्यैव संसिद्धेर्नाज्ञातः खरशृङ्गवत् ।

संवित्तेरप्यसंबोधात्स्यात्तन्मानव्यपेक्षिता ॥२९६॥

(Therefore,) the Ātman gets established on account of its own experience; it is not unknown like the horn of a mule; in the case of knowledge also, there is absence of it before (its rise) and there will be its dependence on the means of knowing it. [296]

This stresses the need of hearing etc. the Śruti-sentences like *tat tvam asi* (NKL).

प्रत्यक्षकुम्भवत्साक्षात्सुषुप्ते ऽनन्यबोधगम् ।
आत्मा ह्यात्मानमैकात्म्यादात्मना वेत्त्यकारकः ॥२९७॥

As (in the waking state one knows) directly an actually existent, so also does one know (the pitcher) in deep sleep which arises from none elser[1]. But, it is the Ātman indeed who, because of its uniqueness, knows itself (even though) it does not have any means of knowing (lit. activity). [297]

[1]In both the states, viz. waking and sleep (signifying dream), one sees an object through the so-called means of seeing.

पराक्प्रवणया दृष्ट्या धीस्थो ज्ञो ज्ञानमात्मनि ।
व्योमकाष्ण्यर्यादिवत्तज्जं सम्भावयति न स्वतः ॥२९८॥

The knower[1], who has resorted to intelligence acquires (lit. sees) in himself some knowledge by an eye, which is directed outwards, as (they see) the dark of the sky etc.[2] and its products; but indeed not (what comes from) itself.[3] [298]

The idea of the verse is to explain our everyday experiences of objects. These proceed when sentience has on it the superimposition of an individual, his sense-organs etc. — this superimposition is *anādisiddha* for that individual.

[1]This refers to sentience (within an individual).

[2]Cf. the Śruti passage *devātmaśaktiṃ svaguṇair nigūḍhām* ... (*Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 1.3).

[3]Cf. Śaṅkara's Adhyāsabhāṣya (p.39): *apratyakṣe 'py hy ākāśe bālās talamalinatādy adhyasyanti.*

नैवाज्ञानं मृषाज्ञानं संशयज्ञानमीक्ष्यते ।
प्रत्यक्प्रवणया दृष्ट्या जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तिषु ॥२९९॥

Not indeed is ignorance, false knowledge, or doubtful knowledge obtained by the eye which has turned within,[1] in (all) the (three) states of waking, dream and deep sleep. [299]

This answers away a doubt if the Self also could be ignorant like the Self with the superimposition of a body etc. on it.

[1]Or, the seer within, viz. the Self.

न सुषुप्तगविज्ञानं नाज्ञासिषमिति स्मृतिः ।
कालाद्यव्यवधानत्वान्न ह्यात्मस्थमतीतभाक् ॥३००॥

[Verses 300-319 discuss that the knowledge arising after deep sleep in the form 'I did not know the real things for all this time.' is not dream.]

The specified knowledge[1] obtained in a dream, (which is later) memory[2] in the form 'I did not know.'; for it has no delimitation by time etc. (and therefore) does not belong to the Ātman. [300]

[1]*vijñāna* which has the usual complex of a knower etc. (*mātrādi*).

[2]Memory of the basic *ajñāna*, since every experience of the state(s) of waking (etc.) gets sublated — basic *ajñāna* however gets sublated only after one has obtained the knowledge of the Self.

न भूतकालस्पृक्प्रत्यङ्न चागामिस्पृगीक्ष्यते ।
स्वार्थदेशः परार्थो ऽर्थो विकल्पस्तेन स स्मृतः ॥३०१॥

The individual self does not belong to (lit. touch) the past and not also to the future[1]. On that account,[2] an imaginary thing which exists in itself (lit. own region) is remembered

by him as another object. [301]

The verse points out that the concepts of time and place are rooted in the superimposition of a body etc. (*adhyāsa*) on the Ātman.

[1]Cf. *Kaṭhopaniṣad* 2.14: *anyatra bhūtāc ca bhavyāc ca.*

[2]That is, owing to *adhyāsa*.

न हि प्रत्यक्षविज्ञानादतीतत्वं समीक्ष्यते ।
न चानागतता मेये मिथ्याज्ञानमतो भवेत् ॥३०२॥

Indeed the quality of belonging to the past (in the case of things) is not grasped by direct perception and so also the character of not having come into existence in respect of an object to be known[1]. And, therefore, there would be false knowledge. [302]

[1]That is to say: The Ātman that was never produced or will never be produced (*aja*).

यत्तत्त्वकं स्याद्यद्वस्तु न तत्तदतिवर्तते ।
नाज्ञातरज्जुजः सर्पो रज्जुमुल्लङ्घ्य वर्तते ॥३०३॥

Of whatever nature a thing is, from that it cannot be apart.[1] A serpent, born of a rope (whose nature is) not known, does not exist beyond the rope. [303]

[1]Or alternatively, that it does not abandon (lit. transcend) it.

तस्मात्तिसृष्ववस्थासु ह्यागमापायिनीष्वजः ।
स्वतो ऽलुप्तदृशा यस्मादात्मात्मानं सदेक्षते ॥३०४॥

Therefore, in all the three states which arise and end, (there exists) the unborn, since the Ātman forever sees itself by its sight which is never losing (lit. lost). [304]

देहान्तरेष्वपि तथा ह्यन्योन्यव्यभिचारतः ।
प्रत्यक्प्रत्यय एवैकः सर्वत्राव्यभिचारवान् ॥३०५॥

In the same way, even in different bodies which are discrete from one another, the experience of the inner/individual self is but one,[1] (and) everywhere certain. [305]

[1]That is to say: There is no means by which one could ascertain that the Ātman in each body is different.

चैतन्यमात्ररूपं सत्प्रथते ऽज्ञानमात्मनि ।
प्रत्यक्कूटस्थनिष्ठत्वात्तद्बाध्यं कारणेतरत् ॥३०६॥

In the Ātman there exists (lit. extends) knowledge (even) being in (or having) the form of mere sentience (and) since it permanently exists in the individual self, the cause and the other[1] are stultified by it.[2] [306]

[1]That is, effect.
[2]The cause and effect relation belong to worldly dealings — for the Ātman has remained ever unchanged (*kūṭhastha*).

नैवं तत्स्यात्स्वकार्येषु तेषां तादूप्यहेतुतः ।
जडस्वभावतो नान्यद्रूपं कार्येषु गम्यते ॥३०७॥

That would not have been so (as described before) for the reason that they[1] attain the sameness of nature with theirs. (This is so because) in respect of their own effects, there is not experienced a form (=nature) other than what is non-sentience. [307]

[1]They refer to *kāraṇa*s mentioned in the preceding verse – these are *indriya*s, *antaḥkaraṇa* etc., which assume the shape of their objects (*tadākārabhavana*).

एवं चेत्को ऽनयोर्भेदः कार्यकारणयोर्मितेः ।
अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां न जाड्यमतिवर्तते ॥३०८॥

If this be so, what difference is there in respect of the knowledge of the two which are the cause and the effect?

Non-sentience does not transgress the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka. [308]

It was shown that in respect of the inner self there is no means by which one could ascertain the difference between the cause and the effect. Now, in this verse, is stated that the difference arose only from ignorance.

कार्यकारणरूपाभ्यामतद्वत्तत्त्विका ततः ।
आत्माविद्यैव सर्वत्र प्रथते स्वात्मसाक्षिका ॥३०९॥

Therefore[1], in the form of the cause and the effect there extends everywhere ignorance about (the nature of) the Ātman which has (in reality) the nature of what does not have that (Ātman)[2], (and) has the Ātman as its experiencer (=witness). [309]

[1]That is, because it is impossible to entertain the existence of the cause and the effect (as discussed before).

[2]Cf. NKL: *kāryakāraṇananirmuktātmatattvikā*.

नैवात्मना स्वभावेन स्वात्मानं लभते जडः ।
यतो ऽतः स्वार्थदेशः स स्वार्थश्चानन्यसिद्धिकः ॥३१०॥

Since the non-sentient does not of itself ever come into existence, possessing its nature; therefore, the region of its own nature and itself are not produced by another. [310]

स्वतो बुद्धे कुतो ऽविद्या तामृते संसृतिः कुतः ।
इति बुद्धात्मतत्त्वस्य गीरियं न तमस्विनः ॥३११॥

How could there be ignorance in the case of the one (who is) self-awakened and how could there be transmigratory existence without ignorance? This is the speech about (i.e. description of) the one who has known its own true nature (to be) thus, (and) not of one who is possessed of darkness. [311]

यथोच्छिन्नात्ममोहस्य निह्नोतुरपि निह्नुतिः ।
एवं प्रागात्मसंबोधाददृयैकात्म्यनिह्नुतिः ॥३१२॥

As in the case of the one whose ignorance about the Ātman is destroyed there follows the concealment of the one who conceals,[1] so, before knowing about/of the Ātman, there remains the concealment of the uniqueness of the (Ātman) without duality. [312]

[1]This refers to *avidyā* and its effect(s).

काकोलूकनिशेवायं संसारो ऽज्ञात्मवेदिनोः ।
या निशा सर्वभूतानामित्यवोचत्स्वयं हरिः ॥३१३॥

For an ignorant one and for the knower of the Ātman, true existence is like the night for a crow and an owl[1] (respectively); Lord Hari himself has declared (this) in the words *yā niśā* ...[2] [313]

[1]A crow sleeps at nightfall, while an owl begins its activity then.
[2]This is *Gītā* 2.69.

तस्मान्न वास्तवं रूपं तद्ध्वान्ताद्यपनोदकृत् ।
तस्मिन्सत्येव मोहादि व्युत्पत्तेः प्रागभूद्यतः ॥३१४॥

Therefore, it is not the real form which is the remover of darkness etc. because ignorance etc. existed before that (true) knowledge (of the inner self occurred) even while it existed. [314]

This verse reaffirms the usefulness of *mānameyādivyavahāra*, i.e. ignorance/*adhyāsa*, before and for the rise of the knowledge of the nature of the Ātman.

प्राणारूढमेवैतद्धन्त्यविद्याद्यशेषतः ।
ब्रह्मविद्धिरतो यत्नात्प्रमाणमिह संश्रितम् ॥३१५॥

This (sentience), which has resorted to the means of knowing

etc.,[1] fully destroys ignorance etc. Therefore, in this respect, the knowers of the Brahman[2] have resorted to the means of knowing with effort. [315]

[1]This refers to *tattvamasyādivākyavicāra* which involves *mātrādi* (i.e. *śāstrīya vyavahāra*).

[2]That is, the seekers of the knowledge about the Brahman.

उताविद्वानिति तथा प्रश्नपूर्वं स्वयं श्रुतिः ।
निर्णेनेक्ति स्फुटं वस्तु यथोक्तेनैव वर्त्मना ॥३१६॥

And, further, the Śruti itself clearly decides the truth by first asking the question *utāvidvān*[1] in the way we have stated before.[2] [316]

[1]Cf. *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.6 and 2.7 for the relevant question and answer.

[2]Namely, by the accepting sentience as having the means of ascertaining what is Reality.

आत्मासाधारणार्थोत्थरूपमात्रसमाश्रयात् ।
तन्मानमपि मानत्वं लभते न तु केवलम् ॥३१७॥

(It is) on account of resorting only to that form which has become (=arisen) from the unique nature of the Ātman that the means of knowing it becomes a means (of removing ignorance) but not by itself.[1] [317]

[1]That is, when unaided by sentience. This is asserting once again how only sentience is responsible for the acquisition of right knowledge about the Ātman.

तावन्मात्रैकयाथात्म्यप्रत्यगात्मत्वकारणात् ।
पराक्षिवव न भेदो ऽत्र मात्रादेः प्रत्यगात्मनि ॥३१८॥

On account of their having only that, viz. the inner self in its true nature as their cause, the knower etc. do not have mutual distinction among themselves with regard to (knowing)

the inner self as (they have the same) in respect of the objects outside. [318]

स्वचिदाभासवन्मोहपृष्ठेनैवेति कर्तृताम् ।
कूटस्थो ऽपि स्वतः प्रत्यङ्नात्मवृत्तव्यपेक्षया ॥३१९॥

The individual self, even though immovable (by nature), becomes the agent, (riding) on the back of ignorance which has the form of the appearance of sentience[1], that is its own, and not by resorting to its own activity. [319]

[1]This is the state of having lost the original state, owing to ignorance.

सर्वधीविक्रियासाक्षिण्येवं सिद्धे स्वतो दृशौ ।
कार्यं ये ऽनुभवं प्राहुर्वाच्यं तैः कार्यसाधनम् ॥३२०॥

[There now follows up to verse 348 a discussion whether *anubhava* is an effect.]

When the experiencer, the witness of all the modifications of intellect, himself a seer – is thus established, those, who have described experience as (some) effect, should (i.e. have to) declare (what) is productive of the effect[1]. [320]

[1]The effect is 'knowledge of the sentience' and the cause 'its means'.

न जायते ऽज इत्यादि विज्ञानघन इत्यपि ।
कृत्स्नपुंविक्रियोत्सारि वाक्यं कस्मादुपेक्ष्यते ॥३२१॥

(Our question is:) Why ignore the statements of the Śruti (i)*na jāyate*,[1] *ajaḥ*,[2] and (ii)*vijñānaghanaḥ*[3] ..., which set aside (=disregard/reject) all modifications of Puruṣa? [321]

The verse makes the following argument: *anubhava* of the sentience (as an individual) is not merely without any cause but also is opposed to the thought in the Śruti.

[1]Cf. *Kaṭhopaniṣad* 2.18.
[2]Cf. BU 4.4.2.
[3]Cf. BU 2.4.12.

प्रमात्राद्युत्थितेः पूर्वं कारकं दुर्लभं मितेः ।
तदभावात्क्रियाभावस्तामृते कार्यता कुतः ॥३२२॥

Before the rise of a knower etc., it is difficult to get (=posit) any means (of knowing); then, in the absence of it, there would be absence of any action and, without that (=action), how could there be anything like an effect? [322]

एतच्चानुभवादेव भवताप्यभ्युपेयते ।
कारकव्यापृतिस्तत्र निपुणेनापि नेक्ष्यते ॥३२३॥

And this is accepted by yourself also on the basis of (=from) experience only; (for) in that connection, no activity of any means is seen by even a well-observing person. [323]

अकुर्वत्कारणं चेत्स्यात्तद्वत्कार्यं सदा भवेत् ।
कार्येतरानवसितिः संभूतौ युगपत्तयोः ॥३२४॥

If there is a cause which is not functioning, an effect would be always there likewise, and there would not be any decision with regard to making between an effect and a cause, while they are existing together.[1] [324]

[1]This refers to the case when the cause and the effect co-exist.

विरुद्धानेककार्याणामेकस्मादेव कारणात् ।
अकुर्वतः प्रसक्तिः स्यादकुर्वत्त्वाविशेषतः ॥३२५॥

There would follow the contingency that mutually opposed defects would result from one and the same (non-operative) cause, since there is no specific non-operation (for their rise). [325]

This refers to the case when there is a sequence, of course,

first the cause and then the effect.

अथ कुर्वदभीष्टं तत्तत्कार्यं तर्हि भण्यताम् ।
अकार्यं कारकमिति सुप्तोन्मत्तप्रभाषितम् ॥३२६॥

If it is accepted that that (viz. a cause) is operative, then it has to be pointed out as to what is its effect. (For, a statement) that there is a cause without any effect would be the speech of one who is either in sleep or mad. [326]

मयाध्यक्षेण प्रकृतिः सूयते सचराचरम् ।
इति श्रीमत्सुरेशस्य वाक्यमेवं समञ्जसम् ॥३२७॥

(In this situation) the statement of the Lord of gods: 'As the superintending one, I urge Prakṛti (consisting in) the movable and the immovable.'[1]; becomes only thus reasonable. [327]

[1]Cf. *Gītā* 9.10

प्रमेये च क्रियायां च प्रमाणे ऽथ प्रमातरि ।
तच्छक्त्युपाधिहेतुत्वाज्जायमानेव चिद्ध्रुवा ॥३२८॥

In respect of an object of knowing, an activity (of getting to know), the means of knowing, and also the knower, it is the immovable sentience, that is, as it were, being born (variously) on account of the limiting adjuncts consisting in its own power. [328]

यथा सद्व्यतिरेकेण न किंचिद्वस्तु सिद्ध्यति ।
तद्वदव्यतिरेकेण घटाभावाद्यसंभवात् ॥३२९॥

As nothing apart from the existent[1] can get established, so also the absence of a pot etc. as non-apart from it cannot (get established).[2] [329]

[1]Namely, *cit* mentioned in the preceding verse, the Brahman.
[2]Be it *bhāva* or *abhāva* of the discrete objects of the world

it cannot have an existence independent of *cit*, i.e. unless through *adhyāsa*.

न हि सद्व्यतिरेकेण त्वसद्वस्त्वपि सिद्ध्यति ।
तस्यापि सदपेक्षत्वात्किमन्यत्स्यात्सता विना ॥३३०॥

Indeed not even a non-existent thing gets established[1] as apart from the existent thing,[2] since even that (non-existent thing) has the expectancy of[3] some existent (thing). Therefore, what else could there be than the existent? [330]

[1]That is, can get established.
[2]Namely, *cit*.
[3]That is, depends on.

यथैवं संविदर्तें ऽसन्नैति संभावनामपि ।
सदप्यभावरूपं वा तद्वदव्यरितेकतः ॥३३१॥

As this is so, without knowledge[1] no non-existent could possibly come to exist and likewise even an existent[2], having the nature of non-existence, (could not come to exist), if apart from it[1]. [331]

[1]That is, the existent or *cit*.
[2]Namely, that which is accepted in the world as existent.

अविद्या वाथ तत्कार्यं नाभेदान्नातिरेकतः ।
सिद्धायते यतो ऽतः स्यादविचारितसिद्धिकम् ॥३३२॥

Since ignorance or its effect would not get established as non-distinct or apart from it[1], therefore, let that be (considered) as established witout reasoning.[2] [332]

[1]This is sentience, *cit*.
[2]Or, call it indescribable (*anirvācya*).

नीलोत्पलदलाभं खं द्विरेफोदरवत्तमः ।
अविचारितसिद्ध्येवं तमस्तज्जं च वीक्ष्यताम् ॥३३३॥

That sky is of the colour of the petal of a blue lotus (and) darkness is like the belly of a bee gets established without any reasoning, in the same way, let this darkness and its effect (also) be seen (as established). [333]

The verse refers to two popularly known instances of two figures of speech which involve attribution of some property of one thing to another — these are, in Vedāntic context, instances of *adhyāsa*; they help to establish the Vedāntic doctrine of *adhyāsa*. Incidentally, this refutes the Bhāṭṭa view that the sky has blue/dark colour.

स्वमहिम्ना न संसिद्ध्येत्स्वतो ऽनवगतात्मकम् ।
भावाभावौ न वस्त्वेति प्रत्याख्यातं यदात्मना ॥३३४॥

What is by nature not known in its own right would not get established by its own extent (=greatness). Existence or non-existence (of any worldly thing) is not an existent thing, since this thing gets disproved (as real) owing to (the existence of) the Ātman. [334]

तस्मादजायमानैव जायमानेव लक्ष्यते ।
अनूभूतिस्तदज्ञानहेतूत्थानात्मजन्मना ॥३३५॥

Therefore, experience which, though it does not arise (lit. it is born), appears like arising (i.e. being born) on account of the rise of (i.e. awareness of) the non-Ātman which springs from the ignorance about that (=Ātman, viz. *cit* above); [335]

तद्विनाशे ऽपि तत्साक्ष्याद्विनश्यन्तीव लक्ष्यते ।
यतो ऽतः कार्यतां तस्या नेश्वरो ऽपि प्रसाधयेत् ॥३३६॥

since, when that[1] gets destroyed, it[2] also gets destroyed on account of the character (of the Ātman) as the seer. Therefore, even the Lord would not be able to establish experience as an effect. [336]

[1]This means: the awareness of the non-Ātman.

[2]This means: the experience.

स्वात्मसाक्षिकतां मुक्त्वा भावाभावात्मवस्तुनः ।
यतो ऽसिद्धिरतः प्रत्यङ्निरस्ताखिलविक्रियः ॥३३७॥

Since a thing of the nature of existence and non-existence cannot get established except with the capacity of one's own Ātman (=the inner self) to be the witness, therefore, the inner self is completely devoid of all modifications. [337]

कार्यं सर्वं यतो दृष्टं प्रागभावपुरःसरम् ।
तस्यापि संवित्साक्षित्वात्प्रागभावो न संविदः ॥३३८॥

Since every effect is seen[1] to have a preceding non-existence of it and that (preceding non-existence) has the character of being witnessed by the knowing one[2], there is (therefore) no non-existence of *saṃvid* 'the knowing one'. [338]

The argument is: The thing and its *prāgabhāva* are both knowables for *saṃvid* which exists now and which existed before also. Therefore, it is ever-abiding.

[1] = *saṃvidavagata*.

[2] *saṃvid* = *cit*.

प्रमात्राद्यतिरेकेण ह्यसंविदितरूपकम् ।
मेयं सिद्धमिहैवैतन्न वेदादन्यतः क्वचित् ॥३३९॥

Only here (=in the *saṃvid*) is established this object to be known[1], (viz. that) whose form (etc.) is *indeed* not known as apart from its knower etc.; not from anywhere else than in the Veda (viz. Vedānta). [339]

[1]It means: the uniqueness of the Ātman.

वस्तुवृत्तमपेक्ष्यैतन्न स्वतः परतस्तमः ।
तज्जं वा तत्तमो ऽपेक्ष्य ह्यव्याकृतगिरोच्यते ॥३४०॥

With this happening of things in view it is that this darkness

(=ignorance) or its effect (gets established) in its own right or on account of another (and), therefore, only with that darkness kept in view it is expressed by the word *avyākṛta*. [340]

This verse rejects the *anirvācyatā* 'indescribability' of *tamas* on the ground that it was mentioned in the Śruti as 'difficult to explain (ineffable) — *durnirūpa*'. NKL points to earlier statement to this effect in SV 176.

चिदाभासं तमो ज्ञेयं नाज्ञासिषमितीक्षणात् ।
जगज्जनिस्थितिलया एवंभूते परात्मनि ॥३४१॥

Darkness is to be known as the appearance (or semblance) of sentience, since there is the experience 'I did not know.'. Origin, sustenance and merger of the world (can be postulated) when the highest Ātman has been (accepted as) such. [341]

तमःप्रधानः क्षेत्राणां चित्प्रधानश्चिदात्मनाम् ।
परः कारणतामेति भावनाज्ञानकर्मभिः ॥३४२॥

The highest, who is principally darkness and who is principally sentience, becomes the cause respectively of the fields[1] and of those who have sentience as their nature[2] on account of (thier earlier) impression(s), ignorance and actions. [342]

This verse explains why there originated this varied world (*viṣamā sṛṣṭi*).

[1]They means: inanimate things, or bodies.

[2]These are beings or knowers of the fields.

यावत्कार्यगतं किंचिद्भावनादि समीक्ष्यते ।
तमसा बीजभूतं तद्व्यज्यते संस्कृतेः पुनः ॥३४३॥

Whatever (viz.) impression(s) etc. belonging to the effect is seen here becomes the seed and it becomes revealed again thanks to darkness because of the impression(s). [343]

This refers to *pralayasarga*.

तमो नियामकं यस्मात्स्वकार्याणां तदन्वयात् ।
ऊर्ध्वं व्यक्तेः पुरा चैव तदेवातो नियामकम् ॥३४४॥

Since ignorance is the determining factor in respect of its products — for it continues to be in them — therefore the same (viz. ignorance) is the determining factor after the products have become manifest and also before (they appear). [344]

नियम्यं कार्यमापेक्ष्य नियन्तैष तमोवधिः ।
तेष्वेव चित्स्वभावः सन्साक्षितां प्रतिपद्यते ॥३४५॥

In those very (products), this controller which has the nature of sentience attains the character of a witness, limited as it is by darkness, with respect to the products to be controlled. [345]

निगीर्णं सज्जलूकादि दुष्टं देशं यथाश्रयेत् ।
भावनाज्ञानकर्माणि तथा यान्ति तमस्विनम् ॥३४६॥

As wasps which have sucked (blood in one part of the body) resort to another (part), that is a spoilt part[1], so do impressions, ignorance and actions accompany (lit. go to) one who is possessed of darkness. [346]

[1]SP and NKL quote: *sampṛktād duṣṭaśuddhāśrāj jalūkā duṣṭaśoṇitam, ādatte prathamaṃ haṃsaḥ kṣīraṃ kṣīrodakād iva* (untraceable).

उत्पत्तिस्थितिनाशेषु कारणं नातिवर्तते ।
कार्यं सर्वं यथा लोके तथेहाप्यवसीयताम् ॥३४७॥

Let this be concluded that in origin, sustenance and destruction (of the world) the cause does not vary, but as all products in this world (vary) here also (do impressions, ignorance and actions vary) as well. [347]

कार्येष्वपि च सर्वेषु कर्तृत्वं यत्समीक्ष्यते ।
अस्यैव तद्विजानीयादतः सर्वकृदुच्यते ॥३४८॥

And the agency which is seen here in respect of all these activities, that may one know as of this one only; therefore he is called the maker of all (of them). [348]

तत्तेज ऐक्षत इति तेजोदेहं सदेव तु ।
उत्तरोत्तरकार्याणां श्रुत्या स्रष्टृतयोच्यते ॥३४९॥

In the Śruti *tat teja aikṣata* that cause itself, being the existent and having *tejas* as its body is declared as the creator of evey subsequent product. [349]

तथा संवर्गविद्यायामप्राणः प्राणतां गतः ।
अध्यात्ममधिदैवं च प्राणवायुतयोदितः ॥३५०॥

So (also), in the (context of) the lore of *saṃvarga*,[1] (some) non-*prāṇa* (i.e. non-sentience) has become Prāṇa with reference to the embodied self, and with reference to the deities, the same is called *prāṇavāyu* 'the vital breath'. [350]

[1]Cf. CU 4.3.3.

नामोपक्रममाशान्तामरनाभिनिदर्शनात् ।
ओतप्रोतं जगत्सर्वं प्राण एवोपदिश्यते ॥३५१॥

By citing the example of the spokes and the hub (of a wheel), the Śruti has declared that this whole world, (whose description has) the beginning (in) *nāma* and the end in *āśā*, is only Prāṇa, fully woven by it length-wise and cross-wise. [351]

[1]Cf. CU 7.1.3; 7.15.1.

तथैवाकाशशब्देन तत्र तत्रैष एव तु ।
तदेतत्सत्यमिति च सबीजः पर उच्यते ॥३५२॥

So also, only this one, the highest one, is mentioned at various places by the word *ākāśa*[1] and in the passage *tad etat satyam*[2] as possessing the seed (of creation). [352]

[1]Cf. CU 1.9.1.
[2]Cf. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 1.2.1; 2.1.1.

प्राणो ह्येष सर्वभूतैरिति चाथर्वणे वचः ।
प्राणबन्धनं सोम्येति सर्वकारणमुच्यते ॥३५३॥

There is a statement of the *Ātharvaṇopaniṣad* also: *prāṇo hy eṣa sarvabhūtaiḥ*[1] and in (the Śruti passage) *prāṇabandhanaṃ somya*[2] (also) it is described as the cause of everything. [353]

[1]*Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 3.1.4.
[2]CU 6.8.2.

एष स्वकार्यं संश्रित्य नानाभेदान्प्रपद्यते ।
स्वोत्सृष्टतोयधाराद्यैर्वैश्वरूप्यं रविर्यथा ॥३५४॥

Having resorted to its own effect (which is varied) this (Ātman) transforms into a number of varied objects as the sun transforms into variety of forms by means of (i.e. having resorted to) showers etc.[1] of waters sent down by itself. [354]

[1]The word etc. refers to a mirror and other bases of reflections.

प्राणभूतादिजन्मैव जन्मात्मन इहोच्यते ।
वियतो ऽजन्मनो जन्म यथा कुम्भादिजन्मना ॥३५५॥

Here[1], the origination of Prāṇa and *bhūta*(s) etc. itself is called the origination of the Ātman (=individual self), as the birth of ether, which does not (really) become born (is described as such) on account of the pitcher etc. having a birth. [355]

[1]That is, in scriptures and among people.

एतस्माज्जायते प्राणो मनः सर्वेन्द्रियाणि च ।
नाव्याकृतं परादन्यदागमादवगम्यते ॥३५६॥

From this (Ātman) are born Prāṇa, *manas* and all sense-organs and the unmanifest is not anything else than the highest (Ātman) — (so) is known from the Śruti. [356]

स्वकार्याण्येव संश्रित्य मृदसाधारणा यथा ।
सामान्यरूपतामेति स्वकार्यैः कारणं तथा ॥३५७॥

As clay is uncommon (i.e. single), with reference to its own effects, so also does a cause become the common characteristic with (i.e. by becoming) the effets. [357]

तदेतन्नित्यमज्ञानं तज्जकालाद्यनाप्लुतेः ।
सर्वकालानुवर्त्येव लोके नित्यमितीर्यते ॥३५८॥

This ever existing ignorance is described in this world as eternal and existing at all times on account of the non-destruction of time etc. which are its effects. [358]

नित्यस्यानुच्छित्तिरिति चोद्यस्यापि न संभवः ।
नित्याज्ञानसमुच्छित्तौ यतः प्रामाण्यमाश्रितम् ॥३५९॥

There is no possibility of also the hypothetical argument, viz. whatever is eternal does not get destroyed ..., since in respect of the destruction of this eternally existing ignorance is accepted the authority (of the Śruti). [359]

प्रमान्तरैरविज्ञातं प्रमेयं वस्तु भण्यते ।
तत्तत्त्वमात्रगं तत्स्थध्वान्तनुन्मानमुच्यते ॥३६०॥

What is called (by us as) the object of knowing (in the Vedānta) is what is unknown by any other (forms of) right knowledge (and) what exists only in the reality (described therein [1]) and removes the darkness residing in it [2] is called the means of knowing that (object). [360]

[1]This refers to the Vedānta.
[2]This means: by superimposition.

आगन्तु चेदिहाज्ञानमनिर्मोक्षः प्रसज्यते ।
पुरेवानागतं भूयो नैष्यतीत्यत्र का प्रमा ॥३६१॥

If ignorance (is considered) here as adventitious, there would result the contingency of the absence of liberation. What right knowledge could there be, viz. holding that it will not come (once) again — the one which had not come (earlier)? [361]

[1]Namely, the Ātman and the world.

कार्यकारणरूपेण द्वयोरव्यतिरेकतः ।
गुणप्रधानरूपेण कार्यकारणगीरियम् ॥३६२॥

On account of the non-difference of the two[1] apart from (that they are) the cause and the effect, (the Śruti makes) this statement of the effect and the cause in the form of the subordinate and the principal. [362]

न कारणं विना कार्यं न कार्यं कारणं विना ।
अन्योन्यापेक्षतः सिद्धेर्विनान्योन्यं न तद्द्वयम् ॥३६३॥

There cannot be any cause without an effect (and) there cannot be any effect without a cause. Thus, on account of their existence with mutual expectation, the pair of them does not exist as either without the other. [363]

भावनाज्ञानकर्मादि कार्योत्पत्तेः प्रयोजकम् ।
तद्भूतौ तदभिव्यक्तेस्तत्स्वापे ऽव्याकृतात्मता ॥३६४॥

Impressions, ignorance and actions etc.[1] is conducive to the rise of the effect.[2] There is the manifestation of that (viz. the effect), when that (viz. impressions[3] etc.) has manifested. (Therefore,) during the sleep of that[3], there is the character of (the world) being unmanifest. [364]

[1]The word etc. stands for Īśvara, atoms, Prakṛti, effort etc.
[2]This refers to the various beings principally.
[3]That is, impressions etc. not manifesting.

स्वकर्तुरुपभोगार्थं कर्माव्याकृतरूपकम् ।
व्यक्तीभूतं प्रयुङ्क्ते क्ष्माबग्न्यन्तं साधनत्रयम् ॥३६५॥

When activity, which had not manifested for its own agent's enjoyment, becomes manifest, then it produces (lit. employs) the triad of the means (of activity), viz. earth, water and fire. [365]

वाय्वाकाशौ समाश्रित्य पूर्वेषां साधनात्मता ।
त्रयाणामप्यतस्तानि वाय्वाकाशौ प्रयुञ्जते ॥३६६॥

The nature of being the means (of further manifestation/production) which obtains in the earlier (mentioned) three also, after they have resorted to wind and ether. Therefore, (it is held that) they[1] produce them[2]. [366]

[1]Namely, impressions etc.
[2]That is, earth, water and fire.

प्रयोजकप्रयोज्यत्वं कर्मसाधनयोर्भवेत् ।
स्वस्वामिभोगसिद्ध्यर्थमेवं व्याकृततेष्यते ॥३६७॥

The character of being the impeller (i.e. productive force) and being what is to be impelled would belong to activity and its means (respectively). Thus is accepted (lit. expected/desired = explained) the manifestedness (of the activity etc.) for (securing) the enjoyment of their own master. [367]

व्यक्तिर्नियतकालैव जगतो ऽव्यक्तरूपिणः ।
अन्तर्यामिकृता चैषा नान्यः संभाव्यते प्रभोः ॥३६८॥

(This) manifestation (of the world), which is (in the early stage) unmanifest, is bound by a definite time (for it) and it is caused by the inner self. Nobody else than that master (viz. the

Ātman = the inner self) can be (the cause/producer). [368]

वायोरिव प्रवृत्तिः स्यात्तथा चैवोपसंहृतिः ।
निर्निमित्तात्तथैवेशाज्जगज्जन्मस्थितिक्षयाः ॥३६९॥

As there would be (produced) an activity (in a body) as well as its cessation by the wind, even when there is no cause for it, in the same way, origin, sustenance and destruction of the world (would be produced) by the master. [369]

This sets aside the possible notion that the creator is an embodied being.

न प्रयोज्यो यदा भोगः स्वाम्यर्थः कर्मणस्तदा ।
हित्वा कर्माखिला व्यक्तीरविशेषात्मतां व्रजेत् ॥३७०॥

When there is no enjoyment for the master to be produced by activity (etc.), then, having given up activity and all these manifestations, (the master) goes (back) to the state of being qualitiless. [370]

अस्य द्वैतेन्द्रजालस्य यदुपादानकारणम् ।
अज्ञानं तदुपाश्रित्य ब्रह्म कारणमुच्यते ॥३७१॥

Having resorted to that ignorance, which is the material cause of this magic show of duality (= manifest or patent to each one of us), it is said that the Brahman is the cause of it. [371]

अज्ञानमात्रोपाधित्वादविद्यामुषितात्मभिः ।
कौटस्थ्यान्निर्द्वयो ऽप्यात्मा साक्षीत्यध्यस्यते जडैः ॥३७२॥

The dull-witted, whose (consciousness of the) Ātman is over-powered (lit. robbed) by ignorance on account of (their Ātman having) the limitation of ignorance alone, superimpose the character of the witness on even this Ātman who is unique, being immovable (= unchangeable). [372]

ज्योतिषामपि तज्ज्योतिरसद्धीपरिमोषणात् ।
तमोरूपमिवाभाति भानुर्नक्तंदृशामिव ॥३७३॥

It is the light of all lights on account of (its) removing (lit. robbing away) the false notion (and yet) it appears to be having the form of darkness as the sun (seems to be dark) for those who see (only) at night. [373]

[1]Cf. BU 4.4.16.

मोहतत्कार्यनीडं यत्कूटस्थाभासरूपकम् ।
ज्ञानं तदविनाभूतः परः साक्षीति भण्यते ॥३७४॥

The highest one, who is not separated from the knowledge[1], which is the nest (basis/support) of ignorance and its effect and has the appearance of the immovable (Ātman), is decsribed (in the Śruti) as the highest witness.[2] [374]

[1]This is *vijñāna*.
[2]Cf. *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 6.11.

इदं तत्सर्ववेदेषु यथाभूतार्थवित्तये ।
सदेवेत्यादिभिर्वाक्यैः कारणं ब्रह्म गीयते ॥३७५॥

This is that known Brahman, (the one which is) declared (lit. sung) in all the Vedas, in such statements as *sad eva* ...[1] in order that there is (on the part of the hearers) the acquisition of the knowledge of Reality as it is. [375]

[1]For instance, CU 6.2.1: *sad eva somyedam agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyam* ...

सर्वज्ञः सर्वशक्तिश्च सर्वात्मा सर्वगो ध्रुवः ।
जगज्जनिस्थितिध्वंसहेतुरेष सदेश्वरः ॥३७६॥

This Lord is ever omniscient, omnipotent, self of all, present in all, immovable, and the cause of origin, sustenance and destruction of the world.[1] [376]

Cf. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 1.1.9.

यः पृथिव्यामितीशो ऽसावन्तर्यामी जगद्गुरुः ।
हरिर्ब्रह्मा पिनाकीति बहुधैको ऽपि गीयते ॥३७७॥

The Lord, who is thus, on this earth[1] the one existing inside, (everyone) and the teacher of the world, is, though one, variously sung as Hari, Brahmā, Pināk in (etc.) [377]

[1]Or, is it possible that Sureśvara cites *yaḥ pṛthivyām* ... as the *pratīka* of some verse to the effect that the Lord is *īśo 'sav* ...'?

कूटस्थस्य न साक्षित्वं द्वितीयासंगतेर्भवेत् ।
नाशिनो ऽपि न साक्षित्वं नाशेनाव्यतिरेकतः ॥३७८॥

The immovable could not have the character of a witness unless it has association with another; so also the perishable cannot have the character of a witness, on account of its not being apart from destruction.[1] [378]

[1]That is to say: A perishable is associated with some other which is perishable.

अज्ञानमात्रहेतौ तु सर्वमेतत्समञ्जसम् ।
कर्तृत्वाद्यन्यथाज्ञानहेतुत्वादात्मरूपिणः ॥३७९॥
प्रत्यग्रूपस्य स्थास्नुत्वाज्ज्ञातुर्मोहेन चान्वयात् ।
कूटस्थस्यापि साक्षित्वमागमापायिनं प्रति ॥३८०॥

But all this is reasonable when it is (accepted that the world) is caused by ignorance alone, since agency etc. of what is the inner self has false knowledge as the cause for it; [379] (and) since what is of the nature of the inner self is perennial (lit. ever-abiding) and has association with ignorance; even the immutable has the character of a witness with respect to what originates and perishes. [380]

आत्मात्मवत्त्वसंबन्ध आत्मात्माज्ञानयोर्मतः ।

परो ऽविवेको भूतानामात्माविद्येति कथ्यते ॥३८१॥

The relation between the Ātman and what has the Ātman is held to be that which obtains between the Ātman and ignorance about the Ātman. It is (therefore) that the highest (degree of) non-discrimination among (i.e. about one and the other of) the elements is called ignorance about the Ātman. [381]

ईशादिविषयान्तं यत्तदविद्याविजृम्भितम् ।
मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यान्मायिनं तु महेश्वरम् ।
इति वेदशिरःसूक्तिस्तथा चोदघृष्यते स्फुटा ॥३८२॥

Whatever (is described as) beginning with *īśa* 'Lord' and ending with (various) objects is (but) the effect of ignorance (because) the most predominent statement of the Veda, which is extremely clear, is expressed in the passage 'One should know Prakṛti as Māyā and Maheśvara as *māyin*.'[1] [382]

[1] Cf. *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 4.10.

दैवी ह्येषा गुणमयी मम मायेति च स्मृतिः ।
वैष्णवी खल्वियं मायेत्यपि लोके ऽपि गीयते ॥३८३॥

Also there is the Smṛti text 'This divine Māyā is but mine, which is made up of three qualities, ...'[1] That this Māyā which in fact belongs to Viṣṇu is sung even in the world. [383]

[1] *Gītā* 7.14

मानान्तरानधिगतं मेयं तावन्निरूपितम् ।
स्वानुभूत्यनुसारेण प्रत्यङ्मात्रसतत्त्वकम् ॥३८४॥

So far (=thus or to begin with), what is to be known and is not known by any other means of knowng is explained according to one's own experience, viz. as consisting in only the inner self together with its true nature. [384]

[1]That is: *ātmana evā jñātatvam ajñātatvaṃ cānubhavaikagamyam iti 'tad dhedam' ityādinoktam* (NKL).

एतन्निदानमधुना मिथ्याज्ञानं निरूप्यते ।
यतो बिभ्यति भूतानि संसारानर्थलक्षणात् ॥३८५॥

Now is discussed the cause of this,[1] viz. the false knowledge about (that one) having the character of the undesirable end, viz. the transmigratory existence, which (all) the beings fear. [385]

[1] Cf. SP: *karmavyutpattyā jñānaśabdo viṣayam api viṣayīkaroty etad ajñānaṃ vastu.*

यदेव नित्यमज्ञानं मिथ्याज्ञानं तदेव तु ।
कारणेतररूपेण तयोरव्यभिचारतः ॥३८६॥

Only that, which is ever ignorance about the (nature) of the Ātman, is false knowledge alone, since they, in the form of the cause and the effect, cannot be apart from each other. [386]

हेत्वन्तरानपेक्षं सत्तदव्याकृतरूपकम् ।
व्यक्तां स्वयमेवैति निमित्तं नास्त्यसंहृतम् ॥३८७॥

That existent, which has not manifested itself in any form, does not depend on any cause other than itself (for becoming manifest). Of itself, it becomes manifest. There is no cause, (for it is) not brought in.[1] [387]

[1]Activity of any *indriya*s etc. which were mentioned earlier are not necessary for *avidyā* or *ajñāna* which can by itself create the world. Also, at the time of *pralaya*, activity of *indriya*s was completely withdrawn.

सुषुप्तादुत्थिती राज्ञः स्वयमेव यथा तथा ।
जग्धाशेषजगन्मूर्तेरव्यक्ताद्व्याकृतिर्मुहुः ॥३८८॥

As a king awakens from his sleep, of himself, so also there is the manifestation (once again) from the unmanifest of one that had devoured the entire (collection of) worldly things. [388]

अनिश्चिता यथा रज्जुरिति न्यायोपबृंहितम् ।
स्फुटार्थं गौडपादीयं वचो ऽर्थे ऽत्रैव गीयते ॥३८९॥

It is only in this context (sense) that there is the clear statement of Gauḍapāda made (lit. sung) – and it is accompanied by an example – viz. 'As a rope, not definitely ascertained, ...' [389]

Cf. *Gauḍapādakārikā* 2.17:

aniścitā yathā rajjur andhakāre vikalpitā /
sarpadhārādibhir bhāvais tadvad ātmā vikalpitaḥ //

तदिदं नामरूपाभ्यामनामकमरूपकम् ।
एवं व्याक्रियताज्ञानहेतुमात्रव्यपाश्रयात् ॥३९०॥

Thus, this one, having no name and no form, was thus manifested by name and form by resorting to only one cause, viz. ignorance. [390]

अभिधानाकृतिर्नामशब्देनेहाभिधीयते ।
अभिधेयाकृतिस्तद्वद्रूपमित्युपदिश्यते ॥३९१॥

Here the word *nāma* expresses what is called *abhidhāna*[1]. In the same way, the word *rūpa* is used (lit. enunciated) for conveying what is described.[2] [391]

[1]Namely, *śabda* 'a word, signifier'.
[2]Namely, *artha* 'meaning, the signified'.

एवं द्वाभ्यां प्रकाराभ्यामीशो व्याकृतजन्मनाम् ।
व्यवहाराय पर्याप्तो न त्वव्यक्तात्मना यतः ॥३९२॥

Thus, by these two ways is the master capable of the dealing

related to the things that have become manifest; since he is not (able to do so) in his own unmanifest form. [392]

This verse clarifies the idea that *nāmarūpābhyām* (dual form) can be related to multitude of objects created because the two members of the compound word necessarily signify two linguistic categories.

नाम्नः सामान्यमात्रस्य त्वसाविति समीरणम् ।
विशेषनाम्ना संयोज्य देवदत्तादिनोच्यते ॥३९३॥

The word *asau* is expressive of a name which has only general (character); it is uttered after connecting it with a proper name such as Devadatta. [393]

This explains BUB: *devadatto yajñadattaḥ iti vā nāmāsya ity asaunāmāyam.*

[1]Cf SP: *nāmasamānyam devadattādinā viśeṣanāmnā saṃyojya.*

तद्वद्रूपस्य सामान्यं रूपमित्युपदिश्यते ।
तदुपात्तविशेषं सच्छुक्लकृष्णादिनोच्यते ॥३९४॥

In the same way, the general character of a form is expressed by the word *rūpa* (and) that, which has assumed particularlity, is mentioned (lit. uttered) as white, black etc. [394]

एवेत्यवधृतावेतदात्मवृत्तव्यपेक्षया ।
आत्माविद्यासमुत्थाभ्यामेव व्याक्रियते परः ॥३९५॥
न तु विध्वस्तनिःशेषप्रत्यगज्ञानतद्भव-
सामान्यभेदैकात्म्याख्यतदनन्यप्रमात्मना ॥३९६॥

In the use of the restriction by the word *eva*, (it is emphasised that), the highest (Ātman) is differentiated only by (name and form which have) arisen from ignorance about (the nature of) the Ātman — (yes, only) after keeping in view the unique nature of the knowledge which is called oneness of collectivity and particularity that have arisen from that one who has destroyed the entire ignorance about the inner self.[1] [395-396]

[1]Cf. verse 208 above; the thought in that verse is here clarified further.

आदावव्याकृतं तत्त्वं नामरूपक्रियात्मना ।
स्वयं तद्व्याकृतिमगाद्यथैतर्हि तथैव तत् ॥३९७॥

As, in the beginning, Reality which was undifferentiated, became differentiated as having the nature of name and form; so that is even today.
This is the meaning of *tad idam*. [397]

नामरूपाभ्यामेवेति न समुच्चयनिश्चितौ ।
समस्तव्यस्तरूपाभ्यां लोके ऽपि व्याकृतिर्यतः ॥३९८॥

The words *nāmarūpābhyām eva* are not for determining that there is the ensemble of the two (responsible for the creation of the world), since there is in the world the manifestation (of things by both of these) in collected and differentiated forms. [398]

This is to say that differentiation of the worldly things can be either by name or by form or by both of them together.

जातितो बधिरस्येह व्यक्तिः स्याद्रूपमात्रजा ।
जात्यन्धादेश्च नाम्नैव तथा चोभयथाप्यसौ ॥३९९॥

As appearance (of the things) would be for one, who was born deaf, only in respect of their form and for one, born blind etc.[1], merely in respect of name (etc.), so also is the Ātman (manifest) in two ways: (That is) by name and form (only). [399]

This explains the thought in the preceding verse.
[1]Cf. NKL: *ādipadena utkhātanetrasaṃgrahaḥ*.

अज्ञातात्मैकहेतूनां मिथोपेक्षात्मनां श्रुतौ ।
नेयत्तास्तीह तत्त्वानामानन्त्यान्न क्रमस्तथा ॥४००॥

Here (in the world of things), which have only the unknown Ātman as their cause, there is not any limit in respect of hearing about such things as have the nature of expectancy of one another[1] and also there is no specific order in them because of their infiniteness. [400]

This verse explains why there is no mention of the number and order of the things differentiated among themselves.

[1]That is, being dependent on.

प्रक्रियानियमो नापि पुंव्युत्पत्तिप्रधानतः ।
प्रतिश्रुति विगीतिश्च प्रक्रियाणां समीक्ष्यते ॥४०१॥

So also there is not any difinite process (of creation meant in the Śruti statement) for the reason that importance (is accepted only) of the knowledge of the Puruṣa (=Ātman); also in every Śruti text, there is noticed varied exposition (lit. singing) of the processes (of creation)[2]. [401]

This rests on an objection, arising from the preceding verse, that there is no definite form of 'creation'.

[1]This mention of the Ātman as Pum (=Puruṣa) is significant in the context of the name of the Brāhmaṇa, viz. Puruṣavidha Brāhmaṇa.

[2]*prakriyāṇāṃ vigitiḥ* is for *prakriyāṇāṃ vigītayaḥ*; so also *samīkṣyate* for *samīkṣyante*. SP points out: *kvacid ākāśādikā sṛṣṭiḥ kvacid agnyādika kvacid akramaiveti vipratipattiḥ* and also refers to the reason for it, viz. *sṛṣṭer avivakṣitatva*.

यया यया भवेत्पुंसां व्युत्पत्तिः प्रत्यगात्मनि ।
सा सैव प्रक्रियेह स्यात्साध्वी सा चानवस्थिता ॥४०२॥

By whichever (of the processes of creation) there might (dawn) on men the knowledge about the inner self; each process (among them) would, in this context[1], hold good (and) that would not be firmly established which refer to creation. [402]

This verse presupposes a question: Which among these various statement in the Śruti regarding creation [cf. note 2 on the preceding verse] should be considered as authoritative? The answer is implied: Not any of them, since creation is merely imagined; this becomes clear from the next two verses.

[1]That is, in these Śruti texts.

[2]That would be contradicted by some other.

उद्भूतिस्थितिहानीनां न क्वचित् संभवो यथा ।
मुख्यां वृत्तिं समाश्रित्य तथोदर्के ऽपि वक्ष्यते ॥४०३॥

As (explained here that) there is at no time (*na kvacit*) any possibility of origin, sustenance and dissolution (lit. loss) (of the world), when we resort to the primary purport (lit. function) (of the Śruti passages), so will it be explained in the later portion as well. [403]

न जायते जन्यते वा नापि हन्ति न हन्यते ।
तमःसंवृतदृष्टीनां षड्विकारादिवीक्षणम् ॥४०४॥
यदर्थं सर्वशास्त्राणां प्रवृत्तिरतिविस्तरा ।
आत्मज्ञानावतारार्थः सर्वशास्त्रसमुद्यमः ॥४०५॥

That is not born, nor is it produced; neither it kills, nor does it get killed; (it is only) on the part of those whose sight is wrapped by darkness that there is seeing (viz. the thought) of six modifications etc.[1] [404]

(The word He in 'He has entered here.' is that) for the explanation of which[2] there is an extensive activity of all[3] Śāstras — (indeed) the effort of all Śāstras[4] is for introducing the knowledge of the Ātman . [405]

Verse 405 presents what is expected by the word *saḥ* in *sa eṣa iha praviṣṭaḥ*. It explains *yadarthaḥ sarvaśāstrārambhaḥ* in BUB.

[1]SP points out that the word etc. refers to the entire *anātmavarga* 'all the objects which are non-Ātman'.

[2]*yadartham* (adv.) replaces *yadarthaḥ* (adj.) in BUB. It can be translated alternatively as: for explaining the meaning of which. That is, for the explanation of which.

[3]The word all signifies all the different systems of philosophy, Vedic and non-Vedic.

[4]NKL only refers to the Śāstras of 'Vātsyāyana etc.', but offers no comment. Yet, it is interesting to note Madhusūdhana Sarasvatī on *Mahimnastotra* verse 7: *kāmaśāstram apy āyurvedāntargatam eva ... tatra vātsyāyanena pañcādhyāyātmakaṃ kāmaśāstram praṇītam, tasya ca viṣayavairāgyam eva prayojanam, śāstroddīpitamārgeṇāpi viṣayabhoge duḥkhamātraparyavasānāt.* Also see verse 408 below.

विरोधः सर्वशास्त्राणां स्वाभिधेयव्यपेक्षया ।
निवृत्त्यर्थे ऽविरोधित्वादत एतत्समीरितम् ॥४०६॥

Mutual opposition among all Śāstras (occurs) owing to (their giving prominence to) their own subject matter; (but) on account of (their) being non-opposed to the purpose, viz. cessation of transmigratory existence, therefore this[1] is stated (in the Bhāṣya). [406]

[1]Namely, BUB: *yadarthaḥ sarvaśāstrārambhaḥ.*

स्वत एव यतः पुंसां प्रवृत्तिः स्वार्थसिद्धये ।
तत्रानुवादि शास्त्रं स्यान्निवृत्तावेव तन्मतिः ॥४०७॥

Because activity of men is of itself for the achievement of what is desired by themselves, the Śāstra (merely) follows that (lit. is only repetitive in that respect); but the knowledge (acquired) from that (ends) only in withdrawing (from activity). [407]

The verse proceeds from this idea: While the Śāstras prescribe various activities towards some purposes of men, they are only following men's desires – they are to be performed for some result, which cannot, therefore, be permanent. Therefore, the Śāstric prescriptions are in reality towards the purpose of withdrawing from attachment etc.

अपि वात्स्यायनादीनां शास्त्राणामुक्तहेतुतः ।

प्रामाण्यमविरुद्धं स्यादैकात्म्यज्ञानजन्मने ॥४०८॥

In the case of the Śāstra(s) of Vātsyāyana (etc.) also, their authority is unopposed owing to the reason (already) stated; viz. (their teaching is) for the rise of the knowledge of the Ātman.[1] [408]

[1]Cf. note 1 on verse 405 above.

प्रवर्तमानः पुरुषः शास्त्रोद्दीपितवर्त्मना ।
प्रवृत्तिविषयं दुष्टं दृष्ट्वातो विनिवर्तते ॥४०९॥

A man proceeding to activity by a path illumined (for him) by Śāstra, recedes from it on seeing the object towards which is his activity (directed) as affected by impurity. [409]

This clarifies how Śāstras propounded by Vātsyāyana and others lead one to cessation from activity described in them. Cf. the remark of Madhusūdhana Sarasvatī mentioned in verse 405 note 1 above. SP has a longish explanation with citations, to the same effect, viz. *śāstrāntarāṇy api ... brahmaṇi paryavasyantīti bhāvaḥ.*

अनित्यदुःखशून्यत्वं पदार्थानां ब्रुवन्स्फुटम् ।
बुद्धो ऽपि रागाद्युच्छित्तौ यतते नात्मनिह्नुतौ ॥४१०॥

Even the Buddha attempts towards (i.e. preaches to bring about) the destruction of attachment etc., declaring clearly that objects of desire are impermanent (and also causes of) misery, and void; (and thus) he does not (attempt) for concealing (the nature of) the Ātman.[1] [410]

This verse shows how Sureśvara views the Buddha's Nihilism. That is in reply to an opinion expressed in *nairātmyamārgam adhigamya bhavanti muktāḥ tasmād asāv atiśayena vicāryate 'tra* (cited by SP-untraceable). Also, *yathāha*: *sarvajñavacanārtho nāma kṣaṇikanairātmyādicāturārthysatyatattvaparijñānena sakalasaṃsāraduḥkhanivṛttyākhyaḥ paramapuruṣārtha iti* (cited by SP).

[1]That is, negating the Ātman. NKL points out: *nirākartur*

ātmatvena tannirākaraṇāsiddheḥ.

त्याग एव हि सर्वेषां मोक्षसाधनमुत्तमम् ।
त्यजतैव हि तज्ज्ञेयं त्यक्तुः प्रत्यक्परं पदम् ॥४११॥

All the Śāstras verily hold only renunciation (of desires) as the best means towards (achieving) liberation and, therefore, one who renounces alone can find (lit. know) it; for the highest one is the inner self of the renouncer.[1] [411]

This emphasises the unity of all Śāstras in holding renunciation (of desires) as the means to liberation. Thus, any possible notion regarding Digambara Jainas' opposition is averted.

[1] = SV 215. SP under this explains: Liberation implies knowledge (of Reality). Also, the second line of the verse is intended to set aside the notion that (ritual) activity can be the means to liberation, for it has differentiation of things as its basis.

एकवाक्यत्वतो तद्वा ऐकात्म्यज्ञानजन्मने ।
वेदशास्त्रस्य कृत्स्नस्य तथा पूर्वमवादिषम् ॥४१२॥

Or rather, the entire Vedic Śāstra is for (giving) rise to the knowledge of the uniqueness of the Ātman on account of its having (only) one purport of it; so have I declared before[1]. [412]

This is another interpretation of BUB: *yadarthaḥ sarvaśāstrārambhaḥ.*

[1] Cf verse 401 above.

प्रमाणानि च शास्त्राणि तत्प्रामाण्यं न चान्यतः ।
अज्ञातात्मावबोधित्वात्तथा पूर्वमवादिषम् ॥४१३॥
यस्मिंश्चाविद्ययाध्यासः संसारानर्थलक्षणः ।
स्वाभाविक्या कृतो मिथ्या शुक्त्यादौ रजतादिवत् ॥४१४॥

Śāstras are authoritative and their authoritativeness is not from anything else[1], for they are informative about the Ātman that is not known before; so have I declared before.[2] [413]

(That Ātman) on which there is superimposition that has the characteristic of the undesirable (end, viz.) transmigratory existence, is caused by the natural (i.e. beginingless) ignorance as (also by the false superimposition of) silver etc. on a shell etc.[3] [414]

[1]Supply: (than the teaching about the uniqueness of the Ātman). Cf. *Kaṭhopoaniṣad* 1.2.15: *sarve vedā yat padam āmananti.*

[2]Cf. verse 405 above.

[3]Cf. Adhyāsabhāṣya (p.32): *sarvathāpi tv anyasyānyadharmāvabhāsatāṃ na vyabhicarati.*

ननु सामान्यविज्ञानविशेषाज्ञानसंश्रयात् ।
जातरूप्यस्मृतेर्लोके मिथ्याज्ञानं प्रसिद्ध्यति ॥४१५॥

Indeed one might say:[1] In this world, false knowledge can occur on account of the remembrance of gold (which originates) from one's resorting to (some) general (characteristic of it) (and) ignorance of some particularity of some object. [415]

[1]The objection to accepting the superimposition of non-Ātman on the Ātman proceeds from the following reasons: Absence of any *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* as related and also the remembrance (i.e. memory) of an object that was seen earlier.

यत्राध्यासो यदध्यस्तं भेदसिद्धौ तयोर्मृषा ।
ज्ञानं जगति संसिद्धं सा चैकात्म्ये ऽतिदुर्लभा ॥४१६॥

There is in this world known (lit. established as existent) false knowledge for establishing the difference between two things, viz. that on which there is superimposition (of another) and that which is superimposed (on it). But[1] that[2] is extremely difficult (to find/obtain) in respect of the uniqueness of the Ātman. [416]

This argument proceeds on the ground that every superimposition is based on existence of differences, but they do not exist if one

accepted *aikātmya*.

[1] *ca* is literally 'and', here meaning 'but'.

[2] This is for *sā* referring to *saṃsiddhi* 'getting established or known' (of *mithyājñāna*) in contrast with *mṛṣājñānaṃ saṃsiddhaṃ*.

समस्तव्यस्तमैकात्म्यं येषां चापास्तभेदकम् ।
चोद्यमेतत्समानं स्यादुभयोरपि पक्षयोः ॥४१७॥

This objection is also in the case of (to be held against) those for whom the uniqueness of the Ātman consisting in totality as well as severality (of things) and (also such) as has cast off these distinctions. In the case of both the views, (the objection) is the same. [417]

The argument is extended, i.e. directed towards also those who hold *bhedābheda* in respect of Reality.

न नः परिहृतेनार्थश्चोद्येनानेन कश्चन ।
प्रत्यङ्मोहैकहेतुत्वात्सर्वानर्थमृषामतेः ॥४१८॥

(The Siddhāntin answers:) No. We have nothing to do with any matter which is set aside[1] by this objection, on account of[2] (our) opinion that all the undesirable things are false and having the cause, only in ignorance about the inner self. [418]

[1] In Māyāvāda, the three causes of *adhyāsa*, which are earlier referred to, are not accepted and therefore the objection is untenable.

[2] That is, because of the strength in (our) opinion ...

अज्ञानमेव बाध्यं नो मानस्येह यतस्ततः ।
तच्चोद्यपरिहारो ऽतः क्रियते नाफलत्वतः ॥४१९॥

Since here (i.e. in this inquiry) ignorance (about the knower[1]) alone is to be set aside by knowledge[2], therefore, there is no refutation, by this,[3] of the objection to that (knowledge), that being purposeless. [419]

[1]That is, the Ātman.
[2]It means: which is not apart from the knower.
[3]*ataḥ* 'by this argument'. SP: *ataḥ aprāptaparāmarśī* (?)

मिथ्याज्ञानातिरेकेण नान्यदज्ञानमिष्यते ।
येषां तान्प्रति चोद्यं स्यान्न त्वज्ञातात्मवादिनाम् ॥४२०॥

The objection could be (valid) in the case of those who hold that there does not exist ignorance apart from false knowledge; and (*tu*) (it would) not (be valid against) those who hold the (usually) unknown Ātman (as Reality). [420]

नन्वज्ञानमवस्तुत्वात्कथं संसारकारणम् ।
मिथ्याज्ञानस्य वस्तुत्वात्तदेवास्त्विह कारणम् ॥४२१॥
तथा च युक्तिमद्यत्नान्महद्भिरपि भाषितम् ।
अप्रामाण्यं पुनस्त्रेधेत्यत एतत्सुसंस्थितम् ॥४२२॥

Now a question is asked: How can ignorance, being a non-real entity, be the cause of transmigratory existence? (Therefore), since false knowledge is an entity, is it to be (considered as) the cause here (in respect of transmigratory existence)? [421] So also is it stated, with specific effort and with the support of reasoning, by even the great; viz. unauthoritativeness is three-fold[1]? Therefore, this (objection) is well-adduced. [422]

In this verse, the objector points out how he derives support for his argument from the learned authority Kumārilabhaṭṭa according to whom, unauthoritative knowledge has three forms: *ajñāna*, *mithyājñāna* and *saṃśaya*.

[1]Cf. *Ślokavārtika* 2.54:

aprāmāṇyaṃ tridhā bhinnam mithyātvājñānasaṃśayaiḥ /
vastutvāt dvividhasyātra saṃbhavo duṣṭakāraṇāt //

SP and NKL quote *Ślokavārtika* 2.55:

avijñāne tu doṣāṇāṃ vyāpāro naiva vidyate /
kāraṇābhāvatas tv evaṃ tatsiddhaṃ nas taduktivat //

[NKL reads *vijñāne*]

किं भोः सदपि मानेन वस्तु साक्षान्निरस्यते ।
तस्मिन्निरस्ते किं शेषं यस्मिन्मानस्य मानता ॥४२३॥

(The Siddhāntin replies:) Tell me, if an existential entity, which is directly perceptible, is also discarded (by you). If it is discarded, what remains there and, in respect of what is there authoritativeness of the means of knowing? [423]

व्यञ्जकत्वात्प्रमाणानां मेयाभिव्यक्तितो ऽपरम् ।
कार्यान्तरं न संभाव्यं नितरां वस्त्वपाक्रिया ॥४२४॥

Since there is revealing (i.e. manifestation/making known) an object to be known by a means of knowing on account of its nature (or natural function) of revealing (it), there cannot be thought of any other purpose (or effect) of the same, be it superior or inferior[1]. Indeed, negating an existential object (is altogether impossible). [424]

This is one more argument: A means of knowing cannot negate an existential entity.

[1]Cf. *aparaṃ nikṛṣṭam utkṛṣṭaṃ vety arthaḥ na tv aparaśabdo 'nyaviṣayo 'ntaraśabdena punarukter iti draṣṭavyam* (SP).

मिथ्याज्ञानं कथं वस्तु न हि मिथ्येति वस्तु सत् ।
मिथ्या तद्वस्तु चेत्युक्तिर्महतामेव शोभते ॥४२५॥

Since an entity which is taken as false cannot be existent, how can false knowledge be an entity? (Therefore,) a statement, viz. that is false and that is also an existential entity, can befit only the great.[1] [425]

[1]This refers to Kumārilabhaṭṭa's argument meant in verse 422 above. Cf. NKL: *bhrāntijñānasya svarūpabādhābhāvāt viṣayamātra-bādhāt tasya* (=*bhrāntijñānasya*) *vastutvam uktam bhaṭṭapādaiḥ.*

स्वतो ऽपि यदि सा वस्तु रज्ज्वां सर्वादिका मतिः ।
रज्ज्वात्मना तथापीयमवस्त्वेवात्र बाध्यते ॥४२६॥

While the cognition in a rope that it is a serpent etc. and also that it (rope) is an existential entity, in its own right, even then that (serpent) in the form of a rope is a non-existential entity; and that gets negated. [426]

This sets aside the argument that a thing itself is negated when the wrong acceptance of another thing for it is negated.

मिथ्याज्ञानस्य कार्यत्वात्किं तत्कारणमुच्यताम् ।
अकारणं सत्कार्यं चेद्विम्भकैरपि हस्यते ॥४२७॥

If false knowledge is taken as an effect, let it be told as to what is the cause of that. If you were to say, there is an existential effect and that is without a cause, even children would laugh (at that)![1] [427]

There is discussion here whether *mithyājñāna* is some effect.
[1]The second line presupposes an objector's view that *mithyājñāna* is an effect without any cause.

रागादिकारणं चेत्स्यात्कार्यं सत्कारणं कथं ।
अवस्त्वपि च वस्त्वेव वस्तुरूपात्तदन्यतः ॥४२८॥

If (*mithyājñāna* as) an effect were to have its cause in attachment etc.[1], how could it be said to have an existent as its cause? Further, even a non-thing would be the thing itself on account of its having the form of some (other) thing as apart from it. [428]

This verse considers the nature of *mithyājñāna* either as an effect or non-effect.
[1]NKL edition and the *pratīka* in NKL read *rogādi* for *rāgādi*!

उपात्तमेयरूपत्वं मानानां सत्यतोच्यते ।
तद्बलेनैव मेयस्थं घ्नन्ति मोहादि नान्यतः ॥४२९॥

It is said that being possessed of the form of the objects of knowing[1] that are grasped is the true nature of the means

of knowing[2] (and) only by the strength of that they destroy false knowledge (=ignorance[3]) etc. connected with (lit. abiding in) the object of knowing; not in any other way. [429]

The verse presupposes the objection: What is the nature of *ajñāna* as a real/existential means?; is it like that of any means of knowing?, or of any object of knowing? There is here an answer to the first doubt.

[1]This is *mānānām meyākārabhavanam.*

[2]Namely, *meyākārabhavane eva satyatvam.*

[3]It means: of the true nature of the object of knowing. Hereafter, the word ignorance is used in such context.

तद्विपर्ययतो मिथ्या सर्वं मोहादि भण्यते ।
वस्त्वसाधारणं रूपं मोहादेर्न प्रमीयते ॥४३०॥

Ignorance etc. is all held (lit. called) as false because of its contrariness to that[1]. The particular form of a thing[2] is not understood with (or by) ignorance etc.[3] [430]

[1]Namely, the means of knowing; the contrariness lies in its not assuming the form of the object of its knowing (*meyarūpākārabhavanasya abhāvaḥ*)— this is explained in the second line.

[2]It means: the object of knowing.

[3]This is to say: Ignorance does not operate like any other means of knowing.

न च वस्तुसतत्त्वं तद्बाधात्तस्य प्रमाणतः ।
मेयप्रबोधनं मुक्त्वा न मितेः सत्यतान्यतः ॥४३१॥

Again (ignorance etc.) is not of the nature of the object of its knowing[1] on account of its[2] stultification by the means of knowing it[3], for (any) knowledge could not have validity except from that it has caused knowing of the object (of its knowing); (it) cannot be for any other reason. [431]

This is an answer to the second doubt, mentioned under verse 429 above.

[1]We follow NKL reading. That means: *vastusvarūpam*; this means: real or existential entity. The explanation *vastuvat satattvaṃ satyam* in SP suggests the use of the compound word. (And, usually, *satattvam* in this sense does not occur uncompounded.)

[2]It means: of ignorance etc.

[3]It means: of a real/existential entity.

Verses 432-445 state that mithyājñāna is removed by the knowledge of Reality.

कारकाणां हि सत्यत्वं स्वकार्यापेक्षयेष्यते ।
इतो ऽन्यथा तत्सत्यत्वं निष्फलं न च लभ्यते ॥४३२॥

[Verses 432-436 point out, on the strength of inference, that *moha* etc. are *mithyājñāna*.]

The validity of productive causes is accepted (lit. desired) indeed (only) with reference to their own effects. (Validity) other than such as this would be futile and (that kind of validity) is not noticed (anywhere). [432]

The first line of this verse states the Siddhāntin's acceptance of the reality of ignorance etc. as the means of knowing the Ātman on account of its usefulness in achieving the purpose (*arthakriyākāritva*). In the second, he discards its absolute usefulness (*pāramārthikatva*).

यद्वस्तु स्वात्मनैवास्ति तत्परार्थं न बोधकृत् ।
पारार्थ्येनैव सद्यच्च तत्परस्माद्विरुङ्न सत् ॥४३३॥

Whatever thing exists on its own strength (=in its own right) does not cause knowledge[1] for the sake of another. But,[2] whatever, accepted as existent, is for serving the purpose of another is apart from the highest (Ātman) — it is not real.[3] [433]

[1]We accept for translation the variant reading *bodhakṛt* noted in the AnSS edition, despite both the AnSS and NKL editions.

Of course, *bodhavat* can be paraphrased as *bodhayukta*: Also, there can be only one such thing, viz. the Ātman.

[2]*ca* for *tu*.

[3]This is to declare ignorance etc. as unreal.

सर्वमन्यानपेक्षं सदीक्ष्यमाणं स्वमात्रया ।
स्वात्मरूपात्पृथग्रूपं न वस्तूत्प्रेक्ष्यते ऽण्वपि ॥४३४॥

Every thing, not dependent on not another[1] (and) experienced (lit. seen) by (i.e. through) its own essence is an existential entity[2]. Even a small thing, having a nature different from what is its own,[3] cannot be imagined (as an existential entity). [434]

[1]This implies the Ātman which is really the essence of the real thing. NKL edition reads: *ananyāpekṣam* for *anyānapeṣkam*.

[2]*svamātrayā*, paraphrased as *svātmanā*, refers to the all-encompassing Ātman; naturally, of an existential entity.

[3]This again refers to the Ātman.

आत्मनैव स्वभावेन वस्त्वात्मानं बिभर्ति हि ।
नात्मनो विद्यते ऽपेक्षा वस्तुनो ऽन्यसमाश्रया ॥४३५॥

The (existential) thing[1] sustains itself by itself, viz. its own manifestation — so it is heard.[2] There is on the part of the Ātman, the existential thing, no expectation which depends on another. [435]

[1]It refers to Ātman, Reality.

[2]Cf. SP: *ātmanaḥ svamahimapratiṣṭhitatvam śrautam iti hiśabdārthaḥ*.

तस्मादविद्यासंभूतं नानात्वं प्रत्यगात्मनि ।
ब्रह्मास्मीति हि तद्ध्वंसान्न क्वचिद्भेदधीर्यतः ॥४३६॥

Therefore, (has arisen) variety in the inner self as produced from ignorance (and) owing to its destruction (which comes from[1] the awareness) 'I am Brahman.'; there is nowhere any

awareness of differentiation (as various things). [436]

[1]We have taken *yataḥ* as Ablative singular together with *taddhvaṃsāt*.

मित्युत्पत्तावनुत्पत्तिर्विरोधाद्बाध्यते यतः ।
तद्बाधे नाप्यपेक्षास्ति मिथ्याधीबाधनं प्रति ॥४३७॥

Since, on the rise of the knowledge (of the Ātman), there is no rise (of duality) owing to (their mutual) contradiction, therefore (it follows that), on the removal of that (ignorance), there is no need (lit. expectation) of the stultification of false knowledge. [437]

मिथ्याधियो ऽपि बाध्यत्वमज्ञानैकसमन्वयात् ।
मूलध्वस्तौ हतं तच्चेन्मिथ्याधीः किं करोति नः ॥४३८॥

In the case of false knowledge also, there is the (possibility of) stultification owing to its congruence[1] with ignorance; if that[2] becomes stultified, when its root[3] is destroyed, what would false knowledge do to us (i.e. what misery will it bring to us)? [438]

This verse anticipates a question in the light of the preceding verse: Is false knowledge never stulfified then?

[1]Congruence is more for *tattādātmya* 'having the nature of it'; or, this could signify *tatkāryatva* 'being its effect' also.

[2]It means: the congruence of ignorance and false knowledge.

[3]It is ignorance.

मेयरूपानुरोधित्वं मिथ्यासंशययोर्यदि ।
सम्यग्ज्ञानात्तयोर्भेदो गम्यतां केन हेतुना ॥४३९॥

If (then) false knowledge and doubt accord with the form of the object of knowing, let it be pointed out; on what ground there is distinction of the two from right knowledge . [439]

अज्ञानं संशयत्वान्नो मिथ्याज्ञानात्तथैव च ।

तयोस्तत्त्वविवक्षायामज्ञानं तत्त्वमुच्यते ॥४४०॥

Ignorance does not arise from being a doubt, so also (not) from being false knowledge; since, while ascertaining the true nature of the two[1], their true nature is called ignorance. [440]

[1]Namely, ignorance and doubt.

अज्ञात एव यद्यत्र ज्ञाते तस्मिन्न तद्भवेत् ।
सर्वत्रासिद्धिरूपत्वान्मिथ्याज्ञानमिदं मतम् ॥४४१॥

That[1], which exists when what (viz. the other[2]) is not known, would not exist when that (other) is known and that (false knowledge) does not exist when that (viz. the Brahman) is known. Therefore[3] this false knowledge is, in every way[4], held (or known) as having the nature (that has) no basis.[5] [441]

This verse states by the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka that false knowledge is not an existential entity.

[1] = *mithyājñānādi.*

[2] = *sat* 'existent', viz. the Ātman.

[3]That is, by the method of Anvaya and Vyatirteka adopted in the first line.

[4]Cf. NKL *sarvatra = sarvaprakāreṇa.*

[5]It literally means: whose form cannot be or is not proven (i.e. established) — i.e. non-existent.

मिथ्याज्ञानस्य वस्तुत्वं येनैव स्यात्सदात्मना ।
अज्ञानस्यापि तेनैव सत्यत्वं केन वार्यते ॥४४२॥

Who could ward off the existential character of ignorance by means of that thanks to which, viz. the existential Ātman, is (established) the existential character of false-knowledge? [442]

This is based on a doubt whether *mighyājñāna*, being a form of the inner-self, would be a non-product (i.e. permanent) — whether by its own nature or by being real! This verse answers

away the first alternative.

रज्जुसर्पो यथा रज्ज्वा सात्मकः प्राग्विवेकतः ।
अवस्तु सन्नपि ह्येष इति पूज्यैरपीरितम् ॥४४३॥

As the serpent seen in a rope is taken as real, owing to the rope, before (there arises non-discrimination (the two), so also this (duality) is (real) [on account of the immutable Ātman][1] — thus is it said by our respectable (teacher). [443]

The statement of Śaṅkara; 'Ignorance is real, because it is based on the Ātman.' is established with an example.

[1]SP points out to this part in square brackets as necessary.

स्वतस्तु सत्यता साक्षान्नोभयोरपि विद्यते ।
अविचारितसिद्धित्वान्न स्वतः परतो ऽपि ते ॥४४४॥

The truth of the two[1] does not obtain in their own right (i.e. on account of themselves) and, on account of their being established only without thought. (The truth is) that they (do not exist) on their own account or on account of another. [444]

This answers away the second alternative mentioned under verse 442 above.

[1]*mithyājñāna* and *saṃśaya*.

तदेवानुप्रविश्येति तत्त्वं यत्पारमार्थिकम् ।
सच्च त्यच्चादिकां भित्तिं मोहात्प्रापदिति श्रुतिः ॥४४५॥

[Verses 445-449 point to *sāmānyajñāna*, *viśeṣajñāna* and *smṛti* (cf. verse 415 above) as not the cause of any error.]

The Śruti states: 'What is absolute Reality (truth) itself first entered that (and afterwards, attained that which is) the existent and it secured that differentiation[1] on account of ignorance.'[2] [445]

This verse refers to BU 1.4.7: *tat sṛṣṭvā tad evānuprāviśat tad anupraviśya sac ca tyac cābhavat.*

[1] *bhitti = bheda* (NKL).

[2] The argument is: The Śruti points to the imaginary character (*kalpitatva*) of the distinction between the Ātman (on one hand) and ignorance and false knowledge (on the other).

न चापि त्रयसद्भावे मिथ्याज्ञानं जगत्यपि ।
मोहमात्रप्रयुक्तत्वान्न सामान्यात्स्मृतेश्च तत् ॥४४६॥

And, further, false knowledge cannot be said to exist in this world while the three exist, for that[1] is caused only by ignorance and not by the common characteristics and remembrance. [446]

This is an argument pertaining to what is said above with reference to the knowledge of some general characteristics, ignorance about some peculiarity and memory of it as the basis. There is thus justification of Anirvacanīyakhyāti.

[1] That is, false knowledge.

सामान्यान्तरनिर्मुक्तं तथासाधारणैरपि ।
असामान्यत्वमेवैति शौक्ल्यमन्यानपेक्षतः ॥४४७॥

Whiteness, which is distinct (lit. free) from any other(s) (as) a common (characteristic(s)) and also from any uncommon (characteristic(s)), attains uncommon nature, because it is independent of (any) other (whiteness).[1] [447]

This verse points out that whiteness (in a shell), that is responsible for *mithyājñāna* 'false knowledge', is not related, in any way, to *sattva*, *jaḍatva* etc. which are the common characteristics (among things, or particularly between things of the world) and also some particular characteristics, viz. the shell-ness, the triangular shape etc. As such the whiteness of the shell itself becomes the common characteristic between the shell and silver which is conceived in its place — it does not depend upon any other whiteness for this mistaking of silver.

[1]According to SP, any common characteristic, being observed, cannot be the cause of error (*bhrānti*).

न चेदं स्मरणाज्जातं नापि सामान्यहेतुजम् ।
शुक्लस्य गृह्यमाणत्वात्पुरोदेशावलम्बिनः ॥४४८॥

Not again is this (whiteness) produced from (lit. born of) memory; nor does it originate from some common (characteristic), because the whiteness is being grasped as belonging to an object (lit. the region) existing before one. [448]

This purports to deny that ignorance comes from memory.

एवं प्रत्यक्ष एतस्मिञ्च्छुक्तिकोदरवर्तिनि ।
तद्विरुद्धमभूज्ज्ञानं रजताभमबोधजम् ॥४४९॥

Thus, in what actually exists inside of a shell and is directly perceptible, there has arisen a knowledge which is opposed to that which resembles silver and is born of non-knowing. [449]

This is reaffirmation of the statement: There is ignorance as regards this (*idam*) in the cognition: 'This is silver.' (*idaṃ rajatam*).

Verses 450-465 discuss how other khyātis are unreasonable, thereby confirming the correctness in holding the Anirvacanīyakhyāti.

अप्रत्यक्षं मतं येषां ज्ञानं तान्प्रति भण्यते ।
इदं रजतमित्येतज्ज्ञानं शुक्तौ कुतोऽन्वभूत् ॥४५०॥

Now, (the following) is stated for them in whose opinion this knowledge is not directly perceptible: 'On what basis did this knowledge (having the form) 'This is silver.' arise in the (object which is) a shell?' [450]

The purpose of this verse is to show that the opponents cannot hold ignorance (*bhrānti*) in respect of 'This is silver.'.

विशिष्टाकृतिदेशेहाकालधर्मं प्रतीयते ।
शुक्तिकाज्ञानतो नर्ते वस्त्वीकृक्साध्यते ऽन्यतः ॥४५१॥

A thing which has some specific form, region, activity[1], time and property[2], cannot be understood (as silver) unless from ignorance about a shell; such a thing (as described) cannot be established by another. [451]

The argument is: Even if it were granted that the false knowledge 'This is silver.' was produced by a similar/common characteristic; such an one cannot be established by the opponent.

[1] *īhā* = *ceṣṭā* (SP, NKL).

[2] Each of silver and shell has its own specific properties (*vastu-dharmas*).

असाधारणधर्मोत्थो न साधारणकारणः ।
रजतं शुक्तिकेत्यादिव्यपदेशो ऽप्रसिद्धितः ॥४५२॥

This cognition,[1] viz. (this) shell is silver, is one that arises from some particular (lit. uncommon) properties and not caused by general (lit. common) properti(es); because (that) is not established.[2] [452]

[1] *vyapadeśa* = *pratyaya* (SP, NKL). But it could better be: This mention of that shell as silver arises from ...

[2] It is possible to treat the two lines as two different sentences. Thus: Cognition (of any particular thing) arises from ... properties. (Therefore) cognition such as (*ādi*) '(this) shell is silver.' does (not arise from any other cause), on account of its being unknown. Cf. *atrāpi pūrvārdhān nañanuṣaṅgaḥ* (SP).

न चेह राजता धर्माः कुतो ज्ञानं तदाकृति ।
न ह्याकारमनालिङ्ग्य ज्ञानमाकारवत्क्वचित् ॥४५३॥

Further, there are here[1] no properties belonging to silver. Whence then would there be the knowledge having that shape of it? Indeed, without touching (lit. embracing) a shape, there is nowhere any knowledge having a shape.[2] [453]

[1]In the cognition of a shell as ṣilver.

[2]This has a reference to the sense-organ assuming the shape of the object of its knowing (*viṣayākārabhavana*).

शुक्तिकानुविधायित्वान्नेदं स्मर्तव्यसंश्रयम् ।
अनालिङ्गितबाह्यार्था बुद्धावेव स्मृतिर्यतः ॥४५४॥

This (cognition) is not dependent on an object of memory since it is related[1] to a shell, for memory arises only in intellect and does not touch (lit. embrace) any external object. [454]

[1]That is, a basis in.

धर्मादिहेतुकं ये ऽपि परिणामं प्रचक्षते ।
सम्यग्ज्ञाने ऽपि तुल्यत्वादनाश्वासस्तथा सति ॥४५५॥

And (we say), also those who say that (the cognition 'This is silver.') is a modification (of intellect) arising from some property etc. (have to hold that) in the case of right knowledge also, there is similarity (of the modification of intellect) and, that being so, there is want of satisfaction.[1] [455]

[1]That is, satisfactory explanation.

भूतकालोपलब्धो ऽर्थः स्मृतेश्चेन्नोचरो मतः ।
नासौ भूतात्मनाज्ञायि भूतज्ञानमनाश्रयम् ॥४५६॥

If it is held that it is an object that is obtained in the past which is within the purview of memory; then (we say that) it is not known as having the nature of (the thing of) the past; for (in that case) the knowledge of (the thing of) the past is baseless.[1] [456]

[1]To say that it is the knowledge of the thing of the past would have no basis in a shell/silver in the past.

स्वोत्पत्तिव्यतिरेकेण ज्ञानकालो ऽपि नेष्यते ।

is a shell.'. [464]

न च प्रत्यक्षविज्ञानात्स्मृतेर्भेदं लभेमहि ।
प्रध्वंसात्तस्य चार्थस्य नातो ऽर्थस्पर्शिनी स्मृतिः ॥४६५॥

Nor do we ascertain the difference of memory[1] from direct perception on account of the destruction of its object. Therefore, memory does not touch the object. [465]

[1]Memory here signifies false knowledge (*bhrānti*).

किं न्वेतदिति जिज्ञासोर्निषिद्धे ऽप्यन्यथाग्रहे ।
तावतो व्यवधानत्वाद्बुभुत्सा च न युज्यते ॥४६६॥
शुक्तिकेयमिति ह्युक्ते यथार्थं प्रतिपद्यते ।
रजताद्यन्यथाज्ञानप्रतिषेधादृते ऽपि हि ॥४६७॥

[Verses 466-475 seek to establish *ajñāna* as apart from *mithyājñāna*.]

Even after the apprehension (of a thing as) another — by one who is seeking to know (the nature of it) — is denied/declined, there (still) remains an obstacle[1] (of that desire to know ...) and it is not proper (that there remains) the desire to know. [466]
Indeed, one obtains the right knowledge when one is told 'This is a shell.'; even without the denial of wrong cognition[2] of silver etc. [467]

In the AnSS edition the verse begins with *kim tu* ... But, in the NKL edition and the *Bṛhadāraṇyakavārtikasāra*, it begins with *kiṃ nu*. We follow this latter, for that yields a better construe and meaning.

[1]*tāvato vyavadhānāt* is very cryptic! This suggests the necessity of knowing the real nature of the thing (*vastuyāthātmyajñāna*).

[2]It means: cognition of a thing to be otherwise than what it is.

नीलोत्पलदलाभं खं सामान्येतरवर्जितम् ।

न पश्येयुस्त्रयासत्त्वान्न हि तच्चाक्षुषं यतः ॥४६८॥

(Indeed) they would not (be able to) see the sky, which has the hue of a petal of a blue lotus and is devoid of (any characteristic) common or another.[1] They do not see them owing to the absence of the three, for the triad is not verily an object of the eye. [468]

[1] *sāmānyetara* could be *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*, but the force of *trayāsattva* reminds one of *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa* and *smṛti* mentioned in verse 405 above.

दिग्विभागादिवद्व्योम प्राग्यानं च रवौ तथा ।
स्वप्ने नानाप्रपञ्चाढ्यं मिथ्याज्ञानमृते त्रयात् ॥४६९॥

Similarly, there occurs even without this triad (the knowledge of) the sky having a division into quarters, the movement to the east in the case of the sun and (this universe) full of variety in a dream. [469]

The argument is: All these three are cases produced by ignorance; not by the three mentioned above (or in verse 405).

यत एवमतो ग्राह्यं शुक्तिकाज्ञानमेव तु ।
रजताद्यन्यथाज्ञानकारणं युक्तिगौरवात् ॥४७०॥

Since this is so, therefore it should be accepted that the knowledge of the shell itself[1] is the cause of the wrong cognition (of it) as silver etc. — this on the strength of reasoning (so far adduced). [470]

This concludes: *ajñānam eva bhramakāraṇam.*

[1] *tu* for *eva*.

कर्मज्ञानादिहेतुत्वान्नियमस्य यथा तव ।
सामान्याद्यविशेषे ऽपि नियमो ऽप्येवमिष्यताम् ॥४७१॥

As in your opinion there is (accepted) a rule that the activity,

knowledge[1] etc.[2] are the cause of wrong knowledge,[3] even while there is not any specifc (one/two) among the common characteristics)[4]; so also should it be accepted (by you, in the same way as that obtains in my opinion). [471]

[1]Knowledge stands for memory or experience in the past (referring to silver that was seen earlier).

[2]The word etc. refers to the desire for having silver (and the like of it).

[3]This wrong knowledge is 'mistaking a shell for silver'.

[4]*sāmānyādyaviśeṣa*— not any specifc among *sāmānya*, *ajñāna* or *smṛti* which were disucssed earlier; cf. verse 447 above. This leads to the acceptance of *adṛṣṭa* as the cause for mistaking a shell for silver and not for an elephant.

भूरिसामान्यविज्ञानाच्छौक्ल्यमेव करोति किम् ।
सदप्यन्यदुदास्ते किं स्वाश्रयग्रहणं प्रति ॥४७२॥

What does only whiteness do in preference to knowledge of greater similarity? Does any other property, even though existent (there), remain inactive towards its own substratum? [472]

The purport of the verse is: Why does only whiteness in a shell cause the error?, why not any other property which is (or, can be) similar? and why is there apprehension only of silver? and not of anything else? Therefore, the Siddhāntin also can hold likewise that only Dharma (etc.) can be the cause of *ajñāna*. Such is the thought in verses 472ff.

अनेकार्थाभिसंबन्धाच्छौक्ल्यस्य रजते च कः ।
पक्षपातो विना हेतुं बलाकाज्ञानकृन्न किम् ॥४७३॥

(Tell me) again, what partiality (or particular inclination) is there of whiteness towards silver, despite its connection with many (other) objects, (and) without any reason? why should not a crane cause the wrong cognition? [473]

This is an illustration of what is stated in the preceding verse in general terms.

स्वाकारमात्रनिष्पत्तेर्नालं कार्यान्तराय हि ।
सामान्यं वा विशेषो वा नातः स्याद्राजती स्मृतिः ॥४७४॥

Be it a common[1] or particular property of a thing, it is not sufficient for (lit. capable of) for giving rise to a cognition (lit. an effect) other than producing the shape of the thing itself; therefore, there would not (arise) the memory of silver.[2] [474]

This is one more reason why *sāmānya* etc. do not cause error.
[1]That is, in common with another thing.
[2]What arises is ignorance about the real nature of the shell.

न ह्यसंनिहितं बोद्धुर्वस्तु बुद्धौ करोति हि ।
ज्ञानमाकारवल्लोके सर्वाकारप्रसक्तितः ॥४७५॥

Cognition, which has a shape (of the object of its knowing) does not indeed, in this world, put into the intellect of the knower a thing which is not in the vicinity (of him)[1]; (if it were otherwise) there would follow the contingency of all shapes (appearing in his intellect). [475]

This is one more reason why silver, existing in another place, does not cause the error of shell-silver.
[1]There is no impression (*ākāra*) on the intellect of a person of a thing that is not present before him.

पदार्थान्तरसद्भावमपेक्ष्यान्यस्य वस्तुनः ।
यस्य सिद्धिर्मृषा तत्स्याद्रज्जुसर्पद्विचन्द्रवत् ॥४७६॥

That (thing) whose existence follows from[1] its dependence on the existence of some other object(s) should be false like in the case of a rope-serpent and two moons.[2] [476]

This and the next verse state that this world is false (*mithyā*),

since the cognition of its existence depends upon the acceptance of cause-and-effect relation.

[1]It literally means: is established by.

[2]As silver in a shell depends for its cognition (in other words, for being an object of someone's cognition) on a shell and is, therefore, false, so is this world false because it depends on the Ātman. Or, the moon is only one, but owing to some defect in the eye of one, seems to be accompanied by another. Cf. also Adhyāsabhāṣya (pp.32-34): *śuktikā hi rajatavad avabhāsate* and *ekaś candraḥ sadvitīyavad iti.*

प्रमात्रादीह यत्किंचित्प्रत्यगज्ञानहेतुजम् ।
अन्योन्यापेक्षसिद्धित्वान्मिथ्या तदपि पूर्ववत् ॥४७७॥

Whatever, viz. a knower etc., (is understood here) has originated from the cause, viz. ignorance about the inner self; (but) that is, as (shown in the illustrations) before,[1] false since there is mutual dependence of them for their existence. [477]

[1]This is a reference to *rajjusarpa* and *dvicandra* in the preceding verse.

आत्मन्यध्यासरूपो ऽयं संसारः प्रतिपादितः ।
अध्यासश्च विना हेतुं न लोक उपपद्यते ॥४७८॥

This transmigratory world is explained to be having the nature of superimposition (of certain things and properties) on the Ātman and it does not stand to reason that this superimposition is without any cause. [478]

This introduces the discussion of BUB: *yaḥ kāraṇaṃ sarvasya jagataḥ.*

तस्माद्धेतूपदेशाय यः कारणमितीर्यते ।
यस्मिन्न्विद्धयेत्येवं ननु कारणमीरितम् ॥४७९॥

Therefore is made (lit. uttered) the statement *yaḥ kāraṇam* ... in order to explain the cause (viz. the superimposition of

that). But (the objector asks:) In the statement *yasminn avidyayā* ... (the nature of) the cause is (already) stated. [479]

The verse contains an objection: BUB contains repetition, for already the sentence *yasminn avidyayā* ... has explained what is now being introduced in *yat kāraṇam* (these are two successive statements!) — the first is explained in verse 414ff.

प्रधानवादमाशङ्क्य यस्माद्भूयो ऽपि भण्यते ।
अज्ञात आत्मा जगतः कारणं न गुणत्रयम् ॥४८०॥

Since this is so said (now) once again, with the apprehension about the theory of Pradhāna (as the origin of this world), (therefore, it should not be considered as repetition). (The correct view is:) The unknown Ātman is the cause of this world and not the three *guṇa*s. [480]

This explains why one should not entertain the idea of repetition.

श्रुतितो युक्तितश्चापि स्वयमेव प्रवक्ष्यति ।
उदर्कं इममेवार्थं नातो ऽन्यत्कारणं ततः ॥४८१॥

He[1] himself will say about this matter later[2] on the basis of the Śruti[3] and also of reasoning. There is no cause (of the world) other than this[4]. [481]

[1]This is Śaṅkara, the Bhāṣyakāra.

[2]In the Madhu Brāhmaṇa etc.

[3]SP cites: *ātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ* (*Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.1); *etasmāj jāyate prāṇaḥ* (*Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 2.1.3); *yaḥ sarvajñaḥ sarvavid* (*Ibid.* 1.1.9).

[4]This refers to the Ātman.

यदात्मके नामरूपे इत्यज्ञानात्मता तयोः ।
भण्यते ऽतो ऽप्रमाणत्वं शुक्तिकारजतादिवत् ॥४८२॥

(Since) it is stated (in the Bhāṣya) *yadātmake nāmarūpe* that the two are of the nature (of the products) of ignorance,

therefore, (the knowledge of the two) is not authoritative[1] like (that of) silver in a shell etc. [482]

This explains BUB: *yadātmake nāmarūpe salilād iva svacchāt malam iva phenam avyākṛte vyākriyate.*

[1]SP points out the purpose of this word as *bādhyatā* 'liability to be stultified'. NKL explains this as *bādhyatva.*

न कारणातिवर्त्यस्ति कार्यं जगति कुत्रचित् ।
स्वकारणाविशिष्टत्वे सलिलादिति हेतुगीः ॥४८३॥

In this world, there nowhere abides an effect apart from (lit. beyond) its cause. There is a statement of the reason, viz. 'from waters' (which is) expressive of the state (of the world) as non-distinct from its own cause. [483]

This is the purport of the illustration in *salilād iva* ...

वस्तुवृत्तं न पर्याप्तं तदज्ञानापनुत्तये ।
अनुपात्तप्रमाणं सदित्यर्थप्रतिपत्तये ॥४८४॥

The nature of the thing[1] is not by itself sufficient for the removal of ignorance (about it) unless it has taken (the support of) an authoritative means (viz. the Śruti statements) for establishing that it is existent. [484]

This explains the meaning of BUB: *yaś ca tābhyāṃ nāma-rūpābhyāṃ vilakṣaṇaḥ svato nityaśuddhabuddhamukta- svabhāvaḥ.*

[1]Namely, the Ātman which is *nitya* ...; but *buddha = bodhaikarasa* (having only knowledge as its essence) though it is, it by itself cannot remove ignorance.

स्वतो बुद्धमिदं यस्मादतः शुद्धमसद्वयम् ।
द्वितीयसंगतिर्यस्माल्लोके ऽशुद्धेः प्रयोजिका ॥४८५॥

Because this itself has knowledge as its essence[1], it is pure and is without duality in it[2]; for, in this world, association of a second is a bringer of impurity to one. [485]

[1]See the note on the preceding verse.

[2]SP notices a variant reading ... *śuddham ato 'dvayam* (not noticed by the AnSS edition). Following that, the translation would be: 'Because ... pure, and therefore, without duality.' But that hardly serves any better purpose. *asaddvaya* literally means: that in which there is no pair, i.e. which is (one) without duality (in purport).

यथोक्ततत्त्वे नाविद्यामृते स्याद्द्वयसंगतिः ।
अतो ऽशुद्धिनिषेधोक्तिस्तदविद्यानिषेधतः ॥४८६॥

In respect of the Reality which is thus explained, there cannot be its associatin with duality (lit. a pair) except without ignorance.[1] Therefore, the statement for the denial of impurity (follows) from (the statment of) the denial of ignorance about it. [486]

[1]That is, such association can be only when there is ignorance.

ईश्वराव्याकृतप्राणविराड्भूतेन्द्रियादिकम् ।
नाविद्योपाश्रयं मुक्त्वा संभाव्यं प्रत्यगात्मनि ॥४८७॥

It is not possible to entertain (that there exists) in the inner self (the group of what are called eight states, viz.) Īśvara[1], Unmanifest, Prāṇa, Virāj, element(s)[2], sense-organs[3] etc.[4], without (having the support of) ignorance. [487]

This is based on an objection: How can one deny duality in Reality (=Ātman) whose eight states are mentioned in the Śruti? — such is the view of Bhartṛprapañca.

According to Sureśvara, the eight forms are (1)Īśvara, (2)Avyākṛta, (3)Prāṇa, (4)Virāj, (5)Bhūta, (6)Indriya, and the remaining two (not mentioned). Regarding this, SP describes in 1.3.314 or 1.4.1043 that they are *sākṣin*, *antaryāmin*, *avyākṛta*, *daiva*, *sūtra*, *virāj*, *jāti*, *piṇḍa*. SP refers to the relevance thus (as given in the notes): *īśvara* = *antaryāmin*/*sākṣin*, *indriya* = *daiva*, *prāṇa* = *sūtra*, *ādi* = *jāti*, *bhūta*(= *vyakti*) = *piṇḍa*; thus is Sureśvara's enumeration justified.

But NKL enumerates in a confusing way as *antaryāmin*, *sūtra*, *virāj*, *viṣaya*, *buddhi*, *manas*, *indriya*, *śarīra* (in 1.3.314) and *avyākṛta*, *antaryāmin*, *sūtra*, *virāj*, *piṇḍa*, *deha*, *indriya*, *antaḥkaraṇa*, *viṣaya* (in 1.4.1043). Even considering the explanation as given in the notes below, some vagueness remains.

[1]SP points out: Īśvara is for the inner self and the witness. But cf. NKL: *jagato 'ntaḥ sthitvā niyantā* 'the inner controller'.

[2]This stands for the world in the form of Tanmātras – *bhavanayogyā vyaktayaḥ* (SP).

[3]That is, deities (SP).

[4]The word etc. stands for *jāti* (SP) but *śarīraviṣayasaṃgraha* (NKL).

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यदृष्ट्या तन्निपुणो ऽपि न वीक्षते ।
न च प्रत्यग्धियं मुक्त्वा परागबुद्धिर्मितिर्भवेत् ॥४८८॥

Even a clever person, (when) with the vision of the true nature of the inner self, would not (be able to) see that[1], (for) the knowledge of the outside world of objects, (which arises only) after giving up the knowledge of the inner self, cannot be right knowledge. [488]

[1]Namely, the world in its eight forms, as understood above in the preceding verse.

पराञ्चि खानीत्येतच्च साटोपमभिधीयते ।
प्रत्यङ्मानैकमेयत्वं वेदान्तेष्वात्मवस्तुनः ॥४८९॥

And it is stated in Vedānta sentences (such as) *parāñci khāni* ...[1] with the purport[2] that the thing (called) Ātman[3] is to be known only by one means of knowing, viz. (seeing it as) the inner self. [489]

This verse presupposes an opponent's argument the knowledge of the inner self occurs through the help of external sense-organs since it (viz. the inner self) is described as knowable from all experiences (*sarvapratyayavedya*).

[1]*Kaṭhopaniṣad* 4.1; cf. verse 180 note 3 above.

[2] *sāṭopam = satātparyam* (SP).
[3] This is the inner self.

इतो विरुद्धमानत्वं स्वतो ऽपास्तद्वयात्मनः ।
शक्यं वैश्वानरवरात्प्रवक्तुं न तु मानतः ॥४९०॥

It is possible to state that the Ātman, which has of itself given up duality, has (a means for knowing it) which is opposed (to the Śruti) only on the strength of the boon of Vaiśvānara [1]; but not on the strength of an authoritative means! [490]

[1] This is an oft-mentioned fact about Bhartṛprapañca. He is said to have obtained a boon from Agni Vaiśvānara for excellent knowledge. Cf. our book [Vol.2:1988] p.25 for *vaiśvānaraprasādāt* ... SP states that this is jeopardizing Bhartṛprapañca.

नित्यशुद्धश्च बुद्धश्च यस्मादात्मा परः स्वतः ।
मुक्तश्चातो ऽवसेयो ऽसौ सद्वेदान्तोक्तिमानिना ॥४९१॥

Because that highest Ātman is ever pure, having knowledge as its essence, and, of itself liberated, it is therefore to be ascertained (to be thus) by one who respects that authoritative statement of Vedānta.[1] [491]

[1] NKL points to sentences such as ... *na lipyate lokaduḥkhena bāhyaḥ*. (*Kaṭhopaniṣad* 5.11).

एवंभूतो ऽप्यसंबुद्धस्वात्मतत्त्वो महेश्वरः ।
आपेदे कारणात्मत्वं नामरूपादिसर्जने ॥४९२॥

The great Lord [1], even though of such nature, was (yet) ignorant (lit. not enlightened) about his own nature (and therefore) became the cause of creation of name, form etc. [492]

[1] SP points out the significance of the word *maheśvara*; *sraṣṭuḥ, saṃhartuś cābhedam abhipretya maheśvaragrahaṇam.*

स एष इत्यनेनापि सुविरुद्धात्मतां ब्रुवन् ।
विरुद्धवस्तुसंसृष्टिं ब्रूते ऽज्ञानैककारणम् ॥४९३॥

Bringing out the nature of the mutually very much opposed (cause and effect) in words *sa eṣa* ...[1] also, (the Bhāṣyakāra) declares that the creation of the mutually opposed things has only ignorance as its cause. [493]

व्याकुर्वन्निति वाक्येन स्वतो ज्ञो ऽपि तमोन्वयात् ।
ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तम् कार्यं प्राविशदुच्यते ॥४९४॥

By the statemnt *vyākurvan* ... is declared that (the highest Ātman), though knower in its own right, entered the effect (lit. products) beginning with the Brahman and ending with the blade of gross on account of its association with darkness. [494]

स्वानुभूत्यनुरोधेन यो ऽज्ञातार्थः पुरोदितः ।
प्रकृतार्थावलेहित्वात्सर्वनाम्ना स उच्यते ॥४९५॥

That unknown thing, which was earlier spoken of, in consonance with one's own experience is mentioned by the pronoun *sa*, owing to its capacity to refer to the thing under discussion. [495]

परामृश्य स इत्येवमव्याकृतसतत्त्वकम् ।
तथारूपः स्वकार्यस्थः प्रात्यक्ष्यादेष उच्यते ॥४९६॥

Having referred to (the highest Ātman) which was of the nature of the essence of the unmanifest, this one is (now) called (=referred to) as *eṣa* on account of its direct perceptibility, abiding as it is in its own effect, in that form (i.e. still unknown). [496]

विरुद्धरूपयोरेवं निर्द्वयद्वयरूपतः ।
स एष इति निर्देशः कथं स्यात्कृष्णसर्पवत् ॥४९७॥

(An objection could be raised:) Thus, since there are two

things of mutually opposed nature and also because they have the forms of non-duality and duality, how could there be the reference *sa eṣaḥ* which is like (the reference) 'a black-serpent'? [1] [497]

[1]In the word black-serpent we notice its two elements: black and serpent in *sāmānādhikaraṇya* 'referring to the same substance'; therefore the question is: How could mutually opposed qualities obtain in one and the same substratum? That is, it is impossible to hold the identity of *saḥ* and *eṣaḥ*.

कारणान्नान्यतः कार्यं तथा कार्याच्च कारणम् ।
इत्युक्तन्यायहेतुत्वान्न विरोधो ऽत्र कश्चन ॥४९८॥

Because of the maxim which has been already stated, viz. that the effect is not different from the cause, nor is the cause different from the effect, there is not any contradiction (involved) here. [498]

अज्ञातवस्तुतत्त्वस्य दुष्करं नास्ति किंचन ।
नीलीकृतं नभः पश्येच्चक्षुषा नीलवस्त्रवत् ॥४९९॥

For the one to do who has not known the true nature of the thing [1] there is nothing difficult. For example, one would see the sky as painted with blue just like a blue piece of cloth. [499]

Here is an answer to the question in the preceding verse.
[1]Namely, the real nature of the Ātman.

योग्यायोग्यव्यपेक्षेयं मानव्यवहृतौ भवेत् ।
कल्पनामात्रनिष्पत्तेर्नापेक्षाज्ञानभूमिषु ॥५००॥

Such (lit. this) specific vision of (what is) proper [1] and (what is) not proper would be (possible) in dealings which involve the use of various means of knowing; (as against this) there will be no such vision (lit. expectation) in dealings (based

on) ignorance, since they have proceeded from only imagination. [500]

[1]Namely, the thing in its real nature.

इत्युक्तप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं हेतुरेषो ऽभिधीयते ।
प्रविष्ट इत्यनेनात्र स्वाभासैकतमोन्वयात् ॥५०१॥

In order to confirm (establish frimly) what is thus[1] stated, this reason is (now) stated (in the words) *praviṣṭaḥ* ..., for there is here[2] association of darkness (i.e. ignorance) which is only a appearance of one's own inner self. [501]

[1]That is, in the statement with the *sāmānādhikaraṇya* in *sa eṣaḥ* (noted above).

[2]This means: in respect of *parasya praveśaḥ*.

ब्रह्मादावित्यनेनापि जनिमत्सर्वमुच्यते ।
कृत्स्नसंसारधर्मार्थं देहेष्विति च भण्यते ॥५०२॥

By the statement *brahmādau* ...[1] also is stated the entire (group of things) that has an origin (lit. birth)[2] and (the word) *deheṣu* is stated (lit. expressed) for (referring to) all the properties of transmigratory existence.[3] [502]

This verse has a reference to BUB: *brahmādistambaparyanteṣu deheṣv iha karmaphalāśrayeṣu aśanāyādimatsu praviṣṭaḥ*.

[1]This stands for *brahmādistambaparyanteṣu*.

[2]This clarifes the word *iha*.

[3]This is for justifying the plural for *deheṣu*.

ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तं देहेष्विति तथोच्यते ।
क्रियाफलाभिसंबन्धो देहेष्वेवेति नात्मनि ॥५०३॥

So also is stated in the sentence *brahmādistambaparyantaṃ deheṣu*, that the relation of action and result (lit. fruit) can exist only in the case of bodies and not in the Ātman. [503]

प्रत्यङ्मोहमरुद्बुद्धिचक्षुर्देहादिरूपिणाम् ।
प्रविष्टवचसैकात्म्यं गुणप्राधान्यमुच्यते ॥५०४॥

By the expression *praviṣṭa* is conveyed the uniqueness (of the Ātman and) the relation of the principal and the subordinate (in the case) of those that have (the various) forms (of the inner self[1]), viz. wind,[2] intellect,[3] eye,[4] body,[5] etc. owing to ignorance about the inner self. [504

[1]These are the limiting adjuncts of the Self.
[2]This is Prāṇa, the limiting adjunct of the Sūtra.
[3]This is the limiting adjunct of Hiraṇyagarbha.
[4]Eye stands for all sense-organs.
[5]This stands for individuality, activity etc.

न ढौकते पराचीनं प्रत्यक्त्वासङ्गतः परः ।
नेहाज्ञामनादाय ह्यात्मानात्मानमीक्षते ॥५०५॥

The highest Ātman, who is not associated with characteristics of the inner self, does not push ahead what is external. Indeed, here (in worldly existence), the Ātman does not see the non-Ātman without having resorted to ignorance. [505

स्थाण्वज्ञानमनादाय न चोरादीक्षणं यथा ।
आत्माज्ञानमनादाय तद्वन्नानात्मवीक्षणम् ॥५०६॥

As there is no awareness (lit. seeing) of a thief etc. without having developed (i.e. resorted to) ignorance about a pillar (etc.), so (also) there is no seeing of the non-Ātman without (the Ātman) having been enveloped by ignorance. [506

This is strengthening the thought in the preceding verse by an illustration.

येनान्वितो ऽयं संसारी सुषुप्ते कर्मणः क्षयात् ।
तत्स्वाभाव्यावशेषः स्यात्तत्कार्यत्वाद्घटादिवत् ॥५०७॥

This transmigratory being (viz. the inner self) would in sleep

come to have only a remnant of the quality of the one by whom he is accompanied, since there is the cessation of activity. (This is so) because he is a product (lit. effect) of that (i.e. him), in the way as a pitcher etc. (of clay). [507]

This is a very cryptically expressed verse! The illustration in it is also somewhat strained. A pitcher made of clay retains the qualities of clay. In the same way, a transmigratory being, a product of the Self, is in sleep inactive and yet retains the capacity (really that of the Self) to know. Thus, though related to the Self as its product, it is non-distinct from it.

स्वात्माभासप्रवेशो यः प्रत्यङ्मोहनिबन्धनः ।
तज्जेष्वपि स एव स्यान्मरुद्बुद्ध्यादिरूपिषु ॥५०८॥

That entry, (of the Self), viz. really the semblance of its own nature, which is rooted in (lit. based on) ignorance about the inner self, would be the same in (the case of) its products also, (viz. those) which have the form of wind, intellect etc. [508]

Read SP: *na cābhāsasyābhāsino 'nyatra sattvam ity aikye praviṣṭaśabdaḥ paryavasyatīty arthaḥ.*

पयोम्भोवत्सूत्ररूपं क्रियाविज्ञानशक्तिमत् ।
कर्तृस्थभावकं स्थास्नु चलं कर्मस्थभावकम् ॥५०९॥

[There now follows a description of the various products of the Self's entry into the manifest, the inner self.]

Like (the mixture of) milk and water is the form of (the Brahman that has become) the Sūtra; it is possessed of (the capacity for) knowledge and action, it is residing in an agent and yet immutable and it is residing in activity (also) and (therefore) unsteady.[1] [509]

[1]SP: *ādyantavat* 'having a beginning and an end'.

बुद्ध्यात्मनो ऽभिनिर्वृत्तिर्व्यवसायात्मनस्ततः ।
हिरण्यगर्भं यं प्राहुरुपादानं जगद्धियाम् ॥५१०॥

From that[1] there comes to be produced the one who is of the nature of the knowledge (and) who has the nature of the activity; (the one) whom they[2] call Hiraṇyagarbha, the material (cause) of the various notions of the world.[3] [510]

This presupposes an objection: Since Hiraṇyagarbha is without any gross body and, as such, devoid of absence of sentience, the Upaniṣadic sentence *hiraṇyagarbham paśyata jāyamānam* (*Mahānārāyaṇīyopaniṣad* 8.12) is contradicted! In other words, it cannot be said to be born from the Supreme Self.

[1] *tataḥ* stands for *ajñātāt paramātmanaḥ*.

[2] SP states: These are Śruti and Smṛti.

[3] Hiraṇyagarbha (or Sūtrātman) is the cause of the manifest effects; cf. SP: *kāryaliṅgakam anumānaṃ sūcayati*.

वैराजं स्थानमासाद्य क्ष्मादिदेशविभागवान् ।
देवताकरणो देव एष एवोच्यते विराट् ॥५११॥

This shining one[1], the maker of deities, after having resorted to the status of Virāj[2], and (there) being possessed of the differences such as regions, earth etc.[3], he is called Virāj. [511]

[1] For this translation of *deva*, as 'shining *deva*' cf. *Gauḍapādakārikā* 2.12.

[2] The status of the gross world (*sthūlaprapañcātmaka sthāna*).

[3] This refers to Agni, sun and others.

तथा च मन्त्रवर्णो ऽत्र ह्यग्निर्मूर्धेति दृश्यते ।
तदुपादानमात्राः स्युर्देवताः स्वाभिमानजाः ॥५१२॥

To that effect there is seen the text of a Mantra, viz. *agnir mūrdhā* ...[1] (and the various) deities which are born of his ego (are) just his material (for creation). [512]

[1] *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 2.1.4. But SP refers this Mantra to Smṛti — cf. *Vāyupurāṇa* 1.9.112: *dyaurmūrdhānaṃ yasya viprāḥ stuvanti.*

आधिभौतिकभूतानां तथैवाध्यात्मरूपिणाम् ।
पूर्वोक्तानां परिच्छेदो ह्यविद्याकामकर्मभिः ॥५१३॥

The differentiation of the beings originating from him, viz. the elements and also those having the form of embodied beings, which are mentioned earlier,[1] is indeed owing to[2] ignorance, desire and actions. [513]

[1] See verses 504 and 508 above.
[2] Or, on the basis of.

सूत्रादिस्थाणुपर्यन्तं जगत्सृष्ट्वात्ममायया ।
स्वाभासैकसहायात्मा तदेव प्राविशद्धरिः ॥५१४॥

Having created by his own power this universe beginning with Sūtra up to a tree, Hari[1], the Ātman, who has only one helper in his own semblance, entered into that (creation) itself. [514]

[1] This reference to the Lord as Hari = Viṣṇu is an indication of the effect of popular Vaiṣṇavite religion on Sureśvara.

ननु व्याक्रियतेत्युक्तं स्वयमेव जगत्पुरा ।
कर्मकर्त्रुक्तितो ऽकस्मात्कथं कर्तीभिधीयते ॥५१५॥

[In verses 515-528, there is a discussion if there is involved a self-contradiction in the Upaniṣadic reference to the creator's entering into the creation.]

(There is an objection:) But, indeed, it is said before that the world became manifest of itself, as understood to Impersonal Absolute construction. How then suddenly there is mentioned the agent of the activity (of manifesting it)? [1] [515]

Similarly, in *idaṃ* (*jagat*) *vyākriyata* it is meant that 'it became manifest' (of itself)'. There was no need therefore of the mention of any agent. But there is a reference to an agent of that creation now! Therefore, the objection has been raised.

परात्मनः प्रवेशो ऽपि न्यायं संगच्छते न च ।
नेहासौ प्रकृतो यस्मादतो नासौ प्रवेशभाक् ॥५१६॥

So also, the entry of the highest Self does not follow logically. (Thus) since that one[1] is not relevant (in the context of the creation), therefore he is not the one who enters.[2] [516]

This is the additional part of the objection.
[1]This refers to the agent.
[2]That is, who can or should enter. Not also, into the discussion!

नैष दोषः परस्यापि ह्यव्यक्तजगदात्मना ।
विवक्षितत्वादाक्षिप्तनियन्त्राद्यभिधीयते ॥५१७॥

(The Siddhāntin answers:) This is not a fault. Because it was intended[1] to refer also to the highest Ātman (as the origin) of the unmanifest world, therefore the role of the controller etc., which is objected to, is mentioned here. [517]

[1]SP points out: There was in the Impersonal Absolute construction stress only on creation; there was not the mention of any controller etc. of the same. Yet that was implied.

इदंशब्दाभिधानेन ह्येकाधिकरणश्रवात् ।
अव्याकृतपदस्यातो यथोक्तो ऽर्थो ऽत्र युज्यते ॥५१८॥

(And) because the word *avyākṛta* is heard as referring to just one substratum (expressed) by the expression in the word *idam*, therefore, in this context, the meaning, as already stated, is reasonably understood. [518]

इदं जगन्नियन्त्रादिविभिन्नानेकरूपवत् ।
यथाधना निश्चिनमः प्रागप्येतदभत्तथा ॥५१९॥

As we now determine that this world possesses many varied forms such as the controller etc., so was it (determined) then (i.e. in the initial stage) also. [519]

नामरूपाद्यभिव्यक्तेः प्राग्व्यक्तापह्नवे ऽप्यभूत् ।
अव्यक्ताध्यक्ष एकाकी व्यक्तं यत्साक्षिकं जगत् ॥५२०॥

For the reason that (there followed) manifestation of name and form etc., the unmanifst witness, all alone, was (the cause) for the concealment of the formerly manifest, the one with whom the witness this world became manifest. [520]

जगज्जनिस्थितिध्वंसनृत्तसाक्ष्यतिरेकतः ।
शिष्टस्येह प्रवेश्यत्वात्पर एवाविशेदतः ॥५२१॥

Because what is to be entered here is to be mentioned as apart from the witness of this world's origin, sustenance, destruction and dance, therefore, the highest (self) alone would enter that. [521]

Read SP: *sākṣiṇo bhedena śrutaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ vā yad avaśiṣṭam tasya sarvasya praveśaviṣayāntarbhāvāt parātmaiva jagati praveṣṭā.*

विवक्षातश्च शब्दानां प्रयोगो जगतीक्ष्यते ।
यथा ग्रामादिशब्दानां तथेहाप्यवसीयताम् ॥५२२॥

And it is seen that in this world the employment of words proceeds from some (particular) desire to state (something), as, for example, (in the employment) of words, village etc.[1]; so also let it be understood (i.e. concluded) here. [522]

[1]The word etc. signifies cities etc. (NKL).

निवासश्च निवासी च तथा चोभयमुच्यते ।
ग्रामशब्देन लोके ऽस्मिंस्तथेहापि जगद्गिरा ॥५२३॥
क्वचिदात्मैव निर्देश्यो ऽनात्मैव क्वचिदुच्यते ।
तथोभयविवक्षापि व्याकृताव्याकृतोक्तितः ॥५२४॥

In this world, a (place of) residence and a resident are both expressed by the word *grāma*; so also here by the word *jagat* is to be mentioned in some places (or at some time) only the Ātman and at other(s) the non-Ātman. Thus, there is a desire to mention by the Vedāntic statement both *vyākṛta* and *avyākṛta*. [523-524]

यत्र नाशादिमद्वस्तु प्राधान्येन विवक्ष्यते ।
तत्रानात्मैव वाच्यो ऽर्थः प्रत्यगात्मोपसर्जनः ॥५२५॥

Where it is intended to express principally a thing, which is liable to destrtuction etc., there the expressed sense is only the non-Ātman, with the inner self as its subsidiary. [525]

अस्थूलो ऽजो ऽजरः शुद्धो यत्र चाप्यभिधीयते ।
प्रत्यगात्मविवक्षैव तत्र ज्ञेयाभिधानतः ॥५२६॥

And where the non-gross, unborn, ageless (and) pure one is stated, there is the desire to express there only the inner self as the expression of the object of knowing. [526]

अव्यक्तं व्याकृतं विश्वं यत्र चाप्यभिधीयते ।
आत्मानात्मद्वयार्थैव विवक्षा तत्र गम्यते ॥५२७॥

And, further, where there is expressed the world both as unmanifest and manifest, there is understood a desire of expressing (both) what has the meaning of the Ātman and what, the non-Ātman. [527]

यन्मदन्यदिति चोक्तेः परस्य प्रकृतत्वतः ।
सशब्देन परामर्शः परस्येह भवेदतः ॥५२८॥

Further, from the statment *yan mad anyat*[1] (it is understood that) the highest Ātman is meant[2]; therefore, there would be reference made (only) to the highest Ātman by the word *saḥ*. [528]

[1]This is BU 1.4.2.

[2]Or, principally intended.

Now follows, up to verse 633, a detailed discussion about 'entry' of the Ātman into the manifest.

अव्यावृत्ताननुगतयाथात्म्यादात्मवस्तुनः ।
ननु प्रवेशस्तस्येह कथं श्रुत्योपदिश्यते ॥५२९॥

[Verses 529-548 state the *prima facie* view: It is the inner self (*jīva*) that has entered the manifest.]

(There is an objection:) How indeed does the Śruti declare the entry of that existent thing, viz. the Ātman, for the true nature of it is that it is not differentiated[1] from (any other) and not followed by[2] (any other)? [529]

[1]It is not distinguished (*aviśeṣa*).
[2]That is, not similar to (*asāmānya*).

अप्रविष्टं यतो वेश्म परिच्छिन्नेन शक्यते ।
प्रवेष्टुं पुरुषेणैवं न खेनैतद्विधर्मतः ॥५३०॥

(We ask this) because (we notice that) it is possible for a person (who is) limited (in size) to inhabit an (earlier) uninhabited house, not by the sky which has the opposite property.[1] [530]

[1]Namely, which is unlimited in size.

सर्वगाणामपि यथा भूतानां परिणामतः ।
सर्पादीनां प्रवेशः स्यादुपलादौ मतं यदि ॥५३१॥

If it is held that like the entry into stones etc. that is possible for the serpent etc.[1] on account of (their) being the modification of elements which have entered into all things, (it is possible for the highest Ātman to enter into all things). [531]

[1]This refers to the then-accepted belief that a serpent could be produced in a stone as a modification of the elements that entered into it from outside it!

युतसिद्धनिवृत्त्यर्थं सहजोक्त्याभिधीयते ।
अश्मनः परिणामत्वात्सर्पादेः परिपाकतः ॥५३२॥

(The answer is:) The statement (that the serpent entered into a stone) is made by the word *sahaja* in order to establish the two as existing apart from each other — (this) for the reason that the stone etc. are (one) modification (of the elements) and the serpent etc. are modification (of another modification). [532]

दृश्यते ऽन्तःस्थतोयानां बहिष्ठः परिपाकतः ।
परिणामः पदार्थानां क्रिमिसर्पादिलक्षणः ॥५३३॥

It is noticed that waters which are inside[1] have their modification outside; so also are noticed substances which have the characteristics of insects, serpents etc. (inside some others). [533]

This points to the modification of the five elements into serpent etc.; and implies the entry of the highest Ātman into beings by assuming the form of the inner self.

[1]This refers to the waters inside a coconut, a modification of waters. But we feel that the illustrations are not wholly apt.

नैवं यस्मादनापन्नधर्मान्तर इहोच्यते ।
कार्ये प्रविष्टः स्रष्टैव पुमान्वेश्मेव तत्कृतम् ॥५३४॥

(The objector persists:) Because here is stated that one, who has not developed any other[1] properties, has entered into a product[2] like a man that enters into a house built by himself.[3] [534]

[1]This is literal translation of *dharmāntara*; but it should not be forgotten that the highest Ātman has no property. All that

can be understood is: It, of its own accord, wished to create and did create the world.

[2]Namely, creation.

[3]This refers to the voluntary acceptance of the limiting adjuncts by the highest Ātman.

यथा भुक्त्वैति नगरं भुज्येतिक्रिययोर्नरः ।
अविशिष्टो भवेत्कर्ता भिन्नकालस्थयोस्तथा ॥५३५॥
सृष्ट्वेदं सकलं विश्वं पश्चात्तत्प्राविशाद्विभुः ।
अनुपात्तान्यधर्मः सन्न तु पाषाणसर्पवत् ॥५३६॥

As (in the sentence) 'A man, having eaten (his meal), goes to a town.', the agent of the two actions of eating and going is but one unchanged man, at two different points of time, so also has the all-pervading Lord, after having created this entire universe, entered into it later, not being possessed of any other properties; not indeed like a serpent into a stone. [535-536]

This has a reference to *tat sṛṣṭvā tad evanuprāviśat* (*Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.6).

न चानवच्छिन्ननतनोर्निर्विभागात्मवस्तुनः ।
पूर्वस्थानवियोगेन स्थानान्तरसमागमः ॥५३७॥

Also, there is no going to any other place by leaving an earlier (occupied place on the part of) the existent thing (viz. the Ātman) which has not a body that is limited and which is of the nature of what is without any parts. [537]

मतं प्रवेशश्रवणादस्तु सावयवः परः ।
इति चेन्नैतदेवं स्यादागमोक्तिविरोधतः ॥५३८॥

If it is held on account of the Śruti statement about its entry (into the world) that the highest Ātman comprises/has parts, that also would not be so, for that would be in contradiction to the statement in the Śruti; [538]

दिव्यो ह्यमूर्तः पुरुषो नेति नेतीति चासकृत् ।
गीर्मनोगम्यधर्माणां सर्वेषामात्मनि ह्नुतेः ॥५३९॥

also because, in the case of the Ātman, there is the denial (lit. concealment) of all properties which can be conceived by *manas*[1], as it has been several times[2] (declared in the Śrutis, for example in) *divyo hy amūrtaḥ puruṣaḥ*[3], and *neti neti*[4].

[539]

[1]Or, understable for *manas*.
[2]It literally means: not once.
[3]*Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 2.1.3.
[4]*athāta ādeśo neti neti* (BU 2.3.6); *sa eṣa neti nety ity ātmā* (BU 3.9.26; 4.3.4; 4.4.22; 4.5.15).

रविबिम्बादिवत्तर्हि प्रवेशो ऽस्तु परात्मनः ।
नैतन्न्याय्यमसद्भावात्तत्संयोगवियोगयोः ॥५४०॥

(It may be argued:) Let the entry of the highest Ātman be like that of the reflection of the sun. (To this we say:) This is not in accordance with reasoning, since the union as well as the separation (of the highest Ātman) have the character of the unreal.

[540]

संयोगश्च वियोगश्च यस्य येनेह वीक्ष्यते ।
प्रतिबिम्बप्रवेशो ऽयं तत्र न त्विह युज्यते ॥५४१॥

Here[1], this entry of the reflection (of the sun) is noticed in that with whom (there is a) contact and from whom (there is its) separation. (But that is) not reasonably acceptable here[2].

[541]

[1]That is, in this world.
[2]This means: in respect of the entry of the Ātman into the inner self.

गुणप्रवेशवद्द्रव्य इति चेन्नानपाश्रयात् ।
द्रव्यैकपरतन्त्राणां गुणानामेव युक्तिमान् ॥५४२॥

तादृक्प्रवेशो नेशस्य स्वातन्त्र्यादुपपद्यते ।

If it is said that (the entry of the highest Ātman into the inner self) is like the entry of properties into a substance, (then also, we say:) No, because of its not needing any support.[1] It is reasonable to hold (the entry into substances) by only properties which have a support in (lit. are dependent on) only the substances. [542]
That kind of entry by the Lord cannot be held reasonable, for it has his independence. [543ab]

[1]Or, its non-resorting (anybody else).

एष सर्वेश्वर इति स्वातन्त्र्यं श्रूयते ऽसकृत् ॥५४३॥

(Also) in (such phrases as) *eṣa sarveśvaraḥ*, the independence (of the Lord) is heard many times (lit. not once). [543cd]

बीजवत्स्यात्प्रवेशश्चेन्नैवमप्युपपद्यते ।
जन्मादिविक्रियाधर्मप्रसक्तेरात्मवस्तुनः ॥५४४॥

If (it be said:) The entry (of the highest Ātman into the inner self) can be like that of the seed (into the fruit). (We say:) It also is not reasonable, for that would involve contingency of having properties of such modifications as birth etc. by the thing called Ātman. [544]

स्थूलादिविक्रियाषट्कप्रतिषेधश्रुतेर्न च ।
प्रवेशो ब्रह्मणो ऽयुक्तः फले बीजादिवत्सदा ॥५४५॥

From the Śruti statement of denial of the six modifications[1] of the gross etc. also (it follows that) the entry of the Brahman (into its product) is not ever unreasonable like that of the entry of seed etc. into the fruit (etc.) [545]

[1]These are six *bhāvavikāra*s mentioned in *Nirukta* 1.2.

ननु पाषाणसर्पेण पुनरुक्तमिदं कथम् ।

फले बीजवदित्युक्तं नैष दोषो भवेत्कुतः ॥५४६॥

(One might ask:) Why indeed is this repetition of what is said by (the illustration of) the serpent in the stone, viz. the statement (that the entry of the Ātman into its product) is like that of seed (etc.) into a fruit etc.? (We answer:) This would not be a fault. 'Why is this so?', (the opponent asks.) [546]

भागभाग्यभिसंबन्धः ख्यातो बीजफलात्मनोः ।
आधाराधेयसंबन्धस्तत्राश्मोरगयोः स्फुटः ॥५४७॥

(It might be said:) It is declared that there exists between what are of the nature of seed etc. and of fruit etc. the relation of a part and a whole [1], while there is a clear relation between a stone and the serpent (in the simile) of the supporter and the supported. [547]

[1]It literally means: what is made up of parts.

परस्मादन्य एवेह संसारी प्राविशज्जगत् ।
परिच्छिन्नस्य लोके ऽपि प्रवेश उपपद्यते ॥५४८॥

(On this, the objector says:) Here [1], (it is to be accepted that) a being different from the highest Ātman entered into the world. Even in this world, only the entry of one, who is limited (in size), is (accepted as) reasonable. [548]

So far, there was a statement of the *prima facie* view in its extensive form, viz. with counter-questions and answers to them.

[1]It means: in the passage under consideration.

स्रष्टृप्रवेष्ट्रोरेकत्वान्नैवमप्युपपद्यते ।
सृष्ट्वा जगत्सृष्टिमनु तदेव प्राविशच्छ्रुतेः ॥५४९॥

[Verses 549-559 present the Siddhāntin's answer.]

(The Siddhāntin answers:) This (conclusion) is not reasonable,

since there is oneness[1] of the creator and the entrant; (this is clear) from the statement of the Śruti 'having created the world, it later entered into that very creation.'. [549]

[1]That is, identity as one existential entity.

पर एव प्रविष्टश्चेत्प्रविष्टानामनेकतः ।
तदनन्यत्वतः प्रापन्महेशस्याप्यनेकता ॥५५०॥

(There arises a doubt:) If it be thus accepted that the highest Ātman has entered (into this world), then on account of the multiplicity of the substances, which are entered into, and on account of the entrant's being not different (from them), there follows manifoldness even of the great Lord. [550]

नैष दोषो यतो नेह भेदेनेशस्य संगतिः ।
आत्मत्वरूपतस्तस्य ह्यात्मा चाभेदसंगतेः ॥५५१॥

(The Siddhāntin answers:) This is not a fault, because there is no any association of the Lord with any differentiated (thing) on account of its[1] being (only) the Ātman. It is the inner self of that[2] on account of its[1] association with (the Ātman) as non-different (from it). [551]

[1]It refers to 'differentiated thing'.
[2]Namely, the differentiated thing.

अनन्यत्वं प्रविष्टैः स्यान्नानात्वमिति दुर्भणम् ।
बहूनामेकयोगित्वादेकत्वं किं न चोद्यते ॥५५२॥

It is (lit. would be) difficult to say that here would be non-difference of the Ātman with those that are entered into and has also difference (from the same). (Our question is:) Why is it not said (by you) that there is oneness of those many which are united with only one (the Ātman) and, (their consequent) oneness (with it)? [552]

न च नानात्वकृल्लोके संयोगो ऽभेदकारणात् ।

तथागमविरोधश्च बहुत्वं चेत्परात्मनः ॥५५३॥

And, in the world, conjunction does not bring about maniness, since it is (only) the cause of non-difference (of the conjoined) and also there will be contradiction to the Śruti if maniness of the highest Ātman (were accepted.) [553]

एको देवो बहुधेतिमन्त्रब्राह्मणयुक्तितः ।
वियद्भेदकलस्तस्मादीश्वरो ऽभ्युपगम्यताम् ॥५५४॥

Therefore, from the argument in Mantra and Brāhmaṇa such as *eko devo bahudhā* ...[1], let the Lord be understood as alone (i.e. one without a second) like the sky. [554]

[1] *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* 3.14.1.

आस्तां तावत्प्रवेशो ऽयं न्याय्यो ऽन्याय्यो यथा तथा ।
दोषान्तरमिह प्राप्तं तत्तावत्प्रविचार्यते ॥५५५॥

[Verses 555-559 discuss some counterargument.]

(One might yet say:) Well, let this entry (of the highest Ātman into many) be left aside, be it reasonable or unreasonable; there is (nevertheless) another fault, that is now considered.[1] [555]

[1] That is, it is to be considered now.

संसारित्वात्प्रविष्टानां परस्य तदभेदतः ।
संसारित्वं प्रसक्तं चेन्न क्षुदाद्यत्ययश्रुतेः ॥५५६॥

On account of the transmigratoriness of those (objects) which are entered into and the non-distinction of the highest from them, there becomes contingent transmigratoriness (in the case of the highest Ātman also). (The Siddhāntin's answer is:) If (this is said), then (we have) to reject (this argument) on the (strength of) the Śruti about the cessation of hunger etc.[1] [556]

[1]Cf. BU 3.5.1: *aśanāyāpipāse śokam moham jarām mṛtyum atyeti.*

सुखिदुःखित्वमोहादिदर्शनान्नेति चेन्मतम् ।
नैवं वेदान्तवाक्येषु न लिप्यत इति श्रुतेः ॥५५७॥

If it is argued (against this) that (the highest Ātman is transmigratory) on account of the sight of the happy and miserable conditions and ignorance etc. (of it); (it has to be told that) this is not so in the Vedānta sentences, (as follows) from the Śruti statement *na lipyate* ...[1] [557]

[1] *Kaṭhopaniṣad* 5.11.

ननु प्रत्यक्षमानेन साक्षाद्दुःखादिदर्शने ।
प्रत्यक्षबाधसिद्ध्यर्थं न न्याय्योक्तिपरंपरा ॥५५८॥

But, indeed, (it may be argued) the experience of misery etc. is patent to one by means of direct perception (and) therefore, it is not reasonable to quote Śruti passages for denying what is directly perceptible.[1] [558]

[1]The argument is based on contradiction between Pratyakṣa and Śruti: What is proved by Pratyakṣa cannot (or, should not) be denied on the ground of Śruti.

नोपाध्याश्रयजनितविशेषविषयत्वतः ।
प्रत्यक्षाभासतासिद्धेस्तेन नोक्तिविरोधिता ॥५५९॥

(The Siddhāntin's answer is:) (this is) not so, because the character of (that) direct perception gets established by being some appearance of specific object (i.e. product) (which has) resorted to (some) limiting adjuncts (of the highest Ātman), and, therefore, there is not any opposition of the Śruti. [559]

दुःखी यदि भवेदात्मा कः साक्षी दुःखिनो भवेत् ।
दुःखिनः साक्षितायुक्ता साक्षिणो दुःखिता तथा ॥५६०॥

[Verse 560-572 argue that sentience cannot have misery.]

If the Ātman were miserable[1], (it has to be said as to) who would become a witness of the miserable. (Also) the character of a witness is not reasonable in the case of the one who is miserable and the character of being miserable, in the case of a witness. [560]

[1]That is, an experiencer of grief.

नर्ते स्याद्विक्रियां दुःखी साक्षिता का विकारिणः ।
धीविक्रियासहस्राणां साक्ष्यतो ऽहमविक्रियः ॥५६१॥

Without any modification (in one), one cannot be miserable; how can there be then the character of a witness on the part of the one who undergoes modification? Therefore, the non-modifying 'I' is the witness of thousands of modifications of the intellect. [561]

सुखदुःखादिसंबद्धं यथा दण्डेन दण्डिनम् ।
राधको वीक्षते बुद्धिं साक्षी तद्वदसंहतः ॥५६२॥

A pursuer of knowledge sees intellect as associated with happiness, misery etc., (himself) remaining unaffected (thereby)[1] like an onlooker sees (another as) a holder of a staff by his holding a staff (himself not associated with him or not being a holder of it). So is the witness (of misery etc.) unassociated with it. [562]

[1]It literally means: unassociated with it. This word qualifies all the three: the pursuer of knowledge, an onlooker and the witness (i.e. Ātman).

शरीरेन्द्रियसंघात आत्मत्वेन गतां धियम् ।
नित्यात्मज्योतिषा दीप्तां विशिंषन्ति सुखादयः ॥५६३॥

Happiness etc. modify (lit. distinguish) intellect which has

attained the character of the Ātman[1] in the collection of body and sense-organs and which has been illuminated by the eternal lustre of the Ātman.[2] [563]

[1]That is, the character of the knower.
[2]Read SP: *ātmacaitanyavyāptabuddhidharmatvād ātmadharmatva-prasiddhir ity arthaḥ.*

पराञ्च्येव तु सर्वाणि प्रत्यक्षादीनि नात्मनि ।
प्रतीच्येव प्रवृत्तं तत्सदसीति वचो ऽञ्जसा ॥५६४॥

All these means of knowledge, viz. direct perception etc., exist outside — they do not abide in the Ātman. Therefore, the statement 'You are that *sat*.' which is applicable only in the case of the inner self (is thus understood) in a smooth manner. [564]

विज्ञातारमरे केन न दृष्टेरिति च स्फुटम् ।
अन्यदेवेति वाक्याच्च प्रत्यक्षं नात्मगोचरम् ॥५६५॥

Also from the Śruti (statements) *vijñātāram are kena* ...[1] and *na dṛṣṭeḥ* ...[2] and also from the statement *anyad eva* ...[3] it is clear that direct perception does not have Ātman as its object. [565]

[1]BU 2.4.14; 4.5.15.
[2]BU 3.4.2.
[3]*Kenopaniṣad* 1.4.

किंतु बुद्ध्याद्युपाधौ तदात्मच्छायैककर्मकम् ।
तथा दुःख्यहमित्यादौ प्रत्यक्षमुपचारतः ॥५६६॥

But (direct perception) has for its object only what are the reflections of the Ātman in its limiting adjuncts such as intellect and, therefore, in the experiences such as 'I am unhappy.', direct perception is (merely) metaphorical.[1] [566]

[1]That is, not true.

सामानाधिकरण्यस्य तथैवेहोपचारतः ।
अयं दुःख्यहमस्मीति विषयेण तदीक्षणात् ॥५६७॥

So also, because of the secondary usage here regarding the existence in the same substratum,[1] the phrases 'Here, I am unhappy.' etc. (arise) from seeing some object by that.[2] [567]

[1]I am a Brāhmaṇa, I am fat, etc. show such superimposition of (or oneness between) a body and the Ātman.
[2]Namely, the Ātman.

नासिकाग्रे महद्दुःखं पादाङ्गुष्ठाग्र एव च ।
देहावयवदुःखादेः प्रात्यक्ष्यान्नात्मदुःखिता ॥५६८॥

There is great pain only at the tip of the nose, and also at the tip of the toe of the foot. (Thus) on account of the direct perceptibility of pain etc. of the limb of a body, there is no condition of misery on the part of the Ātman. [568]

प्रतीचि चेद्भवेद्दुःखं व्यापि चैतन्यवद्भवेत् ।
द्रष्टृस्थत्वान्न कर्मस्थं द्रष्ट्रा दृश्येत बोधवत् ॥५६९॥

If pain were to be on the part of the inner self, it (also) would have been, like sentience, pervading (all the body). On account of its abiding in the agent of seeing it, it would not be seen (viz. experienced) by the seer as what is abiding in some object (of that seeing)[1], even like knowledge (that occurs to one and cannot be seen by the one). [569]

[1]The object has a limited dimension. Therefore, misery affecting it, i.e. modifying it, can be witnessed by the witness. If, then, misery is said to have affected the witness, the Ātman, who could see it? and how?, for, it also has become all-pervading like the Ātman?

स्वात्मनस्त्वेव कामाय ह्यात्मार्थत्वश्रुतेर्भवेत् ।
आत्मैकविषयं सौख्यमिति चेन्मन्यसे न हि ॥५७०॥

'If, on the basis of the Śruti *ātmanas tu kāmāya* ...[1] which explains the nature of the Ātman, you think that happiness would become the only object for the Ātman,' (we have to say:) 'No, not indeed (so)!' [570]

[1]BU 2.4.5; 4.5.6. *sva* is prefixed to *ātmanaḥ* with a view to stress the idea of the inner self (of one's own).

यत्र वा अन्यदित्युक्तेरविद्याविषयं तु तत् ।
दुःखित्वं नात्मनि ज्ञेयं यत्र त्वस्येति निह्नुतेः ॥५७१॥

Indeed, on the basis of the Śruti *yatra vā anyad* ...,[1] that is only the object of ignorance. The character of being miserable should not be held in the case of the Ātman, since there is a denial (of the misery etc. by the Śruti) *yatra tv asya* ...[2] [571]

[1]BU 4.3.31.
[2]BU 4.5.15.

मम तावदिदं बुद्धौ भवद्भ्यो यन्न रोचते ।
प्रत्यक्प्रवणया दृष्ट्या संसारो नात्मनीक्ष्यते ॥५७२॥

This is, in my (opinion), what obtains in intellect and what you do not like (i.e. accept). Yet the fact is: Transmigratory existence is not seen in the case of the Ātman by the sight (viz. knowledge/acceptance) of (it as) the inner self. [572]

This purports to say that the Ātman is not connected with any sorrow for that is so directly perceived/experienced by the knower of the Ātman.

Verses 573-596 discuss how it is not proper to hold, on the basis of logic that the Ātman is transmigratory.

मतं तार्किकसमयविरोधश्चेत्प्रसज्यते ।
इच्छाद्वेषादिमानात्मा यतस्तैरभ्युपेयते ॥५७३॥

If (it be) held that there would be contingent the opposition to the on-all-hands-agreed opinion among logicians, since they also accept that the Ātman possesses desire, hatred etc., [573]

नैवं निःशेषतर्कैश्चेदविरोधो ऽभ्युपेयते ।
सिद्धान्तो दुःस्थितो ऽत्यर्थं तदा वः प्राप्नुयाद्ध्रुवम् ॥५७४॥

(then, we answer that) this is not so. Your conclusion would indeed be in an extremely precarious condition, if it were accepted that it should be in non-disagreement with all the modes of reasoning.[1] [574]

[1]This argument refers to the mutual opposition among those thinkers who base their opinions on logical reasoning. It is noticed that the Jaina logicians do not agree with the Naiyāyikas. It is pointed out that the logicians themselves are not at one. Thus, the possible opposition to the logicians cannot be a valid ground for opposition to the Siddhāntin's view.

न च तार्किकयुक्त्यापि प्रतीचीहासुखात्मता ।
यतो ऽवगम्यते तस्मान्निर्भीतिः सुखमास्यताम् ॥५७५॥

And also, since even by the (logic-based) argument of the logicians it cannot be accepted that there is in the case of the inner self any unhappiness, therefore may you stay happily, devoid of any fear.[1] [575]

[1]Need for agreement with all logicians is not thus any weighty argument.

पराक्प्रत्ययगम्येन दुःखेन स्याद्विशेषणम् ।
न प्रत्यङ्मात्ररूपस्य विरोधादुष्णशीतवत् ॥५७६॥

By the misery experienced by what is outside (the inner self)[1] there would not be any modification of what has only the inner self as its form; (for this happening so) would be like opposition existing between hot and cold in but one thing.[2] [576]

[1]Namely, transmigratory body etc.

[2]As both the properties of hot and cold cannot belong to something at one and the same time, being immutable and transmigratory on the part of the inner self cannot be possible.

प्रत्यक्षाविषयत्वं च प्रतीचः प्रागवादिषम् ।
तच्छायापाश्रयाद्यस्मात्प्रत्यक्षस्यापि मानता ॥५७७॥

And I have already[1] stated before that the inner self has not the nature of an object of direct perception, since even direct perception has the character of a valid means of knowing on account of its resorting to the apparent reflection of that (viz. the inner self). [577]

[1]Cf. SV 150.

यो यतो लिप्सते नासावकिंचित्को ह्यनर्थिने ।
भिक्षां दातुमलं तद्वज्ज्ञेयं स्वार्थपरार्थयोः ॥५७८॥

Since he, who wishes to get from whomsoever (he comes across) that has nothing, would indeed not be able to give any alms to the one who does need any thing, in the same way, should be known (the relation) between one's own self and the highest (Ātman).[1] [578]

[1]One's own self refers to an individual possessed of a body, sense-organs etc. These owe their origin to the Ātman, whose nature cannot be grasped by them or the usual means of knowing. Cf. *na hi citprakāśyaṃ jaḍam pratyakṣam tatprakāśakam ity arthaḥ* [*tat* =Ātman] (SP); cf. *svātmanaḥ* in verse 570 above.

प्रत्यक्षमन्तरेणापि भवेद्दुःखविशेषणः ।
वियच्छब्दगुणं यद्वत्प्रत्यक्चेन्नैवमिष्यते ॥५७९॥
एकमानानधिगतेर्न सुखग्राहिणात्मनः ।
नित्यानुमितरूपस्य गृहीतिः स्यान्मनागपि ॥५८०॥

If it be argued that the inner self would become modified

by misery even without being an object of direct perception just as the sky (can become) possessed of sound as its property, it is not so accepted (lit. desired) by us. [579]
It is not possible for a person who holds that happiness belongs to the Ātman whose nature is (in his view) ever inferred to grasp even a little (of the nature of) it since he has not accepted the one means of knowing it (viz. the Śruti). [580]

[1]This is an argument against the Sāṃkhyas. They infer the existence of the Ātman and hold it to be ever happy. They do not accept the Śruti as the authoritative means to getting to know about the Ātman.

एकत्वादात्मनश्चैवं विषयीकरणे सति ।
असंभवात्तदन्यस्य द्रष्टृभावः प्रसज्यते ॥५८१॥

Also, owing to the uniqueness of the Ātman, if one were thus to make it an object of knowledge there would be contingent the absence of the seer (of it) owing to the absence of anyone else than it. [581]

[1]This is an argument against the Vaiśeṣikas for whom the Ātman is an object of knowing by the usual means of knowing. Their view suffers the fault that the knower and the object to be known are but one entity. Argument against the Vaiśeṣikas continues in the next two and half verses.

विषयित्वमथैकस्य विषयत्वं च दीपवत् ।
मतं चेन्नैतदेवं स्याद्युगपद्वृत्त्यसंभवात् ॥५८२॥

If it be held that only one individual becomes the subject as well as the object like a lamp, this also would not be so on account of the impossibility of the simultaneous occurrence of both. [582]

न व्यनक्ति प्रदीपो ऽपि स्वतो भास्वररूपतः ।
विषयत्वाच्च पुंबुद्धेर्न दीपस्योभयात्मता ॥५८३॥

The lamp also does not reveal (itself) as an object, though it is by its own nature bright[1] and also because it is an object of man's intellect; thus, there does not belong to the lamp the nature of both (the subject and the object). [583]

[1]That is, illuminating.

प्रतीचश्च निरंशत्त्वान्न दीपेन सधर्मता ।
ग्राह्यग्राहकतैतेन विज्ञानस्याप्यपोदिता ॥५८४॥

And the inner self does not have (any) similarity with a lamp because it (=the inner self) is devoid of any parts. Hereby is explained away the character of Vijñāna also, viz. it can be both the object and also the subject (of knowledge). [584]

[1]The second line sets aside the Vijñānavāda of the Buddhists.

तथा गुणगुणित्वेन ह्यक्षलिङ्गाधिगम्ययोः ।
दुःखात्मनोर्मिथोयोगे नानुमानप्रमाणता ॥५८५॥

So also in the case of the conjunction of misery and the Ātman who are to be grasped by the sense-organs and (by their) characteristics there is no authoritativeness of inference for understanding them as a property and its substratum. [585]

[1]Cf. *saṃyoga* in verses 587-588 below.

नित्यमक्षजगम्यत्वाद्दुःखस्योत्पलनीलवत् ।
रूपाद्यक्षजगम्यैश्च सामानाधिकरण्यतः ॥५८६॥

And since misery is ever experienced through perception by sense-organs, like the blue of a lotus (it is not a property of the Ātman) for (this is) on account of its being in the same substratum along with (other objects which are) perceptible by sense-organs such as form etc. [586]

This points out the fault in holding the Ātman as perceptible like misery which, like form, burning etc., is noticeable only in

a body. This entails that the Ātman does not have a body as its necessary substratum.

दुःखस्यात्मनि संयोगजत्वाभ्युपगमे ऽपि च ।
सभागविक्रियानित्यत्वादिदोषः प्रसज्यते ॥५८७॥

And even if it is accepted that misery can affect the Ātman as it is produced from its conjunction (with *manas* etc.),[1] then also would necessarily follow the fault that it is made up of parts, it is subject to modification and it is non-eternal etc., [587]

This is the view of the Vaiśeṣikas.

[1]Supply: of an individual self.

नाविकृत्य हि संयोगि गुणो द्रव्यं कदाचन ।
उपयन्नपयन्वेह लोके दृष्टः प्रमाणतः ॥५८८॥

because, in this world, there is not seen (i.e. known) by any means of knowing a property approach or separate from a substance, with which it is united, without having modified it. [588]

This controverts the Mīmāṃsakas' (i.e. Bhāṭṭas') view.

न चानवयवं वस्तु क्वचिदप्युपलभ्यते ।
विक्रियामाप्नुवन्नापि नित्यं ध्वंसिगुणाश्रयम् ॥५८९॥

Further, there does not obtain anywhere a thing which is not made up of parts (and) which undergoes modification also; so also, (there is no) eternal thing that is the basis of perishing properties. [589]

The views of Bhāṭṭas and the Vaiśeṣikas are controverted.

आकाशस्य च नित्यत्वं नेष्टमागमवादिभिः ।
तत्कार्यश्रवणान्नापि दृष्टान्तो ऽस्ति ततो ऽपरः ॥५९०॥

And those, who hold the authority of the Āgamas, do not accept that the sky is eternal and also there is hearing about its being product.[1] And there is not any other example.[2] [590]

[1]The followers of the Vedānta do not hold, like the Vaiśeṣikas, that Ākāśa is eternal, because there are the Śruti statements like *ātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ*.

[2]This points to that the *paramāṇu*s (which are held by the Vaiśeṣikas as eternal) are also products and, therefore, not eternal; this is so because *paramāḍṇu*s are to have belonged to (i.e. they are the products of) some earlier moments of time (before any element came to exist) and time is according to the Vedāntins not eternal — cf. *sarve nimeṣā jajñire*.

विक्रियावदपि द्रव्यं तत्प्रत्ययसमन्वयात् ।
नित्यमेवेति चेन्नैवमन्यथात्वातिरेकतः ॥५९१॥

If it were argued that any substance which undergoes modifications is permanent because there is continued awareness of that, (it has to be observed that) it is not so, because there are then its modifications (lit. changes) in addition (to itself). [591]

This is the refutation of view of the Pariṇāmavādins (viz. the Sāṃkhyas).

अनित्यत्वम् क्वचिन्नास्ति यथान्येषां प्रवादिनाम् ।
सन्नेवाभावरूपो ऽपि त्विष्टः शून्यत्ववादिनाम् ॥५९२॥

(Also), as in the opinion of other disputants, viz. the Mādhyamikas, there is nowhere (what is called) non-eternity.[1] It is, nevertheless, desired by the Śūnyavādins as (that what is of the nature of absence[2] is an existent (only). [592]

This is the view of the Mādhyamikas.

[1]This stands for Atyantābhāva.

[2]The argument is: If it is the established by some means of knowing, as a pitcher is, then it ought to be existent, though not

actually present.

संवित्प्रमाणसत्त्वेन विना वस्तु न लौकिकम् ।
प्रमाणवादिभिर्दृष्टमनन्यायत्तसिद्धिकम् ॥५९३॥

Those who hold the validity of the means of knowing have not seen any worldly thing unless it has the characteristics of being known by sentience, (for) that is not established by (its) dependence on any other (means of knowing). [593]

That Atyantābhāva 'absolute non-existence' which reveals itself is thus refuted.

भागान्यथात्वाद्द्रव्यस्य नानित्यत्वं क्वचिन्मितम् ।
निर्भागत्वात्प्रतीचस्तत्कया युक्त्योपपद्यते ॥५९४॥

Impermanence is not understood anywhere (i.e. in any thing) unless its parts have not undergone a change (or modification). (And) since (the inner self is) devoid of any parts, by what reason could it be understandable in respect of the inner self? [594]

अथ सावयवत्वे ऽपि नित्यं स्यात्कुलिशादिवत् ।
संयोगपूर्वतो नैवं तद्विभागावसानतः ॥५९५॥

Now (one might argue:) Even while a thing is made up of parts, it can be permanent, like the *vajra* 'thunderbolt'[1], since it[2] is preceded by conjunction. (To that we say:) This is not so, for it ends into division (of the parts again).[3] [595]

This is an argument of the Jainas who hold that the Ātman changes its shape in accordance with the body it occupies. Also there is its refutaion.

[1]It is made up of parts and is yet held as having permanent existence. Translation, viz. 'thunderbolt', is merely convenient!

[2]Namely, its being made up of parts.

[3]This means: The example of *vajra* for proving the permanence of the Ātman, which undergoes modification in size, is not proper.

As counterexample one could point to a pitcher.

वज्रादेरविभागश्चेत्तस्यासंयोगपूर्वतः ।
नानुमेयत्वतो ऽस्त्येव तस्यावयवसंयुतिः ॥५९६॥

If (it be argued that) in the case of *vajra* etc. there would not be division (into parts again) since that *vajra* (having parts) is not preceded by any conjunction (of the parts); this also is not so, on account of the inferability (of that conjunction) — there certainty is the conjunction of its parts.[1] [596]

[1]The argument is: A pitcher, which is made up of parts and is therefore like *vajra*, has first its parts assembled when it came into existence. This is clarified in the next verse.

न हि सावयवं किंचिदृते ऽवयवसंयुतिम् ।
घटादिवद्यतो दृष्टमतो ऽदुःखित्वमात्मनः ॥५९७॥

Indeed, there is not seen any such thing as is made up of parts and has come to exist without its parts being brought together (lit. conjoined) as (for example there is seen) a pitcher (that is produced only by joining of parts). Therefore, the Ātman does not have misery. [597]

निर्दुःखित्वे परस्येष्टे तदन्यस्याप्यभावतः ।
कस्य दुःखनिवृत्त्यर्थं प्रारब्धोपनिषत्त्वया ॥५९८॥

[Verses 598-604 establish the *raison d'être* of the Upaniṣad and refute any possible notion of transmigratory character of the Ātman.]

(A doubt is raised:) When you have accepted (lit. decided) that the state of the highest Ātman consists in being free from misery (and also) owing to the absence of anything else than that (=Ātman), then (the question is:) Why have you begun (the discussion of) this Upaniṣad for effecting cessation of misery? and whose? [598]

प्रत्यगज्ञानहेतूत्थदुःखित्वमतिविभ्रम-
ध्वंसमात्रस्य सिद्ध्यर्थमारब्धोपनिषन्मया ॥५९९॥

(The answer is:) I have begun (the discussion of) the Upaniṣad for establishing that there is only destruction of the error concerning the (worldly) awareness of the miserable state (of the Ātman) arising from ignorance about (the nature of) the inner self. [599]

नवसंख्येयमात्रेक्षी दशमो विभ्रमाद्यथा ।
न वेत्ति दशमो ऽस्मीति स्वीक्षमाणो ऽपि तान्नव ॥६००॥
निःशेषानात्मदृक्तद्वदनिर्ज्ञातात्मतत्त्वकः ।
न वेत्त्यैकात्म्यमस्मीति वीक्षमाणो ऽप्यनात्मनः ॥६०१॥
दशमो ऽस्मीतिवाक्योत्थसम्यग्ज्ञानानलार्चिषा ।
प्लुष्ट्वात्मदशमाज्ञानं दशमो ऽस्मीति वीक्षते ॥६०२॥
यथा तत्त्वमसीत्यादिवाक्योत्थज्ञानवह्निना ।
प्लुष्ट्वेहात्मतमस्तज्जं तथैकात्म्यं प्रपद्यते ॥६०३॥

(This is) like a person who sees that the number of objects (before him) is (but) nine, though he is the tenth individual (and yet) and does not know 'I am the tenth.', owing to (his) error, even though he is well seeing those nine (objects), [600]
in the same way, the person, who has not known the truth regarding the Self and sees (i.e. accepts) the entire (world as full of) non-Ātman(s) (and thus) even while seeing (i.e. experiencing) the non-Ātman (objects) does not know the uniqueness (of the Ātman) in the form 'I am (that Ātman).'; [601]
(and) having burnt the ignorance about himself being the tenth one by means of the flame of fire in the form of the true knowledge which arises from the sentence,'I am the tenth.', he sees (i.e. understands) 'I am the tenth.', [602]
as when one has burnt the ignorance about one's own self and the effects thereof by means of the fire, arising from the (Śruti) sentence 'That you are.' etc., one apprehends the uniqueness of the Ātman. [603]

प्रत्यगज्ञानहेतूत्थशास्त्राचार्यादिसाधनः ।
तद्विरुद्धमथैकात्म्यं प्रत्यपद्यत मायया ॥६०४॥

One, who has such means as Śāstra and teacher etc. which have arisen out of the ignorance about (the true nature of) the individual self, becomes aware by means of Māyā (i.e. by false means)[1] the uniqueness of the Ātman which is opposed to (all) that. [604]

[1]That is, *śāstrāder utpannā brahmadhī* (SP, NKL).

शास्त्राचार्यादयो यद्वन्मोहोत्थत्वान्न वस्तुतः ।
प्रवेशो ऽप्यस्य तादृक्स्यादैकात्म्यप्रतिपत्तये ॥६०५॥

As (the notions of) Śāstra, teacher etc. have arisen out of ignorance and (are not there) as a matter the Reality, so also is the entry of this (Self into its product, ignorance, but only) for the sake of one's acquiring the knowledge of the uniqueness of the Ātman. [605]

This clarifies the purpose of the Śruti regarding the really false entry of the Self into its so-called product. Also it justifies verse 549 above.

व्याकृताव्याकृतावस्थे जगतो ऽस्य स्वभावतः ।
अनूद्य लोकतो दृष्टे तद्याथात्म्यं प्रबोध्यते ॥६०६॥

(Only) after the two states of this universe, viz. the manifest and the unmanifest, which exist by their nature, are stated and after (the two) are seen (i.e. understood) the knowledge of the true nature of the same is acquired (by the people).[1] [606]

[1]This is, on the basis of the popularly known example of a pitcher.

यत एवमतो ऽपास्तरागद्वेषादिधीमलः ।

उदारधिषणः प्राह भाष्यकृन्न्यायवद्वचः ॥६०७॥

As this is so, the Bhāṣyakāra, who has cast off all dirt of attachment, hatred etc. off his intellect and who is very intelligent, has spoken words which are (supported) with proper reason. [607]

अप्रविष्टस्वभावस्य दिग्देशाद्यनभिप्लुतेः ।
प्रवेशो व्याकृते कल्पो जलपात्रार्कबिम्बवत् ॥६०८॥

Like (the entry of) the orb of the sun into a pot of water, the entry into the manifest (universe) of (the Ātman) which is of the nature of one that has (really) not entered and which is not covered by quarters and regions etc., is also imaginary. [608]

This has reference to BUB: *jalasūryādipratibimbavad ātmapraveśaś ca pratibimbavad vyākṛte kārya upalabhyatvam.*

बिम्बात्मना प्रवेशस्य ननु दूषणमीरितम् ।
विप्रकृष्ट्याद्यभावोक्त्या भूयः कस्मात्स आश्रितः ॥६०९॥

[Verses 609-622 justify the statement about the entry of the Ātman into the products, having the form of its reflection.]

(It might be argued:) You have found fault with (the statement) that there is the entry (of the Ātman into its products) in the form of a reflection, stating that there is absence of its being far from other objects etc.[1]; then, why do you resort to the notion of the reflection again? [609]

[1]This has a basis in the earlier verses 540-543 which occur in the refutation of the objector's view.

संभवाद्विप्रकृष्ट्यादेरदुष्टो दूषितः पुरा ।
कथं तदिति चेदत्र युक्तिलेशो भिधीयते ॥६१०॥

(The answer is:) On the earlier occasion, the faultless (Ātman)

was given a blame, because of the possibility of being in the distance etc. Now, if you ask, 'How could that be?', then here is stated some reason in brief.[1] [610]

[1]This refers to BUB: *ātmapraveśaś ca pratibimbavad vyākṛte kārya upalabhyatvam.*

निर्धूताशेषनानात्वतद्धेतुरविभागवान् ।
अनन्यसाक्षिकः प्रत्यङ्ङासीन्नामादिजन्मतः ॥६११॥
द्रष्ट्रादिरूपतस्तावद्व्यतिरेको ऽभवत्पुरा ।
नामादिजन्मनि द्रष्टेत्यादिरूपान्वयो ऽप्यभूत् ॥६१२॥

The inner self was that which was wholly devoid of (lit. had shaken off) the entire variety (of worldly objects) and all its causes[1], which was not possessed of parts, which had none else as the seer (of itself) and which existed before (the production of) name etc. [611]
Formerly (i.e. earlier), there was absence of the distinct forms of it such as the seer etc. and, when name etc. were produced there also occurred its association with the forms such as the seer etc. [612]

These two verses establish the object-reflection relation between the Self and the inner self. The Self and the inner self are really non-distinct. But, the Self is called the inner self owing to its association with body, sense-organs, objects etc. In the first line of verse 612 the Self is meant, and in the second, the inner self.
[1]According to SP, it means: effects.

अप्पात्रत्थापिताद्भानोर्दिवि भानुर्यथेक्ष्यते ।
सुषुप्तस्थस्तथा धीस्थात्कर्तृभोक्तृत्वलक्षणात् ॥६१३॥

As the sun is taken (i.e. understood) to be existent in the sky (as distinct from) the sun which has appeared from a pot of water, so also is the Ātman residing in the state of deep sleep taken to be existent (as distinct) from that Ātman residing in the intellect etc. by means of the characteristics of the agent and the enjoyer etc. [613]

This illustration brings out the real non-difference between the Self and the inner self; the apparent difference is owing to the difference in the states (*sthānabheda*).

द्रष्टृश्रोत्रादिरूपश्च यश्च द्रष्ट्रादिसाक्ष्यपि ।
बुद्धितत्कारणोपाधी क्षेत्रज्ञेश्वरसंज्ञकौ ॥६१४॥

And he who is of the nature of the seer, the listener etc. and the one who sees the seer etc. are having (as their) limiting adjuncts such as the intellect and its cause, are called *kṣetrajña* 'the knower of the field' and *īśvara* 'the Lord'. [614]

स्वप्ननिद्रायुतावाद्यौ प्राज्ञस्त्वस्वप्ननिद्रया ।
इत्यादिस्थानभेदो ऽपि वेदान्तोक्तौ विनिश्चितः ॥६१५॥

And this distinction of their states (in the so-called worldly existence) is also decided[1] in the Vedāntic sentence:[2] The first two[3] are associated with dream and deep sleep and the (one called) Prājña, with dreamless sleep. [615]

[1]That is, decisively stated.
[2]This is *Gauḍapādakārikā* 1.14ab.
[3]This refers to the two names of the inner self, viz. Vaiśvānara and Taijasa.

जिघ्राणीममहं गन्धमिति यो वेत्त्यविक्रियः ।
तद्भावाभावसाक्ष्यात्मा ह्येतच्च श्रुतिमस्तके ॥६१६॥

The Ātman (alone) without undergoing any modification is the witness of the presence and the absence of the one who knows, 'I am experiencing this smell.'— and this occurs at the head (prominent place) of the Śruti. [616]

This is directed against the Mīmāṃsakas who do not accept that there is the Self beyond an individual self (NKL).

अर्थान्तरनिरासार्थं दूषणं चोदितं पुरा ।

तदभावाददुष्टत्वात्प्रवेशो मुखबिम्बवत् ॥६१७॥

We had earlier given blame to (the faultless Ātman) for the purpose of setting aside (the notion of) any object other (than it as existent). (The fact is:) On account of the absence of that[1] (and therefore) on account of its not having any blemish (in reality), the entry (of the Ātman into the manifest) is like the reflection of a face (in a mirror). [617]

[1]Namely, any other object.

दर्पणाभिहता दृष्टिः पर्यावृत्य स्वमाननम् ।
व्याप्नुवन्त्यविभागेन भ्रान्तिं नो जनयेद्यथा ॥६१८॥

(This is like) our sight, obstructed by a mirror, would turn back to our own face and, occupying (that, viz. the face) as not being apart from it, might cause some misconception (=wrong apprehension). [618]

इहापि कारणोपाधिः केवलोऽप्यविवेकतः ।
बुद्ध्यादिकार्यगैर्धर्मैः प्रतिबिम्बवदीक्ष्यते ॥६१९॥

Here (in this example) also, the only (i.e. unique) Ātman, being delimited by the notion of its being the cause, is owing to the absence of discrimination noticed (i.e. grasped) like a reflection (of some object) on account of its properties which belong to its (so-called) effects such as intellect etc. [619]

यथोक्तार्थप्रसिद्ध्यर्थं वचांसि सुबहून्यपि ।
त्रय्यन्तेषूपपद्यन्ते तत्सृष्ट्वेत्यादिकानि च ॥६२०॥

And, there are noticed quite a number of statements in the Vedānta texts for establishing the argument which we had adduced, viz. *tat sṛṣṭvā* ... and others. [620]

दिग्देशकालशून्यस्य प्रवेशो बिलसर्पवत् ।
न त्वाञ्जसः परस्यास्ति तेनाविद्याप्रकल्पितः ॥६२१॥

But (in reality) the entry of the highest (Ātman), who is without[1] space, region and time, is like that of a serpent into a hole is not reasonable and therefore it is produced by ignorance.
[621]

[1]That is, not associated with any such concepts as space etc.

अग्निः सूर्यो मरुद्यद्वत्प्रविष्टो भुवनं तथा ।
अप्रविष्टस्वभावो ऽपि कार्यमात्माविशज्जगत् ॥६२२॥

As the fire, the sun and the wind have entered into the universe,[1] so also has the Ātman that, does not have the nature of one who has entered (the world), entered into it (which is) its effect.
[622]

[1]Cf. *Kaṭhopaniṣad* 5.9-11 which Śaṅkara has quoted in BUB.

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यदृक्सिद्धिहेतुत्वाच्च भवेदिदम् ।
जगज्जनिस्थितिध्वंसप्रवेशानां प्रयोजनम् ॥६२३॥

And, on account of being the cause of acquiring the knowledge of the true nature of the inner self, this would indeed be the purpose of origin, sustenance and destruction of the world and the entry (into it by the Ātman).
[623]

तद्दृष्टेः पुरुषार्थत्वश्रवणादसकृच्छ्रुतौ ।
ब्रह्म वेदेत्येवमादौ कल्पिताः सृष्ट्यादयस्ततः ॥६२४॥

[Verses 624-633 point out that the Vedāntic sentences convey the imaginary character of the creation etc. of the world.]

Since we have heard in the Śruti, time and again,[1] (that) the seeing of that (viz. the true nature of the Ātman[2]) is an end of human endeavour, therefore (the statements about) the creation etc. are imagined[3] in such sentences as *brahma veda* ...
[624]

[1]It, literally, means ...

[2]Namely, its uniqueness.
[3]Or, thought of.

युक्त्या नैवोपपद्यन्ते जगत्सृष्ट्यादयो यतः ।
प्रत्यगज्ञानमात्रोत्था जगत्सृष्ट्यादयस्ततः ॥६२५॥

Because the creation etc. of the world are not justified by (any) reason, therefore, the creation etc. (must be declared to) have arisen from ignorance about (the true nature of) the inner self. [625]

नासतो जन्मना योगः सतः सत्त्वान्न चेष्यते ।
कूटस्थे विक्रिया नास्ति तस्मादज्ञानतो जनिः ॥६२६॥

That which is non-existent has no birth (and) it is not accepted (as born) from an existent because of its (i.e. the latter's) character of an existent. There is no modification (whatever) in the immutable. Therefore, (the notion of) the creation arises from ignorance. [626]

तथा रूपं रूपमिति मन्त्रवर्णोऽपि चात्मनः ।
याथात्म्यदर्शनायैव सृष्ट्यादि प्रत्यपीपदत् ॥६२७॥

So also does the text of the Śruti *rūpaṃ rūpam* ...[1] state the creation etc. (of the world) for showing the true nature of the Ātman. [627]

[1]BU 4.5.19.

व्याप्तिः प्रवेशशब्देन भण्यते कारणात्मनः ।
बुद्ध्यादिकार्यविषया व्यापिव्याप्यत्वमेतयोः ॥६२८॥

Pervasion (of the world) by the Ātman (which is understood to be) its cause is expressed by the word *praveśa*; and (this pervasion) pertains to intellect etc. as its product and (there is between these two, viz. the Ātman and the intellect etc.) the relation of what pervades and what is pervaded. [628]

This specifies that even the imaginary pervasion must have only the Ātman as the pervader.

असाधारणतो न स्यात्कालदिग्देशभिन्नयोः ।
मिथो ऽसंगतितो व्याप्तिर्हिमवद्विन्ध्ययोरिव ॥६२९॥

There would not be (a relation of pervasion) between two dissimilar things, in respect of time, direction and region (which they occupy) — that is, when they do not occur together, (as there can be no relation of pervasion between) Mt. Himalaya and Mt. Vindhya. [629]

मिथो ऽविभिन्नयोर्नासौ नापि सैकात्म्य इष्यते ।
भिन्नसामान्ययोस्तद्वत्तदसाधारणात्मनः ॥६३०॥

It[1] is not accepted in the case of the two things which are mutually distinct[2] and also in the case of those that have only one nature[3]; in the same way also between an individual and its species[4] on account of their one (common) nature. [630]

[1]This refers to *vyāpti*.
[2]Like Mt. Himalaya and Mt. Vindhya.
[3]In totally identical (*tadātma*) things.
[4]That is, bewtween *jāti* and *vyakti*.

कार्यकारणयोरेवं भिन्नाभिन्नविकल्पतः ।
वस्तुवृत्तेन संव्याप्तिर्न युक्त्येहोपपद्यते ॥६३१॥

Also in respect of the cause and the effect there cannot be postulated here[1] with reason (the notion of) pervasion, either by the activity of the (two) things or by holding them optionally as distinct and non-distinct. [631]

[1]This refers to *vyavahārabhūmi*. It is implied that, in addition to the differences as *kārya* and *kāraṇa* and *jāti* and *vyakti*, other differences also render pervasion unthinkable.

यत्र कात्स्न्र्येन वृत्तिः स्याद्रज्जुसर्पादिवद्द्वयोः ।
व्याप्तिर्मुख्यास्तु तत्रैव तथात्मानात्मनोरपि ॥६३२॥

Where there is (identity of) a form (or modification) in its entirety in two things, as in the case of a rope and serpent, let there be a pervasion (and) only there; so also (let it be) in the case of the Ātman and the non-Ātman. [632]

तमसैव यथा सर्पं स्रक्प्रविष्टा न तु स्वतः ।
प्रत्यगज्ञानहेतूत्थमात्मैवं मायया जगत् ॥६३३॥

As only on account of darkness (the character of) a garland has entered into a serpent and not in its real form, so does the Ātman enter into the world which has arisen from ignorance about the nature of the inner self, viz. Māyā. [633]

कया मर्यादया कार्यं मायावी माययाविशत् ।
आनखाग्रेभ्य इत्युक्त्या मर्यादातोऽस्य भण्यते ॥६३४॥

(One might ask:) To what extent does the powerful Lord (lit. magician) enter the effect by means of his power (magic)? Therefore, (in answer) is stated the extent of it in the words *ā nakhāgrebhyaḥ* ... [634]

नखाग्रावधिका यस्मात्संवित्पुंसोऽभिजायते ।
अतः सामान्यवृत्त्यात्मा प्राविशद्देहमीश्वरः ॥६३५॥

Since sentience in an individual is noticed (lit. produced) up to the tip of the nails, therefore (it is held that) the Lord (viz. the Ātman) has entered into a body in a similar way. [635]

दृष्टान्ताभ्यामिमां वृत्तिं व्याचष्टे प्रत्यगात्मनः ।
कृत्स्नकारणतत्कार्यवृत्त्युपाधिसमाश्रयात् ॥६३६॥

(The Upaniṣad) declares this (twofold) activity (i.e. function) of the inner self with (i.e. in the light of) two illustrations, basing the same on the delimiting adjuncts, viz. the cause of

the entire (world) and the functions of its effects (=body). [636]

मिथो विभक्ता एकत्र क्षुरधाने यथा क्षुराः ।
क्षुरधानाद्विभज्यन्ते तथात्मा नाडिभेदतः ॥६३७॥

As (many) razors, distinct from one another, are put into one place, i.e. in the razor-case and are distinguished from (that) razor-case, so also is the Ātman (distinguished from the bodies) on account of the distinction among (various) veins (etc.)[1] [637]

[1]SP and NKL explain this thus: The Ātman is called the listener, the seer etc. by its contact with the ear, the eye etc.

ओतप्रोतात्मना तस्थुरर्वाग्या भूमयो ऽक्षरात् ।
तत्तद्भूमिपरिच्छेदात्क्षेत्रज्ञः पर एव सन् ॥६३८॥

Whatever states, lower than the imperishable, remained on account of the Ātman which has woven them both length-wise and cross-wise, by limiting each one of those states, the highest Ātman is ever (*eva*) existing there as the knower of the field. [638]

This verse refers to the subtle Ātman remaining in every gross product, after producing the same. This is based on *etasmin nu khalv akṣare gārgy ākāśa otaś ca protaś ca iti* ... (BU 3.8.11).

सूक्ष्मताव्यापिते ज्ञेये भूम्यादेर्यावदक्षरम् ।
पूर्वपूर्वप्रहाणेन तन्निष्ठा वियदात्मना ॥६३९॥

(In all things) beginning with the earth etc. and up to the imperishable (Ātman), one has to know the subtlety and pervasiveness (of the Ātman); by abandoning each preceding (of the earth etc., is noticed) its existence in the form of ether. [639]

विश्वंभरो ऽग्निर्विज्ञेयो विश्वस्य भरणादिह ।

दारु कृत्स्नमभिव्याप्य यथाग्निर्दारुणि स्थितः ॥६४०॥
संव्याप्य तद्वदखिलं देहमात्मा व्यवस्थितः ।

Because of his occupying the universe, Agni is to be understood as Viśvambhara, (for), fire resides in wood, pervading the whole of it, [640]
in the same way, the Ātman exists, pervading the entire body. [641ab]

This explains the sentence in BU 1.4.7: *viśvambharo vā viśvambharakulāye*. The second line of this verse forms a syntactical whole, when together with the first line of the next verse.

तस्थावसंव्याप्य यथा क्षुरधानं क्षुरस्तथा ॥६४१॥
श्रोत्रादिनाडीमध्यस्थ आत्माव्याप्य तनुं स्थितः ।
वृत्ती द्वे प्राप्नुते ऽतद्वान्स्वप्नजाग्रदवस्थयोः ॥६४२॥

[In verses 641cd-644, there is description of the twofold appearance of the existent with reference respectively to a body and the outside world (*adhyātma* and *adhibhūta*).]

(Then) like a razor in a razor-case, which has not pervaded the whole (but one part) of it, the Ātman, not having pervaded the whole of the body, is residing (only) in some part, i.e. an ear etc. or the vein. (The Ātman) though really not having them, has two functions to perform, in the two states of waking and deep sleep. [641cd-642]

The second line of verse 641 and the first line of verse 642 together form one syntactical whole. The second line of verse 642 refers to the two states of the Ātman called Vaiśvānara and Taijasa in *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad* 3-5.

सामान्यमात्रवृत्तिं स सुषुप्ते प्रतिपद्यते ।
प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यसंमोहान्न त्वसौ परमार्थतः ॥६४३॥

The Ātman performs the general function only while in deep sleep state; this, on account of the ignorance about the true

nature of the inner self. In reality, however, it is not that (viz. ignorance). [643]

महासत्ता वियज्ज्ञेयं कृत्स्नार्वागभूमिसंप्लुतेः ।
व्यक्तयो ऽन्त्या विशेषाः स्युस्तदसाधारणत्वतः ॥६४४॥

The sky[1], should be known as the absolute (lit. great) existent (on account of its) encompassing all lower regions; the manifold forms are (lit. should be known as) the last (i.e. lower) particulars on account of the uncommonness of them. [644]

[1]The sky stands for the Ātman — NKL: *viyat brahman* and SP: *viyad akṣaram ṛco akṣare parame vyomann iti* ...

सामान्यानि विशेषाश्च तन्मध्यपतितानि च ।
सामान्यात्मविशेषत्वं तदुपाधिरगात्परः ॥६४५॥

The highest (Ātman), assuming such limiting adjuncts as are common, particular and those which fall between the two,[1] thus attained the character of (both) generality and particularity[1]. [645]

In the preceding verse was stated that the sky (=Ātman), having the most pervading character, is called Mahāsattā. Now, a statement follows about other elements and their products — all these are but limiting adjuncts of the Ātman.

[1]Namely, which can be both common and particular.

श्रोत्रत्वगादिनाडिस्थं शब्दाद्यालोचनादिभिः ।
चेष्टितं नामरूपाभ्यां देहे ऽमुष्योपलभ्यते ॥६४६॥

The activity[1] of that one (viz. the highest Ātman) is noticed in a body by various names and forms, (thus) in the sense of hearing, skin, etc. and the veins and by means of (hearing of) sound, etc. and seeing. [646]

[1]See NKL, NKL edition and a variant reading: *veṣṭitam* for *ceṣṭitam*— quite an inferior reading!

असाधारणसामान्यरूपाभ्यामीक्ष्यमीक्षते ।
सर्वमानैः प्रसिद्धत्वादतो व्युत्थाप्यते ततः ॥६४७॥

The object of seeing[1] is seen[2] in its uncommon (i.e. particular) and common (i.e. general) forms with the help of all the means of knowing, since they are known (thereby). (And) therefore the (real experiencer[3]) is lifted up[4] from them. [647]

This points out how this entire world has two parts; one seen and the other which cannot be seen (*vikāra* and *avikāra*).

[1]This refers to the world, the so-called product of the Ātman.

[2]*īkṣate* in the original is understood as *īkṣyate*. Yet, alternatively one could translate: The Śruti sees or the people see the object of seeing in ...

[3]That is, the Ātman.

[4]This indicates that they do not see the one or they find it apart from all activity.

अयं मेयः प्रमाताहं मानमेतदितीक्षणे ।
मिथ्याज्ञाने जनस्तुष्टः स्वप्नमायेन्द्रजालवत् ॥६४८॥

[Verses 648-659 explain the meaning of *taṃ na paśyati*.]

This one is (the object) to be known, I am the knower and this is the means of knowing — in such (way of) knowing, viz. in false knowledge, are people satisfied as (one is satisfied) in a dream or a magic show. [648]

यतो मिथ्यावबोधो ऽयमतस्तदपनुत्तये ।
न पश्यन्ति तमित्याह ये पश्यन्ति यथोदितम् ॥६४९॥

As this (way of knowing) is (only) false knowledge, therefore, for the removal of the same, (the Śruti) has stated, 'They do not see ...' with reference to them who see him as described. [649]

This verse establishes that a person who sees the Ātman as

possessed of varied forms is in reality ignorant about the same.

NKL edition reads: *-bodho 'yam matas* ...; accordingly the translation could be: this (way of knowing) is taken to be false knowledge ...; this hardly makes any difference.

वस्त्वज्ञानैकनिष्ठत्वान्मिथ्याधीर्न हि वस्तुनि ।
न पश्यन्तीत्यतो युक्तं नेक्षन्ते वस्तु तत्परम् ॥६५०॥

False knowledge, being dependent on ignorance about the real thing (does not belong) to the real thing. Therefore, it is proper to accept that they do not see it (viz. the real thing, the Ātman); they do not really see the highest thing (viz. Reality). [650]

This sets aside the possible notion that the common man's knowledge about as object is not false. Since the Ātman has assumed the form of the object, therefore, the knowledge is really not true.

यद्यप्यत्राभिमानो ऽस्ति निष्क्रियाकारकात्मनि ।
पश्यामीत्ययथार्थत्वान्मिथ्याधिरेव सा मता ॥६५१॥

Even if, in this (state)[1], there is on the part of the Ātman, who is the actionless agent, the ego, viz. 'I am seeing.', there does not follow (the sight of) Reality, and so, that is to be understood as false knowledge. [651]

[1]This refers to worldly dealings.

नन्वप्राप्तनिषेधो ऽयं न पश्यन्तीति भण्यते ।
नैवं सृष्ट्यादिवाक्यानां प्रत्यग्बोधैकहेतुतः ॥६५२॥

(One might object:) When it is said (in the Śruti) 'They do not see.', this should be treated as rejection of what is not introduced.[1] (Our answer is:) This is not so, since the sentences (in the Śruti) about creation etc. have the only purpose of giving information about (the true nature of) the inner self. [652]

[1] *aprāptaniṣedha* consists in denying or rejecting what was already not begun as a part of the statement. The objector would hold that *taddarśana* should have been earlier mentioned, should the Śruti *taṃ na paśyanti* become a meaningful *niṣedhavākya*.

मन्त्रो ऽप्याहेममेवार्थं रूपं रूपमिति स्फुटम् ।
तद्दर्शनात्समस्तस्य पुरुषार्थस्य सिद्धितः ॥६५३॥

Even the Mantra *rūpaṃ rūpam* ...[1] has clearly declared this very thought, since there is complete accomplishment of the end of human endeavour from seeing that (viz. the Ātman). [653]

[1] BU 2.5.19: *rūpaṃ rūpaṃ pratirūpo babhūva tad asya* ...

पश्यन्तो ऽपि न पश्यन्ति विरुद्धं कथमुच्यते ।
मेयासंस्पर्शिदृष्टित्वान्न पश्यन्तीति भण्यते ॥६५४॥

(The objector asks a question:) How is this contradictory statement made, i.e. though seeing it, they do not see it[1]? (To this we answer:) That 'they do not see it' is said because there is not (actual) seeing connected with any object of knowing. [654]

[1] The objector persists in holding the contradiction thus: *ātma-darśana* is taken up for discussion (*prakṛta*); therefore, *taṃ na paśyanti* is *niṣedha* of the same. That explains the apparent contradiction in the Śruti (*aprakṛtaniṣedha*).

सदेवेत्यादिवाक्येभ्यः कृत्स्नं वस्तु यतो ऽद्वयम् ।
संभवस्तद्विरुद्धस्य कुतो ऽकृत्स्नस्य वस्तुनः ॥६५५॥

Since from such sentences as *sad eva* ...[1] (it is understood that) there is only one whole thing without any duality, how could there be the possibility of (what is) opposed to it and is not (the) whole (thing)? [655]

[1]CU 6.2.1.

अव्यावृत्ताननुगतं प्रत्यग्वस्तु स्वतो मितेः ।
तद्विरुद्धेह या दृष्टिर्मिथ्यारूपा न सान्यथा ॥६५६॥

The inner self is the real thing, is not distinguished from another, (and) is not similar to (lit. followed by) another. Since it becomes known by itself, therefore, whatever knowledge in this world is opposed to that (viz. knowledge of the real) is false knowledge; it is otherwise (than real). [656]

This is another argument to convey the completeness/fullness of the inner self (Ātman) which is heard in the Śruti.

आत्मानात्मानमाप्नोति यतः प्रत्यक्तयाखिलम् ।
तदन्यानवशिष्टत्वादकृत्स्नः स्यादतो ऽन्यथा ॥६५७॥

Since the Ātman pervades[1] the entire non-Ātman by becoming the one within it; therefore, if (it were) different by being non-distinguished from that (creation),[2] (then) it would have been incomplete. [657]

This explains why the inner self (Ātman) is complete (*pūrṇa/kṛtsna*).

[1] *āpnoti = vyāpnoti.*

[2] This would disprove its *advitīyatva* 'singularity, being one without a second'.

अनात्मा नात्मरूपेण प्रत्यक्त्वात्सिद्धिमर्हति ।
प्रत्यङ्मात्रैकयाथात्म्यात्कुतस्तद्व्यतिरेकतः ॥६५८॥

The non-Ātman cannot be established as the Ātman, since that (viz. Ātman) is of the nature of one that resides within (a body) and since the truth is that the Ātman has only the inner self as its (delimited) nature. How can that be apart from that (i.e. the inner self)? [658]

This explains how duality (viz. non-Ātman) cannot exist as

identical with, and also apart from, the Ātman.

देशतः कालतो रूपाद्वस्त्ववस्थादितो ऽपि च ।
व्यभिचारो ऽस्य संसिद्धस्तद्विरुद्धात्मसाक्षिकः ॥६५९॥

And further, variance in the nature of this (non-Ātman/duality) is established by its region, time, form and (the different) states etc.[1] and has as its seer[2] what is opposite (to it in) character. [659]

It is stated that the varying character of the non-Ātman establishes it to be false.

[1]The word etc. refers to change in properties.

[2]Namely, the inner self, the Ātman.

Verses 660-692 explain BU sentence 'akṛtsno hi sa prāṇann eva prāṇo nāma bhavati'.

प्रतिज्ञार्थस्य सिद्ध्यर्थं न पश्यन्तीति भण्यते ।
अकृत्स्नो हीति हेतूक्तिः सापि चैवं समर्थ्यते ॥६६०॥

The statement beginning with (the words); *na paśyanti* is made with a view to establishing what is enunciated.[1] The statement beginning with *akṛtsnaḥ* ...,[2] which is the statement of the reason (for the earlier statement), is also justified in this very way. [660]

This is the purport of *akṛtsno hi ... bhavati.*

[1]That is, the uniqueness of the ever-existing Ātman.

[2]That is, *akṛtsno hi sa prāṇann eva prāṇo nāma bhavati, ... manvāno manaḥ.*

तदकृत्स्नत्वसंसिद्ध्यै प्राणन्नेवेत्युदीरणम् ।
अन्योन्यव्यभिचारित्वं प्राणादेरीक्ष्यते यतः ॥६६१॥

The statement *prāṇann eva* has the purpose of establishing the incompletelness (in daily dealings) of that (i.e. the non-Ātman), since it is seen (i.e. experienced) that Prāṇa etc. have

existence[1] in the absence of one another. [661]

[1]That is, they are operative.

यस्मिन्दृष्टे ऽप्यदृष्टो ऽर्थः स तदन्यश्च शिष्यते ।
तथादृष्टे ऽपि दृष्टः स्यादकृत्स्नस्तादृगुच्यते ॥६६२॥

Such a thing (or object) is called incomplete when on its being seen[1] a thing, an unseen and other than itself (does) exist; (similarly) it would be seen even while that (former) is not seen.[2] [662]

By this statement of the meaning of *akṛtsna*, Sureśvara suggests that Ātman being *kṛtsna* and known, everything else also becomes known.

[1]That is, known.

[2]Sureśvara suggests that on the Ātman becoming known everything else becomes known and that the Ātman continues to exist while the other (apparent) thing is not seen (i.e. is no more in existence). This is how the Ātman is *kṛtsna*.

आविष्करिष्यन्हेत्वर्थमकृत्स्नत्वप्रसिद्धये ।
न ह्यसौ कृत्स्नतामेति चक्षुःश्रोत्रादिसंहतः ॥६६३॥

With a view to revealing the meaning of the (word expressive of) reason[1] and for establishing the incompleteness (of the non-Ātman, the Veda[2] declares) that the one, who possesses eye, ear etc., does not attain completeness. [663]

[1]Namely, the words *akṛtsno hi* ...

[2]Supply: *vedaḥ* in consonance with *āviṣkariṣyan* (masculine form).

परस्परानभिव्याप्तेर्नामरूपक्रियात्मनाम् ।
व्यभिचारादकृत्स्नत्वं स्यादनात्मैकरूपिणाम् ॥६६४॥

There is incompleteness in the case of those (things) which are of the nature of name, form and action(s) and which have the form of only the non-Ātman and since they do not

pervade one another[1] and there is their mutual exclusion (*vyabhicāra*). [664]

This verse states that all worldly things are *saṃghāta*s and therefore *akṛtsna*.

[1]That is, since they do not exist at one and the same time.

असंहतः संहतः सन्प्रत्यङ्मोहैकहेतुतः ।
प्राणनादिक्रियाः कुर्वन्प्राण इत्यभिधीयते ॥६६५॥

The one which is (in reality) not limited (in body etc.) is (taken as) limited (in a body) on account of the sole reason, viz. the ignorance about (the nature of) the inner self and is described by the word Prāṇa,[1] perform as it seems to do (various) activities beginning with breathing etc. [665]

[1]SP suggests *prāṇa* should be understood for *prāṇanādi*.

तस्मिंश्च प्राणने वायोर्व्यापारः करणात्मना ।
उत्सृज्यमानः कर्मत्वं विज्ञानात्मन एति सः ॥६६६॥

And in that action of breathing there is the function of the wind, in the capacity of an instrument (and), being released, it becomes the object of the activity of the knowing self[1]. [666]

[1]Namely, the inner self.

साक्षादात्मोत्सृजन्वायुं तस्मिन्प्राणनकर्मणि ।
अपेतकारकग्रामः प्रतीचैवानुभूयते ॥६६७॥

In that action of breathing, it is the Ātman itself who is far away from (i.e. is not possessed of) all the organs of activity (and), who, releasing the wind, is experienced by the inner self (as being within itself). [667]

कर्त्रादिकारकाण्यस्मिन्नसाधारणरूपतः ।

All operative causes, viz. agent, means of activity etc., appear to be there in this witness of the coming and going (of wind etc.), (in that) who is not possessed of those (activities) as its properties. [668]

साक्षिरूपं स्वतःसिद्धं तेनैष्वव्यभिचारतः ।
कर्त्रादि तु तमोन्तस्य रूपं धर्माद्यपेक्षया ॥६६९॥

Therefore, its nature as the witness in these (activities) is self-established invariably; but, the form(s) as the agent etc. belongs to that which ends in ignorance (about the nature of the inner self)[1], owing to the dependence of the same on the property or activity (*dharma*) etc. [669]

[1] *tamonta* is not explained by both SP and NKL.

अनित्यहेतुतो ऽनित्यं तेन कर्त्रादि लक्ष्यते ।
निर्हेतु प्रत्यगज्ञानं लक्ष्यते तेन नित्यवत् ॥६७०॥

Therefore, owing to (its rise from) an impermanent cause, the character of the agent etc. is understood (by the knower, i.e. inner self) as impermanent. (And) for that (very) reason, ignorance about the inner self, having no cause for it whatever, is taken as permanent. [670]

प्रत्यगज्ञानमात्रैकनीडत्वान्नान्यरूपता ।
क्रियाकारकरूपाणां नित्यानित्यमतिः कुतः ॥६७१॥

Such things as are of the nature of activity and the means of activity, having a support (lit. nest) only in the ignorance about (the true nature of) the inner self, cannot have any other form.[1] How can (then) there be any thought[2] about (their cause),[3] as permanent or impermanent? [671]

[1] They remain only as product of ignorance and therefore unreal.
[2] That is, discussion.
[3] That is, the sky. What is meant is: The (so-called) knowers

in this world are the products of the sky. Therefore, the sky, their cause, also must be like them only non-eternal.

अतस्तद्व्यभिचारेण नामरूपक्रियात्मनाम् ।
अकृत्स्नव्यपदेशेन मिथ्याज्ञानत्वमुच्यते ॥६७२॥

Therefore (i.e. for that reason) is declared that those who are of the nature of name and form, varying in nature with that (inner self), are of the nature of false knowledge. (This is stated) in the mention 'incompleteness ...'. [672]

अज्ञातायां यथा रज्ज्वां तदध्यस्तैकरूपिणाम् ।
व्यभिचारः स्रगादीनां प्रतीच्येवमनात्मनाम् ॥६७३॥

As the wreathe of flowers etc. has (i.e. shows) variance (with the rope (etc.)) when the rope (etc.) which has/have the form(s) of what is/are superimposed on the same is/are not known (in the real form), so also the non-Ātmans, being superimposed on the inner self, (show variance with it). [673]

प्राणाग्नयः पुरा बुद्धेः सुप्तेष्वन्येषु जाग्रति ।
अतस्तद्विषया तावत्कर्तृतेहोच्यते प्रभोः ॥६७४॥

Fires in the form of *prāna*s exist (even) before one's awakening (from the state of deep sleep) while the others (i.e. other functioning organs) are asleep. Therefore, with reference to that (existence) is here stated the activity (of breathing) of the Lord. [674]

नामतो रूपतश्चैवं प्राणनादिषु कर्मसु ।
लक्ष्यते ऽविद्यया तद्वान्रज्जुः सर्पादिभिर्यथा ॥६७५॥

Thus, owing to name and also owing to form is experienced in the activities, viz. breathing etc. (the inner self) as the performer of them through ignorance, in the same way as a rope (etc.) is noticed (i.e. understood) as having the form of a serpent etc. [675]

प्राणन्नेवेत्यवधृतेस्तदर्थान्तररूपतः ।
प्राणाद्यकृत्स्नतासिद्ध्यै व्यभिचारः प्रदर्श्यते ॥६७६॥

(Therefore) in order to establish the incompleteness of (the agent of) breathing etc. there is shown by the restriction with the use of the word *eva* the variance of the same (lit. that) from other (functions).[1] [676]

[1]For example, seeing, hearing and others. Cf. note 1 on verse 665 above.

कर्मैतदेव कुर्वाणः काले चात्रैव भण्यते ।
अत्रैव च क्रियायोगे तद्रूपाह्वः स इष्यते ॥६७७॥

(This Ātman) who is performing just this activity is described as '(he is) so and so at this point of time'. It is only here on account of (its) association with that (particular) function that it is accepted to have a name after that form. [677]

तद्बानसमकालं तु प्राणनादिक्रियोत्थितेः ।
प्रागूर्ध्वं च तदन्येषु प्राणासंभवहेतुतः ।
न तन्नामा न तद्रूपस्तदन्यत्र च कर्मणि ॥६७८॥

But doing (only) that activity, it does not have that name and that form while doing another activity, i.e. before and after the rise of the activity such as breathing, (and also) at another point of time, since there is no possibility of there being Prāṇa etc. [678]

प्राणनानन्तरं यस्मात्क्रियाशक्तेः समुद्भवः ।
वदन्वागित्यतः प्राह क्रमयोगानुरोधतः ॥६७९॥

Since the rise of any capacity for performing any function (only) follows breathing (by an individual), therefore, the Śruti declares 'speaking, (therefore) it is speech' etc., in accordance with the sequence (of the rise of other functions). [679]

तथोच्यते ऽनयेत्यस्मात्करणं वागुदाहृता ॥६८०॥

The Ātman, because it speaks, is called speech (=Vāc) When there is sound (produced), it is called Vāc. (Also) it is called Vāc, a sense-organ, because thereby is (sound) uttered. [680]

This verse has a purport to point out that there is in worldly dealings the division as the agent, the object and the sense-organs even while the Śruti has declared that all these are but the Ātman.

पश्यंश्चक्षुस्तथा द्रष्टा शृण्वञ्श्रोत्रं तथैव च ।
त्रिधा त्रिधा व्यवच्छिन्न एवं सर्वत्र लक्षयेत् ॥६८१॥

So, (the Ātman) who is seeing is the seer, the eye, in the same way, listening, (it) is the ear. Thus limited in this threefold (function)[1] in three ways[2] is the Ātman — thus should one understand (the thought) everywhere. [681]

This verse describes the limitation of the Ātman under the influence of ignorance.

[1]Seeing, hearing, feeling the touch.

[2]The agent, the object and the means of knowing.

चक्षुरालोचनायैव संशयं कुरुते मनः ।
बुद्धिरध्यवसानाय साक्षी क्षेत्रज्ञ उच्यते ॥६८२॥

Eye[1] is only for seeing[2] (an object), *manas* entertains doubt (about the nature of an object) [or options regarding the nature of the object], intellect is for deciding (its exact nature) and the witness (the Ātman) is called the knower of the field. [682]

[1]SP: Eye stands for all the *indriya*s of *karman* and *jñāna*.

[2]SP: *darśana* indicates all other activities of the *indriya*s.

यैव ज्ञानविकाशेषु साक्षिता सैव नान्यथा ।
क्रियाशक्तिविकाशेषु ह्यन्योन्यव्यभिचारिषु ॥६८३॥

Whatever be the character of the witness it remains the same in respect of different flashes of knowing (i.e. awarenesses); (at all times), it does not vary (even) while there are flashes of the capacities of various functions, and while they differ with one another. [683]

निरस्तावयवे व्योम्नि मिथोभिन्नप्रदेशिनाम् ।
न संभाव्या यथा सिद्धिः प्रतीच्येवं तमोवताम् ॥६८४॥

As in the case of the sky which does not have any parts, (the notions of) parts in mutually distinct regions are not possible to posit; so it is in the case of them who have ignorance with respect to the inner self. [684]

प्राणन्वदन्नित्युक्तानि नामरूपाणि यानि तु ।
कर्मजान्येव तान्यस्य न तु चैतन्यवत्स्वतः ॥६८५॥
अन्योन्यापेक्षसंसिद्धेरन्योन्यव्यभिचारतः ।
अपराधीनसंसिद्धौ भानाविव तमो भवेत् ॥६८६॥

Whatever be the names and forms mentioned in the statements 'breathing, speaking, etc.', they have originated only in (different) functions of this one (i.e. the inner self). But (none of these) is, like (its own) sentience, on the strength of itself, [685]
because they get established through mutual dependence and because they occur in the absence of one another. In case (therefore, it is said that) they get established without depending mutually, it would be like (saying that) there is darkness in the sun. [686]

Verse 685 explains BU: *tāny asyaitāni karmamayāny eva.*

यत एवमविद्योत्थं प्राणाद्यस्यातदात्मनः ।
नामरूपमतस्ताभ्यां पश्यन्नपि न पश्यति ॥६८७॥

Since thus[1] (all this, viz.) Prāṇa etc. has thus originated from ignorance (about the true nature of the Ātman), therefore, from this one which does not have the same (lit. that)[2] as

its nature, (i.e.) from these names and forms, (therefore) this one (i.e. the inner self) does not see, even though it is seeing. [687]

[1]That is, for this reason, viz. being dependent (on another) and being without one another.

[2]Namely, the two factors mentioned in the preceding note.

तत्रैवं सति यो द्रष्टा प्राणनादिक्रियं परम् ।
उपास्त इति जानाति न स्वभावादुपासनम् ॥६८८॥

Then, this being so, whichsoever seer worships the highest (Ātman) as the one that performs such activities as breathing etc., does not really know worship in its own (i.e. real) nature. [688]

This explains BU: *sa yo 'ta ekaikam upāste*. This is not an injunction, inasmuch as there follows a *nindā*: *na sa veda*.

न यतो युगपत्कृत्स्नवस्तुज्ञानं क्रमेण वा ।
अस्त्येकैकमतो ऽनूक्तिः प्राप्ता दृष्टिरनूद्यते ॥६८९॥

Since there does not arise the knowledge of all entities simultaneously or (gradually) in some sequence, therefore (in the statement of the Śruti) there is the mention of the word *ekaika* 'one after another'; thus is followed the nature of each as commonly observed in the world.[1] [689]

This explains the purpose of *ekaikam*. The Upāsana under reference cannot pertain to all objects together, i.e. simultaneously. One can infer from SP: *na svābhāvikajñānasya vidhāyakam idaṃ vākyam*.

[1] *prāptā* = *lokataḥ prāptā* (SP).

नानेकदृष्टिविध्यर्थमेकैकोपास्तिकृत्सनम् ।
मृत्योः स मृत्युमित्येवं तद्वृष्टिरपि कृत्स्यते ॥६९०॥

This censure (implied in) this statement about worship of each of them, one after another, is not prescriptive of seeing many,

for, in the statement *mṛtyoḥ sa mṛtyuḥ* ... is censured that (kind of) seeing[1] also. [690]

[1]That refers to *anekadṛṣṭi*.

सर्व एकमिति ह्युक्तेरिहाप्यैकात्म्यदर्शनम् ।
विधीयते यतो नातः समस्तव्यस्तदर्शनम् ॥६९१॥

Since here also is prescribed in words *sarva ekam*; seeing the uniqueness of the Ātman, therefore, there is no seeing of the aggregate and the several parts. [691]

This has a reference to *atra hy ete sarva ekam bhavanti*.

समस्तव्यस्ततां तस्मान्मानान्तरमितत्वतः ।
अनूद्यापूर्वमैकात्म्यं विधेयमुपपत्तिमत् ॥६९२॥

Therefore, having merely repeated the nature of the aggregate and of the several parts owing to their being known by other means of knowing, (the Śruti finds it proper) to state with reason the uniqueness of the Ātman which was not stated[1] (anywhere) before. [692]

[1]That is, known.

समुद्रतरुगोपिण्डदृष्टान्तैः परमात्मनः ।
व्याचक्षते बलात्केचित्समस्तव्यस्तदर्शनम् ॥६९३॥

[Verses 693-703 state and refute Bhartṛprapañca's view on *atra ... bhavanti*.]

Some[1] emphatically[2] state that the highest Ātman is seen as an aggregate and as consisting of parts in the light of the illustrations of the ocean, the tree, and the body of a cow. [693]

[1]SP and NKL refer some to Bhartṛprapañca. Cf. verses 947-950.

[2]Cf. SP: *balād iti śrutyakṣarabāhyatvoktiḥ*, i.e. going against the Śruti.

नानावयवसंभेदभिन्नार्थश्चेन्नगादिवत् ।
सिद्धः कुतश्चिन्मानात्स्यादनुवादस्तथा सति ॥६९४॥

If (the Ātman) were somehow established by some means to be a thing characterized as a conglomeration of various parts like, for instance, a tree etc.[1], then there could have been a repetitive statement[2] about that. [694]

This verse refers to the idea that the Śruti mentions about the Ātman as a *samastavyasta vastu.*

[1]The word etc. refers to an ocean, the body of a cow.

[2]That is, *anuvāda*. Cf. NKL: *brahma bhinnābhinnam upādānatvāt samudravat ity anumānāt siddhaś cet tathā sati vākyam anuvādo 'pramāṇam ity arthaḥ.*

निःशेषभेदसामान्यदृष्ट्यावृत्तिरुपासनम् ।
विधित्सितं चेत्तादृक्षं कल्पकोट्या ऽपि दुःशकम् ॥६९५॥

If it was intended to prescribe a worship (of the Ātman) by repeating the notion of (its being) identical with the common characteristic and all (variety of the things); then that kind (of worship) would be extremely difficult (to imagine) by every stretch of imagination.[1] [695]

This sets aside the possible view that there is some worship prescribed of the Ātman as a *bhinnābhinna vastu.*

[1]Read SP: *teṣāṃ (= viśeṣāṇām) ānantyāt kārtsnyenānusaṃdhānāsiddheḥ ...*

प्रत्यग्दृष्टेर्हि विषयः स्यादात्मेत्यनुभूतितः ।
तदबोधमृते तत्र कुतः पिण्डादिदर्शनम् ॥६९६॥

Indeed (the Ātman) would be an object of seeing by the individual self owing to its being experienced. Therefore, how could there be the sight (i.e. seeing) of a body etc. unless

(there is) ignorance of that (Ātman)? [696]

तं परादादिति तथा प्रतीच्यज्ञानकल्पितम् ।
मिथ्याज्ञानापनुत्त्यर्थमात्मैवेत्यब्रवीच्छ्रुतिः ॥६९७॥

Also, what the Śruti has declared in the statement *taṃ parādād* ... is in respect of the inner self — a notion produced by ignorance and it is pronounced for removing (i.e. wiping away) completely the false knowledge that the Śruti stated *ātmaiva* ... [697]

पराञ्चीत्यपवादाच्च न पिण्डादीक्षणम् श्रुतेः ।
प्रत्यग्दृष्ट्या विरुद्धत्वान्न परागर्थदर्शनम् ॥६९८॥

So also, on the basis of the denial in the statement *parāñci khāni* ...[1], (it may be said that) seeing the individual body etc. is not (acceptable) to the Śruti. There is no seeing of any outside object (possible), since that is opposed to seeing of the individual self. [698]

[1] *Kaṭhopaniṣad* 4.1; cf. verse 180 note 3 above.

अनन्यमेयतन्मानमातृ वस्त्वविभागवत् ।
अमेयमानमात्रेकं तदात्मेति प्रचक्षते ॥६९९॥

They declare that as the Ātman, which is a thing that does not have any to be known (as associated with it), a means and the knower of knowingit — a real thing, which does not have parts, unique object, not (associated with any) means but the knower of itself. [699]

This explains the nature of the Ātman.

संसारदर्शनाभ्यासात्तन्मुक्तिं ये प्रचक्षते ।
नाकार्यं विद्यते तेषां वैश्वानरवराश्रयात् ॥७००॥

For those who state that liberation of that (viz. the Ātman, as effected) by continued meditation on (the nature of) the

transmigratory existence, there does not exist any activity which cannot be performed; (that is so) on account of the support of Vaiśvānara's favour. [700]

वयं तु वरहीनत्वाच्चर्मवद्वेष्टितुं वियत् ।
न शक्नुमो विना युक्तीरतो न श्रद्दधामहे ॥७०१॥

As for ourselves, we are not able (to declare), without reasoning[1], (such a meaning of the Śruti)[2], in the same way as they (would), for the reason of not having received the boon (of Fire), (indeed, it would be like an effort) to cover the sky with some skin[3] — therefore, we do not have faith (in that meaning). [701]

[1]It literally means: reasons.
[2]Namely, that which Bhartṛprapañca has declared.
[3]Cf. *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 6.20: *yadā carmavad ākāśaṃ veṣṭayiṣyanti mānavāḥ*; this implies opposition to scriptures.

उक्तं च वक्ष्यमाणं समस्तव्यस्ततां प्रति ।
श्रुत्यक्षरानुरोधेन दूषणं दूषितात्मनाम् ॥७०२॥

Thus is blame directed and also will be directed against those whose minds are affected (by wrong notions) with respect to the nature of the Ātman as an aggregate and what is made up of parts — this, in consonance with the statements (lit. words) of the Śruti. [702]

नादूषितात्मभिर्यस्मात्प्रतीचो ऽन्यन्मनागपि ।
प्रत्यग्दृष्ट्येक्षितुं शक्यं वस्तु स्वप्नदृशा यथा ॥७०३॥

And (this is so) because, for those whose intellect is not affected (by notions of duality), it is not possible to see even a little thing which is other than the Ātman as the inner self as by one who is seeing a dream. [703]

This gives the reason why Bhartṛprapañca, who sees duality (*samastavyastavastudarśana*) is blamed as *dūṣitātman*.

प्राणन्वदन्निति द्वाभ्यां क्रियाशक्तिसमुद्भवः ।
पश्यञ्ञ्ण्वन्निति तथा ज्ञानशक्त्युद्भवः कृतः ॥७०४॥

[Verses 704-710 explain BU: *prāṇann eva*.]

By the words *prāṇan* and *vadan*, (there is a statement made about) the rise of the capacity for activity and, by the words *paśyan* and *śṛṇvan*, about the rise of the capacity for knowing. [704]

नामरूपातिरेकेण न ज्ञेयं वस्तु विद्यते ।
उपलब्धौ तयोरुक्ते कारणे श्रोत्रचक्षुषी ॥७०५॥

There does not exist an object to be known apart from (what has) name and form, and, for knowing these two, there are stated two means, viz. ears and eyes. [705]

नामरूपप्रकाश्या च क्रिया प्राणात्मिका तथा ।
नामाभिव्यक्तिकृद्वाक्स्यादेवं सर्वत्र योजना ॥७०६॥

Activity is what can be revealed by name and form and which has Prāṇa as its essence — (this is understood) from the sentence which reveals the name and form — such is the construe everywhere (in the present context). [706]

श्रोत्रादिकरणैर्यद्यत्प्रथते तत्तदुच्यते ।
रूपं व्याक्रियते यत्तु तन्नामेत्युपदिश्यते ॥७०७॥

(In this context), whatever becomes revealed (to an individual) by organs such as ears[1] is called form; and (*tu*) whatever is specified is called to be name. [707]

[1]Organs such as ears refers to the eyes also. This indicates the flash of the knowing sentience (*vijñānaśaktyudbhava*). It is sentience that is really capable of hearing, seeing etc. Therefore, SP rightly points out: *śaktidvayodbhavoktyā samastasaṃsārasya pratīcy adhyāsasyātra vivakṣitatvān na prasiddhanāpnarūpagraho 'tra*

yuktaḥ.

ज्ञानशक्तिविकाशानां मनः साधारणं मतम् ।
क्रियाशक्त्युद्भावानां च कारणं तत्त्रिकालदृक् ॥७०८॥

manas is held as common in (grasping) all the capacities for knowing and that is also the means for the rise of the capacity for activity — (thus) that is the seer (i.e. experiencer) in all the three periods of time.[1] [708]

This explains BUB: *manvāno mano manuta iti* ... But cf. SP: *atra ca bhāṣyānusāreṇa vyutpattitrayam āśritya kartṛtvāditrayam ātmano draṣṭavyam.*

प्राणनादिकृतां मध्य एकैकं यः समीक्षते ।
न स जानात्यकृत्स्नत्वात्पूर्णं वस्तु यतः स्वतः ॥७०९॥

Whosoever amongst Prāṇa etc. sees only each one of them does not know (the true nature of the inner self) because of the incompleteness (of each one of them); since Reality in itself is complete.[1] [709]

[1]Read NKL: *ekaikakriyāviśiṣṭam* (*ātmānam*) *vidvān avidvān.*

यावदेवमयं वेद प्राणितीत्यादिकर्तृकम् ।
अक्रियाकारकं वस्तु न तावद्वेद तत्त्वतः ॥७१०॥

So long as this (individual) knows (this Ātman) as the agent of the action conveyed by (the verb root) *pra-√aṇ*, he has not known the real thing which does not perform (or do) any activity. [710]

This explains away the paradox in *yaḥ samīkṣate na sa jānāti* in the previous verse.

Now is introduced a discussion of the sentence 'ātmety evopāsīta' up to verse 940.

अव्याकृते ऽनभिव्यक्तेर्न चेत्तत्तत्त्वमीक्ष्यते ।
व्यक्तौ च हेतुकार्याभ्यां कथं तर्हीक्ष्यतां परम् ॥७११॥

If that Reality is not grasped in the unmanifest (form, viz. which is in deep sleep state[1]), since it is not revealed (in various name(s) and form(s)), how then can that highest (Reality) be seen when it is manifest by means of the cause and the effect?[1] [711]

This verse refers to two states; deep sleep and waking.
[1]SP: *svāpaviṣayo 'vyākṛtaśabdaḥ.*
[2]Namely, by its various names and forms.

कार्यकारणबुद्धौ ताविष्येते विश्वतैजसौ ।
प्राज्ञः कारणबद्धस्तु द्वौ तु तुर्ये न सिद्ध्यतः ॥७१२॥

Those two, viz. Viśva and Taijasa[1] are understood as affected (lit. bound) by the effect and the cause[2]; as for Prājña[1], it is affected by the cause; and these two do not affect the Turya.[1] [712]

This is *Gauḍapādakārikā* 1.11.
[1]These are names for sentience in the states of waking, dream, deep sleep and liberation.
[2]These refer to non-understanding of the Reality and consequent acceptance of duality as real.

विस्फारिताक्षो जानाति शब्दाद्येव न तत्परम् ।
अपीतकरणग्रामः शब्दाद्यपि न वेत्ति हि ॥७१३॥

One whose sense-organs[1] are wide-open[2] grasps only words etc., but not the highest Reality; for, indeed, he whose sense-organs have merged (into their own cause) cannot grasp even word etc.[3] [713]

[1]These imply organs of action also.
[2]That is, active or operative.
[3]The first line refers to waking state and the second to

sleep state.

कथं पश्यंस्तमात्मानं साक्षाद्वेदेति चोदिते ।
आत्मेत्येवेति नो वक्ति चोद्यहेतुनिवृत्तये ॥७१४॥

When it is asked, 'how does he, seeing, know the Ātman in its own form?', the Śruti announces to us, *ātmety eva ...?*[1], for the removal of the cause of the question (asked). [714]

[1]Cf. BUB: *katham punaḥ paśyan vedety āha, ātmety eva ...*

अतिरोहितरूपं यज्जगत्यव्याकृते तथा ।
तत्साक्षित्वाच्च तद्व्यक्तौ यदक्षैर्व्यज्यते न च ॥७१५॥
प्रत्यक्तया यः प्रथते स्वयंज्योतिःस्वभावकः ।
मातृमानक्रियामेयविभागैर्न विभज्यते ॥७१६॥
जिघ्राणीममहं गन्धमिति यो वेत्त्यविक्रियः ।
स आत्मा तत्परं ज्योतिः शिरसीदं वचः श्रुतेः ॥७१७॥

That is the Ātman; that is the highest light — that whose nature is not concealed (even) while the mundane world in (it when it was) not manifest as well; and which is not revealed by the sense-organs because of its nature of being the witness of it in its manifestation; (the one) which reveals itself as the inner self, having self-luminous nature, and which cannot be divided into parts, viz. knower, means of knowing, function of knowing and objects of knowing, and (the one) which, without undergoing any modification, knows 'I smell this fragrance.'[1] — this is a statement at the head of the Śruti. [715-717]

These verses explain what is Ātman.

[1]Cf. CU 8.12.4: *atha yo vededaṃ jighrāṇīti sa ātmā.*

अभिधाज्ञानगम्यत्वनिषेधायेतिशब्दनम् ।
यतो वाचो निवर्तन्त इति च श्रुतिशासनम् ॥७१८॥

The expression *iti* (in *ātmety evopāsīta*) is for denying the possible thought that (the Ātman has) the character of being

the object of knowing by its name and (for conveying this very idea) there is also a statement in the Śruti *yato vāco nivartante*[1]. [718]

[1]Cf. *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.3.1.

व्याकृताव्याकृतात्मत्वनिराकरणसिद्धये ।
एवेत्याहान्यदेवेति तथा चोच्चैः श्रुतीरणम् ॥७१९॥

The Śruti has used the word *eva* for effecting the refutation of (the idea that) the Ātman is (both) the manifest and the unmmanifest; so also, there is a loud (i.e. prominent) statement of the Śruti *anyad eva* ...[1] [719]

[1]*Kenopaniṣad* 1.4: *anyad eva tad viditād atho aviditād adhi*. This Śruti is also referred to in verses 873, 1117 below.

उपेति सामीप्यवचस्तन्निष्ठा प्रत्यगात्मनि ।
कार्यकारणभूताभ्यां प्रत्यङ्नेदीय ईक्ष्यते ॥७२०॥

(The preposition) *upa* is an expression for nearness; it has relation to (lit. rest on) the inner self. The inner self is seen to be in the nearness owing to what have become the cause and the effect.[1] [720]

[1]These are intellect and false knowledge.

व्याकृताव्याकृतात्मभ्यां यो भिन्नो ऽज्ञानहेतुतः ।
प्रत्यक्त्वधिया हत्वा तावुपैत्यात्ममात्रताम् ॥७२१॥

The one who is distinct from what are of the nature of the manifest and the umanifest (only) on account of the ignorance (about the same) becomes the Ātman, after it has destroyed the two[1] by the knowledge of the true nature of the inner self. [721]

[1]This refers to the two limiting adjuncts mentioned as *kārya* and *kāraṇa* in the preceding verse.

व्युत्थाय कारणात्कार्यात्तत्तत्त्वज्ञानवर्त्मना ।
उपेत्य कूटस्थमजमासीतापरिणामवान् ॥७२२॥

Having risen above the cause and (also) the effect by (following) the way of knowing the truth of that (i.e. inner self) and (thus) having gone nearmost unto the immutable, unborn, (a person[1]) should become unpossessed of (every) modification. [722]

[1]That is, *sādhaka* 'worshipper of the Ātman'.

व्यक्ताव्यक्तविभागो ऽयं सिध्येदात्मन्यतद्व्रति ।
अहोरात्रविभागो ऽयं भानौ तद्व्रहिते यथा ॥७२३॥

This division (of the world) into the manifest and the umanifest would stand established[1] in the case (of the Ātman), which does not possess the two, in the same way as the division of day and night, in the case of the sun who is without them. [723]

[1]That is, is related to; cf. verse 720 above.

आत्मानात्मविभागो ऽपि नायमात्मस्पृगीक्ष्यते ।
अज्ञातात्मैकसाक्षित्वादज्ञानोत्थं न वस्तुगम् ॥७२४॥

Even[1] this division of the Ātman and the non-Ātman is not considered to pertain to (lit. to touch) the Ātman, because it has only the Ātman, not known before, as its witness; (in fact) whatever arises from ignorance does not pertain to (the real) thing. [724]

[1]This implies: Like the division into the cause and the effect.

अनात्मसिद्धिवन्न स्यादात्मसिद्धिरनात्मनः ।
आत्मनो ऽनात्मसिद्धिश्च नैव स्यादात्मसिद्धिवत् ॥७२५॥
आत्मनो व्यतिरेकेण नैःस्वाभाव्यादनात्मनः ।
तथैवाव्यतिरेकेण रज्जुसर्पखपुष्पवत् ॥७२६॥

The (existence of the) Ātman cannot get established[1] (with the help) of the non-Ātman in the same way as (the existence of) the non-Ātman gets established (with the help) of the Ātman[2]. So also, the non-Ātman does not get established (with the help) of the Ātman as the Ātman gets established.[3] [725]

(And this is so, also) because the non-Ātman stands apart from the Ātman owing to its not having a nature of its own and also since it is not apart from the Ātman as in the (instance of) a rope-serpent and/or a sky-flower.[4] [726]

[1]That is, cannot come into existence.

[2]Read SP: *vyavahāradaśāyām anātmano jaḍasyājaḍātmaprasādāt siddhivad anātmaprasādān nātmasiddhiḥ* ...

[3]The Ātman is self-established (*svayamprakāśa*). The non-Ātman cannot establish itself. Nor does the Ātman establish (i.e. really produce) it.

[4]This is yet another argument to point to the imaginary character of the non-Ātman. It does not exist in its own right or as apart from the Ātman. It is like a sky-flower or a serpent in the place of a rope!

तस्मान्नानात्मनो ऽस्त्यात्मा नाप्यनात्मात्मनः स्वतः ।
आत्मनस्तु स्वतः सिद्धिरात्मसिद्धेरनन्यतः ॥७२७॥

Therefore,[1] the Ātman does not exist on account of the (supposed existence of) the non-Ātman; so also does not the non-Ātman exist on account of the existence of the Ātman, or, on its own account. As against this, the existence of the Ātman is established on account of itself, for, the Ātman does not get established by anything else. [727]

[1]Or, thus.

यावानात्मनि वेदात्मा प्रतीच्यात्मानमात्मना ।
निरस्ताज्ञानतत्कार्यं पश्येत्तद्वदनात्मसु ॥७२८॥

As[1] the Ātman has known itself in the [illegible]

i.e. by its own effort, so also should the inner self know itself (even) in the non-Ātman (taken as existent) to be the one who has cast off all ignorance and its effect(s). [728]

[1]*yāvan ... tadvat* are for *yadvat ... tadvat* (i.e. *yathā ... tathā*).

बुद्ध्यादेर्विषयान्तस्य निरस्तस्यात्मनो बहिः ।
अनात्मवस्तुनः प्रत्यङ्ङात्मा ह्यात्मीयतो भवेत् ॥७२९॥

The Ātman is inside (all) the non-Ātman, viz. what begins with intellect and ends with the objects of various sense-organs and which are set aside as external (to the Ātman); (this is so) because each of the things belongs to the Ātman (viz. the inner self). [729]

तद्याथात्म्यात्महेतुभ्यामनात्मार्थसमागमे ।
अव्यावृत्ताननुगतसंगती रज्जुसर्पवत् ॥७३०॥

Therefore, when the Ātman is in conjunction with the non-Ātman object(s) on account of its true natue (of pervading everthing) and the things being caused by the Ātman, there follows the association of the non-differentiated and the unique Ātman like (in the illustration of) the serpent seen in the place of a rope. [730]

The idea is: As a rope appears to be a serpent, so does the inner self appear to have the various sense-organs, as it were.

प्रतीचो ऽव्यतिरेकेण तदन्यद्वस्तु सिध्यति ।
प्रतीचा तस्य जग्धत्वात्क्वानात्मा सिध्यतामयम् ॥७३१॥

A thing other than the inner self gets established as existent (only) as (really) not being apart from it because it is pervaded (lit. eaten, devoured) by the inner self; whence can the non-Ātman (originate) then? [731]

This stresses that the connection between the inner self and the non-Ātman is imaginary.

सहते ऽनात्मतां नात्मानात्मा तद्विरहे कुतः ।
वस्त्वात्मना न चेत्सिद्ध्येत्कुतः सिद्ध्येदनात्मना ॥७३२॥

The Ātman cannot tolerate anything of the nature of the non-Ātman, how then can there exist a non-Ātman in the absence of the Ātman? If Reality does not get self-established by itself, how could it get established by any non-Ātman? [732]

This is to strengthen the idea of the imaginary relation between the Ātman and the non-Ātman. Also, this is another reason to prove the imaginary character of the non-Ātman.

स्वात्मन्येव सदन्यत्र सर्ववस्तु प्रसिध्यति ।
तत्र चेत्तदसत्सत्स्यात्कथमन्यत्र निष्प्रमम् ॥७३३॥

All things appear elsewhere[1], remaining (unchanged) in their own nature[2], and in case it is non-existent there, how could the existent exist elsewhere as non-perceptible? [733]

This illustrates the thought in the preceding verse: The non-existent non-Ātman cannot really exist in what one might call as its effects.

[1]That is, in many forms.

[2]For example, clay changing into a plate, a pot, a pitcher etc.

मातृत्वकञ्चुको यद्वदात्मानात्मानमीक्षते ।
दृष्टिमात्रैकरूपत्वान्न तथात्मानमीक्षते ॥७३४॥

As the Ātman, wearing a robe in the form of the character of a seer, sees the non-Ātman; in the same way does not the Ātman see itself on account of its being merely the seeing (one)[1]. [734]

The idea is: The character of the inner self as the seer of outside world is only attributed to it; in that sense, it sees the objects in the world. But it cannot see itself and the real seer.

[1] *dṛṣṭi* = *draṣṭṛ*. Also, cf. note on verse 745 below.

कर्तृत्वप्रतिषेधार्थं द्रष्टुर्दृष्टेरितिश्रुतिः ।
दृष्टिरेव तु यो द्रष्टेत्याह दृष्टिविशेषणम् ॥७३५॥

The statement in the Śruti *draṣṭur dṛṣṭer*[1] is for the purpose of the denial of any activity (on the part of the Ātman) and (the Śruti) has mentioned the distinguishing factor of seeing in the statement 'He is the seer who is the sight.' [735]

[1]BU 4.3.23: *na hi draṣṭur dṛṣṭeḥ.*

प्रतीचो वस्तुनस्तावद्वस्तुवृत्तं यथोदितम् ।
शब्दवृत्तमथेदानीं यथावदभिधीयते ॥७३६॥

Thus is explained the nature of Reality in the case of the inner self,[1] so now is explained the purport of the word.[2] [736]

[1]This refers to the discussion which was begun in verse 723 above.

[2]*śabdavṛtta* refers to the use and purpose of various words in relation to the Ātman.

यच्चाप्नोति यदादत्ते यच्चात्ति विषयानिह ।
यच्चास्य संततो भावस्तस्मादात्मेति कथ्यते ॥७३७॥

The Ātman is so called, since it pervades, takes up, experiences (lit. eats) objects (of pleasure) here (i.e. in this world) and has a continued existence. [737]

SP points out that this is a verse of Vyāsa. Cf. *Mahābhārata* 1.524*(2); this is inserted after 1.57.88ab in Poona critical ed.

यस्मादर्थे तु विज्ञेया यच्छब्दाः सर्व एव तु ।
समुच्चये चशब्दाश्च तथा सर्वत्र योजयेत् ॥७३८॥

Indeed all the four expressions, viz. *yat* (four times in the

yasmāt 'because' and the (three) *ca*s also are in the sense of collection; in this way should one connect the words together everywhere. [738]

[1]SP comments: First *tu* is for specification (*avadhāraṇa*) and the second, to indicate the absence of any other sense of the word.

व्याप्नोत्यनवशेषेण सर्पादीन्स्रगिवाखिलान् ।
प्रत्यक्तयानात्मनो ऽतः प्रत्यगात्मेति भण्यते ॥७३९॥

[In verses 739-740, Sureśvara derives the word *ātman* from the verb root √*āp* 'to pervade'.]

Since it pervades all the non-Ātmans in their entirety by being inside them, like a wreathe of flowers (etc.) pervades (all) the serpents etc.,[1] it is called the inner self. [739]

This versre is the explanation of *yac cāpnoti tasmāt* in verse 737 above.

[1]The word etc. refers to well-known instance of superimposition.

सावशेषात्मनो ऽकृत्स्नान्निःशेषात्मतया यतः ।
आत्मानात्मन आप्नोति तेनात्मेत्यभिधीयते ॥७४०॥

The Ātman is so called (i.e. Ātman) since the Ātman pervades (all) the non-Ātmans which are of the nature of some dependent things (and) incomplete, being entirely one with them. [740]

स्वचिदाभासमोहेन तदुत्थानखिलान्यतः ।
आदत्ते ऽनात्मनः प्राज्ञे ततश्चात्मेति तं विदुः ॥७४१॥

Since in Prājña (viz. form of the Ātman in the state of deep sleep) it receives within itself by a semblance of its own consciousness all the non-Ātmans which have arisen from it, therefore, they have known it as the Ātman. [741]

Here, Sureśvara derives the word *ātman* from the verb root *ā-√dā* 'to withdraw'.

पर आत्मनि सर्वे ऽपि संप्रतिष्ठन्त एकले ।
पृथिव्याद्या अनात्मान इति चार्थवणे वचः ॥७४२॥

All (objects) without exception (*api*) remain (dormant) in the highest Ātman, which is just alone (i.e. one without a second). And (i.e. for,) there is a statement in the Ātharvaṇa (Śruti) *pṛthivyādyā anātmanaḥ* ... 'The earth etc., the non-Ātman ...'[1]

[742]

Sureśvara confirms the deviation in the preceding verse by a statement in the Śruti.

[1] *Praśnopaniṣad* 4.9-11.

स्वात्माभासाः पराचीना धीवृत्तीर्विषयोन्मुखाः ।
प्रत्यगत्ति यतो ऽतो ऽसावात्मेत्युक्तो मनीषिभिः ॥७४३॥

Since the inner self experiences (lit. eats) (all) the modifications of the intellect which are directed towards objects, which are of the nature of the semblance of its own self, and which have turned outwards; therefore, the wise ones have called it the Ātman.

[743]

Here, Sureśvara derives *ātman* from the verb root *√ad* 'to eat'.

विश्वो हि स्थूलभुङ्नित्यं तैजसः प्रविविक्तभुक् ।
आनन्दभुक्तथा प्राज्ञ इति चागमशासनम् ॥७४४॥

Indeed Viśva is ever the enjoyer of what is gross and Taijasa, the enjoyer of what is segregated (from the body itself), and similarly Prājña is the enjoyer of bliss — this is the instruction in Āgama 'Vedāntic tradition'.

[744]

This is *Gauḍapādakārikā* 1.3a-c. It is called Āgama, i.e. raised to the status of the Veda.

अव्यावृताननुगतः पूर्णः स्वात्मन्यवस्थितः ।
यतो ऽस्य संततो भावस्तस्माच्चात्मेति सब्द्यते ॥७४५॥

Since the Ātman is not distinguished (from anything else), not followed (by anything similar to itself), full (i.e. complete), resting in itself (i.e. independent of anything else) and since the existence of this is continuous, therefore, it is called the Ātman. [745]

This is the total meaning of *yac cāsya saṃtato bhāvas tasmād ātmeti kathyate* in verse 737 above. SP points out that every former adjective leads to the subsequent.

तद्विष्णोरिति मन्त्रो ऽपि विष्णोस्तत्परमं पदम् ।
चक्षुर्वदाततं व्योम्नि व्याचष्टे प्रत्यगात्मनि ॥७४६॥

And the Ṛgvedic verse *tad viṣṇoḥ* ...[1] also declares (only) in respect of the inner self that the highest step of Viṣṇu is wide-stretched in the sky just like the eye. [746]

[1] *Ṛgveda* 1.22.20; 1.154.5: *tad viṣṇoḥ paramam padaṃ sadā paśyanti sūrayaḥ, divīva cakṣur āyatam* ... Also cf. *Subālopaniṣad* 6.1.

नानुत्पन्नमतो ज्ञानं नानपास्तं तथा तमः ।
यथोक्तैकात्म्यसंदृष्टावतः कात्स्न्र्यं ममात्मनः ॥७४७॥

When there is the seeing of the uniqueness of the Ātman, as described before, it is not that knowledge is not produced in this one, so also it is not that ignorance is not removed from (it). Therefore, there is fullness of the inner self.[1] [747]

[1] Or, it literally means: of me, the Ātman. But see *pratyak* in the next verse.

द्रष्टृदर्शनदृश्यानां प्रत्यक्तत्त्वं यतस्ततः ।
तद्दृष्टावखिलं दृष्टं रज्जुसर्पादिवद्भवेत् ॥७४८॥

Since the seer, the activity of seeing, and the object of seeing

have their true nature only in the inner self; therefore, on seeing that (viz. the inner self), all that is seen (before) would become (unreal) like the serpent in a rope etc. [748]

This explains, with illustration, the thought in the preceding verse.

स्रगज्ञानैकहेतूनां स्रग्धिया ज्ञातता यथा ।
प्रत्यङ्मोहजवस्तूनां प्रतीच्यवगते तथा ॥७४९॥

As by the knowledge of a wreathe of flowers (in its true natue), there arises the knowledge of the sole cause of ignorance about (the true nature) of the wreathe of flowers, so also, when the inner self[1] is known, there results the knowledge of the objects produced from the ignorance about (the true nature) of the inner self. [749]

[1]That is, its true nature.

अत्र ज्ञाते यतः सर्व ऐकात्म्यं यान्त्यशेषतः ।
प्राणादयो ऽत आत्मैव द्रष्टव्यः सर्वदर्शनात् ॥७५०॥

Since, in the present context, (the true nature of the Ātman) being known, all (the non-Ātmans), without any exception, become (understood as) one with (the Ātman), therefore, Prāṇa etc. should be seen (i.e. understood) as the Ātman itself; (this is so), because of the statement about the seeing of all. [750]

केचिद्व्याचक्षते ऽपूर्वं विधिमेतं महाधियः ।
नियमं त्वपरे धीराः परिसंख्यामथापरे ॥७५१॥

[Now follows in verses 751-757 a disussion regarding *ātmety evopāsīta* as Apūrva-vidhi as held by the non-Vedāntins.]

Some persons of great wisdom explain this (sentence)[1] as an injunction about what is not (known) before,[2] whereas other learned men call it a restrictive injunction, and, further, some others call it an injunction for exclusion.[3] [751]

In this context, it is useful to remember *Tantravārtika* 1.2.4:

vidhir atyantam aprāptau niyamaḥ pākṣike sati /
tatra cānyatra ca prāptau parisaṃkhyeti gīyate //

[1]Namely, *ātmety evopāsīta*.

[2]Some translate Apūrva-vidhi as 'originating injunction' — conveniently to be used. This injunction is about some matter/procedure not known before; *pramāṇāntareṇāprāptasya prāpakaḥ*.

[3]This can be translated as 'excluding injunction'; *pakṣe 'prāptasya prāpakaḥ*.

नापूर्वविधिरित्येष कदाचिदपि गृह्यते ।
सर्वदैव तु तत्प्राप्तेस्तथा नान्यो ऽपि कश्चन ॥७५२॥

It is never to be accepted that this is an originating injunction, since that (viz. the Ātman about which the Śruti speaks) is ever acquired (i.e. understood), so also there is no other (injunction)[1] possible. [752

[1]This refers to restrictive and excluding injunctions.

पुंव्यापारानधीनत्वान्नेह संभाव्यते विधिः ।
स्वव्यापारैकविषयः सर्व एव यतो विधिः ॥७५३॥

(Further) here (in respect of the knowledge of the Ātman) there is no possibility of (the prescription of) any injunction, since (securing the knowledge of the Ātman) is not dependent on any human activity and since every injunction has for its subject an activity of one's own. [753

संस्थेम्ने ऽस्यैव चार्थस्य पूर्वपक्षोक्तिपूर्वकः ।
भाष्यकृद्भिः कृतो यत्नः स आविष्क्रियते ऽधुना ॥७५४॥

The revered author of the Bhāṣya has made an effort (to secure) firm postulation of this very idea[1], having first stated the *prima facie* views. That (effort) is now explained. [754

[1]Namely, this is not a matter that can be the subject of an type of injunction.

यथा कार्यानपेक्षस्य प्रामाण्यं वचसः स्फुटम् ।
ऐकात्म्यवस्तुनिष्ठस्य तथा पूर्वमवादिषम् ॥७५५॥

As there is authoritativeness of the statement which does not expect any activity to be performed, so (is it there in respect of the statement) which pertains only to the uniqueness of the Ātman; so I have clearly explained earlier.[1] [755]

[1]This hass a reference to SV 20 -31 in particular.

लिङ्प्रत्ययश्रुतेरत्र भ्रान्तिः समुपजायते ।
यजेतेत्यादिसामान्याद्विध्यर्थो ऽतो विचार्यते ॥७५६॥

Since there arises here[1] some misunderstanding after one has heard the suffix of the potential mood, i.e. because of its similarity with (the suffix in the form) *yajeta* etc., therefore, the meaning of the potential mood is (now) taken up for discussion. [756]

This is to justify that this discussion is not any repetition; it is purposeful.

[1]In respect of the sentence *ātmety evopāsīta*.

सिद्धान्तोपक्रमः पूर्वं पूर्वपक्षः प्रदर्श्यते ।
सम्यग्निर्ज्ञातसिद्धान्तो यतो वेत्ति बलाबलम् ॥७५७॥

First is stated the Siddhānta (and) the *prima facie* view is stated (later); since one, who has well ascertained the Siddhānta, (understands) the strength or weakness (in the same). [757]

In BUB, Śaṅkara has followed the unusual method of discussion; he has not stated the objector's view. Sureśvara explains and justifies his teacher's procedure of discussion. This is explanation of Anukta in the Bhāṣya

नापूर्वविधिरेष स्यात्पक्षेप्राप्तत्वकारणात् ।

पक्षे प्राप्तिर्विचारान्ते वक्ष्यते कारणाश्रयात् ॥७५८॥

[In verses 758-769 follows an exposition of the Uttarapakṣa-Siddhānta — as stated by the Bhāṣyakāra.]

This is not (lit. would not be) an originating injunction for the reason that it[1] is known as having the form of alternatives.[2] As to how there occurs (a possibility of) alternatives will be stated at the end of the discussion[3] (on the question of an originating injunction) by resorting to (some) reason. [758]

[1]Namely, knowledge about the Ātman.
[2]That is, not necessarily by this sentence *ātmety evopāsīta*.
[3]SP: *prārabdhakarmavaśāt kṣutpipāsādidoṣodbhavād ātmano vismaraṇam anātmanaḥ smaranaṃ ca sambhāvitam iti vadan bhāsyakṛj jñānasya pakṣe prāptiṃ vicārāvasāna vakṣyatīty arthaḥ.*

नित्यप्राप्तिमिहाचष्टे विध्यर्थापनुनुत्सया ।
अप्राप्तांशानुपात्येव सर्व एव विधिर्यतः ॥७५९॥

With a view to setting aside the meaning (as conveyed by) an injunction, (the author of the Bhāṣya) stated here that the Ātman is ever known, because every injunction necessarily (*eva*) follows that part (of the object to be known) which is not known.[1] [759]

[1]SP adds: *ato nityaprāpte jñāne na kaścid api vidhiḥ.*

पाक्षिक्युपासनप्राप्तिर्नित्या वेति च लिङ्गतः ।
विवक्षिता भाष्यकृतो नित्यप्राप्तिरितीक्ष्यते ॥७६०॥

On the basis of the characteristic mark[1] *nityā vā*, one gets that the intended (thought of the Bhāṣyakāra is about meditation (taken as) an alternative (to something else), and that it is understood as ever obtaining. [760]

There is a reference here to BUB: *yat sākṣād aparokṣād brahma ... na vidhātavyam prāptatvāt ... nityā veti.*

[1]That is, the words.

यत्साक्षादितिवाक्योत्थप्रत्यग्याथात्म्यलेहिना ।
ज्ञानेन तमसो दाहात्कुतो विध्यर्थसंभवः ॥७६१॥

How can there be any possibility of an injunction since there is a removal of ignorance[1] by knowledge which leads to[2] (the knowledge of) the true nature of the individual self arising from the sentence (of the Śruti) *yat sākṣāt* ...[3] [761]

[1]It literally means: burning away of darkness.
[2]It literally means: licks or touches.
[3]Cf BU 3.4.1-2; 3.5.1.

कारकाण्युपमृद्नाति विद्या बुद्धिमिवोषरे ।
कारकत्वमविद्योत्थं स्वतश्चाकारकात्मता ॥७६२॥

Knowledge (of the Brahman) destroys (the notion of) the means[1] in the same way as (it destroys) the apprehension (of a mirage) in a desert place; since (the notion of) the character of the means arises from ignorance and not the nature of the means from itself.[2] [762]

[1]It refers to the means of action such as the agent, the object etc.
[2]It is dependent on acceptance by someone of *vyavahārabhūmi*.

यदज्ञानात्प्रवृत्तिर्या तज्ज्ञाने सति सा कुतः ।
न हीहापास्तनिद्रो ऽपि सुप्तवत्स्वप्नमीक्षते ॥७६३॥

How can there be that activity from the ignorance about which activity arises when there has arisen the knowledge of that? Indeed, no one here[1] sees a dream like a sleeping man even when his sleep is over. [763]

[1]That is, in this world.

यद्धि यस्य स्वतो रूपं न तत्प्राप्तावपेक्षते ।

क्रियां मोहनिमित्तत्वादपेक्षा कर्त्रपह्नवे ॥७६४॥

Whatever indeed be the form of whichever thing, in its own right, the obtainment (i.e. knowledge) of that (thing) does not depend on (lit. expect) any activity for its being known since (it is only) on account of ignorance that there is dependence (on activity) owing to the concealment of the agent. [764]

This verse sets aside the notion of any activity for *brahmaprāpti*.

न च संमोहविध्वस्तौ यथावस्त्ववबोधतः ।
समर्थमन्यत्पश्यामः क्रियाकारकरूपकम् ॥७६५॥

For effecting the destruction of ignorance, we do not see any effective means other than the knowledge of the thing as it is, (viz.) such a means as has the nature of activity and its agent. [765]

This is to discard the idea of any means for the removal of ignorance about the Brahman.

स्वाध्यायाधीतिविधिना ज्योतिष्टोमादिबोधवत् ।
सदा प्राप्तात्मविद्यापि नातो विधिरिहेष्यते ॥७६६॥

As by an injunction in respect of the recitation (or study) of one's own book of study there arises the knowledge of (the need of performing) Jyotiṣṭoma etc., so is known (from it) the lore of the Ātman. Therefore, here (i.e. in this sentence) an idea of injunction is not (to be) entertained. [766]

This verse implies and answers a question whether the injunction should pertain to the knowledge of the meaning of words or another knowledge, viz. direct perception. The first alternative is answered.

देहेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिसर्वव्यापारभासिनः ।
लिङ्गतश्चावसेयत्वान्न संभाव्यो विधिस्ततः ॥७६७॥

Therefore, it follows that an injunction is not possible[1] as

(the Brahman) can be[2] inferred from the characteristic (of it) which reveals all the activity of the body, its organs, *manas*, and intellect. [767]

This verse points out as to why an injunction is not intended for a transmigratory being.

[1]That is, necessary.

[2]That is, is.

तथाहंप्रत्ययात्साक्षादात्मयाथात्म्यनिश्चतेः ।
असम्भवादसंप्राप्तेः कुतो विधिरिहेष्यते ॥७६८॥

So also, on account of the awareness 'I (am).' and the consequent direct decision (or ascertainment) about the true nature of the Ātman, there is an impossibility of one's not getting that[1]. How then can be an injunction expected on that behalf? [768]

This refers to a transmigratory being who has known about the nature of his own self.

[1]That is, one's getting to know that.

नन्विहात्मार्थसंदृष्टावहंप्रत्ययगम्यता ।
पाक्षिकीति ततो ऽप्राप्तेर्भवेन्नैयमिको विधिः ॥७६९॥

(One might object:) Here (in this context), for the purpose of the knowing[1] the Reality (viz. the Ātman) its nature of being known by the awareness 'I am (the Ātman).' is variable[2] and since the knowledge of the Ātman may not therefore be obtained (necessarily), the sentence (*ātmety evopāsīta*) is a restrictivie injunction. [769]

This refers to the argument that the injunction pertains to knowing of non-transmigratory Ātman.

[1]It literally means: seeing.

[2]That isto say: It does not obtain invariably.

पाक्षिकी तावदत्रास्तामैकात्म्यार्थावलेहिनः ।

ज्ञानस्य प्राप्तिर्नित्या वेत्यस्त्वपूर्वो विधिः स्फुटः ॥७७०॥

[Verses 770 -791 discuss the view that the Upāsana of the Ātman has to be prescribed by an injunction.]

May the knowledge pertaining to the unique Ātman be obtained only optionally or let it be ever obtaining, there is to be clearly an originating injunction. [770]

This is the statement by one who accepts the injunction to be originating injunction.

एकार्थोल्लेखिवृत्तीनामातादात्म्याभिमानतः ।
आम्रेडनं हि शब्दार्थः सर्वत्रोपासनश्रुतेः ॥७७१॥

Indeed the meaning of the word *upāsana* in the Śruti statement means the repetition of such functions as (lit.) touch but one object (viz. the truth) up to the (moment when there arises) the awareness of oneness (with that, viz. the Ātman). [771]

This explains the meaning of *upāsana* in relation to the originating injunction.

न पश्यन्तीत्यतो लिङ्गाज्ज्ञानमेव विधित्सितम् ।
न तूपासनमिति चेन्मैवमैकार्थ्यकारणात् ॥७७२॥

(If one would say,) since they do not perceive (the Ātman directly), therefore only that knowledge which arises from its characteristic is intended to be prescribed (in the injunction), but not an Upāsana; (then we say:) Let this not be so, because of the oneness of the meaning (of the two words knowledge and Upāsana). [772]

The purpose is to point out the inutility of explaining the meaning of Upāsana — it should be understood in the sense of *jñāna* .

सर्वत्रैकार्थता दृष्टा वेदोपासनशब्दयोः ।
यथान्यत्र तथेहापि कस्मान्नाध्यवसीयते ॥७७३॥

We have seen the oneness of meaning in the case of the two words knowing (*veda*) and meditation (*upāsanā*), why do you not decide that to be here also, as this is the case elsewhere (i.e. in other passages)? [773]

SP points out an example: *dūraṃ ha vā asmān mṛtyur bhavati ya evaṃ veda* ... (BU 1.3.9ff.)

रश्मींस्त्वं पर्यावर्तयादिति चावर्तनात्मकः ।
विधिः श्रुतः श्रुतौ स्पष्टस्ततश्च फलसंगतिः ॥७७४॥

'May you turn the strings.'[1] is a clear injunction heard in the Śruti and it is of the nature of repetition (of activity); therefrom follows the connection (of the activity) with the result. [774]

It is followed by a clear statement about the result of Upāsana, viz. *bahavo vaite putrā bhaviṣyanti* (CU 1.5.2).

[1]CU 1.5.2.

देवो भूत्वेति देवांश्च सदा तद्भावभावितः ।
देवप्राप्तिं श्रुतिः प्राह भावनाबलसंश्रयात् ॥७७५॥

Depending on the strength of meditation, the Śruti has declared that one attains to a god (i.e. godhead) by becoming a god (oneself),[1] ever resorting to the strength of devotion.[2] [775]

[1]BU 4.1.2-7: *devo bhūtvā devān apyeti*

[2]Namely, the thought of being/approaching some particular god(s). SP reports that *sadā* ... is the last quarter of a Smṛti verse (*Gītā* 8.6). Also, it states that the verse points to the support of Śruti and Smṛti both.

स यो ऽत इत्युपक्रम्य ह्युपासनगिरैव तु ।
अन्त आत्मेत्युपासीत तथैवोपासनश्रुतेः ॥७७६॥

(This is so) because of the Śruti in respect of meditation where

the words relating to Upāsana have begun with *sa yo 'taḥ* ... and ended with *ātmety evopāsīta*. [776]

प्रवृत्तौ चोपसंहारे तथैवोपासनश्रुतेः ।
वेदेत्युपासनार्थत्वमस्याप्यभ्युपगम्यते ॥७७७॥

Thus, since we hear the wrod in respect of Upāsanā in the beginning and in the end as well, therefore, we accept the meaning of the word *veda* also to be Upāsanā. [777]

तथैतत्सर्वं वेदेति यत्र यत्र श्रुतिर्भवेत् ।
अभ्यासस्य तदाप्राप्तेरपूर्वविधिरिष्यते ॥७७८॥

Then, in this way, wherever there is a statement *etat sarvaṃ veda* (and) there does not occur (any word conveying) repetition, that is to be accepted as an originating injunction. [778]

वस्तुस्वरूपान्वाख्याने न च कश्चित्प्रवर्तते ।
तज्ज्ञानजन्ममात्राच्च पुरुषार्थो ऽपि नेष्यते ॥७७९॥

(For) nobody enters on an activity when there is a statement about the nature of a thing (already known or existent) and it is not accepted that from the mere origin of it they accept (the idea of the fulfilment of) the end of human endeavour (i.e. liberation). [779]

यादृक्कर्मविधे रूपामात्मध्यानविधेरपि ।
तादृगेव विशेषो ऽत्र न मनागपि गम्यते ॥७८०॥

Whatever is the form of an injunction regarding an activity, so should it be of an injunction regarding meditation on the Ātman. There is not even a little difference there (between the two injunctions). [780]

कुतो ऽविशेष इति चेदत आह यथा तथा ।
मानस्येव क्रिया यस्मादविशिष्टोभयोरपि ॥७८१॥
वषट्करिष्यंस्तां ध्यायेदिति यद्वद्विधीयते ।

(One may ask:) Whence (should one hold that) there is no difference (between the two injunctions)? Therefore, (the author of the Bhāṣya) answers: *yathā* ... *tathā* ... (thus to say:) Because there is only a mental activity which is not distinct in the two: [781]
(Thus, for example,) as only a mental activity is prescribed (in the injunction) 'One should meditate on that when one is about to utter the word *vaṣat.*', so also (it is prescribed) in respect of meditations on objects (that are identified with) the Ātman. [782]

भावनांशत्रयं यस्मादुपासनविधावपि ।
संभाव्यते ऽतो विज्ञेयो यजेतेत्यादिवद्विधिः ॥७८३॥

Since in an injunction regarding meditation also, it is possible to notice the three aspects of Bhāvanā 'impulse'[1], so let that be considered as an injunction like (the injunction) *yajeta* etc. [783]

These three aspects are explained in verse 785 below. These are *sādhya*, *sādhana* and *itikartavyatā*.

स्वाध्यायस्य विधिर्ब्रूते लिङाद्यात्मानमेव च ।
विधिप्रशस्तज्ञानाभ्यां कुरुध्वं पुंस्प्रवर्तनम् ॥७८४॥

The injunction regarding *svādhyāya* 'one's daily study of the Veda' mentions *liṅ* a verbal suffix expressing (potential mood of the verbal form) etc. and about (*svādhyāya*) itself; by the knowledge (of the injunction) and what is praised, proceed to activity, O men. [784]

See SP on this verse and the next for definition of *śābdī bhāvanā* 'verbal creative impulse' and *ārthī bhāvanā* 'purposive creative impulse'. These are well-known concepts of Mīmāṃsā.

करणांशो विधिज्ञानं किमंशः पुंस्प्रवर्तनम् ।

इतिकर्तव्यता चात्र ह्यर्थवादप्रशंसनम् ॥७८५॥

Knowledge of *vidhi*[1] is the aspect (called) the means[2]; the incitement[3] (of one) to activity is the 'what'-aspect[4]; and the procedure of the activity[5] is the prasie[6] of (some) already done activity. [785]

[1]This explains the *śābdī-bhāvanā*, the suffix of potential (or similar mood) which incites activity of a human being.
[2]This is *sādhana*.
[3]This indicates action towards some purpose.
[4]This is *sādhya*.
[5]It is literally the description 'thus this should be done'.
[6]Or alternatively, censure also.

प्रवृत्तस्य ततः पुंसः करणं याग इष्यते ।
स्वर्गादिश्च किमंशः स्यात्प्रयाजादिस्तथा परः ॥७८६॥

It is understood that Yāga 'sacrificial performance'[1] is some activity which a man has entered on, and the heaven etc. refer to the aspect 'what'[2] (the result, and) the Prayāja 'fore offering' etc. the later (i.e. last)[3] aspect. [786]

This explains the *bhāvanāṃśatraya* mentioned in verse 783 above.
[1]It means: sacrifice (is one aspect).
[2]What is to be effected.
[3]Namely, procedure.

यथा तत्र तथेहापि शास्त्रेणैव समर्प्यते ।
अंशत्रयमतो युक्तमपूर्वविधिरेव तु ॥७८७॥

As (this group of three is) there, so also are here the three aspects (of an injunction) presented by the Śruti; therefore, it is only proper (to hold that this is) only an originating injunction. [787]

किमंश आत्मा विज्ञेयः करणांशस्तथा मनः ।
इतिकर्तव्यता त्यागब्रह्मचर्यादिसाधनम् ॥७८८॥

The Ātman is to be known (i.e. taken) as the aspect 'what' (is to be effected), so also by the word *manas* (is clarified) the aspect 'with what' and abandoning (desires), practising celibacy etc. as the 'procedure, i.e. thus it should be done'. [788]

This explains the three aspects of the injunction in relation to *ātmajñāna*.

कृत्स्नप्रकरणार्थस्य ज्योतिष्टोमादिगामिनः ।
विध्युद्देशतया यद्वदुपयोगस्तथैव च ॥७८९॥
उपासाविध्यपेक्षस्य प्रक्रियापतितस्य च ।
आत्मार्थोपासनविधिदेशे तद्विनियोज्यते ॥७९०॥

As there is the use of the whole chapter pertaining to Jyotiṣṭoma etc. owing to its being the subject matter of the injunction, so also [789]
(the whole of this chapter) has been put to use in an injunction regarding meditation on the Ātman for one who expects an injunction regarding meditation that has occurred in the course (of discussion). [790]

अत्रास्थूलादिवाक्यानामुपास्यार्थसमर्पणे ।
उपयोगः फलं मोक्षस्तमसो वस्त्वपह्नुतिः ॥७९१॥

In this (portion connected with the meditation of the Ātman) the sentences 'It is non-gross.', etc.[1] become useful by informing us about the object of meditation and the result is liberation, viz. keeping away (lit. concealing) Reality from ignorance. [791]

[1] Also cf. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 3.2.9: *brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati*; CU 7.1.3: *tarati śokam ātmavit*.

संप्रदायविदस्त्वन्ये यथावच्छास्त्रचक्षुषा ।
व्याचक्षते महात्मानो यथा तदभिधीयते ॥७९२॥

[Verses 792-808 explain another view: This injunction pertains

to some specific knowledge – other than the meaning resulting from words – viz. that which results into liberation.]

But now is explained that in the way as other knowers of Vedāntic tradition, the respectable (authorities), explain (this matter) with their view (lit. eye) on the existing (statements of) the Śruti. [792]

विधिशून्यस्य वाक्यस्य न प्रामाण्यं किलेष्यते ।
नियोगानुप्रवेशेन यतो वस्त्ववबोध्यते ॥७९३॥

Since, it is reported, that no authority is accepted of a Vedānta passage which is any injunction devoid of it (i.e. injunctive force), (therefore) Reality is made known by the inclusion (of the statement about it) into an injunction. [793]

This proceeds from the rejection of any injunction by propounders of the theory of the Brahman.

नानुवादस्वरूपस्य निरस्तविधिकस्य हि ।
सापेक्षस्येह वचसः प्रामाण्यमुपपद्यते ॥७९४॥

Indeed, here (i.e. in respect of the Śruti sentences) authoritativeness of any statement cannot be reasonable, if it is of the nature of repetition, has set aside (any idea of) injunction and is dependent on (lit. expects) another (injunction). [794]

क्रियैव ननु सर्वत्र तत्र तत्र विधीयते ।
स्वव्यापारे हि विधिना नियोक्तुं शक्यते यतः ॥७९५॥

Indeed, since it is possible to induce to (one) some activity by means of an injunction, therefore, everywhere, in each context, only (some) activity (or another) is enjoined. [795]

द्रव्यस्वरूपे ऽसाध्यत्वाद्विधिः कथमिहेष्यते ।
न हि सिद्धस्य साध्यत्वं निपुणेनापि गम्यते ॥७९६॥

How can (an idea of) an injunction be entertained here since

the nature of the thing (to be known, lit. obtained) is not what is to be brought into existence (lit. obtained)? Indeed, the nature of an already accomplished thing, as a thing to be accomplished, is not entertained by even an intelligent person. [796]

This rules out the possibility that the Ātman is prescribed to be obtained.

न चात्मविषयं ज्ञानं वेदान्तेषु विधीयते ।
तस्य विध्यन्तरात्सिद्धेर्वेदान्तस्यानुवादता ॥७९७॥

Further, the knowledge regarding the Ātman is not prescribed (as what is to be obtained) in any Vedānta text, since that is already accomplished with the help of another injunction. (Therefore,) the Vedānta texts have the character of (mere) restatements (about what is already known). [797]

This sets aside the idea that knowledge about the Ātman has to be produced.

स्वाध्यायाधीतिविधिना ज्योतिष्टोमादिबोधवत् ।
वेदान्तार्थावबोधो ऽपि तेनैवेह समापितः ॥७९८॥

As by an injunction in respect of one's daily study of the Veda there arises the knowledge of (the need of performing) Jyotiṣṭoma etc., so also, the knowledge of the Vedānta (viz. the lore of the Ātman) is here obtained by that (*svādhyāya*). [798]

The first line is the repetition of verse 766 above.

स्यादेतत्फलसंबन्धो नियोगविरहाद्यदि ।
प्रत्यग्ज्ञानस्य लभ्येत न त्वसौ लभ्यते तथा ॥७९९॥

This might be argued: If it is possible to see the connection of the knowledge of the inner self with the result (viz. liberation, even) without any injunction — (then it is counterargued:)

But such a connection is not seen. [799]

पुमर्थकारिता बुद्धेर्नियोगादेव लभ्यते ।
नातस्तन्निरपेक्षस्य प्रामाण्यं वचसो भवेत् ॥८००॥

Capacity of fulfilling the end of the human endeavour is obtained only by enjoining intellect through (the force of) an injunction; therefore, there could not be authoritativeness of a statement which does not expect (i.e. is not related to) an injunction. [800]

नैकात्म्यवस्तुसंव्याप्तिव्यरितिरेकेण किंचन ।
फलं स्यादात्मबोधस्य यथा कर्मफलं तथा ॥८०१॥

There would not be any result accruing from the knowledge of the Ātman over and above the attainment of the Reality, i.e. being one with the Ātman in the same way as the result accrues from ritual activity. [801]

अत्रोच्यते ऽन्यदेवेदं विज्ञानान्तरमात्मगम् ।
विधीयते सहोपायं वेदान्तोक्तिप्रबोधतः ॥८०२॥

In this regard (this) is said: This is an altogether different type of knowledge,[1] pertaining to the Ātman which is prescribed together with the means, as resulting from the statement(s) of Vedānta. [802]

This is in answer to the counterargument above.

[1]The word *vijñānāntara* suggests that this knowledge is different from that which arises from word(s).

न हि वाक्यसमुत्थेन ब्रह्मावाक्यार्थरूपकम् ।
विज्ञानेन परिच्छेत्तुं शक्यते कर्मवत्क्वचित् ॥८०३॥

In no case[1] it is ever possible to delimit the Brahman, not of the nature of the sentence-meaning by the knowledge which arises from (mainly or only) the Vedānta sentences as in the case of ritual. [803]

[1]Or, in no time or place.

नानापदार्थसंसृष्टरूपं शब्दात्प्रजायते ।
विज्ञानं तेनावाक्यार्थरूपं नैव च गम्यते ॥८०४॥

From (Vedic) word there arises knowledge, which is of the nature of composite meaning of different words (*padārthas*). Therefore, that can never be known which is not of the nature of the sentence-meaning. [804]

शब्दस्वभाव एवैष संसृष्टार्थावबोधनम् ।
ब्रह्मासंसृष्टरूपत्वात्तेनातो नावगम्यते ॥८०५॥

This is the natural function of words, viz. they convey to one such information as is of composite nature, (therefore), the Brahman, on account of its nature not being composite in form, cannot be understood from this one (viz. Vedic sentence). [805]

वाक्यं चातीन्द्रियार्थेषु प्रमाणमिति निश्चितम् ।
तस्याप्यविषयत्वात्तद्विज्ञानान्तरगोचरः ॥८०६॥

And it is decided that in respect of the objects which are beyond (the grasp of) the sense-organs, it is (Vedic) sentence that is the authoritative means of knowing. (And) since that[1] is not the object (of the information from word), that is the subject (lit. object) of some other knowledge. [806]

[1]Namely, the Brahman, which is not perceptible and connected with words, (like other objects).

न चेद्वाक्योत्थविज्ञानपरिच्छेद्यं तदिष्यते ।
नाम्नायार्थो भवेत्तर्हि नैवं वेदार्थ एव हि ॥८०७॥

(It may be argued:) If it is not accepted as comprehensible from information (lit. by knowledge), from (Vedic sentence), then the Brahman will not be the thing conveyed by Veda.

(The answer to this is:) It is not so. Indeed (that Brahman is) but the thing conveyed by the Veda. [807]

अपि चाधीयते ऽत्रार्थे वेदवाक्यान्यनेकशः ।
प्रज्ञां कुर्वीत विज्ञायेत्येवमादीनि यत्नतः ॥८०८॥

And, in this regard, they recite (a number of) Vedic sentences in various ways; (Vedic sentences) *vijñāya prajñāṃ kurvīta*[1] and others (have to be recited) specifically (or, with special effort). [808]

Here concludes the statement of the view of some (special) kind of knowledge about the Brahman from the Veda.

[1]For metre, Sureśvara has changed the order of words. See BU 4.4.21.

Verses 809-847 are the Siddhāntin's view.

मुमुक्षुपुरुषार्थस्य मोहमात्रान्तरायतः ।
ज्ञानात्कार्यान्तराभावान्नैतत्साध्वभिधीयते ॥८०९॥

Whatever has been said (by way of opposition to our Siddhānta) is not well said, because from the knowledge (of the meaning of Vedic sentences) there follows the absence of (any other) activity to be undertaken (and) because there is an obstacle only of ignorance in respect of the (ultimate) end of human endeavour in the case of a seeker of liberation.[1] [809]

[1]NKL edition and NKL (*pratīka*) reads: *mumukṣoḥ* ...; an easier reading. But that does not make any difference of meaning.

विधेर्हि तत्र साफल्यं यत्र वाक्योत्थबोधतः ।
व्यतिरेकादनुष्ठेयः पदार्थः कश्चिदिष्यते ॥८१०॥
यथाग्निहोत्रयाथात्म्यविज्ञानव्यतिरेकतः ।
प्रयोगात्मा पृथक्तादृङ्नेह कश्चिदपीक्ष्यते ॥८११॥

There is meaningfulness[1] of an injunction only in that they understand some (other) thing over and above (that) which

is apart from the meaning arising from (Vedic) sentence and which is to be accomplished. [810]
(And) as, in addition to the knowledge of the nature of Agnihotra, they understand (from a Vedic sentence) another distinct (object) of the nature of performance; so they do not expect here (in Vedānta) any object whatever), similar in nature. [811]

[1]That is, usefulness; or lit. fruitfulness.

उत्पत्त्यादौ हि साध्ये ऽर्थे पुंव्यापृतिरपेक्ष्यते ।
उत्पत्त्यादिविरुद्धत्वान्मुक्तेर्नान्यव्यपेक्षिता ॥८१२॥

They expect a man's performance of some activity in respect of accomplishment (of some thing like a sacrifice) etc. And since liberation is opposed to what is accomplishment etc., there is no expectancy of anything else. [812]

utpattyādi signifies four types of (ritual) activity related to objects, viz. *utpatti* 'origination/production', *āpti* 'obtaining/achieving', *vikṛti* 'modification/change', and *saṃskṛti* 'refinement/polishing'.

उत्पत्त्यादि स्वतो नो चेत्किं मुक्तौ कर्मणः फलम् ।
उत्पत्त्यादि स्वतश्चेत्स्यात्किं मुक्तौ कर्मणा वद ॥८१३॥

(One might ask:) If (any of) accomplishment etc. of liberation [1] does not occur of itself, what is the use (lit. fruit) of activity? If again (any of) accomplishiment etc. of liberation does occur of itself, what is the end of activity? Tell me. [813]

The objector takes his stand on the supposition that liberation can be achieved like heaven by activity. Hence, a double-edged argument.

[1]*muktau* (Locative) is for *mukteḥ* (Genitive/Ablative as well); in the case of liberation.

उत्पत्त्यादौ तु यच्छक्तं हेतुमात्रमपेक्षते ।
तस्य कर्मण्यपेक्षा स्यान्नान्यथा तदपेक्षते ॥८१४॥

For *utpatti* etc. (of Agniṣṭoma) there is need of some able (individual) as the (efficient) cause and, in respect of that efficient cause (also), there is need of his (doing some) activity; (when it is) otherwise, it would not expect that (activity). [814]

The argument is: For achieving heaven, activity is necessary. Not for attaining liberation.

प्रवृत्त्या स्वात्मसिद्ध्यर्थं कारकं सदपेक्षते ।
कारकाणां क्रियापेक्षा नोभयापेक्षितात्मनि ॥८१५॥

In order that there is accomplishment (etc.) of an activity, it expects an existent agent etc. So also do agent etc. expect (i.e. depend on) some activity of them; but (in respect of) the Ātman, there is no expectancy (i.e. dependence on) both. [815]

संभावितात्मकर्तृत्वो ब्राह्मण्याद्यधिकारवान् ।
विधिश्रुतेः प्रवर्तेत न तु प्लुष्टतदन्वयः ॥८१६॥

On hearing an injunction, a person, who is eligible by being a Brāhmaṇa etc. and who has considered his own capacity to perform (a ritual activity), proceeds (to perform that activity); but not the one who has got rid of (lit. burnt) that relation (viz. association) with the same.[1] [816]

[1]Namely, *kartṛtva* and *adhikāra*. These are not required in the pursuit of the Brahman.

अपूर्वानपराबाह्यं ब्रह्मास्मीति विजानतः ।
कारकत्वं न संभाव्यं तन्मोहविरहात्क्वचित् ॥८१७॥

It is not at all[1] to be thought of one, who knows 'I am Brahman (which is) not preceded by anything, not having any subsequent, and not outside anything.', that one has the desire (lit. capacity) to act, because there is an absence of ignorance about it.[2] [817]

[1]Or rather, never or not anywhere (for *kvacit*).
[2]That is, in respect of any ritual activity.

आत्मनो ब्रह्मता यत्र ब्रह्मणो ऽप्यात्मता स्वतः ।
तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्योत्थबोधाच्चेत्किमितीहते ॥८१८॥

When[1] the inner self is taken to be the Brahman and the Brahman is by itself taken to be the inner self, thanks to the understanding which has arisen from the sentences like 'That you are.' etc., what then does one wish for in this?[2] [818]

[1]This refers to one's state of having obtained the knowledge of the Brahman.
[2]That is, in this world full of ritual and other activities.

अब्रह्मानात्मविज्ञानमोहोत्थध्वंसहेतुतः ।
प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यबोधस्य कुतो ऽमूढः प्रवर्तते ॥८१९॥

Since the knowledge of the true nature of the inner self arises from the knowledge of that which is not the Brahman[1] or the Ātman and which is the cause of the destruction of ignorance, for what reason would one, devoid of (any) ignorance, proceed[2] to perform any (ritual) activity? [819]

[1]These clauses negate the basis of any eligibility of a person for ritual performance.
[2]*pravartate* is for *pravarteta*.

तत्र को मोह इत्येवं मन्त्रवर्णो ऽपि नो जगौ ।
संसारासंभवं साक्षादेकत्वमनुपश्यतः ॥८२०॥

In that respect, the text of a Mantra has sung[1] to us the impossibility of transmigratory existence in the case of a person who directly experiences his own identity with the Brahman in the words, 'What ignorance is there?'[2]. [820]

[1]That is, declared.
[2]Cf. *Īśopaniṣad* 7.

बाध्यबाधकभावाच्च प्रत्यङ्मोहप्रबोधयोः ।
सहावस्थानताभावात्प्रवृत्तेः स्यादसंभवः ॥८२१॥

And because there exists between ignorance and knowledge about the inner self the relation of the stultified and the stultifier, there cannot be their co-existence and (as such) there cannot be any activity (undertaken by the knower). [821]

मतं वाक्योत्थविज्ञानमात्राच्चेन्न निराकृतिः ।
अब्रह्मानात्मविषयमोहस्येति न तत्तथा ॥८२२॥
तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यानां तावन्मात्रावबोधनात् ।
अर्थान्तरं न संभाव्यं वाक्यवाक्यार्थवेदिना ॥८२३॥

If it is held: There is no removal of ignorance in respect of the objects which are non-Brahman and which non-Ātman by mere knowledge arising from the sentence (in the Śruti).; (we say:) It is not so. [822]
By knowing only that much[1] from (Vedāntic) sentences like 'That you are.', a knower of the meaning of the Vedic sentence and its meaning does not have to think of any other object. [823]

In verse 822, there is clarification of the objection raised in BUB: *vākyajanitavijñānamātrāt nābrahmānātmavijñānanivṛttir iti cet.*

अस्थलाद्यर्थशंसीनि द्रष्टव्यादिविधेर्यदि ।
समर्पयेयुर्विषयमित्येतदपि नेष्यते ॥८२४॥
मुक्त्यन्तरायसंमोहविध्वंस्यैकात्म्यवोधतः ।
न तदर्थान्तराभावादिति पूर्वमवादिषम् ॥८२५॥

If (it is argued) that the conveyers of such meaning as 'not fat' etc. from the injunction, 'That is to be seen etc.' would bring to the fore that object,[1] (then we say:) This also is not accepted, [824]
because, on account of the absence of any object other (than

the self) which results from the knowledge of the oneness (of the inner Ātman and the Brahman) which destroys ignorance (that acts as) an inpediment to liberation, there is no possibility of the existence of another object — this is what I have said earlier.[2] [825]

In this verse there is clarification of another objection in BUB: *draṣṭavyavidheḥ viṣayasamarpakāṇy etānīti cet*. The last quarter of verse 824 conveys the Siddhāntin's reply, viz. rejection of the objector's arguments — continued in verse 825.

[1]Namely, the nature of the Ātman.

[2]Cf. SP: *siddhāntopakrame darśitam*.

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यव्याख्यानमात्रेणैव विना विधिम् ।
न प्रवर्तेत वाक्यार्थसंबोधायेति चेन्मतम् ॥८२६॥
नात्मयाथात्म्यसंबोधिवाक्यश्रवणमात्रतः ।
प्रत्यक्तत्त्वधियः सूतेः किमन्यद्विधिनेष्यते ॥८२७॥

If it is held that (an individual) would not proceed for (acquiring) the knowledge of the sentence-meaning when there is not any injunction (regarding that) and by (i.e. under the impulse of) mere exposition of the true nature of the individual self, [826]
(the reply is:) No. (This should not be so considered) since on mere hearing the sentence expository of the true nature of the self there results the knowledge of the true nature of the inner self, what else is there to be expected from an injunction?[1] [827]

It is held by the objector that an injunction has to be known for the pursuit of the knowledge of the Brahman.

[1]It means: by an injunction (*hetau tṛtīyā*).

अन्तरेण विधिं वाक्यश्रवणायापि नेहते ।
इति ब्रुवाणं प्रब्रूयादनिष्टं श्रूयते कुतः ॥८२८॥

To one who says: (No perṣon) desires to hear a sentence (in the Śruti) unless there is an injunction in it, (a Vedāntin)

should say: For what reason is heard (a sentence conveying) the undesirable?'[1] [828]

[1]SP explains: In common conversation one does hear many undesirable words. There is not any injunction for one to hear them. In the same way, one does not need to have an injunction so that one hears the Veda on the matter of the Brahman.

अनवस्थाप्रसक्तिश्च तत्र तत्र प्रसङ्गतः ।
विध्यन्तरस्येति ततो यथोक्तो ऽर्थो ऽवसीयताम् ॥८२९॥

And there would follow the contingency of *infinite regress*, in respect of every context (viz. in respect of every injunction), therefore, there would be the contingency of (expecting) another injunction. For this reason, may you accept what we have said. [829]

The argument is: If, for hearing the Vedānta sentence, one expects an injunction which is also conveyed by the words of the Śruti, then for hearing that injunction also one would expect another injunction and so on. And this is an endless series.

यथात्मवादिवाक्यार्थश्रुतये न प्रवर्तते ।
विधिवाक्यमृते तद्वद्विध्यर्थश्रवणे ऽपि न ॥८३०॥

As (according to you) one does not proceed to hear a matter discussed in the Śruti sentence pertaining to the Ātman unless without an injunctive sentence, so also (would) not (one proceed) to hear a matter conveyed by an injunction. [830]

मतं वाक्योत्थविज्ञानस्मृतिसंतानता यदि ।
केवलोक्तिश्रवोद्भूतज्ञानादर्थान्तरं स्फुटम् ॥८३१॥

If it is held that there results a continuity of memory of some knowledge arising from the (Vedānta) sentence; it clearly means that there is another thing (which has resulted) from the knowledge that sprang up on mere hearing the statement. [831]

नैवं साक्षाद्यथावस्तुबोधस्यैवेह संभवात् ।
नित्यं संनिहिते तस्मिंस्ततस्मृत्या किं प्रयोजनम् ॥८३२॥

(The answer to this is:) This is not so, because there is the possibility here of only the rise of direct knowledge of Reality; and since that (knowledge) is constantly possessed (by one), what then is the necessity of memory? [832]

अपि पाशुपतास्त्रेण विद्धश्चेन्न ममार यः ।
निष्फलेषुवितुन्नाङ्गो नङ्क्ष्यतीत्यतिदुष्करम् ॥८३३॥

If one pierced by the Pāśupata missile (also) did not die, it is extremely difficult that he should die when his limbs are sharply pierced by powerless arrows. [833]

अपि प्रत्यक्तमो नित्यं भास्वच्चैतन्यबिम्बितम् ।
बुद्धितद्वृत्तयश्चैवं तप्तायोविस्फुलिङ्गवत् ॥८३४॥

Also, ignorance about the inner self is the ever existing reflection of the bright consciousness; and also are intellect and its functions like sparks from a heated piece of iron. [834]

प्रागप्यनात्मसंपातात्प्रतीचैवाप्तमेयकम् ।
जन्मनैवाखिलं ज्ञानं फलवत्किमपेक्षते ॥८३५॥

Even before it came to exist (lit. fell) as a non-Ātman,[1] the inner self, by its very birth, (possessed) complete knowledge wherein (all) objects of knowing (were) obtained (i.e. known). What fruitful (activity) should (lit. does) it expect (then)? [835]

[1]That is, an embodied individual.

मात्रादिव्यवधानेन यथान्यत्र मितेः फलम् ।
फलतो ऽवगतेरेव न तथेहात्मदर्शने ॥८३६॥

As there results elsewhere a fruit of (some) knowledge only as intervened by a knower etc., so it[1] is not here, i.e. in case there arises the knowledge of the Self, because knowing

itself is the result. [836]

[1]Such an intervention of a knower etc. (*mātṛmeyādi*) is not to be thought of.

खपूर्ण एव सन्कुम्भो द्रव्यैर्नानाविधैर्युतिम् ।
वियोगं वा यथा गच्छेच्चैतन्येद्धास्तथा धियः ॥८३७॥

Even if a pot, full of ether, becomes united with, or is separated from different sorts of things, so also are the intellects (of inviduals) (ever) enkindled by sentience. [837]

Experience of individuals can be compared with the varied connections of a pot with numerous things. *caitanya* 'sentience' and individual bodies are exemplified by ether and different pots.

तस्मादावृत्तिपक्षे ऽपि स्वतस्तत्सिद्धितो विधिः ।
नापूर्वः कश्चिदत्र स्यादत एवापरो ऽपि न ॥८३८॥

And therefore even in the opinion regarding *āvṛtti*[1], the injunction (in respect of knowing the Ātman) cannot be the originating injunction. And, for this very reason, there would not be the other injunction[3] as well. [838]

[1]That is, even if the opinion regarding *āvṛtti* is accepted. *āvṛtti* refers to the view that an individual is enjoined to recollect again that he is pervaded by sentience — though that is not patent to him; this was implied in verse 834 above. Cf. SP: *sarvasyāparokṣacidvyāpter vastujñānasmṛtisaṃtatir vidheyeti pakṣe 'pi* for *āvṛttipakṣe 'pi*.

[2]Namely, restrictive injunction.

अशब्दाद्यात्मकं साक्षान्निचाय्यात्मानमेकलम् ।
मुच्यते मृत्युतो विद्वानिति नैगमिकं वचः ॥८३९॥

(And) there is a statement of the Śruti, viz. a knower is released from death on having directly observed the unique Ātman, which is of the nature of what is not word etc.[1] [839]

This explains why there should not be any notion of an injunction entertained in respect of the remembrance of what is known before.

[1]Cp. *Kaṭhopaniṣad* 3.17. Sureśvara has given a sort of paraphrase of the verse, or rather the gist of the Upaniṣadic verse. His words *iti naigamikaṃ vacaḥ* do not convey that there is a quotation.

आत्मन्यवगते साक्षात्प्रमाणार्थसमाप्तितः ।
किमन्यत्स्मृतिसंतानात्प्रार्थ्यते निष्प्रमाणकम् ॥८४०॥

What else is then desired from continuity of remembrance, that which has no authoritative means of knowing it, when one has already acquired the knowledge of the Ātman, by securing the object of direct perception? [840]

भविष्यत्कालसंबन्धि फलं चेह न नाकवत् ।
तज्ज्ञानजन्मकालत्वादग्निजन्मोत्थकार्यवत् ॥८४१॥

And here (in respect of this knowledge) there is not a result connected with any future time like the heaven,[1] (it is) like a product resulting from the churning of fire, known at the time of its production.[2] [841]

[1]Supply: which is acquired after the performance of a sacrifice prescribed by injunction.

[2]The product of Agni's appearance is light. Both the production of fire and its flash are simultaneous. So is the knowledge of sentience — it has been existing simultaneouly with it.

अविधिश्चार्थतः प्राप्तेस्तज्ज्ञानस्मृतिसंततेः ।
बोधाच्च ध्वस्तसंमोहः स्मृतिं नैव व्यपेक्षते ॥८४२॥

There is absence of an injunction then on account of an individual's obtaining the end[1] and the ever continuing memory of the knowledge of the same.[2] And also from that knowledge,[3] which has destroyed ignorance, one does not expect any memory. [842]

[1] *artha = puruṣartha* (= *mokṣa*) consisting in being one with the Ātman. This indicates the absence of any other object of knowing.

[2] It is continued awareness of that, viz. 'I am Brahman.'.

[3] NKL edition and NKL: *bodhaś ca* ... for *bodhāc ca*. accordingly, the translation could be: And knowledge (of the Brahman) which has destroyed ignorance does not at all expect (or depend on) any memory.

सम्यग्ज्ञानाग्निनिर्दग्धे प्रत्यङ्मोहे सबान्धवे ।
यथावस्तुस्मृतिं मुक्त्वा स्मृतिर्नान्यावशिष्यते ॥८४३॥

(Indeed) when the ignorance of the individual self, together with its associates [1], is completely burnt down by fire in the form of right knowledge, there does not remain any memory other than that of the thing (viz. Reality or the Ātman) as it exists. [843]

This explains *smṛti* in *smṛtisaṃtateḥ* in the preceding verse.

[1] SP paraphrases *sabāndhave* as *sakārye*.

प्रमाननुविधानाच्च न स्मृतिर्बाधिकापरा ।
बाध्यत्वेनैव माबुद्धेर्निष्ठिताभूदनात्मधीः ॥८४४॥

And, owing to the discontinuity of right knowledge [1], (it should) not (be argued that) another remembrance is (its) stultifier, because the awareness of the non-Ātman had become steady only owing to the correct knowledge being obscured (lit. stultified). [844]

[1] The AnSS edition reads *pramā-ananuvidhānāc* and the NKL edition (and NKL also), *apramā-anuvidhānāc*. AnSS looks more probable.

बाध्यं तमो मितेः कृत्स्नं तज्जं चाप्यतिदुर्बलम् ।
मानं बाधकमेवासीत्स्मृतिरप्यनयोस्तथा ॥८४५॥

(Truly speaking) darkness and all of its products – (all of this) extremely weak – are stultified by right knowledge [1].

Indeed (right) knowledge[1] has been the only stultifier. And the remembrance of these two[2] also is likewise. [845]

The *bādhya-bādhaka* relation exists when there are one strong and the other a weak one.

[1]The words *miti* and *māna* convey the same as *bodha* in verse 842 and *mābuddhi* in verse 844 conveys the same, viz. right knowledge which is nothing but *ātmajñāna*.

[2]This refers to *ātmajñāna* and *bhedajñāna*, or, *advaitasmṛti*.

न स्मृतिर्विस्मृतिर्वेह संभाव्येतापि केनचित् ।
सकृद्विभातो ह्येवैष रवौ रात्र्यहनी यथा ॥८४६॥

(In fact) nobody can imagine that in respect of the Ātman that there is any remembrance or forgetting, for (*hi*) this has shone forth just once. (This is) in the same way as day and night (have continued to exist) while the sun (has appeared just once). [846]

अनर्थहेतुदाहित्वाद्यथोक्तात्मस्मृतेरतः ।
आत्मस्मृतेः स्वतः प्राप्तिरितरस्यास्तु बाध्यता ॥८४७॥

Therefore, since the already stated remembrance of the Ātman has the character of a destroyer of the cause of undesirable (effects), let there be understood then the remembrance of the Ātman arisen on account of itself and let the other (*anātma-smṛti*) be what is to be stultified. [847]

निरोधस्तर्हि पूर्वोक्तान्मतमर्थान्तरं यदि ।
तन्त्रान्तरेषु तस्यापि कार्यत्वेन श्रुतत्वतः ॥८४८॥
न मुक्तिसाधनत्वेन तस्यानधिगमाच्छ्रुतेः ।
प्रत्यग्बोधात्परं नान्यन्मुक्तेरस्तीह साधनम् ॥८४९॥
अननुष्ठेयरूपत्वात्तत्सिद्धिश्चात्मबोधतः ।
प्रत्यग्ज्ञाने निरुध्यन्ते चित्ततद्वृत्तयो यतः ॥८५०॥

[Verses 848-852 discuss whether *cittavṛttinirodha* is prescribed for acquiring knowledge of the Ātman and continued memory of the same.]

If it is held that the other thing which is stated before is withdrawing (of functions of the sense-organs), (then we have to say:) That is not so; because that has been heard (i.e. prescribed) in the other Śāstra(s)[1] as some effect (activity),[2] [848]
and because it has not been heard from the Śruti as the means to liberation, therefore there is not here any means to liberation other than the knowledge of the inner self[3]; [849]
being of the nature of what cannot to be accomplished (by activity) and because it results from (acquiring) the knowledge of the Ātman, and since human intellect (*citta*) and its functions are checked when there has occurred the knowledge of the inner self. [850]

The argument in verse 850 is: Even granting that *cittavṛttinirodha* leads to liberation, it cannot be prescribed.

[1]This is Yoga and others.

[2]Whatever are effects are perishable and therefore not eternal. And, as such, they are not prescribed for achieving.

[3]Cf. *nānyaḥ panthāḥ* (*Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* 3.1.2.7); *jñānād eva tu kaivalyam* (BUBV 2.4.26) (NKL).

अभ्युपेत्यैतदस्माभिरुच्यते संभवादिति ।
सम्यग्ज्ञानातिरेकेण न त्वन्यन्मुक्तिसाधनं ॥८५१॥
श्रुतौ स्मृतौ वा संभाव्यं ताभ्यां नान्यस्य मानता ।
प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यनिर्णीतौ तार्किकोक्तात्मवस्तुवत् ॥८५२॥

Having accepted this (view of another Śāstra for arguments' sake), we had said *sambhavāt*, 'owint to possibility'; but there is not any means to liberation beside (lit. in addition to) right knowledge (of the individual self) [851]
possibly to be seen (or known, from) the Śruti and the Smṛti; from these two (authoritative texts) there does not become known the authoritativeness of anything other (than knowledge of the Ātman), in the same way as the thing, viz. the inner self,[1] cannot be accepted, among logicians[2], (as the means) in respect of deciding the true nature of the inner self[3]. [852]

These two verses offer an argument after giving up the acceptance for arguments' sake (*abhyupetyavāda*) in the three preceding verses.

[1]The word *ātmavastu* refers to the accepted principle of inference among the Vedāntins. This word does not refer to the existential entity, the Ātman. See *yāthā tārkikaiḥ īśvarādau svatantram anumānādimānam iṣṭaṃ naivaṃ vaidikaiḥ* (SP).

[2]This refers not only to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas but also to the Sāṃkhyas and others. This justifies the reference to *etena yogaḥ pratyuktaḥ* below.

[3]Sureśvara compares the non-authoritativeness of the propounders of Yoga and those of logic. This is in the same way as BS 2.1.3: *etena yogaḥ pratyuktaḥ*.

सर्वाकाङ्क्षैकहेतोश्च प्रत्यग्विज्ञानहानतः ।
न भावनेह संभाव्या मोहे सत्येव सा यतः ॥८५३॥

[Verses 853-856 state that there is neither impulse (*bhāvanā*) nor injunction (*niyoga*) in Vedānta texts.]

And, here (in respect of the knowledge of the Ātman), impulse is not to be thought of (as possible) because of abandoning the awareness of the inner self which is the only cause for all (kinds of) expectations, since that obtains only while there exists ignorance. [853]

मानान्तरानधिगतोक्त्यर्थाधिगम एव नः ।
विधिर्यतो नियोगो ऽपि नैव स्यादनृतन्त्रतः ॥८५४॥

(This is so) because, for us, injunction is only that where we get the knowledge of something which is not obtained from (by) any other means of knowing; (so) also there would not obtain any injunction while there is independence of human (effort). [854]

In this verse, Sureśvara uses the term *vidhi* only to mean an injunctive text.

नियोज्यतद्विषययोर्यत्र भेदो ऽवसीयते ।

विषयः स नियोगस्य नात्मज्ञाने त्वभेदतः ॥८५५॥

There is a scope for an injunctive text where there is distinction understood between a person who is to be impelled (to an activity) and a thing in respect of which he is to be impelled, but not in respect of the knowledge of (the nature of) the inner self on account of their being non-difference (between them). [855]

शब्दो लिङादिशून्यो ऽपि ह्यविज्ञातार्थबोधकः ।
विधिर्भवति सामर्थ्याज्ज्ञाते ह्यर्थे ऽनुवादता ॥८५६॥

Indeed, a word which is informative of some unknown thing can become an injunctive text even though it is devoid of the potential suffix (*liṅ*) etc. and in respect of the thing which becomes known by means of its power (greatness or potence) there can be (only) the nature of description. [856]

यतो वाचो ऽभिधानानि प्रयुक्तान्युपलब्धये ।
सर्वाण्यनभिधायैव निवर्तन्ते ऽवबोध्य च ॥८५७॥
उदपादि च यच्छब्दैर्ज्ञानमाकारवद्धियः ।
स्वतोबुद्धं तदप्राप्य नाम्ना सह निवर्तते ॥८५८॥

[Verses 857-867 discuss that the Vedānta sentences are authoritative in respect of the knowledge of the Brahman.]

(That known thing) from which all expressions of speech that are employed for knowing (it) return[1] without having expressed (that) and having made (that) known; [857]
and that knowledge which was produced by words, possessing the shape of the intellect, does not touch (lit. reach) that self-known and returns together with the name (given to self-known). [858]

[1]Cf. *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.4: *yata vāco nivartante*.

माहात्म्यमेतच्छब्दस्य यदविद्यां निरस्यति ।
सुषुप्त इव निद्राया दुर्बलत्वाच्च बाध्यते ॥८५९॥

This is the greatness of the Veda in that it removes ignorance. It is affected[1] owing to its weakness in the same way as a sleeping person (is awakened) from his sleep. [859]

[1]Translation follows the reading *bādhyate* accepted by NKL edition and this is supported by the paraphrases in SP as *prabudhyate*. AnSS reads *bādhate*. Cf. verse 870 below.

दुर्बलत्वादविद्याया आत्मत्वाद्बोधरूपिणः ।
शब्दशक्तेरचिन्त्यत्वाद्विघ्नस्तं मोहहानतः ॥८६०॥

On the removal of ignorance, we know that one (viz. the inner self = the Ātman) on the removal of ignorance owing to its weakness, since the Ātman in the form of knowledge and (also) thanks to the incomprehensible (potence) of the words (in the Veda). [860]

अगृहीत्वैव संबन्धमभिधानाभिधेययोः ।
हित्वा निद्रां प्रबुध्यन्ते सुषुप्ते बोधिताः परैः ॥८६१॥

(Such is the wonderful potence of the words of Veda that), even without their having touched the connection between the expression and what is to be expressed, (the ignorant ones), who are awakened in their sleep (i.e. ignorance) by others, wake up having given up their sleep. [861]

[1]This illustrates the observation in the preceding verses.

जाग्रद्वन्न यतः शब्दं सुषुप्ते वेत्ति कश्चन ।
ध्वस्ते ऽतो ज्ञानतो ऽज्ञाने ब्रह्मास्मीति भवेत्फलम् ॥८६२॥

(This is so said) since nobody in deep sleep knows (the meaning of) the word(s) as in the waking state. Therefore, when ignorance (about the nature of the Self) is destroyed by the knowledge (of the Self), there follows the result (in the form) 'I am Brahman.'. [862]

अविद्याघातिनः शब्दाद्याहं ब्रह्मेति धीर्भवेत् ।

नश्यत्यविद्यया सार्धं हत्वा रोगमिवौषधम् ॥८६३॥

The awareness (=the shape of the intellect in the form) 'I am Brahman.', which arises from the word(s) of the Veda that destroys ignorance, also gets destroyed together with ignorance in the same way as a medicine (in the body of a diseased person gets destroyed) after it has destroyed the disease. [863]

This sets aside the notion of the continued existence of intellect after it has grasped the nature of the Ātman.

अवशिष्टं स्वतो बुद्धं शुद्धं मुक्तमतो भवेत् ।
नातः स्याद्भावनापेक्षा नापि मानान्तरं प्रति ॥८६४॥

Thereafter, there would remain the Self known, pure, (and) free; therefore; there would not be any expectation of an implulse and also with regard to any other means of knowing. [864]

क्रियाप्रभेदविरहाज्ज्ञानं वा निखिलं तमः ।
हन्त्यात्मलाभमात्रेण न तदन्या तमोहृतिः ॥८६५॥

Indeed knowledge destroys by mere appearance of itself entire darkness, for there is absence of any kind of action. The removal of darkness is not different from that (viz. appearance of knowledge). [865]

क्रियातत्फलयोर्भेदान्न भेदः क्रिययोरतः ।
प्रत्यग्ध्वान्तमतो ज्ञानं स्वात्मलब्ध्यैव हन्ति तत् ॥८६६॥

Therefore, since there is not any distinction between (the so-called) two actions[1] in accordance with the difference between the action and its fruit. As such, knowledge (of the true nature of the inner self) by its very appearance destroys that darkness (in the form of the absence of knowledge) about the inner self. [866]

[1]One action is 'making effort to know' and the other is 'acquiring the knowledge'.

निष्पन्नो ऽपि कुठारादिः प्रयोगविरहाद्यथा ।
द्वैधीभावाय नैवालं तथा नैव प्रमाणधीः ॥८६७॥

As an axe etc., though (already) produced, cannot ever differentiate (between an action and its result) when there is absence of any operation (with it), so also the knowledge (about the Ātman resulting from) the authoritative means (i.e. Vedic sentence) does not at all (differentiate between the so-called two actions.) [867]

अलौकिकत्वाद्बोधस्य स्वतश्चावगमात्मनः ।
बोध्ये हि लौकिके ऽपेक्षा परतो ऽवगतौ तथा ॥८६८॥

(This is so) because of the non-worldliness of what is to be known and because of its nature of its being self-known, for, (only) in a worldly object of knowing, there is such an expectation of outside help so that it can be known. [868]

नद्यास्तीरे फलानीव प्रत्यक्षाद्यनपेक्षतः ।
किमिवेहान्यमानेषु तवापेक्षाभिधाश्रुतेः ॥८६९॥

[Now begins the discussion of the inner self's being beyond the scope of any other means. It is continued up to verse 875.]

What do you expect here (in respect of the knowledge of the Ātman) from other means of knowing when there is the Śruti statement (about it),[1] when there is no expectation of (any means of perception such as) direct perception as in respect of (a statement) 'There are fruits on the bank(s) of a river.'? [869]

This is to emphasise that *śabdapramāṇa* is stronger than any other means of knowing.

[1]Sentences like *tat tvam asi.*

प्रमाता च प्रमाणं च प्रमेयो निश्चितिस्तथा ।
यत्सांनिध्यात्प्रसिद्ध्यन्ति तत्सिद्धौ किमपेक्ष्यते ॥८७०॥

What is expected[1] for establishing that on account of whose presence (lit. nearness) (the structure of a worldly dealing) namely (that which comprises) the knower, the means of knowing, the object of knowing and the decision, gets established? [870]

[1]Translation adopts variant reading *apekṣyate* which seems better for *apekṣate*. Cf. verse 859 above where *bādhyate* is preferred to *bādhate*.

जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तेषु घटो ऽयमिति संविदः ।
व्यवधानं न चेहास्ति तद्भावाभावसाक्षितः ॥८७१॥

In the knowledge 'This is a pot.' (which occurs) in the states of waking, dream and deep sleep, there is some delimitation[1]; (but such dilimitation) does not exist here (in respect of the knowledge of the Ātman), since (the Ātman itself) is the seer of the presence and absence of that (thing). [871]

Cf. SP refers to the example of a lamp that manifests a pot.
[1]Namely, this pot exists on such and such a thing for such and such a period.

इदमेवमिदं नैवमिति बुद्धिर्विभागभाक् ।
अनात्मिकात्मवत्यत्र येनासौ किमपेक्षते ॥८७२॥

Since such a notion as 'This is so and this is not so.' effects distinction and is of the nature of the non-Ātman obtaining in one who has the Ātman within; (therefore) what does that (Ātman) expect (as a means of differentiation)? [872]

कर्त्रादिव्यापृतेः पूर्वमसंकीर्णमुपाधिभिः ।
अविक्षिप्तमसंसुप्तं ह्यनुभवन्किमपेक्षते ॥८७३॥

Indeed before the activity of the agent etc. what would (the individual self) expect while it is experiencing what is not characterized by delimiting ajuncts, what is not unconcealed to it, and what has not slept together with it[1]? [873]

ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ ... is not an injunction, for it lacks in *ākāṅkṣā* 'expectancy'. On this basis, Sureśvara develops his theory of *anubhava* 'experience', which is no doubt regarded as Anukta portion of the Vārtika.

Here, taking help of the deep sleep state, Sureśvara has discussed the experience of an experiencer: 'I am Brahman.'. The existence of the experiencer is however inferred from a thought on the part of the experiencer after his sleep is over; that is to say: Existence of the experiencer at the earlier moment could not be established by usual means of perception.

[1]This argument has a basis in Upaniṣad: *anyad eva tad viditāt* ... (*Kenopaniṣad* 1.4).

प्रमाणमप्रमाणं च प्रमाभासस्तथैव च ।
कुर्वन्त्येव प्रमां यत्र तदसंभावना कुतः ॥८७४॥

Whence can there be the impossibility of existence of that resting on which they produce (the so-called) right knowledge as also what is authoritative, what is not authoritative, and what has the semblance of right knowledge? [874]

प्रामाण्यमेतत्पृष्ठेन कस्मान्नास्त्यभिधाश्रुतेः ।
नियोगस्यापि मानत्वं नानपेक्ष्य प्रमामिमाम् ॥८७५॥

Therefore, why should not there be authoritativeness of the statement of the Śruti (which is thus understood) through this (=experience)? Authoritativeness of an injunction also is not without dependence on this right knowledge. [875]

पश्येदात्मानमित्यादि वाक्यं यत्स्याद्विधायकम् ।
ज्ञानकर्तव्यतायां तन्नियोज्य पुरुषं प्रति ॥८७६॥

[Now, there is discussion in verses 876-894 that the statement

paśyed ... is not an injunction for knowing.]

The sentence 'He should see the Self within his own Self.'[1] and such others would be injunctive in respect of the activity of acquiring knowledge for a person after they had enjoined (him to undertake that activity). [876]

Read SP: *niyogarāgiṇāṃ niyogavaśāt prāṇatyāgādāv api pravṛttiḥ sambhavati tasya śakyatvān nāśakye 'rthe tato 'pi pravṛttir astīty arthaḥ.*

[1]CP. BU 4.4.23 where *paśyati* is used, not *paśyet.*

स्वव्यापारे ऽनपेक्ष्यैव वस्तुवृत्तं वचो यतः ।
नियुङ्क्ते पुरुषं तस्माद्वस्तुवृत्तं सुदुर्लभम् ॥८७७॥

(And) since (this) statement enjoins a person (to some activity) without having (any) reference to the state of the thing (viz. the Ātman), therefore the state of the thing is extremely difficult (to know or to establish). [877]

स्वशक्त्यननुरूपं चेत्कार्यं वाक्यशतैरपि ।
नियुक्तो ऽपि न तत्कर्तुमलं शक्ये स हीश्वरः ॥८७८॥

If an activity which is to be undertaken is beyond a person's capacity, that (person), even if he is enjoined (to undertake that activity) by even hundreds of (injunctive) sentences, will not be able to accomplish that activity, for (he) is capable (of doing) (only) what is possible. [878]

In verses 876-877, Sureśvara had, for the time being, accepted that there is an injunction in *paśyed* ... Now, he rejects that there is any injunction.

अभिधाश्रुतिश्चेत्तत्सिद्धौ व्यायच्छेत प्रयत्नतः ।
विधिवत्मानुगामित्वान्नार्थस्पृक्सास्वतन्त्रतः ॥८७९॥

If there were a statement of the Śruti that one should attempt with effort to accomplish that, then that statement does not

concern an existent object, because it follows the way of the injunctive statements and is not independent.[1] [879]

The purport is: The Śruti does not enjoin a person to create by his effort the inner self. Since the inner self is already a known thing, no sentence, which is injunction, can refer to the poroduction of the inner self.

[1]It is *puruṣatantra* 'expecting human activity'. In an impossible task, there is never any human activity and in respect of that there is no injunction operative as well!

स्वमांसान्यपि खादन्ति नियोगानतिलिङ्घिनः ।
जहत्यपि प्रियान्प्राणाञ्शक्यत्वादेव नान्यतः ॥८८०॥

Those who do not transgress the injunction would eat even their own flesh; they would even give up their dear life, only because (these two acts) are possible for one to accomplish; not otherwise[1]! [880]

[1]In an impossible task, there is never any human activity and in respect of that there is no injunction operative as well!

अशक्ये विनियुक्तो ऽपि कृष्णलाञ्श्रपयेदिति ।
सर्वात्मनाप्यसौ कुर्वन्कुर्यात्तस्करकन्दुवत् ॥८८१॥

An injunction which enjoins on one an impossible activity as in (a statement) 'He should cook *māṣa* grains of gold.', then a person (who is so enjoined), making all efforts to do that, would do it like a thief called Kandu.[1] [881]

SP: *aśakye niyogād apravṛttir ity etad dṛṣṭāntenāha.*

[1]The purpose is (in accordance with Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 10.2.2): 'Let there be no cooking of *māṣa* grains of gold, for in the attempt at that cooking there would be only loss of energy. In this context, a story is told of a thief, called Kandu, who, in order to escape arrest, entered into a kitchen and began to do some cooking, of course not knowing anything about it and, as a result, only fell into the hands of the pursuers. (Both SP and NKL do not give

नात्मोपास्यत्वावगमाद्वाक्यशेषे भवेदिदम् ।
पदनीयान्तरतरप्रियमित्यादिशेषतः ॥९३६॥

This is not so, because the knowledge that the Ātman is to be worshipped (arises) from the remainder of the sentence: This from the remainder (in the form of the words) *padanīya*, *antaratara*, and *priya* etc. [936]

Now follows the answer. Translation follows the variant reading in the AnSS edition where *padanīyāntarataratapriya*, a *samāhāradvandva* compound is used.

आत्मानं प्रियमित्येतद्वाक्यशेषे ऽवगम्यते ।
तस्मादात्मैवोपास्यः स्यान्नानात्मोपास्य इष्यते ॥९३७॥

(This) is understood in the remainder of the sentence, viz. *ātmānam priyam*; therefore, Ātman alone is to be worshipped, it is not desired that the non-Ātman is the object of worship. [937]

अकृत्स्नत्वान्निषेधश्च न त्वात्मोपासनस्य सः ।
शब्दज्ञानातिवर्तित्वख्यापनायेतिशब्दनम् ॥९३८॥

And also there is rejection[1] (of worship) on the basis of incompleteness; that[2] is not desired in the case of the worship of the Ātman. The use of the word *iti* is for declaring the character (of the object, viz. Ātman, as) what transcends the knowledge from words. [938]

[1]Cf. verse 935 above.
[2]Namely, the rejection.

यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते नेति नेत्यादिकं तथा ।
एवम् सत्यर्थवत्सर्वमन्यथा तदनर्थकम् ॥९३९॥

So also words in the Śruti *yato vāco nivartante*[1], *neti neti*[2] etc. (indicate the same). This being (only) thus, all (that is stated in the Śruti) becomes meaningful and, if otherwise, that

would be meaningless. [939]

[1] *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.4.1.
[2] BU 2.3.6 etc.; see verse 539 note 4 above.

अनात्मार्थापनुत्त्यर्थमात्मानमिति शब्द्यते ।
नातो वाक्यान्तरं तत्स्याद्यथोक्तार्थानुवादतः ॥९४०॥

With a view to rejecting the notion of any non-Ātman (it is that) the word *ātmānam* is uttered; therefore, that is not[1] (considered as a) different[2] sentence, for there is (in it) a restatement of what is said. [940]

This verse has in view the word *priyam* in verse 936 above. The Śruti statement(s) in view is (or, are) *ātmānam eva priyam upāsīta* and/or *ātmānam eva avet*.

[1] It literally means: should not be.
[2] It should not be different in meaning. Two parts of a sentence under purview should form unity of thought. Cf. the NKL edition note: *arthaikatvād ekaṃ vākyam arthabhede na ekavākyatvam ity arthaḥ*.

आत्मेत्येवोपासीतेति हेतुरत्रोपदिश्यते ।
अकात्स्न्यदोषहानाय प्रतीचः कृत्स्नतोच्यते ॥९४१॥

[Verses 941-950 explain the Śruti *atra hy ete sarve ekam bhavanti.*]

In (the statement) *ātmety eva* ... there is stated the reason (for worshipping the Ātman) and, for averting the fault of incompleteness that might attach to the individual self, there is stated its completeness. [941]

आत्मनो ऽनवशेषेण संबन्धो ऽनात्मवस्तुना ।
रज्जुसर्पादिवन्नातः प्रतीचः शिष्यते पराक् ॥९४२॥

The Ātman has relation to the non-Ātman in its entirety[1] exactly as there obtains (the relation between) a rope and a serpent; therefore, (the non-Ātman) is not stated as being

away from the inner self. [942]

Translation follows the variant reading *parāk* supported by the NKL edition, because we expect in the verse the neuter from *parāk* to yield the adverbial sense. Contrary to this, the word *parāṅ* is a Nominative singular (masculine) form and that does not seem to be correct because that does not qualify *anātmavastu* (neuter).
[1] *anavaśeṣeṇa* = *tādātmyena* 'being entirely identical'.

सर्वमज्ञातमेव स्याद्यस्मिन्नज्ञात आत्मनि ।
ज्ञाते ज्ञातं च कृत्स्नो ऽसौ तावत्त्वात्सर्ववस्तुनः ॥९४३॥

If this Ātman were to remain not-known, all of the world would have remained entirely unknown and (this) being known, (that) becomes known.[1] That one (viz. the Ātman) is complete (and) all the world (of objects) has only that much as its dimension. [943]

[1]This is similar to CU 6.1.3: *yenāśrutaṃ śrutam bhavati* ...

युक्त्या निरूप्यमाणस्य ह्यात्मा तत्त्वमनात्मनः ।
प्रत्याख्यातः स चेत्तेन क्वानात्मा सिद्ध्यतामयम् ॥९४४॥

When this non-Ātman is examined with proper reason, its true nature (would be revealed as only) the Ātman; but if that one is rejected,[1] then how could this non-Ātman be established? [944]

[1]That is, not recognised.

अनात्मतत्त्वमन्वेति ह्यात्मासङ्गो ऽगुणो ऽद्वयः ।
स्वतः सिद्धौ न चेत्सिद्ध्येत्किमन्यद्भेषजं ततः ॥९४५॥

Indeed, the Ātman associates itself with the non-Ātman things, being (at the same time) unattached, qualitiless and without duality, (and) if it does not get established by itself, what then would be the source[1] of (liberation)? [945]

[1] *bheṣajam* literally means: medicine. The use of the word medicine is metaphorical; it expresses Sureśvara's intention to indicate cure of the malady of misery.

ज्ञातायां स्रजि तन्मोहकल्पितानां यथैकता ।
प्रतीच्येवं तदज्ञानकलृप्तानामेकतेष्यते ॥९४६॥

As when (the true nature of) a rope is known, there is (understood) oneness of all the notions which had arisen out of ignorance about it, so also, in the case of the individual self, oneness of all the notions, resulting from the ignorance about that (individual self), is accepted (by us). [946]

आत्मशब्दाभिधेये ऽर्थे प्रत्यक्सामान्यरूपके ।
अन्तर्भवन्ति निखिला विशेषा इति केचन ॥९४७॥

[Verses 947-950 are the explanation of *atra hy eke sarve ekam bhavanti* ... by Bhartṛprapañca.]

Some[1] say: All particulars[2] are contained within the thing which is expressed by the word *ātman* and which has several and collective forms. [947]

[1] The word 'some' refers to Bhartṛprapañca. This view was earlier referred to in verses 693ff.

[2] This means: distinct individual selves, objects etc., i.e. *jagat*.

सामान्येन समस्तं तद्विशेषैर्व्यस्तमेव च ।
कृत्स्नमेवं परं ब्रह्म सदोपासीत यत्नतः ॥९४८॥

Being common (in those in collective form) that (Brahman is) whole; by its particular forms, it is several; thus, this highest Brahman should one ever worship with particular care. [948]

अवस्थावदवस्थाभिः क्वचित्कात्स्न्र्यं प्रचक्षते ।
कार्यकारणरूपेण क्वचिद्व्याचक्षते तथा ॥९४९॥

Sometimes they describe the completeness (i.e. the Brahman)

as possessed of different states by the different states[1]; so also do they sometimes describe the same by its form (as made up of) causes and effects. [949]

[1]This refers to the world in eight states of the Brahman; cf. verse 487 above.

भागभागिविभागेन नाभिनेम्यरवत्तथा ।
व्याचक्षते महात्मानः संप्रदायबलात्किल ॥९५०॥

And also (they describe the same) by resorting to its division of the parts and the whole as in the case of the hub, the rim and the spokes (of a wheel) — thus do the learned describe (the Brahman), indeed on the strength of the tradition (which they follow). [950]

This concludes Bhartṛprapañca's explanation of *atra hy ete sarve ekam bhavanti.*

अक्षराणामतात्पर्याद्युक्तितश्चाप्यसंभवात् ।
प्रतिपत्तुं वयं तादृक्शक्नुमो नाञ्जसा परम् ॥९५१॥

[Verses 951-968 are the refutation of Bhartṛprapañca's view on the sentence.]

We are not able to understand the highest (Brahman) to be that,[1] in a neat way, because the words[2] (of the Veda) do not have that as their purport and also because thare is no possibility of it (being so) for reasons (shown below).[3] [951]

[1]That is, of that nature in Bhartṛprapañca's view.
[2]Sureśvara uses the word *akṣara* 'letters'.
[3]Sureśvara rejects the view of Bhartṛprapañca on the basis of *śrutisamanvaya* and *tarka.*

अज्ञातं जगदज्ञाते ज्ञाते ज्ञातं च यत्र तत् ।
तद्ब्रह्मैवंविधिं कृत्स्नं न गोवृक्षादिवन्मतम् ॥९५२॥

That Brahman is such that, if it is not known, the world (also) does not become known, and, when that becomes known, then does that (world also) become known — thus the Brahman is (described as) the whole, it is not understood as cows, trees etc.[1] [952]

[1]Refer to verse 693 above. *ādi* refers to sea and clay. Reference to (i)cows indicates the *sāmānya-viśeṣa* relation; (ii)trees, parts and whole relation; (iii)sea, states and what has states relation; and (vi)clay, cause and effect relation.

सामान्यानि विशेषाश्च व्यावर्तन्ते परस्परम् ।
प्राणादिवदतः कात्स्न्यं न तेषां युक्तिमद्भवेत् ॥९५३॥

The common properties (of different individuals) and the particular ones differ from one another in the same way as Prāṇa[1] etc.; therefore, the wholeness of them (being positive) does not[2] become reasonable. [953]

[1]*prāṇa=prāṇana*. This refers to the functions of different organs of a human body such as breathing, speaking etc.
[2]It literally means: would not.

तदानन्त्याच्च तद्बोधो नेश्वरेणापि कात्स्न्यतः ।
क्रमशो ऽक्रमशो वापि शक्यः कर्तुं कदाचन ॥९५४॥

And, on account of the infinite number[1] of them[2], it would not ever be possible for even an able person[3] to know them in their entirety or serially or otherwise.[4] [954]

[1]It literally means: the infiniteness of them.
[2]It means: '*sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*' mentioned in the preceding verse.
[3]The word *īśvara* is here a person who is possessed of parts or who has varied means of knowing at his command.
[4]In a sequential order, or in a desultory (or, random) manner.

तादात्म्यभावनायां तु पुंसां संभावनापि न ।

शक्या सुनिपुणेनापि कर्तुं तद्व्यापृतिः कुतः ॥९५५॥

With regard to their being possessed of the nature of that (=Brahman), it is not possible even for an excellent (thinker) to entertain an idea of them; how can there be any employment of the same (by him)? [955]

This refers to the notion of worshipping some object/being. Such worship becomes possible if only one knows/ascertains the nature of it and then tries to become one with it. Here there are difficulties; innumerable particulars and therefore the absence of the knowledge of the same. In brief, worshipping *samasta-vyasta* Brahman is not possible.

गङ्गावतारवन्नापि बहूपासितृकर्मता ।
भावनोपचयाभावादेकैकस्मिंस्तथा सति ॥९५६॥

As in the case of the descent of the Ganges, there cannot be here[1] an object (of the activity) of many worshippers, for there would not be a collection of the devotions of (many distinct individuals) if there were devotion in each one of them. [956]

The basic idea is: The Ganges came to the world through the effort of many towards one goal; so also a number of individuals would, each of them, worship one form of the Brahman and the collected effort of them would suffice for getting to know the whole of the Brahman. (Yet the preceding verse has already pointed to the impossibility of the same!)

[1]This means: in respect of knowing the Brahman of varied nature by many.

देवो भूत्वैति विबुधान्भावनोपचयान्नरः ।
इति सर्वपदार्थेषु पुंसो ऽशक्यं विधित्सितम् ॥९५७॥

A man (first) becomes a god and (then) becomes one among them owing to the increase (in the intensity) of devotion. (But) being so is impossible for a man, (even if) that is intended

to be achieved in respect of all objects (of the world). [957]

This verse points to the impossibility of worshipping the Brahman by a single individual and also by many of them coming together.

यज्ज्ञातमपि कात्स्न्र्येन तत्तदन्यच्च नाञ्जसा ।
ज्ञानेन ज्ञायते तादृक्कृत्स्नं कथमिहोच्यते ॥९५८॥

How can a thing be called complete (or full) which, when seen, is not known in its fullness or by which, being known, any other thing is not known? [958]

In the case of *samastavyasta* Brahman, there are difficulties (as already pointed out) in getting to know the variety of the individuals/particulars and therefore there cannot be anything complete. Naturally then that is not like the Brahman of the Vedāntin.

पराग्वस्तु विरोधित्वात्प्रत्यग्बुद्ध्या न गम्यते ।
पराञ्चीत्यपि हेतूक्तेर्नातः पिण्डादिकृत्स्नधीः ॥९५९॥

A thing which is away (from the inner self) cannot be understood by the knowledge of the inner self because it is opposed (in nature to the latter). (This is so,) because there is a statement about the reason for it in the Śruti *parāñci* ...[1] Therefore, there cannot be the knowledge of the entire mass of objects such as a body etc. [959]

[1] *Kaṭhopaniṣad* 4.1; cf. verse 180 note 3 above.

तथात्मनि च विज्ञाते सर्वं ज्ञातं भवेदिति ।
येनाश्रुतं श्रुतमिति कस्मिन्न्विति तथा परम् ॥९६०॥

Thus is the highest (Brahman known) from 'The Ātman being known, all would become known.'. 'By which being heard, everything else is heard.'[1] and 'In what ...'[2]. [960]

[1] *yenāśrutaṃ śrutam bhavati amatam matam avijñātaṃ vijñātam*

(CU 6.1.3)

[2]*kasmin nu bhagavo vijñāte sarvam idaṃ vijñātam bhavati* (*Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 1.1.3). Or perhaps BU 3.8.7: *kasmin nu phalam* ...

आत्मसाम्यग्रहे ऽप्यात्मभेदमात्रगृहीतितः ।
नैवानात्मार्थसामान्यविशेषाणां ग्रहो भवेत् ॥९६१॥

Even when one has grasped that the Ātman is common (in all the non-Ātmans), there follows merely the grasp (of them) as different from the Ātman and, therefore, there would not really follow the grasp of the common and the particular properties of the non-Ātmans. [961]

The verse answers the following idea of the opponent: By knowing the common property, the particulars could be known. Hence, since Ātman is common to the non-Ātmans, the knowledge of the same would result in the knowledge of all the non-Ātman(s). This would avert the opposition to the Śruti *yenāśrutaṃ śrutam* ...'.

समस्तव्यस्ततादृष्टावेवमादि सुदुर्घटम् ।
अपूर्वानपरानन्तराबाह्योक्तिश्च दुःस्थिता ॥९६२॥

In the view (of the Brahman) as appearing in collective and individual (forms), this (argument stated just before) and any other (such argument), likely to be offered, would be very difficult to stand. Further, the Śruti statement (about the Ātman), viz. it is *apūrva*, *anapara*, *anantara* (and) *abāhya* would stand in danger (of being unauthoritative or false). [962]

पराक्प्रमेयमानानां प्रत्यगर्थधियोदितः ।
बाधो ऽतो ऽसाध्वभिहितं समस्तव्यस्ततां प्रति ॥९६३॥

It is declared that there is a stultification or (denial of) the outside objects of knowing and the means of their knowing on account of the cognition of the inner (i.e. real) object; therefore; what you have said[1] about the character (of the Brahman) as collective and individual in forms is not well

said. [963]

[1]See verse 947 above.

तथोपास्यस्य ब्रह्मत्वे श्रुत्या साक्षान्निराकृते ।
नेदं यदिदमित्येवं समस्तव्यस्तता कुतः ॥९६४॥
स्थूलाद्यशेषापह्नुत्या चाक्षरे प्रत्यगात्मनि ।
कारणान्तस्य जगत ओतप्रोतोक्तितस्तथा ॥९६५॥

In that way, the nature of the object of worship is (already) expressly denied by the Śruti itself, viz. in the words *nedaṃ yad idam* ...[1]; this being so, whence can there be the collective and individual nature (of the Brahman)? [964]
and also, on account of the concealment[2] of the entire mass of gross things etc. into the imperishable inner self and from the statement that the world ends into its cause, since it is woven (in it) length-wise and cross-wise? [965]

[1] *Kenopaniṣad* 1.5.
[2]That is, merger.

न च प्रत्यग्धिया द्रष्टुं परागवस्त्विह शक्यते ।
समस्तव्यस्ततैवं च न मानादुपपद्यते ॥९६६॥

And it is not possible here (in our worldly dealings) to see an outside object by the knowledge of the inner self and thus the nature of the collective and individual forms of the Brahman does not arise from reason. [966]

This is to say: *samastavyastatā* cannot be established by any means of knoinwg.

मानभूमेश्च व्युत्थाप्य तथा विदितभूमितः ।
प्रत्यङ्मात्रस्य ब्रह्मोक्तेः समस्तव्यस्तता कुतः ॥९६७॥

Therefore, when we have raised[1] the Brahman above the level/area of knowing and also beyond what is known and stated that merely the inner self is the Brahman, whence can

there be (in the Brahman) the nature of collective and individual (forms)? [967]

This states further: *samastavyastatā* is opposed to the means of knowing, viz. Śruti.

[1]It literally means: said about.

न समस्तं न च व्यस्तं नोभयं प्रत्यगात्मनि ।
प्रत्यक्प्रवणया बुद्ध्या वीक्ष्यतां यदि शक्यते ॥९६८॥

So there cannot be seen either as collective or as individual or both of the (forms) together (of the Brahman) in the inner self; so, with a mind inclined towards (understanding) the inner self, let this be seen, if it is possible (for you). [968]

कस्मात्पुनरिदं त्यक्त्वा दृष्टादृष्टार्थसाधनम् ।
आत्मेत्येवोपासीतेति महान्यत्नः श्रुतेरिह ॥९६९॥

[Verses 969-983 are the explanation of *tad etad padanīyam asya sarvasya* (BU 1.4.7).]

(Now, the question is:) Why should the Śruti make such a great effort and state abandoning this means of achieving every seen and unseen object[1] in *ātmety evopāsīta*? [969]

[1]This refers to Agnihotra and other ritual.

पदनीयमिदं यस्मादनात्मभ्यः परं पदम् ।
सर्वज्ञेयपुमर्थानां प्रत्यग्ज्ञाने समाप्तितः ॥९७०॥

(The answer is:) This should be obtained/known[1], since this one (viz. the Ātman) is a state/status above that of all the non-Ātman (objects) and because all the ends of human endeavour are known to have been obtained when the knowledge of individual self has occurred (to one). [970]

[1]Generally verbs in Sanskrit which convey movement convey also the sense of knowing.

न हि प्रतीचि विज्ञाते कश्चिदप्यवशिष्यते ।
ज्ञेयो ऽर्थः पुरुषार्थो वा पदनीयमतो भवेत् ॥९७१॥

Indeed, since no known object or end of human endeavour remains (to be achieved) when the inner self is known, therefore that is to be obtained. [971]

This states the reason for the argument in the preceding verse.

अनात्मार्थे तु विज्ञाते स्वाध्यस्ताहिप्रबोधवत् ।
न किंचित्स्यात्परिज्ञातं नानात्मातः प्रमित्सितः ॥९७२॥

As against this (*tu*), when a non-Ātman is known nothing else would become known, as in the case of the cognition of a serpent which is superimposed on (the real thing) itself.[1] Therefore the non-Ātman is not sought to be known. [972]

[1]Here Sureśvara's phrasiology is peculiar. In his use of *svādhyastāhiprabodhavat*, the first member of the compound, viz. *sva*, stands for a rope/garland of flowers. We understand this because of *ahi*. It means that we do not understand the true nature of the object present, viz. a rope or a garland and also we do not know the serpent. This leads to the following: When we say, we grasp the non-Ātman we have really grasped neither the non-Ātman nor the Ātman — there is just ignorance. Read SP: *yathā svaśabditādhiṣṭhāna- ... vā jñāyate*.

अस्येति शैषिकी षष्ठी कृत्स्नसंगत्यपेक्षया ।
प्रतीचा व्यतिरेकी सन्नानात्मा ह्येति संगतिम् ॥९७३॥

The Genitive case in (the form) *asya* is expressive of *śeṣa* 'remainder'[1], in view of its association with the whole (world of the non-Ātman)[2]. For, non-Ātman gets connected with the inner self, though it remains apart from it. [973]

This verse justifies the use of the Genitive form *asya* together with *sarvasya*.

[1]Cf. *ṣaṣṭhī śeṣe* (Pāṇini Sūtra 2.3.50). 'The Genitive case is expressive of relations between two words other than those which are not enumerated in other Pāṇini Sūtras'.

[2]This is to express the presence of the inner self in all the non-Ātmans. In other words, this is expressive of the association of all this world with the self.

नर्ते विभागं संबन्धः प्रतीचानात्मनो ऽस्ति हि ।
प्रत्यगर्थो ऽविभागात्मा नातः संगच्छते द्वयम् ॥९७४॥

Indeed, there is no connection of the non-Ātman with the inner self unless without (i.e. there has been an accepted) division. The thing, called the inner self, is undivided in nature, therefore, (the existence of) a pair (of distinctly existing inner self and the non-Ātman) does not stand to reason. [974]

This argument is based on the imaginary division of Reality into the inner self and the non-Ātman and the consequent *śeṣe ṣaṣṭhī*.

अतो दुःस्थितसिद्ध्येतत्परागवस्त्वन्तरात्मनि ।
तावन्मात्रैक्याथात्म्याद्बुद्ध्यादे रज्जुसर्पवत् ॥९७५॥

Therefore, this external object, viz. the non-Ātman, is very difficult to find while there exists (only the Ātman). The true nature of intellect etc. is only that much, viz. they are only the Ātman, as it[1] is in the case of a serpent (seen) in a rope. [975]

[1]That is, the true nature.

पराक्तयैष ज्ञातो ऽपि प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यहेतुतः ।
अनात्माज्ञात एव स्याच्छुक्तिकारूप्यबोधवत् ॥९७६॥

Being an external object, the non-Ātman would remain only unknown even if it is (said to be) known through the true nature of the inner self;[1] the non-Ātman would remain (really) unknown, in the same way as there is the cognition of silver in a shell. [976]

[1]That is, thanks to its Māyā (=*avidyā*) or *bhrānti*.

निर्धारणे वा षष्ठीयं ज्ञेयार्थस्यावधारणात् ।
प्रतीचो ह्यनधिगतान्नान्यो ऽनधिगतो यतः ॥९७७॥

Or rather, this (use of the) the Genitive case is to be known for specification since the object of knowing is specified (in the Śruti statement); for, a thing other (than the inner self) cannot become known when the inner self has not become known. [977]

This is the alternative explanation of the Genitive case *asya*.

ज्ञातो ऽपि तद्वदेवास्मान्नात्मनो विद्यते परः ।
प्रत्यगज्ञानहेतुत्वात्तदन्यस्येह वस्तुनः ॥९७८॥

(Supposing) it was known also, it would not, like that (unknown non-Ātman) exist as apart from this Ātman, because here (i.e. in worldly dealings, the existence of) anything other than that (viz. the Ātman) is possible only on account of the ignorance about the inner self. [978]

अनात्मनो ऽस्य सर्वस्य व्याकृताव्याकृतात्मनः ।
यस्मादात्मा परं तत्त्वं पदनीयमतो भवेत् ॥९७९॥

Since the Ātman is the highest truth (obtaining in) all this (world of) the non-Ātman which is of the nature of the manifest and the umanifest, therefore (the highest Reality) should be known/obtained. [979]

This states the meaning of *yad ayam ātmā*.

खण्डादौ गोत्ववद्यस्मात्प्रत्यग्दृष्ट्यान्तरात्मनि ।
समीक्ष्यते हिरुङ्नापि तेनासावात्मतत्त्वकः ॥९८०॥

Since (the non-Ātman) is seen, through the cognition (of the real nature) of the inner self, in the inner self, in the same

way as cowness is seen in an individual cow[1], therefore (it) — one really of the nature of the Ātman — is not far (i.e. apart) from it[2]. [980]

[1] *khaṇḍādau* in the verse is a paraphrase for *gopiṇḍa*. The word etc. refers to the shape, colour etc., but cowness is not seen as distinct from any one of these.

[2]The verse implies that what are called the non-Ātmans are but the projections of (the superimpositions on) the Ātman.

ज्ञेय आत्मैव नानात्मा पदनीयत्वकारणात् ।
नन्वन्यज्ञाने नान्यस्य क्वचिदस्त्यवबुद्धता ॥९८१॥

What should be sought to be known is only the Ātman, not the non-Ātman, because it is (forever) of the nature of what shold be obtained/known.[1] (The objector asks:) Let me say, when one thing is known another does not become known.[2] [981]

[1]See verse 970 note 1 above.

[2]Cf. SP: *na hi kvacid api deśādau ghaṭādijñānena paṭādi jñāyamānaṃ dṛṣṭam ity arthaḥ.*

सत्यमेवं भवेदेतद्यद्यात्माप्यन्य इष्यते ।
आत्मासावन्य इति च नानुन्मत्तस्य गीरियम् ॥९८२॥

(The answer to this is:) True, this could be so, if it were accepted that the Ātman also[1] is known as another (i.e. distinct object from the non-Ātman). That it is the Ātman and it is distinct (from the non-Ātman) is not a statement of one who is not mad. [982]

[1]The force of *api* 'also' is to emphasise the impropriety in comparing it with *ghaṭa*, *paṭa* etc.

अनेनेति तृतीयेयमित्थंभूतार्थलक्षणा ।
इदंधीशब्दगम्यस्य प्रत्यङ्मात्रसतत्त्वतः ॥९८३॥

In the word *anena*, the (use of) the Instrumental case is for indicating an object of some (lit. what has become of such and such) particular nature, because whatever is understood from the word *idam* is of the nature of only the inner self. [983]

घटो नास्तीति को ऽन्वस्मान्मानादर्थः प्रतीयते ।
संवित्तावदशेषेभ्यः प्रमाणेभ्यो ऽवसीयते ॥९८४॥

[Verses 984-990 explain that all this world is but of the nature of one's experience (*saṃvid*).]

(This is an objection:) What is the meaning acquired from this means of knowing (viz. our experience): 'There does not exist a pot.'? Insofar as *saṃvid* 'cognition' is concerned, it is obtained from all the means of knowing. [984]

न संविदः पृथक्त्वेन नापि संविदि तद्धिया ।
अनात्मवस्तूत्प्रेक्ष्यं स्याद्यथा संविदियं स्वतः ॥९८५॥

(The answer is given:) Not indeed should the non-Ātman be seen as an object distinct from *saṃvid* 'cognition' and not also with the cognition (i.e. notion) of that (viz. *saṃvid*). *saṃvid* can be understood as an object which is non-Ātman, since *saṃvid* (exists) in its own right.[1] [985]

[1]That is to say: *saṃvid* is merely the Ātman itself.

उपलब्धो ऽस्ति सन्कुम्भो लम्बोष्ठो देशकालवान् ।
पूर्वपूर्वातिरेकेण नोत्तरार्थो ऽनुभूयते ॥९८६॥

A pot is known as an existing thing[1], having a broad brim (lit. long lip) and having a place and (some) period of time (for its existence) (and, in) every subsequent detail (of this cognition), is not experienced in supersession of every preceding detail. [986]

This justifies the argument in the preceding verse. The non-Ātman

being seen in the *saṃvid* (=Ātman) in succession would not disprove its absolute existence.

[1]Cf. NKL: *sann iti sattāsāmānyayogaḥ astīti svarūpasattvam iti bhedaḥ.*

कर्त्रादिव्यापृतेः पूर्वं संवित्स्वात्मन्यवस्थितेः ।
अविभागादनाख्येया तदुद्भूत्या फलायते ॥९८७॥

saṃvid 'cognition' is indescribable since, before the activity of the agent etc., it has remained in its own nature, owing to its non-differentiation[1] (which occurs through ignorance); (but) it shows the result(s) by the appearance of that (differentiation). [987]

[1]Add: into a number of non-Ātman objects.

अक्रिये ऽपि यथा व्योम्नि ह्युत्पत्तिस्थितिहानिभिः ।
जगन्ननर्ति मय्येवं सदसद्विश्वरूपभृत् ॥९८८॥

As the world dances[1] by the rise, existence and loss (of the various forms etc.) in the non-active sky[2], so does this world which assumes all these forms of the existents and the non-existents dances within Me (i.e. the individual self possessing Ego)[3]. [988]

[1]This metaphorical expression means: It appears to present various forms.

[2]SP points out that all thinkers accept the sky to be devoid of any activity.

[3]The sudden use of *mayi* 'in Me' is expressive of the association of *saṃvid* and *ahaṃkāra*; also (very possibly) of the influence on Sureśvara of some God-oriented philosophy.

नञ्घटार्थावपह्नुत्य संवित्सद्रूपमात्रया ।
अवगत्यात्मना सत्त्वं सर्वदृक्स्यादविक्रियः ॥९८९॥

The inner self (*sattva*),[1] which is free from (every) modification, would be the seer of all after having concealed (both) the

nañ (=*abhāva* 'absence') and the pot[2] by its knowledge that is merely its existent form of *saṃvid*, that is by its nature of knowing. [989]

1That means *satya* 'Reality'.

[2]This refers to presence of the pot (*ghaṭasya bhāvā*). *nañ* stands for absence of it, as translation shows.

दिग्विभागो ऽविभागे ऽपि व्योम्नि यद्वत्प्रकल्पितः ।
प्रध्वस्ताशेषभेदे ऽपि मयि भिन्नधियस्तथा ॥९९०॥

As they have held (lit. imagined) in the case of the partless sky a division into quarters, so also (do they hold) different notions (in Me), in whom the entire (world of) differentiation is already destroyed (i.e. not existent). [990]

Verses 991-1019 explain 'yathā ha vai padenānuvindet'.

कथं पुनरबोधोत्थक्लृप्तोयेन तत्परम् ।
गमयते सत्यमित्यस्य परिहृत्यै परं वचः ॥९९१॥

Now, the subsequent statement (of the Śruti) is made with a view to setting aside this objection: How is that highest (Reality) make the truth known by a means arising (or derived from)[1] ignorance?[2] [991]

[1]That is, devised on the basis of.

[2]It literally means: the absence of the knowledge of the Ātman, that is to say, we proceed to know the Ātman on the basis of the knowledge of the non-Ātmans. This latter constitutes ignorance (*abodha*).

परमार्थात्मनासत्यं पदं तदपि बोधकम् ।
स्वार्थस्यैवमुपायत्वमसत्यस्यात्मनीक्ष्यताम् ॥९९२॥

[Verses 992-993 are the first argument adduced by Sureśvara on the meaning of the word *padam*.]

Even that word (indicative/expressive of the Ātman), untrue (i.e. non-conveyer of truth) by nature (though it is,) is the conveyer (of the Ātman); thus should be seen or accepted the character of the means of knowing in the non-Ātman towards the meaning of its own essence, i.e. towards the Ātman. [992]

उपायसत्यतां मुक्त्वा नान्यदृगुपयुज्यते ।
सत्यतात्र ह्युपायानामुपेये किं तयेष्यते ॥९९३॥

Leaving aside the trueness of the means of knowing,[1] there is not employed another (means) which sees another[2]. Indeed, here is in respect of (knowing) what is there to be known — what (else) is desired by that (=trueness of the means)? [993]

The point made is: The acceptance of true means etc. is also imaginary (*kalpitatva*).

[1]This means its character as the existent and refers only to the Ātman (i.e. the inner self). Its *satyatā* consists in its grasping the true nature of the objects, viz. their having no essence (=truth).

[2]We have accepted the variant in AnSS edition. *anyādṛk* is in contrast with *upāyasatya*.

गवादिखुरबिम्बो वा पदमित्युपदिश्यते ।
अनन्वितार्थसिद्ध्यर्थं दृष्टान्तो ऽयं तथा सति ॥९९४॥

Or rather, the word *pada* is mentioned (here) in the sense of the footprint of a cow[1] etc. (There can be an objection raised here: But) that being so, this illustration (can be understood) for proving the object not connected (with the means of knowing). [994]

[1]This is another meaning of the word *pada* We have translated *go* as 'cow' because it is convenient, though *go* can stands for animals in general.

गवादिबोधनिर्वृत्तिः पदतज्ज्ञानहेतुतः ।
अनन्वितपदज्ञानगोपिण्डैकावसायिनी ॥९९५॥

यथैवं नामरूपादिप्रपञ्चोपायहेतुतः ।
अप्रपञ्चात्मके भूम्नि प्रत्यग्बोधः प्रजायते ॥९९६॥

There results (the acquisition) of the knowledge of the cow etc. by means of a footprint and the knowledge of it; (the acquisition) ends into the knowledge of Reality, viz. the animal itself, (though) the footprint and the knowledge (of the animal) are not (in reality or directly) connected. [995]
As this happens, (so also) there arises the knowledge of the self in what is great and what is not of the nature of this (multifold) universe, with the help of the means in the form of this (multifold) universe which is made up of names, forms etc.[1] [996]

Verse 995 answers the objection in the preceding verse and verse 996 shows how the illustration is understood.

[1]The word etc. refers to various activities.

प्रमाणभूमावैकात्म्यं विरोधान्न प्रतीयते ।
तमोन्वयाप्रमेयत्वात्तदभावे ऽपि नेक्ष्यते ॥९९७॥

The uniqueness of the Ātman is not experienced on the level of the various (worldly) means of knowing, on account of (their) opposition (to Reality); so also, it is not known (lit. seen) even in the absence of that (viz. the world of means), since the Ātman cannot be an object of knowing owing to the continued darkness (i.e. ignorance). [997]

The first line refers to the waking and the dream states and the second line to deep sleep state. In all these states, there continues ignorance and therefore the knowledge of the Ātman is obstructed.

न हि वस्त्वात्मनैवात्ममोहाद्युच्छित्तये क्वचित् ।
प्रमाणनिरपेक्षं सद्वस्त्वलं स्वप्रसिद्धये ॥९९८॥
संसारानवतारः स्यान्मानवैफल्यमेव च ।

(An objection would be raised:) Indeed, there does not exist

anywhere a thing which is by itself capable of destroying ignorance about itself. (The answer is:) (But) an existential entity which is independent of any means of knowing, is capable of establishing itself [998]
and there would not have come to exist this transmigratory world and so (also) there would have been (felt/experienced) the uselessness (or futility) of the means of knowing (viz. Veda). [999ab]

Here in 998ab, there is an objection that the knowledge of the Ātman is not necesary for the removal of ignorance about the non-Ātman, the non-Ātmans themselves would be capable of removing it. 998cd and 999ab are an answer to that objection. If the non-Ātman was capable of removing ignorance about itself, there would not have been the necessity of any means of knowing etc.

A thing known through the use of the means of knowing is not capable of removing wrong knowledge about itself; that is to say, worldly *pramāṇavyavahāra* is not itself useful in removing any ignorance.

इत्येतस्येह चोद्यस्य परिहाराय चोत्तरम् ॥९९९॥
यथा गवात्मना साक्षाद्गां विन्देद्गोपदानुगः ।
प्रत्यक्चैतन्यसृत्यैवं विन्देत्तत्परमं पदम् ॥१०००॥
प्रत्यक्तया यदाभाति ह्यागमापायिसाक्षितः ।
देहेन्द्रियमनोधीषु चैतन्याभासरूपकम् ॥१००१॥

And (what now) follows is the answer to (or, for answering away) this objection (abode) raised. [999cd]
As one, following (the track of) a cow's foot(print), would find an individual cow itself as having the nature of a cow, so also would one get that highest object by following the course (i.e. activity) of the inner consciousness, [1000]
which appears as being within (a body), on account of its being the witness of whatever comes and goes in various cognitions of the different organs by the body, and *manas* and which has the form of the flash of sentience. [1001]

जडेष्वेकमनेकेषु कूटस्थं क्षणभङ्गिषु ।
अनात्मसु तथा चात्मा संहतेष्वप्यसंहतः ॥१००२॥

The (only) one among many non-sentient, the immutable among the many that are perishable in a moment, and also the Ātman in the non-Ātmans, though not collected in a mass, (is) yet collected in a mass[1]. [1002]

[1]Or alternatively, *saṃhateṣv asaṃhatataḥ* 'The partless among those that are made up of parts'.

तस्यावाक्यार्थरूपस्य पदमेतत्प्रचक्षते ।
पद्यते ऽनेन तद्यस्मात्तेनेदं पदमुच्यते ॥१००३॥

This[1] they call as a word (expressive) of that which is of the nature of not the sentence-meaning; since by this is obtained/reached that; therefore, this is called word (expressive of that). [1003]

[1]The description given in verses 1001-1002.

स्वमहिम्नैव चेत्सिद्ध्येदुपायः परमार्थवत् ।
स्वतः सिद्धेर्न मिथ्यात्वं तस्य स्यात्परमार्थवत् ॥१००४॥
परमार्थादभिन्नश्चेन्नितराममृषात्मता ।
इत्यादि पूर्वमुक्तं यदनुसंधेयमत्र तत् ॥१००५॥

If the means were to get established, like the highest Reality, by its own potence; then, owing to its self-establishing, it would not have any falsity just like the highest Reality (would not have it). [1004]
If it is not distinct from the highest Reality, then it has certainly the nature of what is not (ever) false — all this, which we have said before, should be remembered here. [1005]

न सामान्यं विशेषो वा यथैकात्म्ये ऽवगम्यते ।
उक्तमप्युत्तरत्रैतदसंतोषात्प्रवक्ष्यते ॥१००६॥

in the case of the uniqueness of the Ātman will be said later (also) — though already stated (before) — (of course) owing to want of satisfaction. [1006]

प्रत्यगात्मनि विज्ञाते नाज्ञातमवशिष्यते ।
अनेन ह्येतदित्युक्त्या तत्पूर्वमुपवर्णितम् ॥१००७॥
निःशेषपुरुषार्थाप्तिर्दुःखहानिस्तु तत्फलम् ।
यथा हेत्युच्यते श्रुत्या साधनाभिन्नमात्मनः ॥१००८॥

When the inner self is known, there does not remain anything that is not known — that has been already explained by the statement *anena heti*, [1007]
(and) obtaining the entire (group) of the ends of human endeavour, (consisting in) getting rid of grief, is the fruit of that (=knowledge of the inner self). This is said by the Śruti *tathā ha* ... where the Ātman is (understood as) non-distinct from the means.[1] [1008]

This is another meaning of *yathā ha*, expressed in *anena hy etat sarvam*.

[1]That is, the means to liberation.

ननु प्रतीचि विदिते तदन्यद्विदितं भवेत् ।
ज्ञानार्थे प्रकृते कस्माल्लाभार्थेनोपसंहृतिः ॥१००९॥

(An objection is raised:) Let me ask, 'It is said, when the inner self is known, everything else would become known, thus, you have introduced the topic of knowledge at the start, (and then) for what (reason) is there a conclusion with the (statement of the) object of gain?' [1009]

ज्ञानलाभार्थयोर्यस्मादेकार्थत्वं विवक्षितम् ।
अविद्याध्वंसमात्रत्वात्तेनात्रास्त्वविरुद्धता ॥१०१०॥

(The answer is:) (This is so,) since it is intended to state the unity of meaning between the object of knowing and the object of gain. Let there be (understood) the absence of contradiction (in meaning) on account of (the latter) being

merely the destruction of the absence of knowledge. [1010]

नित्यलब्धैकरूपस्य नालाभो ऽज्ञानतो ऽन्यतः ।
यथैवं तस्य लाभो ऽपि तज्ज्ञानान्नान्यतो भवेत् ॥१०११॥

(In fact) there is no absence of gain as different from the absence of knowledge of what is ever of the nature of (a thing) obtained/known; therefore, this being so, the gain of it would also not be different from the knowledge of it[1] and not from any other (source). [1011]

[1]That is to say: It is the same as that.

आत्मता ब्रह्मणो लाभो ब्रह्मताप्यात्मनः फलम् ।
व्यावर्त्यभेदात्तद्वित्तेरेकं वस्तु द्विरुच्यते ॥१०१२॥

The Brahman becoming the individual self[1] is the gain; so also, the self's becoming the Ātman is the result — (thus) is the unique thing stated twice (i.e. in two ways) on account of the basis, viz. their distinction from each other[2]. [1012]

[1]The word *ātman* here is used for individual self. Also we notice the pair the Brahman and the Ātman used in contrast — one of the rare occasions for such expression.

[2]This explains that the difference is purely linguistic, and not pertaining to Reality.

ब्रह्मता नात्मनो ऽन्यत्र नात्मता ब्रह्मणो ऽन्यतः ।
यत एवमतो ऽभेदो ज्ञानलाभार्थयोरिह ॥१०१३॥

The nature of the Brahman does not obtain elsewhere than in the Ātman, (as also) the nature of the Ātman[1] does not obtain elsewhere than in the Brahman. Since this is so, therefore here (in this Śruti passage) there is non-distinction of the two meanings expressed by the words *jñāna* and *lābha*.[2] [1013]

[1]That is, the individual self.

[2]Namely, the object of knowing and the object of gain; cf. verse 1010 above.

लब्धृलब्धव्ययोर्भेदो यत्राविद्योत्थभूमिषु ।
फलभेदः क्रियाभेदात्तत्र भिन्नार्थता तयोः ॥१०१४॥

Where (therefore), in the states which arise from ignorance, there is the difference between the one who obtains and the one that has to be obtained; there is (also) a distinction among the results on account of the distinction between (two) actions and there are two meanings of the two (words expressive of the actions as well.) [1014]

आप्तशेषपुमर्थो ऽपि प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यमोहतः ।
असर्वज्ञो भवेदात्मा तथानाप्तार्थ एव च ॥१०१५॥

An individual, though he has obtained the entire group of the ends of human endeavour, becomes, on account of ignorance in respect of the true nature of the inner self, a non-omniscient being and also one who has (really) not obtained (any) end of human endeavour. [1015]

तत्रात्मा लब्धाविद्वान्स्याल्लब्धव्यं च क्रियाफलम् ।
उत्पत्त्याद्यन्तरायं सत्कारकोपात्तिपूर्वकम् ॥१०१६॥

There (in that state) the individual self, who is a non-knower, is (lit. would be) the one who will obtain (the reward) and the reward which would be the result of (his) action of obtaining it is obstructed/hindered by (the process of creation etc.) and is preceded by taking up some effective means (of achieving it). [1016]

तादृग्लब्धो ऽप्यलब्धः स्यादविद्यामात्रहेतुतः ।
आद्यन्तयोरभावाच्च स्वप्नपुत्रादिलाभवत् ॥१०१७॥

(The Ātman), though obtained in such nature (as is described),[1] is (to be taken as) un-obtained for only one reason, viz. (its) ignorance and also owing to the absence of the beginning

and the end of itself, as in the case of the obtaining of a son in a dream. [1017]

[1]Cf. verses 1015-1016 for qualifications of the ignorant individual self.

विपरीतस्वभावो ऽत आत्मलाभः स्वतः सदा ।
अज्ञानहेतोरन्यादृक्स च ज्ञानान्निवर्तते ॥१०१८॥

Therefore, the existence[1] of the Ātman is of an altogether different kind, viz. it is ever (existent) in its own right. It appears, on account of ignorance,[2] different and turns away from knowledge[3]. [1018]

[1]It literally means: coming into existence.
[2]That is, being overpowered by ignorance.
[3]It ceases to be the witness and appears as a partial knower.

आरभ्य सर्वं वेदेति ज्ञानार्थेनोपसंहृतिम् ।
अतो ऽनुविन्देदित्याह लाभार्थेनैव तत्फले ॥१०१९॥

Therefore, having begun (the discussion) with the words *sarvaṃ veda*, which convey the notion of knowledge, the Śruti stated the conclusion in the word *anuvindet* (and) has (thus) conveyed the reward, viz. knowledge and liberation as fruits, namely the only gain. [1019]

This explains away the contradiction conceived by the objector.

अप्रख्यातो यथैवात्मा व्याकृते ख्यातिमेयिवान् ।
एवं तदवबोधान्ना ख्यातिमेत्यविनश्वरीम् ॥१०२०॥

[Verses 1020-1024 explain *evaṃ kīrtiṃ ślokaṃ vindate* ...]

As the unknown[1] Ātman came to have a name (lit. description) when it (had become) manifest; similarly, does a man come to have an ever-lasting name (i.e. fame) by knowing (the true naure of the Ātman). [1020]

[1]This stands for *avyākṛta* 'non-manifest'.

संहतिश्चक्षुरादीनां श्लोकशब्देन भण्यते ।
यथात्मा संहतिं प्रापद्व्याकृतः करणादिभिः ॥१०२१॥
एवं विद्वानवाप्नोति पुत्रामात्यादिसंहतिम् ।
उक्तज्ञानप्रवृत्त्यर्थमर्थवादो ऽयमिष्यते ॥१०२२॥

Collection of eyes etc. is expressed by the word *śloka*. As the Ātman, when it became manifest by organs etc., obtained (the nature of) a collection, [1021]
so does a knower (of the true nature of the Ātman) obtain a collection of sons, relatives[1], and others. Therefore, is this sentence accepted (or understood) as an Arthavāda for purposes of producing, i.e. urging, an effort towards (securing that) knowledge. [1022]

[1]For *amātya*. It does not mean here a minister. This sense is noticed in Gṛhya texts.

निरेषणानां नेदृग्घि संसारं प्रजिहासताम् ।
फलं युक्तं प्रवृत्यङ्गमर्थवादो भवेदतः ॥१०२३॥

Indeed, such a result is not relevant (lit. necessary) in the case of those who do not have any desire and who wish to abandon transmigratory existence. Therefore, this Arthavāda is (only) for generating (in them) an activity towards getting knowledge.[1] [1023]

[1]This refers to 'not towards acquiring worldly prosperity'.

कीर्तिं चैकात्म्यविज्ञानं श्लोकं चैकात्म्यसंगतिम् ।
यथोक्तवस्तुवेद्येतत्फलमाप्नोत्यभीप्सितम् ॥१०२४॥

(The knower obtains) fame, viz. knowledge of the uniqueness of the Ātman, and reward, viz. association with the uniqueness, i.e. the Ātman. Thus he obtains the desired result which informs him of the thing as described (above). [1024]

अव्याकृतव्याकरणं प्रत्यग्दर्शनसिद्धये ।
तदन्तरायस्तत्सक्तिस्तन्निवृत्तौ परा श्रुतिः ॥१०२५॥

[Verses 1025-1028 state the purpose of the Śruti *tad etat preyaḥ* ... (BU 1.4.8).]

(There has been stated earlier) the explanation of the division (or manifestation) of what has been (never) divided (manifested)[1] in order that there occurs the seeing (i.e. knowledge) of the inner self. (And) the obstacle to that[2] is one's adherence (lit. attachment) to that (notion of division). (And therefore) the subsequent Śruti (proceeds) with the purpose of the removal of that (viz. adherence to that). [1025]

SP reports that this verse conveys what Bhartṛprapañca has held.

[1]This refers to *tad asya rūpam* ... BU 2.5.19 (*Ṛgveda* 6.47.18 and *Jaiminīyopaniṣad* 1.44.1). It is the purport of *tad etat preyaḥ* ...; cf. NKL: *sṛṣṭisaṃkīrtanam ātmajñānārthaṃ kṛtam. sṛṣṭe ca jagati saktir ātmajñānapratibandhaḥ.*

[2]The first *tat* in the second line refers to *pratyagdarśana*, the second to *antarāya* and the third, (*pratyagdarśanāntarāya-*)*śakti.*

शब्दादिबडिशाकृष्टचेतसः प्रत्यगीक्षणे ।
न सामर्थ्यं यतस्तेभ्यो व्यावृत्त्यर्थं परा श्रुतिः ॥१०२६॥

Because, on the part of one whose mind is attracted by the baits, viz. word etc.,[1] there is no capacity for seeing the inner self, the subsequent Śruti (proceeds) with the purpose of warding (one) from those (word etc.) [1026]

[1]NKL points out that *śabdādi* causes obstruction to one's knowing the inner self.

हेत्वन्तरोपदेशो वा पदनीयत्व आत्मनः ।
तदेतदितिशास्त्रेण भण्यते तद्बुभुत्सवे ॥१०२७॥

Or, with reference to the Ātman being the object of knowing,

there is the statement (lit. instruction) of another reason in the statement of the Śruti *tad etat* ... (so that it becomes useful) to one who desires to know that. [1027]

The earlier portion of the Śruti pointed out why one should attempt to know the inner self, viz. because it has generally remained unknown to human beings. This verse points to how knowing the inner self is the most desired means to liberation.

सांख्यमुक्तिनिवृत्त्यर्थमथवास्तूत्तरा श्रुतिः ।
प्रेयोगिरात्मनो यस्मान्निष्ठानन्दस्य भण्यते ॥१०२८॥

Or, let the subsequent Śruti be for the removal of the notion of liberation posited by the Sāṃkhya(s); because the word *preyaḥ* with reference to the Ātman (viz. the inner self) conveys (that it, viz. the Ātman) is the basis of the (highest) delight. [1028]

SP quotes *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 57 and 68 as the basis for the argument. They purport to say that liberation consists in mere making between Prakṛti 'matter' and Puruṣa 'sentience'. They do not refer to the state as consisting in bliss. This verse controverts the Sāṃkhya(s)' position and lays emphasis on the state of being full of bliss — this alone is in consonance with the Śruti.

पुत्रात्प्रेय इदं तत्त्वं वित्तात्प्रियतरं तथा ।
पुत्रो वित्तं च लोके ऽपि प्रसिद्धं प्रियरूपतः ॥१०२९॥

This Reality is (to one) more dear than a son. So also (it is) more dear than wealth (of every kind); and it is well-known in the world[1] that a son and wealth are taken to be (very) dear (to one).[2] [1029]

This is the restatement of the contents of the Śruti in brief.
[1]The force of *api* is that it indicates *abhivyāpti* (SP).
[2]See SP: *na vastuto 'sya priyatvaṃ kiṃ tu pratītyā.*

ईर्यसुंस्तमबर्थे स्यात्पुत्रादीनां बहुत्वतः ।

छान्दसत्वात्प्रियतमस्तथात्मा संभवत्यपि ॥१०३०॥

[Now starts the ascertaining of the character of the inner self as the most dear and continues up to the verse 1045.]

The suffix *īyasun* is in the sense of *-tamap*[1] because of (i)the maniness of sons etc.[2] and (ii)the character of (the words is) *chāndasa*[3]. Also, it means that the Ātman (alone[4]) can be in the same way the most dear to one. [1030]

[1]The suffix *īyasun* expresses comparative degree and the second, viz. *-tamap* the superlative.

[2]The word *putrādi* refers to *vitta* already mentioned.

[3]In *chandas* the usual rules of grammar do not hold as they are; that is, the comparative suffix may be used for the superlative. The suffix *-īyasun* is mentioned by Pāṇini as equivalent of *-tamap* in Pāṇini Sūtra 5.3.57: *dvivacanavibhajyopapade tarabīyasunau* and sanctions the option in Pāṇini Sūtra 3.1.85: *vyatyayo bahulam*.

[4]Cf. SP: *ātmaiva priyatamaḥ*; *apir avadhāraṇe* ...

वित्तात्पुत्रः प्रियः पुत्रात्पिण्डः पिण्डात्तथेन्द्रियम् ।
इन्द्रियेभ्यः प्रियः प्राण आत्मा प्रियतमस्ततः ॥१०३१॥

A son is more dear[1] than wealth; one's own body is more dear than the son; also a (certain) sense-organ might be more dear to one than the whole body; Prāṇa (=the inner self[2]) is more dear than the sense-organs. Therefore, the Ātman is the dearmost (of all to one). [1031]

That the Ātman is the dearmost is shown by *pariśeṣya* 'what is left over and above others' and *anubhava* 'experience'.

[1]The word *priyaḥ*, though not in the comparative or the superlative, is in the sense of *priyataraḥ* and *priyatamaḥ*, according to the context, cf. *vyatyayo bahulam* quoted above.

[2]The difference between Prāṇa and Ātman has to be noted.

वित्तं द्विविधमप्यत्र वित्तशब्देन गृह्यते ।
देवलोकः फलं यस्माद्देवस्यापि न तत्पदम् ॥१०३२॥

In this (statement of the Śruti),[1] the word *vitta* is understood as *vitta*[2] of both the types to be. Even that from which results (the attainment to) the world of gods is not a place (to be attained) by the god.[3] [1032]

SP refers to the Śruti *vidyayā devalokaḥ*— this *vidyā* should not be mistaken for Ātmavidyā; it is understood here in the sense of any Upāsanā as mentioned in an earlier part of the text.

[1]The word *atra* is *saptamyartha* 'in the sense of the Locative'.

[2]One is in worldly prosperity and the other is in the form of knowledge of some Upāsanā. Also this refers to the twofold means, viz. gold, cow (*karmasādhana*) etc. and Upāsanā which is related to some god or object of worship (NKL).

[3]Because it is impermanent. As against the knowledge of the Ātman is ever-lasting; (cf. *vidyayā devalokaḥ* (cf. BU 1.5.16); *na muktiḥ tatphalaṃ niṣedhaśruteḥ*— SP) *deva* here is the shining one, the Ātman. Its goal is liberation, not the world of gods.

प्रीतिसाधनहेतुत्वात्प्राणादौ प्रीतिरिष्यते ।
बन्धकीप्रीतिवन्मुख्या नैवानात्मसु युज्यते ॥१०३३॥
व्याध्याद्युपप्लुतो यस्माद्वक्ति निर्विण्णमानसः ।
अद्यैव मरणं श्रेयो मम दुःखार्दितात्मनः ॥१०३४॥

In the case of the sense-organs etc.,[1] they entertain a liking[2] for them because they are the means to (acquiring) pleasure[3]; (but) the principal (pleasure[3]) is not at all (entertained) in respect of (any of) the non-Ātmans in the same way as a longing[2] for a courtesan,[4] [1033]
because a person who is oppressed by disease etc. (and is therefore) dejected in mind, says (to himself) 'For me, who am afflicted with sorrow, death just today is more agreeable.'[5] [1034]

Verse 1034 explains how *prāṇa* etc. are not dear as the principal objects.

[1]*prāṇa* in the sense of 'sense-organ'; cf. our book [Vol.4:1991] p.128.

[2] *prīti = snehaḥ/saktiḥ.*

[3] *prīti = manasaḥ ullāsaḥ.*

[4] SP notes the variant reading *vardhakīprītivat* for *bandhakīprītivat* and explains the word *vardhakī* as an infidel woman. The editor of the AnSS edition does not have *vardhakī* as a variant reading in any manuscript consulted. NKL and NKL edition also do not support *vardhakī.*

[5] SP adds: *tasmāt prāṇādāv amukhyā prītir iti śeṣaḥ.*

प्रतीचि निर्निमित्तैव सर्वावस्थास्वपीष्यते ।
प्रीतिरग्न्युष्णवत्तस्मादात्मा प्रेयाननात्मनः ॥१०३५॥

During all the states of (one's life), a liking is entertained for the inner self, even if there is not any cause whatever (*eva*) for it — (this is) in the same way that heat ever abides in fire. Therefore, the Ātman is more dear than (any) non-Ātman.[1] [1035]

[1] NKL points out the purpose of the verse: The Ātman is dear, because it is the cause of bliss (to an individual).

त्रैगुण्यात्सर्वभावानां मोहदुःखसुखात्मता ।
स्वत एव त्वनध्यस्ता ह्येवं केचित्प्रचक्षते ॥१०३६॥

In this regard some[1] say: Since all beings and the objects[2] outside them, are (the combination) of the three qualities[3], they are of the nature of (having been affected by) infatuation, misery and pleasure; this is so by their very nature and (this condition is) not superimposed on them.[4] [1036]

[1] SP identifies them to be the Sāṃkhyas and supports this idea with *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 55 and 60cd, together with a very brief comment thereon.

[2] The word *bhāva* refers to whatever undergoes a change or modification; therefore, both beings and things.

[3] Qualities are: *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*— the three constituents of Prakṛti.

[4] SP cites here *guṇavaty aguṇasya satas tasyāpārthakaṃ carati*

(*Sāṃkhyakārikā* 60) and observes *ātmanaḥ sattvādiguṇahīnatvāt svataḥ sukhādyabhāvaḥ.*

तत्तु नैवं यतः सत्त्वम् मोहादित्रयकृद्धियः ।
भानूदयं प्रपश्यामश्चोरदृग्रोगिदिग्दृशाम् ॥१०३७॥

But that is not so because it is only Sattva which causes the trio, infatuation etc.[1] (This is thus justified:) We see the sunrise (as the cause of confusion) for the thieves, (of sorrow) for those who are afflicted with disease(s) of the eye, and (of happiness) for those who want to find out (lit. see) the direction[2].

[1037]

The idea is: *sattvam prakāśakam*— this is particularly true in the case of the sun, *nātra rajastamasī calanāvaraṇayor abhāvāt.*

[1]That is, *moha*, *sukha* and *duḥkha*.

[2]NKL is more specifically helpful in ascertaining this.

समं त्रयं त्रिषु भवेत्त्रैगुण्यं चेद्भवौ मतम् ।
गुणान्तराधिकारो ऽपि न च भानूदये मतः ॥१०३८॥

If it were held that there is the combination in the sun of the three (qualities) in equal proportion,[1] then in all the three (viz. infatuation etc.) it would have been the same (i.e equal in proportion to others) and it is not (i.e. cannot be) accepted that there is in the sunrise any scope/place[2] for any quality other (than Sattva).

[1038]

The argument of the Sāṃkhyas could be: 'Being a *bhāva*, the sunrise could also be *triguṇātmaka*' and this would imply the impropriety of the illustration in the preceding verse. But this argument would go against the Sāṃkhya doctrine according to which the sun is only *sattvātmaka*, i.e. it cannot be at the same time *cala* or *āvaraka* in accordance with *rajas* and *tamas*— it can be only *prakāśaka*. As such, the illustration is only apt.

[1]*samaṃ trayaṃ triṣu=guṇatrayasya sāmyaṃ sukhaduḥkhamoheṣu.*

[2]*adhikāra=praveśa* (SP); it is literally entry.

प्रमाणैर्गृह्यते प्रीतिर्व्यभिचारिण्यनात्मसु ।
रज्ज्वां सर्पादिवन्नैवं प्रत्यगात्मनि सेक्ष्यते ॥१०३९॥

(Thus) delight (lit. liking), which is not uniform (i.e. the same) is ascertained for (all) the non-Ātman objects, (with the help of) different means of knowing[1] as in the case of the (notion(s) of) a serpent etc. in respect of a rope[2] etc. But this[3] is not so seen in respect of the inner self. [1039]

Here concludes the discussion of the Sāṃkhya view.

[1]This stands for the means acceptable to the Sāṃkhyas: *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *śabda*.

[2]The word *rajjvām* should be understood for *rajjvādau*, since the word *sarpādi* stands for *sarpa*, *śuktikā* and other well-known *upamāna*s in illustrations.

[3]This refers to *vyabhicāriṇī prīti* 'variously changing liking'.

आत्मैव प्रिय इत्यत्र हेतुः स्पष्टो ऽभिधीयते ।
श्रुत्यान्तरतरोक्त्येह तद्धेतुश्चात्मतोच्यते ॥१०४०॥

In respect of this statement 'The Ātman alone is dear (i.e. dearer than others).', the reason is clearly stated by the Śruti in the words 'it is the nearmost within'. In this (statement) is mentioned also the reason for that[1], viz. the nature (of all this universe is) the Ātman[2]. [1040]

[1]NKL reads *taddhetusthiti* for *taddhetuś ceti*. This is obviously misreading in the manuscript of NKL.

[2]This refers to the first sentence in BU 1.4.8, repeated by BUB: *yad ayam ātmā*.

यथान्तरतमः प्रत्यक्कथोदर्कं प्रवक्ष्यते ।
वाचक्नव्यक्षरान्तेन ग्रन्थेन प्रत्यगात्मनः ॥१०४१॥

It will be stated later as to how the inner self is the nearmost within (*antaratama*), i.e. in the later portion of the text (beginning with) the word *vācaknavī* and ending with the word *akṣara* that pertains to the inner self. [1041]

Sureśvara's wording is cryptic; it stands for the beginning of Yājñavalkya's discussion with Vācaknavī and ending with his statement about *akṣara* (BU 3.8.8ff.)

The purpose of the verse is to say that the conclusions of the discussion in the earlier portion will be reaffirmed in the subsequent portion of the BU, viz. in the dialogue of Yājñavalkya and Vācaknavī Gārgi. This indicates that Sureśvara follows Śaṅkara's method of showing *ekavākyatā* (=*ekārthatā*) of the entire text.

NKL refers to *tātparyaliṅga abhyāsa* 'repetition pointing to but one purport'.

प्रत्यक्तान्यानपेक्षा हि तदन्यत्तदपेक्षया ।
यतो ऽन्तरतमः प्रत्यक्तस्मादेवावगम्यते ॥१०४२॥

Since the nature of the inner self does not indeed depend on any other (object etc.) and what is other than that[1] (exists) only depending on it, therefore, is the *pratyak* 'existing within' thus understood as the nearmost within.[2] [1042]

[1]Namely, the inner self

[2]The purport is: It is one with the Ātman; or, in other words, the inner self.

यस्य त्वष्टास्ववस्थासु प्रत्यक्त्वं सममिष्यते ।
तस्यान्तरतम इति दुर्घटं वचनं भवेत् ॥१०४३॥

But, in the case of him who holds that the nature of the inner self is the same[1] in all of its eight states[2], the word (lit. expression) *antaratamaḥ* would be very difficult (to explain or understand).[3] [1043]

This and the next verse express the view of Bhartṛprapañca. In his theory the expression *antaratama* does not go well with the Ātman.

[1]That is to say: It remains unchanged.

[2]See verse 487 and note thereon.

[3]According to Bhartṛprapañca, so Sureśvara intends to convey,

the inner self undergoes, i.e. gets modified into eight states and is yet unchanged. This does not stand to reason.

अन्यूनाधिकरूपासु त्वष्टावस्थास्विहात्मनः ।
कं विशेषं समाश्रित्य ह्यात्मान्तरतमो मतः ॥१०४४॥

In this connection (we ask:) With reference to which distinctive feature does the Śruti hold that the Ātman is the nearmost within, while it persists in the eight states of the same nature, viz. that none of them is not less or more than another? [1044]

[1]It literally means: Having resorted to ...

भाक्तैवानात्मसु प्रीतिर्यस्मात्तस्मादनात्मनः ।
व्युत्थाप्य निखिलां प्रीतिं प्रतीच्येव निवेशयेत् ॥१०४५॥

Since liking for the non-Ātman objects is understood only in the secondary sense, therefore, having given up (lit. warded away) the entire liking for the non-Ātman, let one fix[1] delight only in the inner self. [1045]

Thus Sureśvara states his own view; after he has pointed out the defect in Bhartṛprapañca's view.

[1]This means: entertain, find.

एवं व्यवस्थितौ सत्यां युक्तिलेशो ऽभिधीयते ।
पुत्रादि प्रियमात्मेति द्वयोर्विवदमानयोः ॥१०४६॥
आत्मनो ऽन्यत्प्रियमिति यो ब्रूते मोहसंप्लुतः ।
ब्रुवाणं तं प्रति ब्रूयादिति श्रुत्यनुशासनम् ॥१०४७॥
यस्ते प्रियतयाभीष्टः सो ऽचिराद्दुःखकृद्भवेत् ।
यतो नङ्क्ष्यति स क्षिप्रं नश्यंश्चासुखकृत्प्रियः ॥१०४८॥

[Now follows the explanation of *sa yo 'nyam ātmanaḥ priyam* ... (BU 1.4.8)]

Such being decision[1] (of what is liked and not liked), there is (now) stated some (more) argument: Between the two, who are arguing (against each other), holding the views (such as)

'the son etc. is (more) dear' and 'the Ātman (alone is more dear)', [1046]
to the one who, overpowered by ignorance, would say that a thing than the Ātman is (more) dear, should one say, 'Such is the instruction of the Śruti: [1047]
That one, which is desired by you as the dear one, would soon be the cause of (your) misery, because the one will soon perish (and), thus perishing, will be the cause of unhappiness. [1048]

All these three verses together are an explanation of the Śruti statement *priyaṃ rotsyatīti ... pramāyukam bhavati* (BU 1.4.8).

[1]Or, division.

यथोक्तस्याविसंवादं तत्तथैवेति च श्रुतिः ।
आत्मैव प्रिय इत्येवं प्रतिज्ञां प्रत्यभाषत ॥१०४९॥

And the words in the Śruti *tat tathaiva* (*syāt*) (reaffirmed) in a way that it does not involve (any) contradiction with the statement of the proposition 'The Ātman alone is dear.', which was made earlier. [1049]

Translation is in agreement with the first explanation of SP, confirmed by NKL. This brings out the relation between the two sentences *ātmaiva priyaḥ* ... and *tathaiva syāt*. Or, as SP points out alternatively, the Śruti reaffirmed 'the Ātman alone is dear' in such a way that it is not contrary is to what is stated earlier.

यस्मादेवमतो हित्वा प्राणादीनप्रियात्मनः ।
सर्वान्तरतमात्मानमुपासीत प्रियं सदा ॥१०५०॥

Since this is so, therefore, having abandoned *prāṇa* etc.[1] which are such as cannot be dear, one should ever consider as dear the Ātman, which is the most within of all. [1050]

This verse is the explanation of *ātmānam eva priyam upāsīta*. Some explanation of SP, *sarvasmāt antaratā ... draṣṭavyaḥ*, though ingenious, is not acceptable.

[1]The word *ādi* refers to the sense-organs.

स य आत्मानमित्युक्त्या प्राप्तदोषनिराक्रिया ।
प्रमायुकत्वं मर्त्यत्वात्प्राणादेर्न तु वार्यते ॥१०५१॥

In the statement of the Śruti *sa ya ātmānam*, there is the refutation of the evil that would affect (lit. reach) the self; but the perishable nature of *prāṇa* etc. is not (i.e. cannot) be warded away, since they are liable to death. [1051]

This brings out the purpose of *sa ya ātmānam* ... 'Though agreeable like other things, it (i.e. self) does not perish.'

व्यावृत्तसर्वबाह्यार्थप्रीतेस्तन्मुक्तिकामिनः ।
न हास्येति गिरा नातो मुमुक्षोः फलकीर्तनम् ॥१०५२॥

Therefore, in the words *na hāsya*, there is not a statement of the fruit[1] for him who has withdrawn himself from any liking for all external objects[2] and who has a desire for freedom from that[3] and for one who wants to be free from this (external world). [1052]

[1]This is literal translation. It means the result, viz. liberation.
[2]They signify *prāṇa* etc. which certainly perish.
[3]That is, the bondage of it.

आविरिञ्चाद्विरक्तश्चेत्कुम्भीपाकादिवेह यः ।
आप्ताशेषक्रियाकार्यो मुक्तौ स विनियुज्यते ॥१०५३॥

That person among them here[1] is eligible for securing[2] liberation, who is averse to (the entire universe) beginning with Viriñca, if at all, as from (the hell called) Kumbhīpāka[3], after he has performed the entire mass of activity to be performed (according to the dictate of Śāstra). [1053]

[1]Cf. SP: *iheti madhye 'dhikṛtānām iti yāvat.*
[2]It is literally 'is enjoined to acquire'.
[3]This is one of the *narakas* enunciated in Purānic or old

tradition.

परीक्ष्य लोकानित्यादि तथा नैगमिकं वचः ।
त्यज धर्ममधर्मं चेत्येवमादि स्मृतेरपि ॥१०५४॥

To that purpose[1] is there the Śruti statement *parīkṣya lokān ...*[2] and also a similar one from the Smṛti, (such as) *tyaja dharmam adharmaṃ ca .*[3] [1054]

[1]Or alternatively, so also is ...
[2]*Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 1.2.12.
[3]*Mahābhārata* 12.167.10.

Verses 1055-1165 pertains to BU 1.4.9.

आत्माविद्यापनुत्त्यर्थं प्रारब्धोपनिषत्परा ।
आत्मेत्युपक्रमं यच्च तत्सूत्रं प्रागुदाहृतम् ॥१०५५॥

The subsequent[1] Śruti begins (lit. has proceeded) with the purpose of removing ignorance about (the nature of) the Ātman and the Sūtra, which has its beginning in the words *ātmeti*, has been already introduced. [1055]

The purpose of verses 1055-1068 is to show the connection of the foregoing discussion with *tad āhuḥ* in BU 1.4.9.

[1]Read NKL: *paraviṣayatvāt parety arthaḥ*. This is because there immediately follows the (the Sūtra, viz. statement) *ātmety evopāsīta*.

तद्भेदमित्यनेनास्याः प्रमेयो ऽर्थो निरूपितः ।
अकृत्स्नवचसा तद्वत्प्रमाभासो ऽप्यपोदितः ॥१०५६॥

The purport to be known from this[1] Upaniṣad has been explained in the statement *tad dhedam ...*[2] So also is set aside by (the use of) the word *akṛtsna* what (would have) appeared as the knowledge of the truth. [1056]

[1]Supply: which has been stated immediately before.
[2]BU 1.4.7.

आत्मैवैको ऽत्र द्रष्टव्यः कृत्स्नत्वान्नात्मनो ऽपरः ।
अकृत्स्न एव तावत्स्यात्तदन्यो यावदीक्ष्यते ॥१०५७॥

In (connection with the teaching of) this (Upaniṣad), the Ātman alone is to be known (lit. seen), because of its completeness and not what is other than the Ātman, (because) it is seen that what is other than that (viz. the Ātman) is[1] only incomplete. [1057]

[1]It literally means: would be.

को ऽहं कस्य कुतो वेति कः कथं वा भवेदिति ।
प्रयोजकमतेरेष विध्यर्थो ऽत्रावगम्यते ॥१०५८॥

The meaning of the injunction which conveys the inciting thought is this: 'Who am I? or, to whom do I belong? whence (was I) born? or what shall I be and how?' [1058]

NKL here points out that the questions in the verse pertain to the exposition of *tvampadārtha* 'an individual mentioned by the word *tvam*'. Both SP and NKL point out the fuller significance of each question.

उत्पत्तिस्थितिविध्वंसाः कार्याणां स्युः कुतो न्विति ।
अन्वयव्यतिरेकाख्यो व्यापारो ऽत्र विधीयते ॥१०५९॥

Whence indeed would they be — origin, sustenance and destruction of the products (i.e. effects) — (to explain this) there is enjoined here the activity of applying (the method of) Anvaya and Vyatireka. [1059]

This is an explanation of the earlier verse where the injunctions *ātmety* ... and *ātmā* ... *draṣṭavyaḥ* expect one to think about the nature of the Ātman by the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka.

It is taken for granted here that an injunction is always about some ritual and therefore one is expected to begin to think, and this is taken as an activity.

तपसा तत्परं ब्रह्म विद्धीति वचनादतः ।
अन्वयव्यतिरेकाख्यो व्यापारो ऽत्र तपो मतम् ॥१०६०॥

Therefore, from the Śruti statement *tapasā tatparaṃ brahma viddhi*,[1] *tapas* is understood to be an activity, called applying the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka. [1060]

[1] *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 3.2.

यतो वा इत्यतो वाक्यान्न तदन्यत्तपो भवेत् ।
लक्षणोक्तेर्य आत्मेति सो ऽन्वेष्टव्य इति श्रुतेः ॥१०६१॥

There would not be on the authority of the Śruti statement *yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante*[1] (the idea of) any *tapas* 'penance' other than that[2]; (this is so) owing to the statement in the Śruti which is the definition of (the Brahman), viz. *ya ātmāpahatapāpmā* ... and which further enjoins *so 'nveṣṭavyaḥ*.[3] [1061]

So far Sureśvara has made every effort to show the oneness of purport of various Śruti passages (from BU, CU and *Taittirīyopaniṣad*; viz. their *ekavākyatā*).

[1] *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 3.1.

[2] This refers to applying the method of Anvaya Vyatireka mentioned in the preceding verse.

[3] CU 8.7.1 and 3.

त्यक्ताप्रियपरागर्थो ह्यमानित्वादिसाधनः ।
प्रियात्मानमुपासीत शक्रवद्ब्रह्मचर्यवान् ॥१०६२॥

One, who has abandoned all the unlikable external objects and is possessed of means such as being without attachment to the body[1], should, being a Brahmacārin like Śakra[2], think of the Ātman as the dear one. [1062]

[1] Cp. *Gītā* 13.7.

[2] Refer to CU 8.11.3.

आत्मेत्यनेन वाक्येन ब्रह्मविद्योपासूत्रिता ।
यदर्थोपनिषत्कृत्स्ना वृत्तिस्तस्या भविष्यति ॥१०६३॥
आत्मेत्येकमिदं सूत्रं कण्डिकाद्वयमेव वा ।
अध्यायो वा समस्तो ऽयमध्यायद्वयमेव वा ॥१०६४॥

In this statement, viz. *ātmety* ... is introduced the lore of the Brahman for (conveying) which the entire Upaniṣad (has proceeded). Now will be given a full explanation[1] of that; viz. one Sūtra *ātmety* ..., or two sections[2] (*kaṇḍikā*s), or this entire chapter[3] or these two chapters[4]. [1063-1064]

[1]The Upaniṣadic sentence *tad āhuḥ* is the explanation of the lore of the Brahman. This, according to Śaṅkara (NKL).

[2](i)*tad dha* ... and (ii)*tad etat* ... This, according to Sureśvara (NKL).

[3]That is, BU ch. 1.

[4]That is, BU chh. 1-2.

अव्याकृतव्याकरणप्रभृतीन्यपरे विदुः ।
पञ्चैव किल सूत्राणि तथापीष्टं न बाध्यते ॥१०६५॥

[Verses 1065-1068 mention the view of Bhartṛprapañca.]

Others (however) have understood (the explanation to be) only the five Sūtras beginning with the statement of the division of what was unmanifest; but, even in that way, the desired purpose is not lost (lit. obstructed). [1065]

अव्याकृतं स एषेह तथात्मैवेति चापरः ।
पदनीयं तथा प्रेयः पदार्थाः पञ्च सूत्रिताः ॥१०६६॥

(Thus, according to him,) there are (references to, or Śruti statements about the five Sūtras heard (or enumerated,) viz. *avyākṛta*, *sa eṣeha*,[1] *ātmaiva*,[2] *padanīyam* and *preyaḥ*, as the objects of knowing. [1066]

The first four references occur in BU 1.4.7 and the fifth in BU 1.4.8. Cf. SP: *ajñātam ātmatattvaṃ jagato nidānam, tad eva*

sṛṣṭe jagati praviṣṭam, tad eva cānātmano hitvā jñātavyam, tasyaiva jñātatvena padanīyatvam, tad eva ca priyatamam iti padārthapañcakam atra sūtram.

[1]In BU it reads *sa eṣa iha*. Sureśvara has adopted double Saṃdhi in Chāndasa manner.

[2]This is *ātmety eva* for metre's sake.

यथोक्तानां च सूत्राणामा शास्त्रस्य सममपनात् ।
वृत्तिः स्यादुत्तरो ग्रन्थस्तत्र तेषां समन्वयात् ॥१०६७॥

(Let it be understood that) the subsequent portion of this text up to the completion of this Upaniṣad is the explanation of the Sūtras as stated (above), because, in that (portion), there is proper construing of them. [1067]

व्याचिख्यासुरथेदानीं सूत्रार्थाञ्श्रुतिरञ्जसा ।
प्रयोजनाभिधित्साया उपोद्घाते प्रवर्तते ॥१०६८॥

Now, the Śruti, desirous as it is to explain the thoughts in the Sūtras in a smooth way, proceeds to introduce the discussion with an aim to state their purpose. [1068]

Now follows the discussion of the meaning of *tad āhuḥ*.

For *upoddhāta*, cf. NKL: *cintāṃ prakṛtasiddhyarthām upoddhātam pracakṣate*, i.e. the statement of the basic thought or the purpose of the discussion which is undertaken.

वक्ष्यमाणवचो वस्तु तच्छब्देनाभिधीयते ।
ब्रह्म जिज्ञासवो विप्रा आहुर्यद्गुरुसंनिधौ ॥१०६९॥

By the word *tat* is expressed the thing about which there is a discussion to be undertaken (in the subsequent portion of the text), viz. what the Brāhmaṇas, who were desirous of knowing the Brahman, said in the presence of the preceptor. [1069]

To begin with, the Vārtika explains the meanings of the words in *tad āhuḥ* ...

विज्ञाताशेषवेदान्तसर्वस्वं ब्रह्मणि स्थितम् ।
उपसद्य गुरुं न्यायादाहुः केचिन्मुमुक्षवः ॥१०७०॥
यज्ञाद्याहितसंस्कारा अपास्ताशेषसाधनाः ।
सांसारिकपुमर्थेभ्यो विरक्ताः शुद्धबुद्धयः ॥१०७१॥
त्यक्त्वा कर्माणि निःसङ्गाः कर्मणां चरितार्थतः ।
ब्रह्मविद्याप्लवेनेमं संसाराब्धिं तितीर्षवः ॥१०७२॥
आ विरिञ्चात्पुमर्थानामकृत्स्नत्वादिदोषतः ।
वितृषो ऽशेषतद्दोषध्वस्तिश्रेयः परीप्सवः ॥१०७३॥
साक्षेपमाहुः श्रेयांसं गुरुं प्राप्य निरेषणाः ।
गुरुद्वारैव विद्येह श्रेयःप्राप्तौ क्षमा यतः ॥१०७४॥

Having approached the preceptor who had known the essence of all the Upaniṣadic texts and who abided in the Brahman[1], some seekers of liberation addressed (him) in the prescribed manner[2], [1070]

— (the seekers) who had purified themselves by (lit. placed in themselves) some *saṃskāra*s (by the performances of) sacrifices etc.[3], who had discarded (lit. thrown away) all the means (of ritual performance etc.), who had become averse to the ends of human endeavour, and who were thus pure in intellect, [1071]

who were without any attachment, after having abandoned the ritual activities, since the purpose of (their) activities had been fulfilled, and who were desirous to cross over this ocean of worldly existence in a boat in the form of the lore of the Brahman, [1072]

who were without any desire owing to there being faults in all the ends of human endeavour up to Viriñca, such as incompleteness etc. and seeking to attain bliss (which consists in) the destruction of all of the faults in them, [1073]

devoid of any desire, having approached an excellent preceptor, with courage[4] addressed him; since, here in respect of obtaining bliss, only knowledge through (the guidance of) the preceptor is an effective (means).[5] [1074]

There description here of Brāhmaṇas who are seekers of liberation.

[1]That is, who was given to constant meditation on the nature of the Brahman.

[2]There are statements in the Śruti and the Smṛti about the manner in which one should approach the preceptor. Refer to *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 1.1.12.

[3]That is, who had purified their intellect by the performances of rituals.

[4]*sākṣepam* usually means: thoughtlessly (or, without much thought). Here the idea is: They made bold to address him.

[5]See CU 6.14.2: *ācāryavān puruṣo veda* ...

किमाहुरित्यपेक्षायामिदं तदभिधीयते ।
मन्यन्त इत्यनेनैव यच्छब्दो याति संगतिम् ॥१०७५॥
अव्यावृताननुगतं वस्तु ब्रह्मगिरोच्यते ।
मुख्यार्थो ब्रह्मशब्दो ऽयमेवं सत्युपपद्यते ॥१०७६॥

(With a view to answering) the curiosity as to what they said, this is said in the statement: *manyante* ... and thus (i.e. in this way), the word *yat* gets properly construed. [1075]
By the word *brahman* is mentioned that (real) thing which is not differentiated from anything else and is not followed by (i.e. is not similar to) any other. This being the case, this word *brahman* becomes reasonable in its primary sense. [1076]

Here is introduced the Śruti *yad brahmavidyayā sarvam bhaviṣyanto manuṣyā manyante*.

तद्यया वेद्यते बुद्ध्या तदसाधारणात्मना ।
ब्रह्मविद्येति तां साक्षाच्छेमुषीं प्रतिजानते ॥१०७७॥

They call that instruction as the lore of the Brahman by which the Brahman, in its uncommon nature, becomes known; they declare that itself[1] as devotion (to the Brahman). [1077]

This explains the word *vidyā*.

[1]This refers to the lore of the Brahman.

सर्वं कृत्स्नं भविष्यामो मन्यन्ते ब्रह्मविद्यया ।
यन्मनुष्या वयं तत्र विरोधमनुयुञ्जमहे ॥१०७८॥
कृत्स्नमेव यतः प्रोक्तं वस्तु यत्पारमार्थिकम् ।
तत्प्रमाणविशुद्ध्यर्थं चोदयन्ति मुमुक्षवः ॥१०७९॥

We hold an objection to that, viz. men think, 'We shall become by the lore of the Brahman all that is complete.', [1078] because the thing, which is the ultimate Reality, is described to be all this;[1] therefore, the seekers of liberation raise an objection with a view to ascertaining the clarity of the argument (lit. means of knowing): [1079]

Now, there is discussion of the meanings of the sentence. To begin with, verse 1078 expresses the intention of the disciples. These justify the questioning by the seekers for liberation. They raise this question not because they desire anything, but they seek fuller clarification of the Reality which is described as 'all this'.

[1]The entire mass of this world. Cp. *atra hy ete sarve ekam bhavanti.*

ब्रह्मविद्यैव कृत्स्नाप्तौ यस्मात्साधनमुच्यते ।
तत्प्राप्तौ तत्तमोमात्रं व्यवधानमतो भवेत् ॥१०८०॥

Since the lore of the Brahman alone is declared to be the means to obtaining fullness (or completeness), therefore, only ignorance about that (Brahman) would be the obstruction to acquiring that.[1] [1080]

[1]Namely, knowledge of the Brahman.

द्योतिकैव यतो विद्या न त्वसौ कारकं ततः ।
उत्पत्त्यादिक्रियाकार्यं तस्माच्चेह न शङ्क्यते ॥१०८१॥

[The objector might emphasise the word 'arguing' which leads to the idea of 'producing' (the knowledge of the Brahman). The following verse answers away this objection.]

Since knowledge is only an indicator[1] (to Reality, i.e. the Brahman), indeed, it is not, therefore, a means of producing (that) and therefore, in this context[2], no doubt should be entertained as to any activity and its effect beginning with production.[3] [1081]

NKL writes *karmasamuccitadhīphalatvam mukter arthān nirastam*; the editor of NKL points out that this remark is for setting aside the idea of the combination of knowledge and activity which Bhartṛprapañca has posited.

[1]It means: what throws light on.

[2]It means: securing liberation.

[3]These are: *āpti*, *saṃskṛti* and *vikṛti* (beside *utpatti*).

सिद्धे ऽर्थे द्योतको दीपो न तु कार्ये यतस्ततः ।
सर्वात्मभावः सर्वेषां सिद्धः प्रागपि बोधतः ॥१०८२॥

Since a lamp is an illuminator of an already existing object and not of what is to be produced, therefore (let it be understood that), in the case of all (the persons), becoming (one with) the Ātman is accomplished even before (they have acquired) the knowledge[1]. [1082]

This is to affirm that liberation (*sarvātmabhāva*) does not have to be produced.

[1]It is the knowledge of oneness of the individual self with the Supreme Self.

अतो ऽकृत्स्ना वयं मोहात्कृत्स्नात्मानो ऽपि वस्तुतः ।
निहत्य विद्ययाविद्यां यामः कात्स्न्र्यं स्वतोगतम् ॥१०८३॥

Therefore, we are incomplete on account of (our) ignorance, even though we are in reality of the nature of (what is) complete[1] (and), having destroyed ignorance (by the knowledge of the Brahman), we shall attain fullness[2] which is already within us. [1083]

[1]*sarvaṃ kṛtsnam manyante.*

[2]Or, completeness. Mark the conceived motion in *kārtsnyaṃ yāmaḥ*.

अधिकारविनिश्चित्यै मनुष्या इति गीरियम् ।
मनुष्याणां हि निःशेषत्रय्यर्थे ऽधिकृतिर्यतः ॥१०८४॥

This word *manuṣyāḥ* is for specifying eligibility, since men have eligibility with respect to the meaning of all the three Vedas. [1084]

दृष्टार्थतो वा विद्याया मनुष्यग्रहणं कृतम् ।
तावन्मात्रो ऽधिकार्यत्र नाग्निहोत्राधिकारिवत् ॥१०८५॥

Since the lore of the Brahman secures a 'seen'[1] purpose, therefore, there is a mention made of (all) men[2] (in the Śruti regarding the lore of the Brahman). Here, whosoever is man is eligible (for the study of the lore); not like only someone that is eligibile for (the performance of) Agnihotra[3]. [1085]

Here is another explanaltion of *manuṣyāḥ*.

[1]In the case of injunctions regarding rituals the results are unseen, since ritual does not directly lead one to the final result.

[2] *tāvanmātra* = *manuṣyamātra*.

[3]Regarding Agnihotra and other such performances, there is restriction of caste etc. of the performer. This is not so in the case of the lore of the Brahman.

प्रत्यबुध्यत यो यस्तदिति चोर्ध्वं प्रवक्ष्यति ।
नातः कर्माधिकार्यत्र दृष्टार्थत्वादपेक्ष्यते ॥१०८६॥

And (the Śruti) will later declare (in words) *pratyabudhyata yo yas tat*.[1] For this reason,[2] it is not found here necessary that one has to be eligible by (the performance of) some (ritual) activity, since (this lore of the Brahman) has a seen result. [1086]

Though the preceding verse has expressed this idea, it is repeated here purposely. One who performs a ritual activity becomes eligible

for the final result. This is indirectly known. In the case of the lore of the Brahman, the case is different, i.e. one knowing the Brahman becomes one with it. Read SP: *karmādhikārī tadvadviśiṣṭo 'dhikārīty arthaḥ*.

[1]This has a reference of BU 1.4.10 which reads *pratyabudhyata sa eva tad abhavat*. This jusjtifies the second line of the preceding verse.

[2]In other words: Because there is a seen result.

कर्मभ्य इव च ज्ञानात्फलप्राप्तिं सुनिश्चिताम् ।
मन्यन्त उभयत्रापि श्रुतिमानाविशेषतः ॥१०८७॥

They hold that there results definitely the fulfilment of some end from knowledge as from the performance of (rituals), since, in the case of both[1], there is no difference in respect of the means of knowing them, viz. the Śruti. [1087]

This explains why they decide the lore of the Brahman as leading to liberation.

[1]This means: the knowledge of activity and the lore of the Brahman.

यन्मन्यन्ते नरास्तत्र विरुद्धमिव लक्ष्यते ।
यतो ऽतश्चोदयामो ऽत्र यथा विप्रतिषिद्धता ॥१०८८॥

Since there appears here in the statement *manyante narāḥ* something which is opposed (to the acquisition of the result of the lore of the Brahman as explained above), therefore we are adducing how there is opposition. [1088]

[1]This is to introduce the question *kim u tad brahmāved yasmāt tat sarvam abhavad iti*; (*parichinnam aparichinnaṃ vā*).

किमु तद्ब्रह्म यद्वेद्यं यज्ज्ञानात्सर्वताप्यते ।
किंचापि तदवेदन्यद्यज्ज्ञानात्कृत्स्नतामगात् ॥१०८९॥

What is that Brahman, which is to be known (and) from the knowledge of which is obtained fullness (completeness)? And

further, what else did it know from whose knowledge it attained to fullness[1]? [1089]

[1]This is the paraphrase of *sarvatā*.

ब्रह्माकृत्स्नं मतं तच्चेदुक्तदोषानिराकृतेः ।
अनुपास्यं भवेत्तादृक्प्राणादिवदसंशयम् ॥१०९०॥

If that Brahman is held to be incomplete (=not full), then it would certainly not be what should be pondered over (lit. worshipped, or meditated on), in the same way as the sense-organs etc. which are similar to that,[1] because there is no removal of the fault (already) stated[2] before. [1090]

[1]That is, *akṛtsna* like the *prāṇa*s.
[2]Namely, pondering over 'that which is not full, would not lead to the result, viz. fullness'.

कल्पना नापि गौण्यत्र मुख्यार्थे सति युज्यते ।
न ह्यालभन्ते वाहीकं मुख्ये गवि सति क्वचित् ॥१०९१॥

In this context, it is not proper to hold a metaphorical notion while the principal meaning/object is acceptable[1]. Indeed, they do not kill in any sacrifice a Vāhika (a man from the Punjab) when there (really) exists a bull[2]. [1091]

Calling the Brahman incomplete, one cannot establish that the knowledge of the Brahman is the result called incompleteness.
[1]That Brahman is full is a matter of experience, therefore it is not correct to consider that it is not full (as said in verse 1090 above).
[2]We have an example of *lakṣaṇā* 'metaphorical usage in language' in the oft-quoted sentence *vāhikaḥ gauḥ* 'A man from the Punjab is a bull.'; therefore, since a Vāhika is here called a bull, one should not proceed to kill him in a sacrifice where a bull is to be killed. Such an activity never takes place; it is only improper to do so. Metaphorical usage in language should not imply an actual action.

मुख्यं ब्रह्म न चेदस्ति गौणं स्यात्तद्विना कुतः ।
मुख्यमग्निं विना गौणं न लोको ऽप्यवगच्छति ॥१०९२॥

Supposing there did not exist the Brahman in the principal sense (of the word), how could there be a metaphorical Brahman without that? (Indeed,) unless there is a real fire, people do not entertain the notion some metaphorical fire. [1092]

This refers to the *lakṣaṇāvyāpāra* whose example is *agniḥ māṇavakaḥ* 'Young Māṇavaka is fire.'. Here, unless the speaker has known what is real fire — or, in other words, if there did not exist a real fire — he would not have employed the metaphorical statement mentioned above. In the same way, the real Brahman being unknown, nobody could hold it as metaphorically existent. Cf. Śaṅkara's statement in Adhyāsabhāṣya (p.81): *sarvo hy ātmāstitvam pratyeti* ...

अकृत्स्नज्ञानतो नापि पुरुषार्थो ऽवगम्यते ।
ब्रह्माज्ञानसमुत्थत्वान्मिथ्याज्ञानत्वकारणात् ॥१०९३॥

And, further, the end of human endeavour is not obtained from knowing what is incomplete, because (that knowledge) has arisen from the ignorance about the Brahman, i.e. because it has arisen from false knowledge. [1093]

मेयमानादिसंभित्तिर्यदि नामेह लभ्यते ।
अयथावस्तुरूपत्वात्स्वप्नमेयादिवत्तु सा ॥१०९४॥

If at all we find here[1] the differentiation among the object of knowing, the means of knowing etc., that is like the objects of knowing in a dream since they are of the nature of what is not real. [1094]

This explains *mithyājñānatvakāraṇāt* in verse 1093.

This refers to the use of *pramāṇa-prameya-vyavahāra* in respect of the Brahman and in that is that *vyavahāra* based on unreality

of objects; the example of a dream makes the idea clear. For this, see *Gauḍapādakārikā* 2.1.

[1]It means: in respect of knowing the Brahman .

अकृत्स्नस्य च ब्रह्मत्वं विरुद्धं भानुशैत्यवत् ।
तस्मादकृत्स्नं ब्रह्मेति न मानेनोपपद्यते ॥१०९५॥

And (holding) an incomplete thing as the Brahman involves internal contradiction as (in holding that) the sun is possessed of cold; therefore, by none of the means of knowledge is an incomplete object reasonably held as the Brahman. [1095]

ब्रह्मास्तु तर्हि तत्कृत्स्नमुक्तदोषासमन्वयात् ।
मुख्यार्थलाभतश्चापि तस्य च प्रकृतत्वतः ॥१०९६॥

Let then that Brahman be full (i.e. complete), since it is not inseparably associated with the faults stated earlier and, further, for the reason that it is the matter under description and from that we get to know the principal meaning of the word. [1096]

न कृत्स्नमिति तद्ग्राह्यं तत्प्रमाणाद्यसंभवात् ।
तदन्यवस्तुसद्भावे तद्ब्रह्मत्वं विहन्यते ॥१०९७॥

Let not that Brahman be understood as full, for there cannot be any means etc. of knowing that[1] (And) if there is held to exist another object, the nature of the Brahman would get disproved[2]. [1097]

[1]It means: its fullness.

[2]In the first half of the verse the objector points to the need of having some means of knowing for the nature of the Brahman and, if a means of knowing were accepted to exist, that should mean something else than the Brahman existed and therefore the nature of the Brahman as one without a second should get disproved.

न च मानानपेक्षस्य सिद्धिरभ्युपगम्यते ।

मानादियत्नानर्थक्यप्रसक्तिः स्यात्तथा सति ॥१०९८॥

And nobody accepts as proven what is not dependent on a means of proof; for, if that were so, there would result the contingency that there is uselessness of a man's effort to employ the means of proof etc. [1098]

सदानुदितालुप्तैकज्ञप्तिमात्रसतत्त्वकम् ।
यद्यपीष्टं तथापीदं नात्ममोहापनोदकृत् ॥१०९९॥

Even if it is held that (Reality) is ever unoriginated, unnegated, and of the nature that is merely knowledge, in that case also it cannot be the remover of ignorance about the Ātman. [1099]

न हि मानमनाश्रित्य वस्त्वात्माज्ञानहानिकृत् ।
स्रक्स्थाण्वादावदृष्टत्वादुक्तदोषो ऽपि चापतेत् ॥११००॥

Indeed, there cannot be a thing which is the remover of ignorance about the Ātman, unless without resorting to some means of knowledge; for this fault would occur when (the absence of any means of knowing) is not noticed in (the apprehension of) a garland, a tree etc. [1100]

मानाद्यनभ्युपेतौ हि न किंचिद्वस्तु सिद्ध्यति ।
तदभ्युपेतौ ब्रह्मत्वं व्यावृत्तेर्न प्रसिद्ध्यति ॥११०१॥

Indeed nothing can be proved if any means of knowintg it etc. is not accepted and if that[1] is accepted then the nature of the Brahman cannot be established because it is then already differentiated (from something). [1101]

[1] = *mānādi*.

यथाकथंचिच्छदार्थो यदि नामाभ्युपेयते ।
तथापि दोषवद्ब्रह्म यथा तदधुनोच्यते ॥११०२॥

And, indeed, if the meaning of the Śruti (passage) is somehow accepted (as known), in that case also, the Brahman will have

(to be accepted as having) a fault — how that is so is now explained. [1102]

कृत्स्नं वा यदि वाकृत्स्नं यथेच्छसि तथास्तु तत् ।
ब्रह्मत्वं किं स्वतस्तस्य किंवा तत्परतो मतम् ॥११०३॥

(Well!) let that Brahman be complete or incomplete, in whatsoever (form) you may hold (lit. desire) that (to be). (We ask a question:) Does the nature of the Brahman exist in its own right or on account of (a thing) other than that? [1103]

यदि तावत्स्वतस्तत्स्याद्ब्रह्मविद्या निरर्थिका ।
न ह्युष्णत्वं हुताशस्य परतः कुर्वते बुधाः ॥११०४॥

If, in the first place, that would exist in its own right, then the lore of the Brahman would be meaningless. Indeed, the wise do not accept the hotness of fire as (coming) from another. [1104]

ज्ञानमूर्तेर्न चाज्ञानमागन्तु सहजं तथा ।
भानौ तमोवत्तेनेदृग्ब्रह्म नैवोपपद्यते ॥११०५॥

Further, in the case of what has the form of knowledge, ignorance cannot be either adventitious or natural in the same way as darkness in the sun[1]. Therefore, such[2] Brahman does not get reasonably explained. [1105]

[1]That is, together with the sun.
[2]Namely, which is accompanied by ignorance.

शास्त्राद्यारम्भानर्थक्यदोषश्चापि प्रसज्यते ।
स्वानुभूतिविरोधोऽपि ब्रह्मत्वं चेद्भवेत्स्वतः ॥११०६॥

And there would also be contingent the fault of meaninglessness (or uselessness) of/in the effort of the Śāstra[1] and also contradiction with one's own experience, if it would be held that the state of the Brahman gets established by itself. [1106]

[1]The Śruti text giving instruction on the nature of Brahman; *ārambha* 'activity' — cf. *vāmetaras tasya karaḥ prahartuś ... citrārpitārambha ivāvatasthe* (*Raghuvaṃśa* 2.31).

योषाग्निवच्चेच्छास्त्रं स्याद्दृष्टिमात्रविधायकम् ।
तथा सत्यविरोधः स्याद्भिन्नाधिकरणत्वतः ॥११०७॥

(Again) if the Śruti would enjoin one merely to look upon (something as the Brahman), in the way as one should see fire in the place of a woman[1], there would be in that case no opposition, since the Brahman and the so-called other thing do not have (two) different bases. [1107]

[1]Cf. CU 5.8.1: *yoṣā vāva gautamāgniḥ*. This pertains to the conflict between Śāstric sentence and direct perception.

सदसीति क्रियानिष्ठं प्रत्यक्षाद्यर्थनिष्ठितम् ।
विरोधः को ऽनयोरत्र मिथोर्थासंस्पृशोः सतोः ॥११०८॥

The sentence *sad asi* 'You are existent.' is based on (what is formally expressive of) action and is based on what is directly perceived etc. What contradiction could there be in this case where these so-called two are not touching one another? [1108]

This verse is the explanation of the second line of the preceding verse.

sad asi has the word *asi* which grammatically refers to some action, but being and action are here just non-different. They refer only to being, therefore there is no contradiction between the two.

नैतदेवं यतो वाक्यं वस्तुनिष्ठं पुरोदितम् ।
विरोध एव तेन स्यादेकाधिकरणत्वतः ॥११०९॥

But, this is not so, since there is already a statement made which pertains to Reality. Therefore, there is indeed contradiction in that (since the two are mentioned in that sentence) as having but one basis. [1109]

This refers to the earlier passage *sarvo 'py ayam* ... (SV 556).

अशक्या ब्रह्मदृष्टिश्च कर्तुं ब्रह्माप्रसिद्धितः ।
लोकसिद्धौ तु योषाग्नी तद्दृष्टिः सुकरेष्यते ॥१११०॥

Also, it is not possible to look upon something as the Brahman because of the non-knownness of the Brahman. As against this, a young woman and fire are already existing in the world[1] and therefore that (metaphorical) seeing is easily acceptable. [1110]

[1]As two distinct entities.

अथाग्निवच्चेत्तद्ब्रह्म सिद्धं मानान्तरान्मतम् ।
तावतैव कृतार्थत्वात्किमन्यत्प्रार्थ्यते श्रुतेः ॥११११॥

If that Brahman were taken to be established by another means (of knowing) in the way as fire, then by that very (means of knowing) the purpose being served[1] what else is expected from the Śruti? [1111]

The argument is: Fire is seen and immediately known, there is no need of any other means of knowing it, i.e. a Śruti or a statement of somebody about it, for example. Similarly, if the Brahman is seen (i.e. experienced) by one, where is the need of such a Śruti?

[1]Namely, that it becomes known.

तद्दृष्टावेव निःशेषपुरुषार्थसमाप्तितः ।
फलान्तराय तद्दृष्टिर्न च स्यादग्निदृष्टिवत् ॥१११२॥

Since there is the attainment of all the ends of human endeavour when the Brahman is seen, therefore there is no need to see it (in another object) for achieving (yet) another result; (and thus) this would not be like seeing the fire (in a woman). [1112]

Before one hears the statement about fire in a woman, one does really see the fire, and one's purpose is not fully served, viz. no *puruṣārtha* is obtained; therefore, that purpose has be served by yet another means, viz. by accepting *lakṣaṇā* 'metaphor' and doing meditation on 'fire in the woman'. As against this, when the Brahman is seen every *puruṣārtha* is obtained, there remains no other purpose to be achieved whatsoever. It means, therefore, that seeing Brahman in some objects is entirely redundant. This argument in the verse is supported by the illustration of a dissimilar object (*vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta*).

परतो ऽपि च कृत्स्नत्वे ब्रह्मत्वं दुःस्थसिद्धिकम् ।
क्रियातो ज्ञानतो वा तद्यदि वोभयसंश्रयात् ॥१११३॥

And in the opinion that completeness (of the Brahman is established) on account of another, the character of the Brahman is difficult to establish.[1] One would entertain ideas about the nature of the Brahman as established from some action, or from the knowledge (of it)[2] or perhaps from both.[3] [1113]

The argument, which is controverted in this verse, presupposes that the nature of the Brahman cannot become known from itself.

[1]The Brahman would be determined as impermanent like heaven etc.

[2]Supply: by some means of knowing. This also points to its impermanent character.

[3]This is clarified in the next verse.

न ब्रह्मता क्रियातः स्यादुत्पत्त्यादिसमन्वयात् ।
न स्यादाद्यन्तवद्ब्रह्म ह्यपूर्वाजादिशास्त्रतः ॥१११४॥

Indeed the nature of the Brahman cannot be established on the basis of some action, because that (viz. action) is inseparably connected with an origin etc.[1] Further, the Brahman would not be having a beginning and an end, since there is a scripture saying that it is *apūrva*, *aja* etc.[2] [1114]

The first line clarifies the argument in the preceding verse and the second offers the reason for not accepting it.

[1]The word etc. stands for *āpti*, *saṃskṛti* and *vikṛti*; these would show its changeable nature and, consequently, its impermanence.

[2]BU 3.8.8.

अपवादश्च बहुशः कर्मकार्यस्य दृश्यते ।
मुमुक्षुत्वस्य तद्धेतोः कर्मकार्यं न तत्ततः ॥१११५॥

Many a time it is noticed that there is rejection of (lit. exception taken to) there being an effect of some action in respect of liberation[1]; it has that (Brahman) as its cause and, therefore, it is not an effect of that (viz. an action). [1115]

[1]Cf. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 1.2.12; BU 4.4.22.

अथ ज्ञानात्तदभवत्कृत्स्नं ब्रह्मेति चेन्मतम् ।
अन्यानन्यप्रमेयत्वे तथापीष्टं न सिद्ध्यति ॥१११६॥

If it is held that the Brahman became full[1], owing to knowledge, then, having accepted (that knowledge) to be different from it, not different from it, and different and non-different from it also would (i.e. does) not establish the truth (or get established). [1116]

If knowledge and the Brahman are accepted to be the source and the product, we can pose three different relations between the two: (1)the two are different, (2)the two are not different and (3) they are in part different and in another not different. This is the basic supposition in the word *jñānataḥ* of verse 1113. This verse points out very clearly that none of these three relations can be entertained and therefore the supposition gets disproved.

[1]That is, produced — cf. *utpattyādi* mentioned earlier in verse 813.

क्रियाविरोधः प्राप्नोति यद्यनन्यस्य मेयता ।
श्रुत्यन्तरविरोधश्च प्रत्यग्दृष्टौ प्रसज्यते ॥१११७॥

If it is held that the unique Brahman is an object knowable from what is not different from it, then there results opposition to the activity[1] (viz. making it known) and, further, there becomes contingent the opposition to another Śruti[2] regarding seeing the inner self. [1117]

[1]If the Brahman is understood as produced from what is not different from it, then there is opposition as regards what is the agent and what, the object of production.

[2]*Kenopaniṣad* 1.4: *anyad eva tad viditāt* . Or BU 3..5.2: *na dṛṣṭeḥ dṛṣṭāram paśyet.*

तथा च ज्ञानसाध्यत्वं ब्रह्मणः संप्रसज्यते ।
अन्यानन्यप्रमेये ऽपि दोषो ऽयं दुर्निवारणः ॥१११८॥

So also it would be contingent to accept the nature of the Brahman as what can be obtained or acquired by means of knowledge[1]. And this fault[2] is difficult to avoid in that it is accepted as a knowable from another or not from another (i.e. from itself). [1118]

SP points out that the argument in the two verses is based on acceptance of the distinction and the non-disctinction (obtaining) between knowledge and the Brahman.

[1]It is accepted in the expression that knowledge and the Brahman are related as a means of knowledge and the result to be acquired thereby. This is against the Śruti which says that knowledge and the Brahman are not different.

[2]*kriyāvirodha* and *śrutyantara.*

बुद्ध्वाथान्यत्तदभवत्तदन्यत्किमबुध्यत ।
तदप्यन्यत्पुराज्ञासीदनवस्था प्रसज्यते ॥१११९॥

If (it is held that) the Brahman became complete on knowing a different thing, then what was that other that was known? Holding that it[1] also was yet another thing earlier would make *infinite regress* contingent. [1119]

[1]Namely, that which was known.

निर्निमित्तस्य कृत्स्नत्वे ऽप्यस्मदादेस्तथा न किम् ।
पक्षपातः श्रुतेर्नापि प्रामाण्यादुपपद्यते ॥११२०॥

In case (the Brahman), which did not have a cause (for becoming full), attained fullness[1], why should not this (be) in the case of persons like us[2]? (Indeed) such partiality on the part of the Śruti cannot stand to reason because it is the real means of knowing (Reality). [1120]

This verse has set aside the view beginning with the words: *etena kiṃcāpi tad aved iti.*

[1]That is, becoming one with the Brahman.

[2]It means: Those who are required to know the nature of the Brahman by the study of the Vedānta.

समुच्चयनिषेधश्च युक्तिभिर्वक्ष्यते स्फुटम् ।
प्रधानगुणभावो ऽपि विरोधान्न तयोर्भवेत् ॥११२१॥

And[1] there will be clearly stated the rejection of the combination (of knowledge and activity[2]) by (adducing) reasons. Also, there cannot be the relation between the two as the principal and the subordinate, because of their (mutual) contradiction. [1121]

This refers to Bhujyu Brāhmaṇa (=BU 3.3).

[1]By the word 'and' Sureśvara suggests (this is according to SP and NKL) the idea of the combination has been already rejected with reason in the SV 357-377. But this refers to BUBV 1708ff. — his justifies *vakṣyate*

[2]This refers to threefold combinations of knowledge and activity, according to SP and NKL; knowledge and activity in equal proportion, knowledge and activity in unequal proportion, knowledge principal and activity subordinate, or vice-visa).

इत्यादिबहुदोषत्वाद्दुःसंभाव्यं प्रमाणतः ।
विद्ययैवाप्नुमः कात्स्न्र्यमित्यादि यदुदीरितम् ॥११२२॥

Because there are these and many other fault, (attaining completeness) is difficult to occur on the strength of any means of (right) knowledge; (therefore) we shall obtain this wholeness etc., which was stated, only by knowledge. [1122]

This concludes the introductory to the Siddhānta which follows soon after.

न कश्चिदपि दोषो ऽत्र यथैतदुपपत्स्यते ।
अन्यथा कल्प्यमाने ऽस्मिन्नुक्तदोषपरंपरा ॥११२३॥

There is not be even a little of fault here[1] because (all) this will be stated with reason[2]; if this is understood otherwise,[3] there follows a chain of faults stated (above). [1123]

[1]According to NKL, this refers to Vivartavāda.

[2]It will be shown later that knowledge about the Brahman will effect liberation.

[3]This is a reference to Pariṇāmavāda: According to some, the Brahman undergoes modifications. According to a note by NKL on verse 1160, Bhartṛprapañca's view resembles this view.

एवं तावदुपोद्घातो व्याख्यातो ऽत्र समासतः ।
भगवत्पादभाष्ये ऽस्मिन्नन्यदीयो ऽपि वर्ण्यते ॥११२४॥

Thus far, we have briefly explained the introductory[1] in the commentary of (our) revered teacher(Śaṅkara), to begin with, and now in this (i.e. in what follows, or 'here') another introdutory is also being presented.[2] [1124]

[1]The word *upoddhāta* has to be understood as words *tad āhuḥ* in the beginning of BUB 1.4.9.

[2]Earlier explanation has followed the argument of Śaṅkara and what now follows is the argument of the Vṛttikāra. According to SP and NKL, he is Bhartṛprapañca. SP states that Sureśvara finds the exposition acceptable.

Verses 1055-1124 presented an exposition of the introductory remark by Śaṅkara and now from verse 1125 the Vārtika discusses the meaning of BU 1.4.9 according to the Vṛttikāra.

तदेतद्ब्रह्मविद्याया आरम्भे फलमुच्यते ।
तत्प्रवृत्त्यङ्गतायै च तत्फलस्य प्रकीर्तनम् ॥११२५॥

With the words *tat* ... there is here[1], at the very beginning of the lore of the Brahman, the statement of the result (of the lore) and, the statement of the result of the same is made as an ancillary to the activity towards that (viz. acquiring the lore of the Brahman). [1125]

[1]This is *etat*.

वक्ष्यमाण उपोद्घातो ब्रह्मविद्या ततः परं ।
ततो ऽप्यूर्ध्वं फलोक्तिश्चेत्तच्छब्देनोच्यते कथम् ॥११२६॥

(A question is asked:) If the introductory is going to be stated, and the lore of the Brahman (also will follow) later, and then thereafter (there is going to be) the statement of the result, then why is (that result) expressed by the word *tat*? [1126]

NKL clarifies the question thus: *tat* signifies the introductory atement; *tad ātmānam avet* is the lore of the Brahman and *tat ūrvam abhavat* is the mention of the result. Therefore, Bhartṛrapañca's view: *tat*, which is expressive of the result, is *dūrānvayaṣṭa*.

अनन्तरेण संबन्धसामर्थ्ये सत्यमानतः ।
दवीयसाभिसंबन्धस्तच्छब्दस्योच्यते कुतः ॥११२७॥

(The answer is given thus[1]:) When (in your opinion also) the word *tat* (is said to have) the capacity to be connected[2] with what has preceded, (though) it is in distance (from it) (and) though there is no authority for it, why do you object to our view? [1127]

[1]Add: by a counter-question.

[2]It means: has a syntactical unity.

[3]In *kaṇḍikā* 8: *na hāsya priyam pramāyukam bhavati*; the *vidyāphala*.

द्वैतैकत्वात्मकं साक्षाद्ब्रह्मविद्योदयात्पुरा ।
समाप्य तत्फलं कृत्स्नं जातकौतूहलाः परे ॥११२८॥
आहुरेवं द्विजाः केचिद्विरक्ताः पूर्वभूमितः ।
संभाव्यते ब्रह्मविद्भिर्यत्तदर्थबुभुत्सवः ॥११२९॥

Having experienced (lit. obtained) that entire result which is of the nature of (knowing) only unity in duality before there arises the direct knowledge about the Brahman,[1] they, who have their curiosity about the highest aroused, [1128] (they) who have become averse to the earlier stage of their life — the persons of three castes[2], becoming desirous of' knowing the meaning of that which is thought/pondered over by the knowers of the Brahman, thus said: [1129]

This is according to Bhartṛprapañca the meaning of *āhuḥ*.

[1]The knowledge of the Brahman does not refer to the instruction about the Brahman but the knowledge about the nature of it.

[2]According to BUB it refers to the Brāhmaṇas. But translation follows SP which notes the significance of the word *dvijāḥ* according to one view; read: *dvijagrahaṇena traivarṇikānām eva vedadvārā vidyādhikāraṃ sūcayati*. However, SP does not keep from noting its view: *dvija* indicates the maxim of *manuṣyāṇāṃ sahasreṣu* [... *kaścin māṃ vetti tatvataḥ*] (*Gītā* 7.3).

द्वैतैकत्वधिया नैव पूर्वया फल्गुकार्यया ।
संभाव्यते सर्वभूतिर्यतः सा ब्रह्मविद्यया ॥११३०॥

Becoming all (i.e. complete or full) is not at all possible by earlier (gained) knowledge of unity in duality, which produces (only) an insignificant result,[1] since that (becomes possible) by the lore of the Brahman. [1130]

[1]This refers to earlier *upāsanā* which would lead only to

transmigratory existence; cf. SP: *upāstir hi saṃsāraphalā.*

द्वैतैकत्वमतिर्यद्वत्स्वानुरूपफलाप्तये ।
अलं सर्वमतिस्तद्वत्सर्वंभावफलाप्तये ॥११३१॥

As getting to learn[1] unity in duality is capable of resulting into one's acquiring its own proper result, so is the knowledge of all (as the Brahman) is capable of resulting into one's acquiring (the result, i.e.) the becoming all (i.e. complete). [1131]

[1]This is *mati*, viz. *dhī* (i.e. *vijñāna*) already noted in the preceding verse.

ब्रह्मबुद्ध्या भविष्यामः कृत्स्नं ब्रह्मेति तद्विदः ।
यन्मन्यन्ते ऽथ तद्ब्रह्म किमवेदिति पृच्छ्यते ॥११३२॥

Since the knowers of that (knowledge of the Brahman or the Brahman itself) think (i.e. hold:) 'We shall become the complete Brahman by getting to known the Brahman.'; there is the question asked, 'What did that the Brahman know?' [1132]

This is the explanation of BU: *yad brahmavidyayā ... tat brahmāvet.*

किमवेदिति यः प्रश्नः स किं स्यात्कर्तृकर्मणोः ।
विद्यायाः पृच्छ्यते कर्ता कर्म वेह विवक्षितम् ॥११३३॥

Is the question, viz. 'What did it know?', with reference to the agent or the action of knowing?[1] That is to say: 'What is sought to be mentioned, the knower or the object of knowing?' [1133]

This verse seeks the specific matter under question.
[1]*kartṛkarmaṇoḥ* is an optional compound.

ब्रह्मणा चेत्कृता विद्या निष्फलेयं प्रसज्यते ।
ब्रह्मविद्योदयाद्यस्मादभूद्ब्रह्म पुरापि तत् ॥११३४॥

If it is held that the Brahman obtained this lore, then it is futile (to say so); since that Brahman was that (viz. itself) even earlier, i.e. even before the rise of (the result of) the lore of the Brahman. [1134]

This sets aside the possibility that the Brahman was the agent in the act of learning the lore.

तस्मात्कर्मैव विद्यायाः पिपृच्छिषितमत्र तु ।
प्रमेयोपाश्रयादेव यतः प्रामाण्यमुच्यते ॥११३५॥

Therefore, it is only (*tu*) the object of knowing which is questioned about, since the authoritativeness (of a means of knowing) is said[1] (to exist) only by its connection with (lit. resorting to) the object to be known (that is becoming known). [1135]

This is suggested: As a result of the answer in the preceding, the Brahman is the object in that act.

[1]That is, held.

वस्तुनिष्ठत्वतो ऽदोषः कर्तर्यपि विवक्षिते ॥११३६॥
सर्वं ब्रह्माभवद्यस्माद्विज्ञानात्तदिहोच्यते ।
ब्रह्मविद्येति सर्वाप्तावसाधारणकारणम् ॥११३७॥

And even if (the Brahman) were intended as the agent of the knowing, there would be no fault,[1] since (the character of the agent) is abiding in the thing (i.e. Reality)[2]. [1136]
That is called the lore of the Brahman from which (there arises) the knowledge: 'All (this) became the Brahman.'; that is, therefore, the uncommon means of acquring (the fullness) of all.[1] [1137]

[1]Both SP and NKL rightly point out: *adoṣaḥ iti padacchedaḥ*. Also, read in this context, SP: *na ca kartṛpraśne vidyāvaiphalyam, svataḥ sadā brahmatve 'pi brahmaṇaḥ avidyādhvaṃsitvena tatsā-phalyād iti bhāvaḥ*. (This is accepted by NKL).

[2]Supply: which is the object of knowing. That means the Brahman.

सर्वैकत्वावबोधो ऽयं ब्रह्मविद्यागिरोच्यते ।
द्वैतस्याद्वैतयाथात्म्यात्कलृप्तसर्पादितत्त्ववत् ॥११३८॥

This, namely, knowing about all (duality) merges into but one (Reality), is expressed by the word *brahmavidyā* because of one's knowing thereby about the duality as the real nature of non-duality (exactly) in the same way as the truth about a serpent etc. that was imagined (in the place of a rope was realised). [1138]

This states the purpose of Brahmavidyā.

सर्वैकत्वं परं ब्रह्म परमात्मेति यं विदुः ।
तन्मोहजानां सर्वेषां स तत्त्वं परमार्थतः ॥११३९॥

The unity of all (duality) is the highest Reality, the Brahman; that is what they have known as the highest Ātman, it is, in reality, the true nature[1] of all that are the products of ignorance about itself. [1139]

This is according to SP in consonance with the Bhāṣya on BU (of Bhartṛprapañca): *sarvaikatvam param brahma paramātmā yaḥ ... sa ātmā.*

[1]Both SP and NKL have rightly invited attention to *sa tattvam iti padadvayam.*

तदज्ञानैकहेतुत्वात्तेनैव परमात्मना ।
तदन्यान्यात्मवन्ति स्युः सर्पादीनि स्रजा यथा ॥११४०॥

On account of that very highest Ātman (and) on account of only one cause, viz. ignorance about that (Ātman), the things other than that come have their existence in the same way as the serpent etc. come to have their existence (really) on account of a wreathe (etc.). [1140]

This is the meaning of the Bhāṣya (of Bhartṛprapañca?) on BU: *anenātmanātmanvanti.*

उक्तात्मच्युतदृष्टीनां तदबोधैकहेतुतः ।
आब्रह्मस्थाणुभेदो ऽयं नामरूपक्रियात्मकः ।
अविद्याकृत एवायं न यथावस्तुधीकृतः ॥११४१॥

On the part of those who have lost[1] the knowledge (lit. sight) of (the true nature of) the Ātman, as described before, there is (this world of) duality beginning with the Brahman up to a pillar that has nature of names, forms and actions on account of only one reason, viz. ignorance about that (Ātman) — this (world of discrete objects) is produced only by ignorance and not by the knowledge of the thing (viz. Reality) as it is. [1141]

[1]It literally means: fallen from.

तमोघ्न्यैव ततो ब्रह्म प्राप्यते ब्रह्मविद्यया ॥११४२॥
यथोक्ततत्त्वकान्येव रज्ज्वां तत्क्लृप्तवस्तुवत् ।
सूत्रं विराड्देवता च यावत्किंचिच्च वस्त्विह ॥११४३॥

Therefore, the Brahman is obtained only by the lore of the Brahman which destroys darkness, [1142]
(and also) whatever things[1], viz. the Sūtra[2], the deity (called) Virāj etc. — the different elements[3] that were mentioned are here the Reality[4] as in the case of a rope there exists a thing (which) is imagined in its place.[5] [1143]

This is how Bhartṛprapañca would hold the Brahman as *dvaitādvaitātmaka*. According to Śaṅkara and Sureśvara, this refers to *vyavahārabhūmi.*

[1]*vastu* in singular stands for *vastujāta* 'all things'.

[2]It is for Hiraṇyagarbha.

[3]This refers to the five elements.

[4]This refers to the Brahman which really persists in all the eight states mentioned earlier.

[5]This refers to a serpent seen in the place of rope and temporarily as a real thing.

ब्रह्मैवेदं यथा सर्वं विद्यया तदबोधजम् ।
अविद्यया तथाकृत्स्नं ब्रह्म सूत्रादिरूपकम् ॥११४४॥

As by (securing) the knowledge (about the Brahman) it is understood that all this and whatever is produced by the non-knowing[1] (about the true nature of the Brahman) is only the Brahman, in the same way, is the Brahman (understood) by not securing (that knowledge) (to be) incomplete and possessed of forms, beginning with Sūtra. [1144]

This is another statement about how the Brahman, which is without any particulars, comes to have them; these particulars are the eight forms, Sūtra etc. Refer to note on verse 487 above.

[1]That is, ignorance.

भावनाज्ञानकर्माणि साधनानीति यद्यपि ।
तत्सतत्त्वमविद्यैव यतो ऽतः सैव कारणम् ॥११४५॥

Even if (it is said that) devotion, knowledge and action are the means (of acquiring the knowledge of the Brahman), yet for the reason that their nature is, (ignorance) only, that itself[1] is the cause (of this multifold universe). [1145]

[1]Namely, ignorance.

न हि साधनसापेक्षं वस्तु स्यात्पारमार्थिकम् ।
परमार्थं न वस्त्वस्ति यत्परायत्तसिद्धिकम् ॥११४६॥

Indeed, a thing, which depends on the means (of knowing it or for its becoming known), cannot be a real thing. The ultimate Reality is also not a thing which, for getting established, depends on another. [1146]

मोहोत्थाः पृथगात्मानः साधनायत्तसिद्धिकाः ।
सूत्रादयस्तृणान्ताः स्युरन्योन्यव्यभिचारिणः ॥११४७॥

The different individual selves have originated from ignorance

and they get established as existing through their dependence on (different) means; (those things/objects), beginning with the Sūtra and ending with (a blade of) grass, are things which have variance with one another. [1147]

सर्वे ऽप्येते यथादृष्टि ह्येकैकस्य तमस्विनः ।
सूत्रादयो ऽनुभूयन्ते यथाकर्म यथाश्रुतम् ॥११४८॥

All of these, viz. the Sūtrātman etc., are understood by each person, who is possessed of (i.e. overpowered by) ignorance, as he sees them, in accordance with his activity, and his learning. [1148]

अविद्यैव यतो ऽमीषां प्रागभावो न तत्परम् ।
भावनाज्ञानकर्मभ्यो जन्मैषां तेन नान्यतः ॥११४९॥

Since ignorance alone is the prior non-existence of these (multifold objects), (and) not the highest Reality,[1] the origin of these is from devotion, knowledge and action and not from any other thing. [1149]

[1]This implies that one should not try to infer the cause of these, viz. Pradhāna (as the Sāṃkhyas would do) or the Brahman (of the Pariṇāmibrahmavādins).

यथैता दर्शनावस्थाः कार्यमासां तथाविधम् ।
उत्पाद्यमाप्यं संस्कार्यं विकार्यं च क्रियावशात् ॥११५०॥

As these are the different phases (or types) of their worship[1], the functions connected with these also are of those kinds; viz. they are things (i)which can be created, (ii)which can be obtained, (iii)which can be polished or improved and (iv)which can undergo modification(s), by some action. [1150]

This explains the result produced by Upāsanā-jñāna 'meditation/ worship'.

[1]This is literally seeing or notion or view. But these are: *bhāvanā*, *karmans* or Upāsanās.

पिण्डात्माहमितीक्षाणः पिण्डमेव प्रपद्यते ।
दैवं विराजं सूत्रं च मृतः सन्प्रतिपद्यते ॥११५१॥

One, who considers about oneself: 'I am this body.', becomes (only) body; being dead, that one becomes the divine Sūtrātman or Virāj. [1151]

This explains *piṇḍātmadarśī piṇḍātmānam evābhisampadyate. pretya* in the Bhāṣya (of Bhartṛprapañca? — SP and NKL editions).

संस्कारोपचयाद्यद्वद्देवो भूत्वैति देवताम् ।
संकारापचयाद्ध्वंसस्तथा तासां न संशयः ॥११५२॥

As one becomes a certain deity after amassing together a number of impressions[1] and becomes that deity itself, so also, there occurs the destruction of one's status of the deity by the diminishing of the impressions — there is no doubt about this. [1152]

This is to emphasise that the result of the Upāsanā of Sūtra etc. is impermanent.

[1]This is for *bhāvanajñānakarmaṇi* mentioned in verse 1145 above. Cf. SP: *bhāvanāprakarṣāj jīvann eva devatābhāvam anubhūyānte yathopāsti pratipadyate.*

ब्रह्मणो ऽन्यद्यतो वस्तु ब्रह्मैव परमार्थतः ।
तदबोधात्तदन्यत्तद्बोधाद्ब्रह्मैव तत्त्वतः ॥११५३॥

Since a thing which is (known as) other than the Brahman is in reality the Brahman itself; that thing is other (than the Brahman) owing to ignorance about that (Brahman); so also it would become Brahman itself (just) on knowing that (Brahman). [1153]

This verse justifies the statement in verse 1143 above.

सत्वादिदर्शनानां स्यात्सत्वादेव यथा फलम् ।

परात्मदर्शनस्यापि तद्भावः स्यात्तथा फलम् ॥११५४॥

As the Sūtrātman etc. themselves would be the result of the worship of the Sūtrātman etc., similarly, in the case of looking upon (oneself as) of the nature of the highest (Reality), there would be the result, viz. becoming one with that. [1154]

Read SP: *paramātmadarśanāvasthāyāḥ paramātmabhāva eva kāryam iti bhāṣyeṇāha*; (possibly Bhartṛprapañca's Bhāṣya on BU).

ब्रह्मभावो ऽत्र नित्यः स्यात्कारणाद्यनपेक्षतः ।
अनित्यमितरत्सर्वं यदविद्याविजृम्भितम् ॥११५५॥

Here, becoming one with the Brahman would be permanent because that (becoming) does not have dependence on any (external) cause. Everything else (than the Brahman), viz. that which has proceeded (lit. spread out) from ignorance, is impermanent. [1155]

This sets aside an argument that Brahmabhāva, being a product of *jñāna*, can be perishable/impermanent.

अनित्यं दर्शनं ज्ञेयं नित्यस्यापि परात्मनः ।
मोहमात्रान्तरायत्वात्कादाचित्कं हि दर्शनम् ॥११५६॥

In the case of even the perennial highest Ātman, consideration/seeing (of it to be such) is not ever-lasting. Indeed, seeing occurs only sometimes, because of the sole difficulty (in the form of) ignorance (about the nature of it). [1156]

This explains away the possible objection to the rise of transmigratory existence.

अहमेव परं ब्रह्मेत्यस्यार्थस्याप्रबुद्धता ।
अविद्येति वयं ब्रुमो येह नास्ति सदात्मनि ॥११५७॥

We say that not knowing this truth, viz. 'I am the highest

Brahman.', is ignorance and which does not ever exist on the part of the Ātman. [1157]

This is Bhartṛprapañca's explanation of *avidyā*. Cf. SP: *yathoktaṃ sāvidyāham evedaṃ sarvam ity etasyārthasyāsambodha iti.*

परात्मनि तु संबोधो नित्यः स्याच्छशिशीतवत् ।
तदन्यात्मस्वनित्यो ऽसौ मोहसंवीतबुद्धिषु ॥११५८॥

As against this (*tu*), there is on the part of the highest Ātman perfect (*sam*) knowledge, permanent (or invariable) in the same way as there is cool in the moon. (But) in the case of those (beings), whose intellect is wrapped up in ignorance and who have a nature other than one of that (highest Ātman), it[1] is impermenent. [1158]

[1]This refers to *sambodha* 'perfect knowledge'.

तत्रैवं सति यो ऽकात्स्न्र्यमित्वा ब्रह्माप्रबोधतः ।
सर्वात्मविद्ययाविद्यां हत्वा ब्रह्माभवत्पुमान् ॥११५९॥
पुरापि चात्मसंबोधाद्ब्रह्मैवायं स्वतो ह्यभूत् ।
यतो ऽतस्तत्त्वसंबोधाद्ब्रह्म ब्रह्म प्रपद्यते ॥११६०॥

This being so, the person who has become a limited being[1] on account of ignorance about (the nature of) the Brahman would become the Brahman after having struck down that ignorance by the knowledge about all that it is the Brahman. [1159]

And since even before knowing well (the nature of) the Brahman this person was only the Brahman, therefore (what really happens is that) the Brahman (itself) becomes the Brahman by knowing well the true nature (of its own). [1160]

[1]It literally means: incomplete.

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यसंबोधात्तदन्यत्रैव या मतिः ।
परार्था सा मतिर्ज्ञेया बाह्यकर्मण्यपाश्रया ॥११६१॥

If there is any thought about something else than the inner self, on account of well knowing the true nature of the inner self, then that thought is to be known as one about another (i.e. non-Ātman), dependent as it is on external activities. [116

This points to that the knowledge about the inner self is n dependent on any means of knowing.

अहं ब्रह्मेति यज्ज्ञानं स्वार्थमेव तदिष्यते ।
सर्वप्रयोगबीजात्मध्वान्तोच्छेदित्वहेतुतः ॥११६२॥
निःशेषपुरुषार्थानां ज्ञेयानां चापि कृत्स्नतः ।
प्रत्यक्तत्त्वपरिज्ञानसमुत्पत्तौ समाप्तितः ॥११६३॥

But that knowledge, which has the form 'I am Brahman.', is accepted as the knowledge for itself, because it is the cause of the destruction of the darkness which is of the nature of the seed of all activities [1], [116
because of its fullness in respect of the knowable objects which do not have left any end of human endeavour (to be achieved), and also because it has attained (completeness) at the rise of the all-sided knowledge about true nature of the inner self. [116

This reiterates the point discussed in the preceding verse.
[1] It includes ritual activities.

भर्तृप्रपञ्चप्रस्थानमेवमेतद्यथोदितम् ।
इतो ऽन्यत्रापि तद्वाष्यं गमयेदेवमेव तु ॥११६४॥

This is the standpoint (or rather, view) of Bhartṛprapañca as stated above; so also is his explanation of passages other than this; it would inform about (the relevant) matters in this very way. [116

According to SP, the theory of Bhartṛprapañca is really agreement with Vivartavāda.

ब्रह्मभाविरवं श्रुत्वा ये तु व्याचक्षते ऽन्यथा ।

तानुद्दिश्य विचारो ऽयं प्रारब्धो गुरुभिः स्फुटः ॥११६५॥

Keeping in view those (others) who explain (the thought of the BU) on hearing the word about (the inner self) as what is going to be the (known) Brahman, some other way, our teacher has begun to state his clear opinion (on the same). [1165]

This is Sureśvara's view: Bhartṛprapañca had stated that, in the sentence *brahma vā idam* the word *brahma* signifies a human being who is going to be the Brahman. Therefore (SP observes:) some wrongly understand Bhartṛprapañca to be opposed to Vivartavāda of Śaṅkara. With these persons in view, Śaṅkara has introduced in BUB the opinion of Bhartṛprapañca, intending to remove their mis-conception.

Verses 1166-1589 are the longish explanation of BU 1.4.10.

यथोक्तसूत्रव्याख्यायां प्रयोजनविवक्षया ।
उपोद्घातोक्तदोषाणां परिहाराय यत्यते ॥११६६॥

An effort is (now) made to explain away the faults mentioned in the introductory with the intention to bring out the purpose of the explanation of the Sūtra[1] which is already stated. [1166]

This explains BU: *brahma vā idam agra āsīt ... tat sarvam abhavad ti* (BU 1.4.10).

[1]This is understood to be the Siddhānta; *ātmety evopāsīta* (or he two *kaṇḍikā*s?); cf. verse 1064 above.

ब्रह्मविद्योपदेशस्य विषयश्चावधार्यते ।
साक्षाद्ब्रह्माथवाब्रह्म यदि वोभयरूपकम् ॥११६७॥

And the subject matter of the instruction in the lore of the Brahman is ascertained thus (in the form of three possibilities, viz.) whether the Brahman is directly perceptible Brahman itself, or that which is not Brahman[1] (viz. that which is the inner self) or that of both the types? [1167]

[1]Not perceptible. This is *antaḥkaraṇādyavachinna*. The NKL edition reads correctly *-athavābrahma* not like *-athavā brahma* in the AnSS edition.

समाशङ्कितनिःशेषदोषानागन्धितं स्फुटम् ।
श्रुतिः प्रतिवचः प्राह दोषमूलनिरासकृत् ॥११६८॥
ब्रह्मेति ब्रह्मशब्दो ऽयं मुख्यब्रह्मार्थवाचकः ।
अपूर्वादिश्रुतेर्ज्ञेयो ब्रह्मत्वं न ततो ऽन्यथा ॥११६९॥

Indeed, the Brahman is clearly untainted by the entire multitude of faults which are conceived (as affecting it) — the Śruti has given an answer that completley destroys (any idea of) fault. [1168]

This word *brahma* is to be known from the Śruti (statement) beginning with (the word) *apūrva* ...[1] as expressive of that object which is the principal Brahman. The nature of the Brahman cannot be anything else than that.[2] [1169]

[1]Cf. the Śruti *apūrvam* ... BU (Mādhyandina) 3.8.8. This shows that the Brahman is principally known as non-delimited by *deśa*, *kāla* and *vastu* (= *vastvantara*). That is the principal purport of the Śruti texts.

[2]For example, a pitcher etc. But these would not really exist apart from the Brahman.

अविचारितसंसिद्धप्रत्यगज्ञानकारणात् ।
अब्रह्मेव तदाभाति मोहसंवीतचेतसः ॥११७०॥

That the Brahman appears to those whose minds are wrapped up in ignorance as the non-Brahman on account of the ignorance about (the nature of) the inner self which has somehow[1] come into existence. [1170]

[1]This refers to the indescribability of ignorance. Here the NKL edition reads: *avicāritasaṃsiddhapratyagajñāna-* which is better than the AnSS edition reading *-saṃsiddhi-*, or even the variant noted by it, viz. *-saṃsiddheḥ pratyag-*. Translation follows the NKL edition

reading.

प्रत्यक्संबोधविध्वस्तप्रत्यङ्मोहः परात्मनः ।
संभावयति संबोधान्नान्यद्वस्त्वन्तरं यथा ॥११७१॥

One who has destroyed one's own ignorance about the nature of the inner self by knowing (the true nature of) the inner self understands from that knowledge that there is no other thing than the highest Ātman. [1171]

एवमेव महामोहसंवीतधिषणः पुमान् ।
ब्रह्मैवापि स्वतो मोहान्न तत्संभावयत्यपि ॥११७२॥

Just in this way, a man whose intelligence is wrapped up in great ignorance (about the nature of the inner self) does not even understand that, though he himself is the Brahman. [1172]

बुद्धतत्त्वस्य लोको ऽयं जडोन्मत्तपिशाचवत् ।
बुद्धतत्त्वो ऽपि लोकस्य जडोन्मत्तपिशाचवत् ॥११७३॥

For one, who has known the true (nature of the world), this world is like that unto an unintelligent, or madman or a goblin. And also for this one, who has known the truth (of the world), is this world like to an unintelligent, or a mad person or a goblin. [1173]

Though both SP and NKL mention that this is a verse from some Purāṇa, but we have not found it in the Purāṇa texts.

यदि नामास्ति संभेदः साक्षात्कल्पितसर्पयोः ।
भीतं प्रत्यविशिष्टो ऽसौ वास्तवत्वादनादृतः ॥११७४॥

If indeed there is a mixture of a real and an imaginary serpent, that (serpent) is for the one, who is afraid, not distinguished (by its real property) and is not ignored as out of the world of reality.[1] [1174]

[1]A person who is afraid does not really know that there is

not a real serpent and the cause of his fear is but an imaginary serpent.

प्रत्यक्तत्वं तमोमात्रव्यवधानादिहोच्यते ।
ब्रह्मभावीति न पुनर्वस्तुतत्त्वव्यपेक्षया ॥११७५॥

Here[1], only on account of the obstruction of ignorance it is that the true element, viz. the inner self, is mentioned as what is goint to be the (known) Brahman not on account of the view of the real nature of the thing (viz. Reality). [1175]

[1]That is, in the Bhāṣya (of Bhartṛprapañca).

इदंधीशब्दगम्यं यद्ब्रह्मरूपाद्विशिष्यते ।
ब्रह्मैव तदुपाधीहेदंशब्देनाभिधीयते ॥११७६॥

Here[1], it is only that Brahman itself which is understood from the word (expressive of) the knowledge '(It is) this.', which is distinguished from the real form of the Brahman[2] and, being delimited by that (i.e. this world), that is here expressed by the word *idam*[3]. [1176]

[1]In the sentence of the Bhāṣya: *idam iti nāmarūpavyākṛtaṃ jagan nirdiśyate*

[2]Namely, that which is in fact formless.

[3]SP points out this as the meaning of the word *idam* as stated in the Bhāṣya (of Bhartṛprapañca?).

यो ऽसावविद्योत्सङ्गस्थः प्राक्प्रविष्ट इतीरितः ।
स्वाभासान्तः स संमोहान्नामरूपात्मको ऽभवत् ॥११७७॥

That one, who, being on the lap of ignorance[1], was mentioned earlier as the one who entered, was really inside his own appearances (and) only out of complete (*sam*) ignorance came to be possessed of a name and a form.[2] [1177]

[1]It means: being delimited by ignorance.

[2]SP cites Bhāṣya (of Bhartṛprapañca?): *sa idaṃ jagad ātmatvenā-*

bhisampanno 'bhūd avidyayā.

अव्याकृतादिपिण्डान्तं पर एव त्वविद्यया ।
तदात्मत्वं समापेदे न त्वसौ परमार्थतः ॥११७८॥

It is only the highest self that has become possessed of the nature of that, which begins with the unmanifest and ends with a body, only owing to ignorance and not in reality. [1178]

प्रागात्मबोधात्पिण्डादौ यात्मेत्यासीन्मतिर्दृढा ।
सा तत्तत्त्वमसंप्राप्य सिद्धा स्रग्हिबोधवत् ॥११७९॥

That firm consciousness, viz. there is only the Ātman, which existed in respect of a body etc. before one's knowing the true nature of the self, existed there because it had not obtained the form of the truth in the same way as (the knowledge of) a serpent in (the place of) a wreathe. [1179]

अविद्याकल्पितांस्तस्मादन्वयव्यतिरेकतः ।
विधूयानात्मनो ऽशेषांस्तत्प्रत्यग्रूपमैक्षत ॥११८०॥

Therefore, having thrown away (the notion(s) of) all the non-Ātmans which were created by ignorance with (the help of)) the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka, a person knows that (real) form of the inner self. [1180]

This refers to *tad ātmānam* (BU).

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यविद्याग्निसंप्लुष्टाशेषतत्तमः ।
ब्रह्मैवात्मानमेवेति प्रत्यबुध्यत वाक्यतः ॥११८१॥

The person, who has completely (*sam*) burnt the entire darkness about that [1] by means of the fire in the form of the knowledge about the real nature of the inner self, knows himself as the Ātman by means of the Śruti statement [2]. [1181]

[1]This refers to the inner self.
[2]In the form 'I am the Ātman.'.

न हि प्लुष्टाखिलाविद्यः प्रतीच्यन्यन्मनागपि ।
प्रत्यग्दृष्ट्येक्षते ऽन्यस्य तदविद्यैकहेतुतः ॥११८२॥

Indeed, one, who has burnt (one's) entire ignorance, does not see in the inner self even a little (thing) other than (the inner self) by adopting the notion that it is the inner self; because that other (thing could thus be imagined only) on account of the ignorance about it (i.e. the inner self). [1182]

अद्वैतविषयं चेदमेकं ब्रह्मेति भण्यते ।
समस्तव्यस्तता यस्मान्नेह प्रत्यग्धियेक्ष्यते ॥११८३॥

And it is declared that only this unique Brahman is not the object of duality[1], since (its) collectiveness and individuality are not seen when there has occurred the knowledge (of the true nature) of the inner self. [1183]

[1]It refers to existence of the Self without any second.

मिथ्याभिमानात्संपत्तिरविद्योत्थासु भूमिषु ।
यत्र वा अन्यदित्येवं श्रुतिश्चापि जगौ तथा ॥११८४॥

It is on account of false conception that there is becoming (manifold) in different states that have arisen from ignorance — so has the Śruti sung (i.e. declared) in the statement *yatra vā anyad* [*iva syāt tatrānyo 'nyat paśyet*] ...[1] [1184]

[1]Cf. BU 4.3.31.

निरविद्य इहाद्वैते भेदहेतोरसंभवात् ।
स्वत एवाभिसंपत्तिर्यत्र त्वस्येतिशास्त्रतः ॥११८५॥

Since there is no possibility of any cause of effecting differentiation in non-duality, in which there does not exist any ignorance, there is (its) becoming (manifold) only on its own[1] — this (is known) from the scriptural statement *yatra tv asya* [*sarvamātmaivābhūttatkena kaṃ paśyet*]...[2] [1185]

This sets aside a possible argument that the individual self's becoming the Brahman is also a product of *avidyā*.

[1]SP points to *iha punar advaite sarvabhāvānām ananyatvāt sarvam añjasaivātmatvenābhinsampadyata (iti bhāṣyeṇa)*— as the Bhāṣya of Bhartṛprapañca(?).

[2]BU 4.5.15.

तस्मात्तदिति विद्यायाः पूर्णता फलमुच्यते ।
तदन्यस्य त्वकृत्स्नत्वाज्जिहासाविषयत्वतः ॥११८६॥

Therefore, in the word *tat* is expressed the result, viz. the completeness of knowledge and, as against this, there is a desire of abandoning everything else than that (=the Brahman), because it is incomplete and not an object (of knowledge). [1186]

This explains the meaning of BU: *tasmāt tat sarvam abhavat.*

यदिदंशब्दनिर्दिष्टं पूर्णाविद्यैकहेतुजम् ।
अहं ब्रह्मेति तद्ध्वंसात्पूर्णमेवाभवत्स्वतः ॥११८७॥

That, which is mentioned by the word *idam* and which has originated from only one cause, viz. complete ignorance, became complete owing to the destruction of that (ignorance by knowing) 'I am Brahman.'. [1187]

This explains that the individual self was wrapped in ignorance and, therefore, incomplete and, then, on knowing 'I am Brahman.', became complete.

भर्तृप्रपञ्चभाष्यस्य प्रचारो ऽयं प्रदर्शितः ।
श्रुत्यक्षरानुसारेण तथानुभववर्त्मना ॥११८८॥

This one (i.e. thus) is shown (to be) the accepted purport[1] of the explanation, given by Bhartṛprapañca, in keeping with the wording of the Śruti and also with experience.[2] [1188]

[1]This means: It is in accord with Vivartavāda, according to Śaṅkara and Sureśvara.

[2]With reference to the second line, read SP: *kim ity evaṃ tadīyabhāṣyasya gatir ucyate*; this is to state that his explanation is in accord with the Śruti and is supported by experience.

ब्रह्मेति ब्रह्मशब्देन द्वैतैकत्वात्मकं किल ।
भण्यते न परं ब्रह्म तस्य विद्यानपेक्षतः ॥११८९॥

They say (*kila*)[1]: By the word *brahman* is mentioned that Brahman which is of the nature of duality and non-duality (both) and not the highest Reality, for that does not expect any instruction (about it). [1189]

This has a reference to verse 1165 above. The purpose of this and the following verses is to remove the misunderstanding on the part of some of Bhartṛprapañca's commentators on his interpretation of BU: *brahma vā* ... Sureśvara follows Śaṅkara, as implied in the preceding verse.

[1]Cf. SP: *kilety ubhayor bhāṣyakṛtor atrānicchoktiḥ*.

परस्य ब्रह्मता यस्मादनन्यायत्तसिद्धिका ।
स्वत एव तु तत्सिद्धेर्नातस्तदभिधीयते ॥११९०॥

Because the highest Reality has the character of the Brahman which is not dependent on any other (thing or means) and is of itself established; therefore, it is not mentioned by (the word *brahman*). [1190]

This is the reason for the argument *na param brahma* in the preceding verse.

तथा कालानवच्छित्तेरासीदिति न तत्प्रति ।
घटते कालसंबन्धो विरिञ्चे तूपपद्यते ॥११९१॥

So also, because it is not delimited by time, there cannot be with reference to it the use of the word *āsīt* 'it was.'[1]; in respect of Viriñca, however, it stands to reason. [1191]

This is another reason for saying that *para* is not understood by the word *brahman*.

[1]Cf. *Kaṭhopaniṣad* 2.14: *anyatra bhūtāc ca bhavyāc ca*.

ननु तस्यापि विज्ञानं नोपदेशव्यपेक्षया ।
जन्मनैवास्य तत्सिद्धेर्न युक्ता ब्रह्मगीरियम् ॥११९२॥

One might say that the information about him (viz. Viriñca) also is not dependent on instruction[1], since that gets established at his very origin; therefore, this word *brahman* is not reasonable. [1192]

Also Viriñca or Hiraṇyagarbha, though different from the Brahman, may not be the meaning of the word *brahman*; this is the thought of the questioner.

[1]Namely, the statement *tasmāt tat sarvam abhavat*.

आसीदिति च निर्देशस्तस्मिन्नपि न युज्यते ।
विरिञ्चस्य त्रिकालत्वादासीदस्ति भविष्यति ॥११९३॥

So also the mention 'There he was.' is not reasonable in the case of that (viz. Viriñca), because Viriñca belongs to all the three periods of time; (that is to say:) 'He was, he is and he will be.'. [1193]

यत एवमसंतोषात्पक्षान्तरसमाश्रयः ।
मनुष्याधिकृतेर्वेति क्रियते पूर्वपक्षिणा ॥११९४॥

Since this is so, viz. there is dissatisfaction (about the answer), therefore, the other view is resorted to and the *prima facie* view is put forth *manuṣyādhikṛter vā* ...[1] [1194]

This verse gives the view of the Bhartṛprapañca's Bhāṣya as the basis for the doubt in verses 1192-94.

[1]NKL cites: *manuṣyādhikārād vā tadbhāvī brāhmaṇaḥ syāt* as the Bhāṣya (of Bhartṛprapañca?).

मनुष्याः प्रकृताः पूर्वं ते च निःश्रेयसार्थिनः ।
ब्रह्मणो नत्वनर्थित्वात्तथा चाप्रकृतत्वतः ॥११९५॥

At mention was made first of men and they were described as desirous of the highest bliss; but the Brahman is not (intended to be) desirous of anything, because that is not the matter which was begun in the discussion. [1195]

This is to explain the other view.

ऋष्यादिवचसा चापि ब्रह्मविद्याविशेषतः ।
सर्वार्थैव समुद्दिष्टा नाग्रजन्मैकगोचरा ॥११९६॥

Also by the statement about the sages etc. it is not the lore of the Brahman that is distinguished and therefore it is introduced as one having the first-born (Hiraṇyagarbha)[1] as its subject. [1196]

[1]This conveys by implication the Brahman also.

जन्मनैव तु तत्सिद्धेर्नोपदेशाव्यपेक्षता ।
ज्ञानमप्रतिघं यस्य वैराग्यं चेति च स्मृतेः ॥११९७॥

It is already established at its very birth and has no dependence on any instruction; and this is based on the Smṛti statement *jñānam apratigham* ...[1] [1197]

[1]As we have noted in verse 79, this is the *Vāyupurāṇa*.

द्वैतैकत्वात्मकब्रह्मविद्याकर्मैकसाधनः ॥११९८॥
अपरब्रह्मतापन्नो भोज्यादव्यावृत्तमानसः ।
निःशेषप्राप्त्या चोच्छिन्नकामकर्मादिबन्धनः ॥११९९॥
परब्रह्मपरिज्ञानभावनोपचयात्परः ।
ब्रह्मभावी नरो ऽतो ऽत्र ब्रह्मशब्देन भण्यते ॥१२००॥

Therefore, by the word *brahman* is mentioned here a man who will be the Brahman — (he) who has the sole means (of achieving his ends) by activity connected with the knowledge

of the Brahman which is of the nature of unity in duality; who has become another Brahman[1], who has his mind turned averse to (all) enjoyable (objects), who has cut off the bonds in the form of desire, activity, etc. by obtaining the entire (multitude of desires), and who has become the highest by the increase of his devotion to all-sided knowledge about the highest Brahman. [1198-1200]

This is the view of Bhartṛprapañca, according to his commentators' explanation in respect of BU 1.4.9-10.

[1]Namely, Hiraṇyagarbha.

भविष्यद्वृत्त्या लोके ऽपि प्रयोगो दृश्यते यथा ।
ओदनं पचतीत्यादि तथेहापि भविष्यति ॥१२०१॥

In worldly dealings also, we notice employment of a word with the notion of the function of the future, as for example, in the sentence 'He is cooking rice.'[1] etc.[2]; so also, here (the man) will be (the Brahman). [1201]

This is the explanation of the second line of the preceding verse in the light of linguistic usage.

[1]What is cooked are grains and after they are cooked they become rice. Yet we say 'He is cooking rice.', so also here the employment of the word conveys the sense of the future.

[2]SP refers *ādi* to making a gift of village or weaving a carpet, while NKL refers it to shaping a pitcher.

गृहस्थो भार्यां विन्देत शास्त्रे चापि समीक्ष्यते ।
एवं व्याचक्षते केचिद्गम्भीरन्यायवादिनः ॥१२०२॥

In the Śruti text also it is seen (in the sentence) 'A householder should get a wife.'[1] — thus do some thinkers who talk about the profound rules (of interpretation)[2], explain (the purport of the Śruti). [1202]

[1]It means: one, who wants to be (i.e. is going to be) a householder, should get married. Cf. *Gautama Gṛhya Sūtra* 1.4.1.

Sureśvara dropped the word *sadādṛśīm* from the original Sūtra for the sake of metre; not because he ignores *varṇa*.

[2]SP says the word *gambhīra* indicates ridicule (of the Bhartṛprapañca's commentators).

Verses 1203-1234 refute the view of the commentator of the Vṛttikāra whose views are presented just before.

सर्वापत्तेरनित्यत्वदोषासक्तेर्न तत्तथा ।
साधनायत्तलब्धात्मा न लोके ऽस्त्यविनश्वरः ॥१२०३॥

(But) that is not so, because all beings will necessarily become (the Brahman). And also there will be contingent the fault, viz. impermanence (i.e. non-eternality of the Brahman). (Indeed, whatever[1]) comes into existence owing to its dependence on some means is known even in the world[2] as non-permanent. [1203]

[1]This has a reference to liberation which has to be produced by certain men, as taught in the Śruti. This has a basis in the experience that things related as causes and effects are impermanent.

[2]This means: in the Śruti also.

अथाविद्योत्थाकृत्स्नत्वनिवृत्तिं चेदिहेच्छसि ।
कल्पनेयं वृथैव स्याद्ब्रह्मभावीति या कृता ॥१२०४॥
यतः प्रागपि तद्बोधात्सर्वो जन्तुः स्वभावतः ।
ब्रह्मत्वादाप्ततद्भावो नित्यमेव न साधनात् ॥१२०५॥

Now if you understand here[1] (liberation to be) the cessation of the incompleteness that had arisen from ignorance, then this notion (which you entertain), viz. that (an individual) is what is going to be the (known) Brahman, would be just useless, [1204]
since, even before (the rise of) the knowledge of that (=Brahman), every being had been by its very nature the Brahman, and therefore, having had already attained the nature of the Brahman, was therefore eternal, not by (any) means

(taught in the Śruti etc.). [1205]

[1]Namely, in this context.

केवलं तत्तमोमात्रव्यवधानैकहेतुतः ।
संभावयत्यकृत्स्नत्वं प्रत्यगात्मनि मूढधीः ॥१२०६॥

An individual, whose intellect is blurred in respect of the inner self on account of only one cause, viz. the covering of its true nature by mere ignorance about it, entertains the notion of insufficiency (or incompleteness). [1206]

यद्विद्यैकहेतु स्यादब्रह्मत्वं न तु स्वतः ।
तद्यथावस्तुसंबोधान्मूलनाशात्प्रणश्यति ॥१२०७॥

That character of what is a non-Brahman, which has arisen from only ignorance (about the true nature of the inner self) and not by its own nature, gets destroyed by the knowledge of the thing (viz. the inner self) as it is, i.e. by the destruction of the root (of ignorance). [1207]

एवं चेत्स्यादभिप्रायः किमर्थं निष्प्रयोजनम् ।
मुख्यार्थं संपरित्यज्य पुंसि ब्रह्मेति कल्पनम् ॥१२०८॥

If such is the intended thought, why then (entertain) the notion of the Brahman in an individual, having given up the primary meaning of the word without any reason? [1208]

This amplifies the thought in verse 1204 above.

श्रुतार्थहानिरेवं स्यादश्रुतस्य च कल्पना ।
अपन्यायो वृथा च स्यात्पुमर्थासंभवादिह ॥१२०९॥

Thus there would be (i)abandoning what is heard in the Śruti and (ii)(entertaining) the notion of what is not heard; thus, this would be a bad way (or manner) of interpretation since there would be no possibility of (securing) the end of human endeavour, viz. liberation. [1209]

अविद्योत्थातिरेकेण स्वत एवेति चेन्मतम् ।
अब्रह्मत्वं न तद्धानिरुपायासंभवात्क्वचित् ॥१२१०॥

If it is held that the character of what is a non-Brahman exists in its own right (*svataḥ eva*) as apart from what is arising from ignorance, then there is no possibility whatever of the existence of any means (of removing it) at all[1]. [1210]

[1]It means: at any time, at any region, and in any condition. Cf. SP on the next verse: *kvacid ity avasthādeśakāloktiḥ*.

अभिव्यञ्जकमेवेष्टं प्रमाणं न तु कारकम् ।
नापोद्ध्री नापि कर्त्रीयं विद्यातो वस्तुनः क्वचित् ॥१२११॥

The means (for the removal of the notion of the non-Brahman) is held (by us) to be what reveals it and (*tu*) not what produces (it); then also, this lore (of the Brahman) is neither the remover nor the producer of anything at all[1]. [1211]

The first line gives a general notion of what a means of knowledge should be, viz. it is merely informative, and the second line extends the notion to the means of knowing the Brahman (i.e. to the lore of the Brahman).

[1]See the note on the preceding verse.

स्वप्रमेयाखिलाज्ञानध्वंसिनीति समीक्ष्यते ।
विद्या लोके तथेहापि तद्ध्वंसिन्येव गृह्यताम् ॥१२१२॥

In worldly dealings, (any) lore is desired to be what destroys the entire ignorance about the object to be known by it; so also here (in respect of the Brahman), let (the lore) be accepted as the destroyer of that[1] (ignorance about the Brahman). [1212]

This verse is similar to the preceding. In the first line is stated the general rule regarding any branch of knowledge and in the second is extended the general rule or procedure to the lore of

the Brahman. Cf. SP: *lokānusāritvād vedasyety abhiprāyaḥ.*

[1]This refers to *svaprameyākhilājñāna.*

सदानुदितानस्तमितभास्वद्विज्ञानमात्रतः ।
तद्विरुद्धतनुर्मोहः कुतो ब्रह्मणि चेन्मतम् ॥१२१३॥

(And) if it is (asked by the opponent:) How can there remain in the Brahman[1] (as you have understood) ignorance which is opposed to it in nature[2], since it is ever only bright knowledge[3], which has ever been there[4] and which will never disappear[5]?

[1213]

The idea in the first line is that of the sunrise and the sunset — these two occasions occur again and again, but knowledge on the part of the Brahman has ever been abiding.

[1]*brahmaṇi* is *viṣayasaptamī* and not *adhikaraṇasaptamī*; cp. *iha* in verse 1212 above on which SP: *brahma saptamyarthaḥ* (for *iha*).

[2]The word *tanu* means *svarūpa.*

[3]*vijñāna* here stands for *jñāna.*

[4]*anudita* literally means: which has not arisen; i.e. which is beginningless.

[5]It literally means: which will never set.

नानुभूत्यैव तत्सिद्धेर्ज्ञातकुम्भानुभूतिवत् ।
न वेद्मीत्यनुभूतिर्हि सर्वेषामात्मसाक्षिका ॥१२१४॥

(Our answer is:) No. (This is not so), because that[1] gets established by one's experience (of the cause) as a pitcher becomes known[2] by means of its experience. (Indeed) all of them have a personal experience, viz. 'I do not know (myself).'.

[1214]

This verse states why the objection cannot be raised.

[1]It refers to *moha* of the previous verse.

[2]That is, when ignorance about it is removed.

अव्याकृताधिकारे च यदुक्तं प्राक्समासतः ।
ब्रह्मण्यविद्यासंसिद्ध्यै स्मर्तव्यं तदिहाखिलम् ॥१२१५॥

Further[1], whatever was briefly said (by us earlier)[2] in connection with the topic of the undifferentiated — all that has to be remembered here in order to become aware of the ignorance in respect of the Brahman. [1215]

[1]This is *ca*.

[2]Namely, the means of knowing convey information about what was not known earlier.

विद्याविधानाच्चाविद्या ब्रह्मण्यस्तीति गम्यताम् ।
विद्याविधानं विज्ञाते पिष्टपेषणवद्यतः ॥१२१६॥

And let it be understood in respect of the Brahman that there is ignorance about the Brahman, since there is a prescription of the lore of the Brahman; for such a prescription of the lore in respect of what is already known (would have been) like grinding what was already ground. [1216]

This is a further argument in confirmation of what is stated in the preceding verse. Also, it brings out why the Brahman is at the same time unknown.

SP and NKL refer to *tat tvam asi* (CU 6.8.7) but better understand *ātmā vā are śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ* in this very Upaniṣad.

अज्ञानमेव मिथ्याधीः प्रमेयानभिसंगतेः ।
रूप्याध्यारोपणं तस्मादुदाहारि गरीयसा ॥१२१७॥

Ignorance (about the self) is itself false knowledge, because it is not connected with the object of knowing. Therefore, the elder one[1] had given the illustration of the superimposition of silver (on a mother-of-pearl). [1217]

In BUB we read *na hi śuktikāyām* ... this is justified by Sureśvara as pointing to how false knowledge is rooted in ignorance about a real thing.

[1]SP makes out this to be Śaṅkara.

the Brahman. Cf. SP: *lokānusāritvād vedasyety abhiprāyaḥ.*

[1]This refers to *svaprameyākhilājñāna.*

सदानुदितानस्तमितभास्वद्विज्ञानमात्रतः ।
तद्विरुद्धतनुर्मोहः कुतो ब्रह्मणि चेन्मतम् ॥१२१३॥

(And) if it is (asked by the opponent:) How can there remain in the Brahman[1] (as you have understood) ignorance which is opposed to it in nature[2], since it is ever only bright knowledge[3], which has ever been there[4] and which will never disappear[5]? [1213]

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[5]It literally means: which will never set.

नानुभूत्यैव तत्सिद्धेर्ज्ञातकुम्भानुभूतिवत् ।
न वेद्मीत्यनुभूतिर्हि सर्वेषामात्मसाक्षिका ॥१२१४॥

(Our answer is:) No. (This is not so), because that[1] gets established by one's experience (of the cause) as a pitcher becomes known[2] by means of its experience. (Indeed) all of them have a personal experience, viz. 'I do not know (myself).'. [1214]

This verse states why the objection cannot be raised.

[1]It refers to *moha* of the previous verse.

[2]That is, when ignorance about it is removed.

अव्याकृताधिकारे च यदुक्तं प्राक्समासतः ।
ब्रह्मण्यविद्यासंसिद्ध्यै स्मर्तव्यं तदिहाखिलम् ॥१२१५॥

Further[1], whatever was briefly said (by us earlier)[2] in connection with the topic of the undifferentiated — all that has to be remembered here in order to become aware of the ignorance in respect of the Brahman. [1215]

[1]This is *ca*.

[2]Namely, the means of knowing convey information about what was not known earlier.

विद्याविधानाच्चाविद्या ब्रह्मण्यस्तीति गम्यताम् ।
विद्याविधानं विज्ञाते पिष्टपेषणवद्यतः ॥१२१६॥

And let it be understood in respect of the Brahman that there is ignorance about the Brahman, since there is a prescription of the lore of the Brahman; for such a prescription of the lore in respect of what is already known (would have been) like grinding what was already ground. [1216]

This is a further argument in confirmation of what is stated in the preceding verse. Also, it brings out why the Brahman is at the same time unknown.

SP and NKL refer to *tat tvam asi* (CU 6.8.7) but better understand *ātmā vā are śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ* in this very Upaniṣad.

अज्ञानमेव मिथ्याधीः प्रमेयानभिसंगतेः ।
रूप्याध्यारोपणं तस्मादुदाहारि गरीयसा ॥१२१७॥

Ignorance (about the self) is itself false knowledge, because it is not connected with the object of knowing. Therefore, the elder one[1] had given the illustration of the superimposition of silver (on a mother-of-pearl). [1217]

In BUB we read *na hi śuktikāyām* ... this is justified by Sureśvara as pointing to how false knowledge is rooted in ignorance about a real thing.

[1]SP makes out this to be Śaṅkara.

अस्त्वविद्या परे भूम्नि यथोक्तन्यायगौरवात् ।
न तु ब्रह्मैव तां कुर्यात्सर्वज्ञं प्रत्यगात्मनि ॥१२१८॥

(Therefore), on the strength of the example stated before, let there be ignorance on the part of the highest pervader[1] (i.e. the Supreme Self). But let not the Brahman, which is omniscient, create that[2] in the inner self. [1218]

[1]Sureśvara uses the word *bhūman* for the Brahman because of metrical exegencies. Cf. BS 1.3.8; CU 7.23-24 .
[2]It refers to *avidyā*.

न हि धीपूर्वकारी सन्निःशेषानर्थदायिनीम् ।
प्रतीच्यविद्यां विसृजेद्यान्यत्रापि न काम्यते ॥१२१९॥

Indeed, a human being who acts on thought would not create in the inner self ignorance which causes all kinds of undesirable results (and) that which is not desired elsewhere also. [1219]

Everyone knows that ignorance causes disasters and therefore would not create it anywhere..

यद्यविद्या भवेत्कार्यमस्त्वेतद्यदिहोदितम् ।
अकार्यत्वात्त्वविद्यायास्त्वदुक्तं तुषकण्डनम् ॥१२२०॥

If ignorance is (lit. would be considered as) an effect (lit. product), let there be this, viz. what is (already) said.[1] As against this, if ignorance does not have the nature of a product, then your making a statement[2] is (like) pounding the chaff.[3] [1220]

The argument is: Though omniscient, the Brahman cannot be considered as the basis of *avidyā*.
[1]It is already stated that the Brahman does not create ignorance in the inner self.
[2]Namely, the argument: *avidyā* is a product of the Brahman.
[3]This example means: it is useless for one to try to get any

grains out of chaff. The Brahman produces nothing. Cf. verse 1214 above.

अथोपचारात्कार्यत्वमविद्याविषयत्वतः ।
तथापि नापराधो नस्तदन्यासंभवादिह ॥१२२१॥

If again, the nature of a product (is attributed to ignorance) in a secondary sense, because it is affected by ignorance; then also this is not a fault on our part, as there is no possibility of the existence of anything else (than the Brahman). [1221]

The idea behind this verse is: We know that the inner self is affected by ignorance; i.e. there exists ignorance and therefore the Brahman must have created ignorance (viz. it is a *kārya*).

न हि ब्रह्मातिरेकेण ब्रह्माविद्याकृदिष्यते ।
न ह्यन्यो ऽतो ऽस्ति द्रष्टेति तथाच श्रुतिशासनम् ॥१२२२॥

Indeed, it is not held that there exists beside the Brahman (another) Brahman which creates ignorance. (For, there is) instruction in the Śruti to that effect, viz. there is not any other seer than this one.[1] [1222]

This sets aside the possibility about the existence of another sentient being apart from the Brahman.

[1]Cf. BU 3.7.23.

क्रिया वा कारकं वेह सदसद्वेह यन्मतम् ।
अप्रज्ञातात्मयाथात्म्यं ब्रह्मैव तदितीक्ष्यताम् ॥१२२३॥
पुरुष एवेदं सर्वमात्मैवेदमिति श्रुतिः ।
नानुभूतेः प्रमाणाद्वा तदन्यद्वस्तु लभ्यते ॥१२२४॥

Whatever be here[1], whether action or agent of an action and[2] the existent or the non-existent, it is such that the truth of its nature is not known; (therefore,) let that be accepted (lit. seen) as only the Brahman itself, [1223]
for, (there are) the Śruti statements 'All this is only Puruṣa.' (and) 'This is only the Ātman.'. (And) neither from experience

nor from (any) means of knowing is known any object other than that (Puruṣa or Ātman). [1224]

This is to set aside the existence of even an insentient thing beside the Brahman and to establish the existence of the Brahman alone.

[1]Namely, in dealings worldly and Śāstric as well.

[2]*vā*=*ca* (so understood by us).

ननु शास्त्रोपदेशो ऽयमेवं सत्यफलो भवेत् ।
नासौ ब्रह्मणि साफल्यं नाप्यन्यस्मिन्समश्नुते ॥१२२५॥
उपदेशानपेक्षत्वाद्ब्रह्मत्वस्य परात्मनः ।
असंभवात्ततो ऽन्यस्य ह्युपदेशो ऽफलो भवेत् ॥१२२६॥

(An objection may be raised:) But if this were so, this instruction in the Śruti would be fruitless (i.e. meaningless). (For) that (instruction) does not become fruitful with reference to the Brahman or anything other than that; [1225] (for), the nature of the Brahman abiding in the highest Ātman does not depend on (any means of knowing or another thing), since that is not possible[1]. (And) instruction in regard to the other[2] would indeed be useless (lit. fruitless). [1226]

This would explain the thought arising from the preceding verse regarding the *aphalatva* of Śāstra.

[1]Namely, any other means of knowing or another thing does not have any existence.

[2]That is, non-*brahman.*

ब्रह्माकर्त्रपि संबोधात्प्रागभूत्तदसंसृति ।
अविद्यातज्जसंबन्धात्कर्तृत्वे ऽपि न दोषभाक् ॥१२२७॥

(This is in answer to the doubt:) The Brahman, though a non-agent (of any action) was there existent even before[1]; it has been non-transmigratory. (And if it is held) to be an agent of some action, thanks to its connection with ignorance and its products, it does not have (that) fault[1] even then. [1227]

The Siddhāntin answers away the thought in the two preceding verses.

[1]It means: before the transmigratory world came to exist.

[2]Namely, the character of being transmigratory.

प्रागज्ञातं तदैकात्म्यं यथैवानुभवान्मतम् ।
ब्रह्मास्मीत्यपि संबोधस्तथैवानुभवाश्रयात् ॥१२२८॥

As indeed (*eva*) the uniqueness of it, which was not known before, is understood (i.e. grasped) through experience, in the same way, there will be understanding of the knowledge, 'I am Brahman.' through experience. [1228]

प्रमेयाधिगमं कुर्वत्प्रमाणमफलं यदि ।
क्वान्यत्र फलवत्तत्स्यान्नातो ऽन्यत्स्यान्मितेःफलम् ॥१२२९॥

If any means of knowing, which brings about knowledge about the object of (its) knowing, were held as fruitless, (then we ask) where else[1] could it be fruitful? Therefore, there would not be any fruit other than the knowledge (of it[2]). [1229]

[1]That is, in what other respect.

[2]It means: the object of its knowing'; here, the Brahman.

सोत्प्रासमिव चाहातो बाढमित्येवमादिना ।
अस्त्वेषो ऽवगते दोष इतो ऽन्यः कीदृशो गुणः ॥१२३०॥

Therefore (the Bhāṣyakāra) said, as if with a smile of ridicule, 'Well, let it be so ...'. Let there be this[1] fault, when the Brahman is being known; for, what excellence can there be other than this?[2]'. [1230]

[1]This refers to the fruitlessness of instruction which brings about *ajñāna*(*-dhvasti*).

[2]Namely, the knowledge of the Brahman brings about the destruction of ignorance, thereby declaring the fruitlessness of instruction ... in reality, fruitfulness

अथावगमवैयर्थ्यं भवता परिचोद्यते ।
तत्रापि चानवगमध्वस्तिः प्रतिवचो भवेत् ॥१२३१॥

Now, if you happen to posit fruitlessness of even the knowledge (arising from instruction of the Śruti), in that respect also our answer would be that there follows destruction of ignorance[1].
[1231]

[1]This means: not understanding the true nature of the Brahman; and that latter is conveyed by the Śruti.

ऐकात्म्ये तन्निवृत्तिश्चेदसम्भाव्येति चोद्यते ।
लब्धैकात्म्येन नैवेयं निवृत्तिः काम्यते श्रुतेः ॥१२३२॥
अप्रसिद्धे त्वथैकात्म्ये निवृत्तिरिह चोद्यते ।
तथा दृष्टविरोधो वः प्राप्नुवन्न निवार्यते ॥१२३३॥

(Now) if an argument is adduced (by the opponent:) The removal of that[1] is not possible even when the uniqueness of the Brahman is understood; (the answer to the objection is:) Indeed (this) removal is not desired (i.e. expected) by one who has acquired the knowledge of the uniqueness of the Ātman from the Śruti. But, this removal is here urged[2] by the Śruti in respect of the uniqueness of the Brahman when it is not known; then the (fault of) opposition to what is seen[3] would come to you and it could not be averted.
[1232-1233]

[1]Namely, ignorance to which a reference is made in verse 1231.
[2]It literally means: enjoined to be destroyed.
[3]That is, experienced. Here, the uniqueness of the Ātman.

सर्वस्यानुपपन्नत्वं सिद्धं दृष्टबलाश्रयात् ।
दृष्टस्यानुपपन्नत्वं किमाश्रित्याभिधीयते ॥१२३४॥

The unreasonableness of whatever (was argued) is (thus established) on the support of what is seen. But, on the support of what can be established the unreasonableness of what is

seen? [1234]

This is said for reaffirming the argument in the preceding verse which is related to *dṛṣṭavirodha*.

उक्तानि तावद्भूयांसि दूषणानि विभागशः ।
अब्रह्मविषये क्लृप्ते ब्रह्मभावी पुमानिति ॥१२३५॥

Thus are shown (lit. stated) a number of faults, one after another[1] in respect of the non-Brahman which is accepted to be what is going to be the (known) Brahman (in future). [1235]

[1]It means: part by part; as divided into various parts of the argument.

भूयो ऽप्यस्यैव दाढ्र्यार्थं पूर्वपक्षाय यत्यते ।
वाक्यार्थाभाससंजातभ्रान्त्युच्छित्त्यै प्रयत्नतः ॥१२३६॥

Yet once again an attempt is made (in what follows) to offer more support to (lit. to strengthen) the *prima facie* view with a view to removing completely (i.e. disproving), with care, the mistake (in that view) caused by what appeared (to him) as the meaning of the Śruti statements. [1236]

Now follows in verses 1237-1277 a discussion on the purport of BUB: 'puṇyo vai ... brahmabhāvī puruṣa ucyate iti cen na'.

पुण्यः पुण्येन भवति पापः पापेन कर्मणा ।
संसारिणं समुद्दिश्य श्रुतिरेतदुदाहरत् ॥१२३७॥

That 'He becomes holy by performing holy acts, he has become a sinner by performing sinful acts.'[1] is stated by the Śruti with reference to a transmigratory being. [1237]

[1]Cf. BU 3.2.13.

तथैष हीति विस्पष्टं संसार्येवाभिधीयते ।

तस्माद्विलक्षणस्तद्वदीश्वरो ऽप्यभिधीयते ।
स एष नेति नेतीति य आत्मेत्यादिना तथा ॥१२३८॥

[In verses 1238-1245, there is shown the difference between Īśvara and a transmigratory being.]

So also (in the Śruti passage) 'This one indeed ...'[1] only a transmigratory being is clearly mentioned (and) so also Īśvara, who is in nature opposed to him, is mentioned (in the Śruti statements) *sa eṣa neti neti* ...,[2] and *ya ātmā* ...,[3] etc. [1238]

[1] *Praśnopaniṣad* 4.9.
[2] BU 3.9.26 etc., see verse 539 note 4 above.
[3] CU 8.7.13.

तथाक्षपादकाणादतर्कशास्त्रेषु यत्नतः ।
उपपत्तिशतैरीशः साध्यते वादिभिः पृथक् ॥१२३९॥

So (also), other (exponents of philosophy) have severally made effort to establish in their works on logic (e.g.) by Gautama and Kaṇāda[2] with hundreds[1] of arguments the existence of Īśvara. [1239]

[1] This is hyperbolic number for saying 'numerous'. NKL cites some arguments; so also does the editor of NKL in his note.
[2] This may refer to even Seśvara Yoga that also seeks to establish the existence of Īśvara.

दुःखापनयनार्थित्वप्रवृत्तेर्दर्शनादपि ।
अत्यन्तभेदो विज्ञेयः संसारीश्वरयोरतः ॥१२४०॥

And also, on noticing the activity (of individuals) who have the desire of removing their sorrows, one has to know (i.e. accept) the extreme difference between a transmigratory being and Īśvara. [1240]

तं त्विदित्वैतमेवेति कर्मकर्तृविभागतः ।
क्षेत्रज्ञेश्वरयोरुक्तेर्मृगव्याधादिभेदवत् ॥१२४१॥

And also from the Śruti passages *taṃ viditvā* ...[1], *etam eva* ...[2] etc. on the basis of the division made between an agent and an object (of action), as also from the statement about a *kṣetrajña* 'knower of the field' and Īśvara (should one understand) the difference as that between a deer and a hunter.[3] [1241]

[1]BU 4.4.23.

[2]BU 4.4.22. Sureśvara's verse reads: *etam eva* ...; however SP and NKL, *etaṃ vai tam ātmānam* which is BU 3.5.1. SP and NKL further refer to *etam itaḥ pretyāham abhisambhavitāsmi* (CU 3.14.4). It seems that Sureśvara intended some Śruti passages as the basis. But one may refer to *Gītā* ch. 14. It may be remembered that they held the *Gītā* as an Upaniṣad.

[3]This illustration is well in keeping with *karma-kartṛ-vibhāga*.

मुमुक्षोर्गतिमार्गस्य देशभेदोपदेशतः ।
भेदे ऽसति गतिः केयं गन्तृगन्तव्ययोर्भवेत् ॥१२४२॥

(This is noticeable also) from different information (given) about the destinations in respect of the paths of journey for the one who is seeking liberation. (And therefore we ask:) If there were no distinction (between the individual self and the highest), why should there be the (twofold) movement with reference to the (individual who is) going and the destination? [1242]

This has reference to *śuklakṛṣṇagatī* or *devayāna* and *pitṛyāṇa* which are talked about in the Upaniṣads. (Cf. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 3.1.7; CU 5.3.2 and 5.10.2; BU 6.2.2; *Kauṣītakyupaniṣad* 1.3; *Praśnopaniṣad* 1.9.) Thus there are two different paths to two different goals, viz. *devaloka* and *pitṛloka* and men are supposed to go by this or that of the two paths. How could there be this talk in the Upaniṣad, if men were not taken as transmigratory? In the case of Īśvara, he does not have to take to (or travel by) any of these two paths or to go to any. This is understood in the following verse also.

दक्षिणोत्तरमार्गोक्तिस्तथा सति विरुध्यते ।
गन्तव्यदेशाभावाच्च गतिर्नैवोपपद्यते ॥१२४३॥

And in case that was so (viz. as you say[1]), then the statement about the southern and the northern paths would be contradictory (lit. opposed) and, since there is no distinction to be reached, there would not be any movement reasonably to be accepted. [1243]

[1]That is, the Brahman and the individual self are one, non-distinct.

तथाभ्युदयकैवल्यसाधनानां विधानतः ।
न हीश्वरस्य कैवल्यं साधनायत्तमिष्यते ॥१२४४॥

So also, on account of the prescription of various means to worldly prosperity and liberation (one has to accept that the individual self and the Brahman are different.)[1] Indeed they do not accept that the state of liberation of Īśvara is dependent on any means. [1244]

[1]This idea has run through verses 1240-1244.

ब्रह्मभावी ततो नेशः किंतु तद्व्यतिरेकभाक् ।
संसार्येवाभिधीयेत यथोक्तन्यायगौरवात् ॥१२४५॥

Therefore,[1] what is going to be the (known) Brahman is not Īśvara but one who experiences the state(s) apart from the same (i.e. the state(s) of Īśvara). Thus it is only a transmigratory being who would be talked about here (as a seeker of liberation) on the strength of the argument(s) stated by us. [1245]

This is the concluding remark of the *prima facie* view about *brahmabhāvī puruṣa*.

[1]That is, for these reasons. This is *samānādhikaraṇa* with *yathoktanyāyagaurava*, viz. the same arguments (SP).

नैवं ब्रह्मोपदेशार्थशास्त्रानर्थक्यसक्तितः ।
संसारिविद्ययैवास्य पुरुषार्थसमाप्तितः ॥१२४६॥

(The Siddhāntin answers:) This is not so; for that would invite the contingency[1] of the fruitlessness of the Śruti which is meant for the instruction regarding the Brahman and also because this (transmigratory) individual can obtain the end of human endeavour only by means of the lore (imparted to) transmigratory beings. [1246]

[1] *sakti* is for *prasakti* (=*prasaṅga*).

न च ब्रह्मोपदेशस्य सर्वभावातिरेकतः ।
शक्यं फलान्तरं वक्तुं येनासावर्थवान्भवेत् ॥१२४७॥

And it is not possible to say that there is some other fruit (i.e. result) of the instruction regarding the Brahman beyond becoming all[1] and whereby[2] he would have obtained his desired end. [1247]

[1] It means: to become the Brahman, cf. *tad āhur yad brahmavidyayā sarvam bhaviṣyanto* ... (BU 1.4.9).
[2] It means: by that other fruit (if there existed any).

पुमर्थसाधने ऽन्यस्मिन्न चासौ विनियुज्यते ।
मन्त्रवत्तेन तच्छास्त्रं स्यादनर्थकमेव तु ॥१२४८॥

Further, an individual is not enjoined to acquire the end of human endeavour by any other means; (if it were thatwise), the instruction (i.e. the scriptural text) would have been fruitless (i.e. meaningless) in the same way as any other Mantra[1]. [1248]

The argument of the Siddhāntin has run through verses 1246-1248.
[1] A Mantra like *īṣe tvā* ... in *Yajurveda* is enjoined for recitation while a branch of some sacrificial tree is cut; that makes the Mantra fruitful. Now, Upaniṣadic Mantras do not have any relation to sacrificial activity — their employment towards that is not pre-

scribed. As such, one would call them fruitless/meaningless. But Śaṅkara and his followers have held that sacrificial purpose alone does not make Mantras meaningful. They can be (or rather, they are) meaningful in that they make one aware of the true nature of Reality, thereby effecting one's liberation.

मतं दुःखिन एवासौ संपदर्थं विधीयते ।
ब्रह्मास्मीत्यविनिर्ज्ञाते कथं ब्रह्मणि सा भवेत् ॥१२४९॥

If it is held that it (viz. instruction) is prescribed for the person who is sorrow-stricken in order that he looks upon the object of instruction[1] as the Brahman, then (the question is:) How could that[2] be possible in respect of the Brahman, when it is not known in the awareness: 'I am Brahman.'. [1249]

Verses 1249-1250 pertain to a view of some other opponent: Instruction regarding the Brahman is subservient to Upāsanā.

[1]The purpose of such looking is 'worship' (*upāsanā*).

[2]Namely, *sampad* which consists in looking upon some object as the Brahman (*upāsyajñāna*) and therefore Upāsanā also.

तस्मिंस्तु शास्त्राद्विज्ञाते शक्यते कर्तुमञ्जसा ।
ब्रह्मसंपदतः शास्त्रं तादर्थ्यादर्थवद्भवेत् ॥१२५०॥

But worship of the Brahman can be easily possible when that (Brahman) is known from the Śruti; thus the Śruti would become meaningful, being useful for that purpose. [1250]

The opponent's view is that, if a thing is taken as the Brahman, the Śruti statements talking about the *brahmasampad* 'looking upon (or viewing) something as the Brahman' would be meaningless.

ननु ब्रह्म यदि ज्ञातं तावतैव कृतार्थता ।
न चेत्तत्संपदा किं स्याद्येन तामनुरुध्यसे ॥१२५१॥

(The Siddhāntin puts a question:) But, let me say, if the Brahman becomes known, only in that lies the fulfilment of the goal. If such is not the case, what would be the use of

looking upon something as the Brahman, so that you adopt (lit. follow)[1] it? [1251]

[1]We follow here the variant reading *anurudhyase* for *anurudhyate* shown in the AnSS edition of the BUBV (and not shown even in the NKL edition). The verse becomes meaningful, if we accept the variant. The word *tām* in the fourth quarter of the verse refers to *sampad* mentioned in the third quarter. Of course, alternatively (i.e. following the printed editions), the last quarter can be translated thus: ... so that (the seeker of liberation) adopts (lit. follows) it?

नैवं ब्रह्मावबोधस्य पाराथ्र्येन फलत्वतः ।
सर्वमेव यतो ज्ञानं परार्थं फलवन्मतम् ॥१२५२॥

(The objector persists to say:) This is not so because knowing the Brahman can be (said to be) fruitful only when it serves the purpose of another; for, all knowledge is accepted, on all hands, as fruiful if it serves some purpose of someone. [1252]

parārthatva of knowledge is the basic argument of the opponent. He means that *brahmajñāna* as understood by the Vedāntins cannot be taken as *parārtha*.

उक्तत्वात्परिहारस्य नैवमेतद्ध्वेदिह ।
ब्रह्मज्ञानात्तदन्यत्र परार्थं ज्ञानमिष्यते ॥१२५३॥

(The Siddhāntin answers:) Since a counterargument (to this view) has been already stated[1], this would not (now) be an objection here[2]; (we hold that) except in knowing the Brahman, knowledge elsewhere[3] is accepted to be serving the purpose of another. [1253]

[1]This refers to *brahmajñānasya phalaṃ nāsti* (verse 1248) above.
[2]That is, in respect of *brahmajñāna* and *brahmasampatti*.
[3]That is in knowing any other branch of study.

सर्वत्रैव हि विज्ञानं संस्कारत्वेन गम्यते ।
पराङ्गं चात्मविज्ञानादन्यत्रेत्यवधारणात् ॥१२५४॥

Indeed knowledge[1] is everywhere accepted as an impression (on a learner's mind) and also as serving the purpose of another (i.e. some person) elsewhere than in the knowledge of the Ātman — such is the decision.[2] [1254]

[1]Sureśvara deliberately uses the word *vijñāna*. This has a reference to the subject-object relationship in every knowledge situation of the world, that has duality at the basis. Sureśvara uses the word *ātmavijñāna* not *ātmajñāna* because he refers here to Śāstric instruction. Knowledge arising from it would work towards one's becoming one with the Brahman. But he really means *ātmajñāna* by *ātmavijñāna*.

[2]SP and NKL point out that this verse is from Kumārila's *Tantravārtika* p.240, *line* 15 (on Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 1.3.25, Benares Sanskrit Series No.3, 1882-1908, ed. by Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī) Cf. *śabdasādhutājñānasya śabde puṃsi vā saṃskārakāritvena prayogāṅgatvam prakṛtya vyākaraṇādhikaraṇe vārtikakāroktim atra mānatvenodātarati.*

सामानाधिकरण्येन तथा ब्रह्मात्मशब्दयोः ।
श्रुतौ श्रुतेर्न संपत्स्यात्संपद्येष न हि क्रमः ॥१२५५॥

So also, by the scriptural use of the words *brahman* and *ātman* in the same case relation, there cannot arise from the Śruti the notion of looking upon something as (the Brahman); indeed in no such looking is this the manner (of the use of words).[1] [1255]

There is no use of *iti* here as in the case of *mano brahmeti* ... This is clearly *sāmānādhikaraṇya* and an indication of the absence of the notion of *sampad*; SP and NKL.

[1]While looking upon something as another, someone who is the agent and the object of his looking (or obtaining) are not expressed in the same case relation. Thus *aham brahmāsmi* reveals *sāmānādhikaraṇya*, while *mano brahma iti jānāti* do not show that; for, in this latter case, *manas* is the object and *brahma* is the

object. There is not the use of *iti* here as in the case of *mano brahmeti* ... This is a clear case of *sāmānādhikaraṇya* and an indication of the absence of the notion of *sampad* (NKL).

आत्मा ब्रह्मेत्येवमादौ सामानाधिकरण्यगीः ।
अन्यस्यान्यत्र संपत्स्यादद्वये सा कथं भवेत् ॥१२५६॥

In *ātmā brahma* ... and such other (Śruti texts), there is the expression (of two words) in the same case relation. Indeed, in *sampad* one would look something elsewhere (i.e. in some other); how can that[1] be there when there is absence of duality? [1256]

[1]It means *sampad* 'looking upon a thing as another'.

द्रष्टव्यस्यात्मनस्तद्वदैकात्म्यं श्रुतिरब्रवीत् ।
ब्रह्मादि सर्वमात्मेति संपन्नातो ऽत्र युज्यते ॥१२५७॥

Likewise, the Śruti has declared a person's becoming one with the Ātman which is to be seen. So also in the Śruti 'The Brahman etc.[1] is all this.', it is not proper to entertain any idea of such looking upon one thing as another. [1257]

This affirms the *advayatva* of the Ātman.

SP here supports the *advayatva* of the Ātman by the Śruti passage *idaṃ sarvaṃ yad ayam ātmā* (BU 2.4.6).

[1]The words in the first quarter have a reference to *kṣatra* and *vaiṣya*, as SP points out, on the basis of *brahma tam parādāt* ..., *kṣatraṃ tam parādāt* ... (BU 2.4.6).

तदापत्तिश्रुतेश्चेयं संपन्नेहोपपद्यते ।
ब्रह्मैव भवतीत्यादितदापत्तिवचांस्यपि ॥१२५८॥

And even on the basis of the Śruti statement about (a person's) becoming that, looking upon something as another is not acceptable here (lit. in this context), (for there are also) such statements as *brahmaiva bhavati*, referring to becoming that. [1258]

The second line implies that, only on the similarity between the words *āpatti* and *sampatti*, one cannot rush to say that statements like the one about *sarvāpatti* can be taken as the basis for the theory of an individual being looked upon as the Brahman, thus indicating the acceptance of duality.
aapad *with* sampad !

वचनात्स्यात्तदापत्तिः संपत्तेरिति चेन्मतम् ।
नैवं प्रत्ययमात्रत्वात्संपत्तेर्न तदिष्यते ॥१२५९॥

If it is held that one can undertstand becoming the Brahman as an effect of looking upon something else as that (viz. the Brahman) on the basis of the Śruti statement, this is not so, because (becoming that) has the nature of only (one's) experience, and that (viz. *brahmāpatti*) is not accepted (as resulting from) looking upon something else as the Brahman. [1259]

The Vedāntins hold that the Śruti statement about the Brahman makes one aware of its own meaning and this knowing itself is becoming one with the Brahman. There is nothing intervening between knowing the Brahman and becoming the Brahman. That is to say, there is no such process as: Śruti → *sampad* → *tadāpatti*.

तमोमात्रान्तरायत्वादाप्तमप्याप्यते न तत् ।
न च संपत्तमोहन्त्री मिथ्याज्ञानात्मकत्वतः ॥१२६०॥

(The fact is) that it (=the Brahman) is not obtained[1], even though it has been already obtained, because of its having the obstacle of mere ignorance about itself. And *sampad* is not the remover of ignorance, for it is itself of the nature of false knowledge. [1260]

[1]It means: not known.

तमोध्वंसातिरेकेण सम्यग्ज्ञानस्य नापरम् ।

फलमण्वपि संभाव्यं ज्ञानस्याकारकत्वतः ॥१२६१॥

It is not possible to think of even a little fruit in addition to destruction of ignorance (which results) from right knowledge; for, owing to its nature of being knowledge, not even a little of another fruit can be thought of. [1261]

This verse has in view an objector's notion: *śrutivacana* → *brahmasampatti* → *brahmāpatti.*

वस्तुनः शक्तिकृन्नापि वचनं ज्ञापकत्वतः ।
ज्ञापकानि हि शास्त्राणि कारकाणि न कुत्रचित् ॥१२६२॥

And a Śruti statement, being (only) informative (about the Brahman), does not produce (any) power in the real thing; for, the Śruti texts are only informative and nowhere productive (of any effects). [1262]

The second line of the verse is a general rule regarding informative means of knowing; it supports the specific statement about the Śruti sentences which declare the nature of the Brahman but not create it.

अभीष्टपुरुषार्थस्य बाधश्चैवं प्रसज्यते ।
निःशेषपुरुषार्थाप्तिकारि ब्रह्मावबोधनम् ॥१२६३॥

Thus[1], there will be contingent a difficulty in (achieving) the desired end of human endeavour for an individual; (as against this), informing (one) about the Brahman is capable of bringing about complete attainment of the end of human endeavour for an individual. [1263]

The verse brings about the difference in the attitude of the two sides, viz. the Vṛttikāra and the Siddhāntin. Also it points out why teaching about the Brahman is not a subsidiary to some prescription of worship (*brahmopāsanā*).

[1]Namely, by accepting that *sampad* which results from Vedānta sentences, and in turn, into liberation.

तादृक्षं संपदो न स्यान्न च दुःख्यात्मबोधतः ।
निःशेषपुरुषार्थाप्तिस्तद्बुद्धेरनृतन्त्रतः ॥१२६४॥

Similar (fruit) would not (result) from *sampad*, and also by knowing oneself as affected by sorrow; the complete achievement of the end of human endeavour for an individual is obtained from knowing that (viz. the Brahman), since it does not depend on man (i.e. man's effort). [1264]

The first line refers to *sampad* and the knowledge connected with it and the second line, with the knowledge of the Brahman and liberation.

Verses 1263-1264 emphasise that *duḥkhyātmabodha* (i.e. *saṃsāridhī*), is, because it is not *puruṣatantra*, ever obtaining and that would involve the contingency of all-time absence of liberation. If it were not so held, then there would ever be the state of liberation for an individual (NKL).

अपूर्वाद्यर्थ एवैकः प्राधान्येन विवक्षितः ।
काण्डद्वये ऽपि नैतस्मादन्यो ऽर्थः कश्चिदीक्ष्यते ॥१२६५॥

In both of the Kāṇḍas[1] there is only one thought to be expounded, viz. about that which did not have anything preceding it, as the principal matter; therefore, no other thought can be entertained (as the subject of discussion). [1265]

The verse emphasises how the Upaniṣad does not anywhere refer to an individual who later on becomes the Brahman as a subject of discussion in the Vedānta sentences discussed above.

[1]These refer to the Madhu Kāṇḍa and the Muni Kāṇḍa which cover BU chh. 1-2 and chh. 3-4 respectively.

एतावदर इत्यन्त उपसंहारदर्शनात् ।
न चोपक्रमसंहारविरुद्धोक्तिः प्रशस्यते ॥१२६६॥

(And) there is seen in the end the conclusion (in the words)

etāvad are; (indeed) contradictory statements in the introductory and the concluding (parts of a work[1]) are nowhere appreciated[2]. [1266]

[1]In the *upakarama* and *upasaṃhāra*.
[2]It means: acceptable.

तत्रैवं सति संसारी यद्यन्यो ब्रह्मणो भवेत् ।
इष्टस्यार्थस्य बाधः स्यान्न च ध्वान्तनिराकृतिः ॥१२६७॥

This being so, if there existed (according to one) a transmigratory individual apart from the Brahman, there would result obstruction to the desired end[1] and not the removal of darkness[2]. [1267]

[1]It means: liberation.
[2]It means *avidyā*.

आरम्भे ऽवसितौ शास्त्रं परस्परविरोधतः ।
समञ्जसं न क्लृप्तं स्यात्संभवे ऽप्यविरोधिनः ॥१२६८॥

(Also) on account of the mutual contradiction between the beginning and the end of it, the Śāstra (i.e. scripture) would not be considered as reasonable — this, even when there is a possibility of (some scripture) that does not involve internal contradiction. [1268]

समाख्यानुपपत्तिश्च ब्रह्मणो ऽन्यस्य वेदनात् ।
नापि रूढिस्तदन्यस्मिन्नश्वकर्णादिवद्भवेत् ॥१२६९॥

If there is understood (from the Vedānta statement) information of something else than the Brahman, there would result impropriety (lit. unreasonableness) of the nature (of the lore[1]). So also, there is not a convention (to use the word *brahman* as) some other thing (than the Brahman) as in the case of word *aśvakarṇa* etc.[2] [1269]

[1]This is *brahmavidyā*, if the Brahman were taken to mean

manuṣya, then *brahmavidyā* would not be a significant name.

[2]The first line conveys the argument based on the significance (or, strictly speaking, etymology) of the name (*yoga*); the second line refers to the convention which can be impervious of *yoga*. To explain this, the example of *aśvakarṇa* is stated. *aśvakarṇa* literally means: a horse's ear; but, by *rūḍhi*, one can understand the word to signify somebody of that name, or, as NKL points out, a particular tree. The word *ādi* is not explained by SP or NKL. Though NKL writes *ādipadena karṇādisaṃgrahahaḥ*, one wonders if NKL understood by *karṇa*, which literally means an ear, the great hero of the *Mahābhārata* bearing that name. One can point out to the names *Śunaḥśepa*, *Śunaḥpuccha*, *Śunolāṅgūla* from the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, all meaning 'a dog's tail', but actually standing for three brothers' names.

आत्मेति वेत्तुरन्यश्चेन्न ब्रह्माहमिति श्रुतेः ।
प्रतीचो ब्रह्मवत्प्रत्यग्ब्रह्मणो ऽपि विशेषणम् ॥१२७०॥

If by the word *ātman* is signified someone other than the knower, then there would not have occurred a specification by the Śruti of the inner self as the Brahman in (the words) 'I am Brahman.' with regard to the Brahman abiding (as) the inner self. [1270]

Identity of the inner self and the Brahman is here emphasised with a view to warding off the notion that Brahman signifies *manuṣya*.

ब्रह्मता न मदन्यत्र कौटस्थ्यान्मम नाशिषु ।
ब्रह्मणो नान्यतः प्रत्यक्साक्षात्त्वाद्ब्रह्मवस्तुनः ॥१२७१॥

The character of the Brahman is not elsewhere than in me (i.e. my inner self), on account of (hearing about) my immutability among perishable (objects); the inner self (also) is not (existing) elsewhere than in the Brahman, since the Reality, viz. the Brahman, is directly perceptible (in it). [1271]

SP refrs to the Śruti passage *yat sākṣāt* ... (BU 3.4.1) which

mentions the Brahman and the the inner self as identical.

अव्यावृत्ताननुगतेर्मुख्यार्थश्च तथा सति ।
ब्रह्मविद्येति सिद्धः स्याद्व्यपदेशो न चान्यथा ॥१२७२॥

That being so[1], the primary meaning of the word *brahmavidyā* gets established because of the Brahman not being distinguished (from any other object) and also not being followed (by any other object)[2]; also, it[3] would not be improper. [1272]

[1]The Brahman and the inner self are taken as identical.

[2]The word *vyāvṛtta* signifies what has differences in qualities like colour etc. with other objects in other class (*vijātīya*) and *anugata* signifies what shares a common (*sāmānya*) quality with the objects in the same class (*sajātīya*), i.e. similar to something else. The Brahman is neither of them. The word *avyāvṛttānanugati* points to two specific attributes of the Brahman and not of a man.

[3]Namely, the meaning of *brahmavidyā*.

भिन्नाभिन्नत्वगीर्यापि सापि दुःस्थितसिद्धिका ।
विरुद्धधर्मसंबन्धो न प्रतीच्यस्त्यधर्मणि ॥१२७३॥

(Now) as to the statement (about the Brahman and the inner self) being different and non-different; that also establishes a difficult situation. (Indeed) there is no connection of qualities which are opposed (to the Brahman) with the inner self which is (in reality) without any qualities. [1273]

This refers to the condition of the inner self as overpowered by ignorance. Only in this condition it seems to be different from the Brahman.This is the force of the word *duḥsthita*. By merely calling it *bhinnābhinna*, one cannot establish one's theory of *bhedā-bheda*. SP rightly points out BU passage (3.8.8) which describes the Brahman as only *asthūla* etc.

धर्मधर्म्यभिसंबन्धा गृह्यन्ते ऽनात्मवस्तुषु ।
प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणेन नामीषामात्मनि ग्रहः ॥१२७४॥

The relations of qualities and those who possess the qualities are understood in the case of objects other than the Ātman by such means as direct perception. One does not hold these (relations) in the case of the Ātman. [1274]

That is, the Ātman cannot be known by any means other than the Śruti and *dharmadharmisambandha* is understood only by *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *upamāna*— those three *pramāṇa*s are accepted in common life.

आत्मानात्मनिमित्ते ऽपि व्यपदेशो ऽपि दुर्घटः ।
विकल्पतो वा तत्सिद्धिर्ब्रह्मसंसारिणोर्भवेत् ॥१२७५॥

And (this) name (*brahmavidyā*) also would be difficult to explain even though it has both the Ātman and the non-Ātman as the subject-matter[1] of discussion. (One might argue:) Or, perhaps, that (name, viz. *brahmavidyā*) would get established with reference to the Brahman and the transmigratory being optionally. [1275]

[1]This is the meaning of *nimitta* on the authority of SP and NKL which hold *nimitta* = *viṣaya*. The word *ātmānātmanimitta* would literally mean 'caused by (or arisen on account of) the Ātman and the non-Ātman'.

न चार्धवैशसं युक्तं तत्त्वज्ञाने विवक्षिते ।
संशयो हि तथा श्रोतुः स्यादनिश्चितवाक्यतः ॥१२७६॥

(The answer is:) It is not at all (*ca*) proper to adopt half-killing[1] when it is intended (to secure/expound) the knowledge of Reality, since, from a statement wherein there is no certainty,[2] there would be on the part of a listener (only) doubt about that (viz. Reality). [1276]

[1] 'One cannot cook one half of a chicken, keeping the other half alive for further regeneration.' This is *ardhavaiśasa*.
[2]That literally means: where there is *vikalpa* 'option'.

निश्चितं फलवज्ज्ञानं यस्य स्यादिति शास्त्रतः ।
न तु संशयितं यस्मात्संशयात्मा विनश्यति ॥१२७७॥

(This is so) on the basis of the Śruti[1], viz. knowledge is fruitful (in the case of him) whose (knowledge) is ascertained (i.e. proceeds from decision)[2]; but not that which is beset with doubt, because (it is said in the Smṛti,) One who entertains doubts perishes ...[3] [1277]

[1]Cf. CU 3.14.4: *yasya syād addhā na vicikitsāsti.*
[2]The word *niścitam* is misprinted in AnSS as *niścittam.*
[3]Cf. *Gītā* 4.40.

परमात्मन्ययुक्ता चेत्साधकत्वादिकल्पना ।
शास्त्रोपालम्भतो नेवं शास्त्रीयेयं प्रकल्पना ॥१२७८॥

[Verses 1278-1283 point out that the word *brahman* signifies the Brahman (i.e. *mukhya-brahman*).]

If (one argues:) The notion of being an aspirant (for liberation) on the part of the Supreme Self[1] is improper, (our answer is:) No, it is not so, for that (argument) would give blame to the this Śruti; this is indeed a notion entertained[2] by the Śruti. [1278]

The argument is: The Śruti statement *tad ātmānam evāvet* (CU 1.4.10) points to the Brahman as the agent of *jānāti-kriyā* and, as such, it is unreasonable to hold that liberation results from knowing an agent of some action! This explains the word *akṣama* in the nextd verse.

[1]Namely, *brahmabhāvī jīvaḥ iti kalpanā.*
[2]As will be clear: 'owing to ignorance'; cf. the next two verses.

अक्षमा भवतः केयं साधकत्वप्रकल्पने ।
किं न पश्यसि संसारं तत्रैवाज्ञानकल्पितम् ॥१२७९॥

(An objector argues:) What kind of (*kā*) inability is this on

your part, with respect to the notion[1] of (the Brahman itself) being an aspirant (for liberation)? (We answer:) Why! Do you not see this world which is imagined by ignorance resting as it is only on that (Brahman)[2]? — (this is what we hold!). [1279]

[1]It means: you cannot entertain.
[2]*tatra* is equal to *paramātmani* in the preceding verse.

अनात्मवस्तु यत्किंचित्तद्ब्रह्मानवबोधतः ।
ब्रह्मण्येव समध्यस्तं शुक्तिकारजतादिवत् ॥१२८०॥

Whatever is a non-Ātman object, is (what exists) thanks to non-knowing of (the nature of) the Brahman; (that) is superimposed on the Brahman itself, in the same way as silver on a conch-shell etc.,[1] (for example). [1280]

[1]The word *ādi* refers to *rajjusarpa*, *mṛgatṛṣṇikā* and such other well-known examples.

यस्मादेवमतो ऽशेषसंसारानर्थकल्पना-
निदानबहुलाज्ञानसमुच्छित्त्यै परा श्रुतिः ॥१२८१॥

Since this is so, therefore, the subsequent Śruti proceeds with the purpose of destroying the ignorance (about the nature of the Ātman) as a potent remedy against the undesirable notion of this entire transmigratory existence. [1281]

We take *aśeṣasaṃsāra* ... up to *samucchityai* as one word and not two, in this we follow the NKL edition of the BUBV not the AnSS edition. Also read SP: *-svāvidyādhvaṃsi brahma-vidyārthatvenārabdheti* ...

ब्रह्मेतिब्रह्मशब्देन कृत्स्नं वस्त्वभिधीयते ।
प्रकृतस्यात्मकात्स्न्र्यस्य वैशब्दः स्मृतये मतः ॥१२८२॥

(In the Śruti text referring to) the Brahman, it is the (one) whole object that is signified by the word *brahman* and the

word *vai* (in the same text) is understood for the remembrance of the wholeness of the Ātman which is the subject matter of discussion. [1282]

Cf. *brahma vā idam agra āsīt* (CU 1.4.10).

प्रकृतार्थोपरोधाच्च मुख्यब्रह्मार्थलाभतः ।
यथोक्तदोषाभावाच्च ब्रह्म कृत्स्नमिहास्त्वतः ॥१२८३॥

(Therefore), lest there should be opposition (*uparodha*) to what is taken up for discussion, (and) owing to the profit (which should accrue) from accepting the meaning of the principal Brahman and also because (in so doing) there should be absence of faults as stated before,[1] let here be (understood) the whole Brahman (as the thing meant). [1283]

The argument is: The word *brahman* signifies the Ātman without duality (*advaya*).

[1]By Śaṅkara in BUB, viz. *prakṛtahānāprakṛtaprakriyāprasaṅga*, *mukhyārthabādha* and *upoddhātadoṣa*. Refer to verses 1203-1209 above.

In verses 1284-1311, Sureśvara states and refutes the argument against the wholeness of the Brahman.

ननु मानादिविरहादकृत्स्नमपि नेष्यते ।
कुतः कात्स्न्र्यं यतः सर्वं मानादेव प्रसिद्ध्यति ॥१२८४॥

(An objector argues:) But, even a thing, which is not whole, is not acceptable[1], if there is absence of any means (for proving its nature). Therefore, whence is this wholeness (of the Brahman proved)? Indeed, everything gets established (i.e. proven) on the basis of some means of knowing. [1284]

This verse, i.e. the objection, proceeds from resentment against *yathoktadoṣābhāvāt* in the preceding verse.

[1]This literally means: accepted.

अभ्युपेतौ च मानादेस्तस्य कात्स्न्र्यं विहन्यते ।
न हि ब्रह्मातिरिक्ते ऽर्थे सति संभाव्यते ऽजडैः ॥१२८५॥

And, in case (such) means is accepted (as existing), the wholeness of that (Brahman) is stultified, because, when there exists an object in addition (to the Brahman), the intelligent do not hold that it is the Brahman. [1285]

The Advaitin is held as an intelligent person. There is obvious derision intended by the opponent, because, if the Advaitin were to accept that there are means of knowing the Brahman as apart from the Brahman, that would give lie to his proposition that the Brahman was alone.

भिन्नाभिन्नत्ववादे ऽपि ब्रह्माभिन्नात्मना भवेत् ।
व्यावृत्तेर्न तु भिन्नेषु ब्रह्मता स्याद्घटादिवत् ॥१२८६॥

Even in the theory that (the Brahman and the transmigratory world) are distinct and non-distinct, there would be the Brahman which remains undifferentiated in nature; and because of their distinction (from the Brahman) there would not be (in the dissimilar objects) the nature of the Brahman as established in the case of a pitcher etc. [1286]

In the case of a pitcher or a piece of cloth, we notice that though it may have some characteristics similar to those of a thing of its kind (*abhinna*) it is still distinct from it because of its peculiarity; some pitcher may be bigger than another, it may have a different colour; so also, a piece of cloth may be longer or shorter than another, it may be old or new in comparison with another and so on. This explains the word *ādi* 'etc.'.

वस्त्वन्तराभ्युपगमः प्रत्यक्कात्स्न्र्यविघातकृत् ।
न तु मानाभ्युपगमो मितेस्तदवसानतः ॥१२८७॥

(And) acceptance (of the inner self[1]) as something else than the Brahman would be an obstacle (to understanding) the wholeness/completeness of the inner self. However, acceptance

of the (different) means (does not obstruct) knowledge, because (their) end is that (viz. knowledge). [1287]

The first line reaffirms the oneness of the Brahman and the inner self. It emphasises that, if *bhedābhedavāda* were accepted, then the wholeness of the inner self (as seen in the sentence 'I am Brahman.') would be opposed. Thus *bhedābhedavāda* and Śaṅkara stand in opposition. The second line points out that the acceptance of the means of knowing does not bring about such an undesirable condition. Therefore, the means are understood to be there only up to the point when there results understanding of the nature of the Brahman or the inner self. That is to say: They do not really exist apart from the Brahman. There were notions of them held for the convenience of apprehension of their oneness.

[1]Supply: which is held to be subject to transmigratory existence.

वस्त्वन्तरस्य सद्भावः सिद्धे कात्स्न्र्ये विरुध्यते ।
मानाद्यपेक्षा सिद्धस्य नानुन्मत्तेन चोद्यते ॥१२८८॥

The existence of an object other than the real object (viz. Brahman) would be opposed when the wholeness (of the latter) is established (and the existence of) the means etc.[1] in the case of (an object whose existence) is established is not upheld by one who is not mad.[2] [1288]

[1]This stands for *mānameyavyavahāraḥ* which was understood in the preceding verse where the word *mānābhyupagamaḥ* is used.

[2]This amounts to the discontinuation of the *mānādivyavahāra* when the Reality is established; cf. *miti* in the preceding verse. Both, this verse and its preceding, indicate Śaṅkara's idea — That *pramāṇādivyavahāra* (= *mānādi* ... here) is also understood as a product of superimposition.

न चापि वास्तवी सिद्धिः प्रमात्रादिविरोधिनी ।
सत्यामेव यतस्तस्यां संसारानर्थविभ्रमः ॥१२८९॥

Establishing of Reality is not opposed to (the acceptance of)

the knower etc., since only when that comes to be (i.e. gets) established, (there arises) the superimposition on it of the undesirable transmigratory existence. [1289]

वास्तव्या अपि संसिद्धेः स्वमहिम्नैव नेष्यते ।
प्रमाणविरहात्सिद्धिरेतच्च स्वानुभूतितः ॥१२९०॥

Also, in the case of the self-established Reality, it is not accepted as what gets established in the absence of the various means of knowing, i.e. on its own strength, and this is (clearly known) from one's own experience. [1290]

मेयकात्स्न्यविरोधित्वान्न मितेः शङ्क्यते भिदा ।
मेयस्वरूपावसितेर्नान्या मानस्य मानता ॥१२९१॥

Not any doubt is entertained in respect of knowledge that it has a distinction (from the Brahman) because of its character of not having any opposition to the wholeness of the object of knowing, viz. the Brahman. The character of the means of knowing as a means is not distinct from that it culminates into (grasping) the true nature of the object of knowing. [1291]

Cf. verse 1287 above.

न हि मेयप्रतिस्पर्धि तन्मानं मेयबोधितः ।
मानप्रसादात्सिद्धं सत्स्पर्धते मितिबाधितैः ॥१२९२॥

(Indeed) that means of knowing is not vying with (i.e. is opposed to) the object of knowing, because the existent being established by the favour[1] of the means of knowing, the existent stands in opposition to (all the objects) which are stultified by knowledge. [1292]

[1]That is, power.

न हि वस्त्वनपाश्रित्य मानत्वं लभ्यते मितेः ।
वास्तव्या अपि संसिद्धेर्न सिद्धिः स्यात्प्रमां विना ॥१२९३॥

Indeed, without having recourse to the real object (i.e. the Brahman), knowledge cannot get the character of (the authoritative) means of knowing. The knowledge about Reality (viz. the Brahman) cannot be (thought of) as an established means[1] without knowledge. [1293]

[1]Supply: towards destruction of ignorance.

स्वप्रमेयार्पणं मुक्त्वा मानत्वे ऽन्यन्न कारणम् ।
अर्पितेन विरोधश्चेदस्तु कामं न दुष्यति ॥१२९४॥

There is no other ground for a means of knowing to be that (i.e. the means of knowing) unless it has yielded (i.e. led to the knowledge about) the object of its knowing (viz. the Brahman). If it is held that there is opposition to what is yielded (viz. knowledge), well, let it be so, it does not affect (our position). [1294]

प्राग्ज्ञानाज्ज्ञानकाले च मानं मेयो ऽप्यपेक्षते ।
प्रमाणकार्ये निर्वृत्ते नान्यत्किंचिदपेक्षते ॥१२९५॥

Even the object of knowing (in Vedānta, viz. the Ātman[1]) expects a means (of knowing it) before the knowledge (of it has dawned) and at the time of the knowing (of it); further, when the function of the means is accomplished[2], (the object of knowing) does not expect anything else (than itself). [1295]

[1]This is in view of *meyaḥ* in the masculine gender.
[2]That is, knowledge has occurred by using that means.

अज्ञातो ऽर्थः प्रमेयः स्याज्ज्ञाते को ऽतिशयो मितेः ।
अज्ञाते न विरोधो ऽस्ति ज्ञाते चान्यानपेक्षतः ॥१२९६॥

The object that is not known is taken to be the object of knowing. What excellence could there be in the knowledge when its object is already known? When (however) the object is not known, there does not exist any opposition[1] (of any kind); and when that (object) has become known, it has the

character of not being dependent on anything else (as the means of knowing it). [1296]

This reaffirms the thought in the preceding verse.

[1]Supply: to the existence (and consequent acceptance) of the means.

मेयासाधारणात्मोत्थज्ञानस्यैव प्रमाणतः ।
तस्य वस्त्वनुरोधित्वादभेदादविरोधिता ॥१२९७॥

Since (here in the theory of Advaita) the means of knowing is only the knowledge which arises from the object of knowing, i.e. the unique Ātman, and it has conformity with Reality, therefore, there is non-distinction (between the means of knowing and the object of knowing) and consequent absence of opposition. [1297]

पश्येदात्मानमित्यत्र नियोज्यो विषयाद्विरुक् ।
न लभ्यते यतो नात ऐकात्म्ये स्याद्विरुद्धता ॥१२९८॥

In the statement 'He should see the Ātman.', the person to be enjoined is not (really) found to be away from the object (to be seen); therefore, for this reason also, there would not be any opposition to his oneness (with the object of his knowing). [1298]

ब्रह्मश्रुतेश्च मुख्यो ऽर्थः प्रतीचो ऽन्यत्र दुर्लभः ।
यथाकथंचिदित्येतदतो नैवाभ्युपेयते ॥१२९९॥

The primary meaning of the Śruti about the Brahman (i.e. the sentence such as 'He should see the Ātman.') is in every way difficult to fix elsewhere than in the inner self; therefore this (viz. the supposed absence of the whole of the Brahman) is not accepted. [1299]

स्वत एवात्मनः कात्स्न्र्यान्न कात्स्न्र्यं साधनाश्रयात् ।
साधनायासतः प्राक्च ब्रह्मैवासीदितीरितम् ॥१३००॥

Since the wholeness of the Ātman exists by its own nature, that wholeness is not on account of any means (of producing it). (For) it is said that the Brahman did exist there even before the means became operative (towards the purpose of knowledge)[1]. [1300]

[1]This is to say: Since the Brahman is already existent, the so-called means of producing the knowledge about it cannot be said to have produced that Brahman.

आसीदित्यपि यः शब्दः स तन्मोहाद्यपेक्षया ।
वस्तुवृत्तमपेक्ष्यैतन्नासीदस्ति भविष्यति ॥१३०१॥

And even that word *āsīt* (is used in the Śruti) with an eye on[1] (or keeping in view) ignorance about it. (The verbs) *āsīt*, *asti* and *bhaviṣyati* (are) not used (by one) depending upon the happening in the case of the real object. [1301]

Sureśvara uses the word *vṛtta* in the sense of happening which requires cause the use of the verbs indicative of the past, the present and the future tenses while referring to the Brahman. There is no such happening in respect of the Brahman, i.e. it does not undergo any change; therefore, the indication of any tense in any proposition about it is ruled out.

[1]It literally means: in expectation of.

सदानुदितालुप्तैकज्ञानमूर्तिरिति त्वया ।
कुतो ऽज्ञायि विना मानान्मानं नाज्ञाततां विना ॥१३०२॥

(A question is asked:) Whence have you known that (the real Brahman) has a form which has not come into existence, which will not disappear, and which has the form of knowledge, unless without any means of knowing? — (And indeed) there cannot be a means (operating) without (having to make known) something which has the nature of being unknown. [1302]

एकं ब्रह्म सदा बुद्धं यथा मानानुभूतितः ।

As from the means (in the form of Śruti), experience and instruction by the learned this formerly not-known Brahman becomes known as ever unique (i.e. one without a second), so also (does it become known) by resorting to (mere) one's experience.[1]
[1303]

[1]This experience takes the form of 'I do not know.'.

व्युत्पत्तिफलमाश्रित्य तमो ऽसंभव उच्यते ।
व्युत्पत्तेः प्राक्तमस्वित्वं तत्साक्षित्वे ऽपि गम्यते ॥१३०४॥

Impossibility of (the existence of) ignorance is posited only after one resorts to the result of the knowledge arising from instruction. (This means:) Before knowledge from instruction (has occurred), there is understood (in the inner self which is really the Brahman) the state of having been overpowered by ignorance, even while it has the nature of the witness.
[1304]

This has reference to SV 176.

This is to indicate the wholeness of the inner self that is equal to that of the Brahman and also to explain away the association of ignorance with the inner self.

AnSS reads *tamosaṃbhava*, wrongly.

स्वसत्तयात्मनो मोहं न यतो वस्तु हन्त्यतः ।
शास्त्रानारम्भदोषो ऽपि नैवास्मान्प्रति ढौकते ॥१३०५॥

Since the real object does not destroy ignorance on the part of the inner self by its existence, therefore even the fault of not-beginning the study of the Śruti also does not affect us.
[1305]

This pertains to a fault pointed out earlier, viz. the inutility of Śāstric study.

SP refers to BSB 1.1.4 (cf. p.154): *śāstrotthajñānād ajñānadhvasteḥ śāstrārambho 'rthavān iti samanvayādhikaraṇe sthitam ity arthaḥ.*

अनादेरपि बाधश्चेत्तमसो नाभ्युपेयते ।
प्रमाणानां प्रमाणत्वं न क्वचिद्वः प्रसिद्ध्यति ॥१३०६॥

And if the removal of ignorance, which is beginningless, is also not accepted (by the opponent), (then, in that case, we have to say to him:) For you there will not be anywhere any means of knowing which has the character of the means of knowing. [1306]

The means of knowing informs one of something not known before, therefore, if the Śruti sentence is held as not capable of removing ignorance and thereby conveying the nature of the Brahman, then it has to be declared as totally non-productive of any effect.

अनुभूतेस्तदज्ञातं सिद्धं ब्रह्म पुरा मितेः ।
अपास्ताज्ञानतत्कार्यं तत्तु मानात्प्रसिद्ध्यति ॥१३०७॥

(One would say:) That Brahman, which was not-known before it was made known (by the Śruti), was (already or in reality) established by experience, but it can get (or gets) established by means of knowledge, as one from which is removed ignorance and its effect(s). [1307]

The thrust of the argument which is refuted is: There is no need of any *pramāṇa* (or Śruti) for getting to know the Brahman.

पूर्वोक्त्यैवोत्तरेषां च दोषाणां परिहारतः ।
परिहारान्तरं तस्मान्न वाच्यं तत्प्रसिद्धितः ॥१३०८॥

(And we answer thus:) Since there is (already) a refutation of these later (shown) faults by our earlier arguments,[1] therefore yet another argument (for their refutation) has not to be adduced (lit. stated), since that can be effected by the same (automatically). [1308]

[1]Sureśvara has in mind his argument against some doubt raised

by the opponent earlier in verse 1087 above.

प्रतीचो ऽर्थस्य ज्ञेयत्वादनवस्था च नेष्यते ।
अकारकस्य कौटस्थ्याद्विरोधो नात्मदर्शने ॥१३०९॥

Since the object to be known is the inner self, it is not possible (lit. accepted) that there is *infinite regress*. So also, there is no contradiction in (stating about the) seeing of the self since the Brahman/Ātman which is (in reality) not an agent of any action is immutable.[1]
[1309]

[1]Since the inner self is self-illuminating, there is not involved any contradiction (i.e. *svaprakāśatvān na svātmani kriyāvirodhaḥ*).

घटादिमेयसाधर्म्ये निषेधो ऽपि श्रुतीरितः ।
यथोक्तावगमत्वं तु न कथंचिन्निवार्यते ॥१३१०॥

In respect of the similarity of (the Brahman/inner self) with a pitcher as an object of knowing also there is rejection stated in the Śruti. But, in no way, the character (of the Brahman) as what becomes known, as stated before, cannot be negated.
[1310]

The objector compared the statement *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyo mantavyo śrotavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ* ... to a popular statement *ghaṭo draṣṭavyaḥ*. Thereby he means to point out the contradiction involved in the Śruti statement. Thus, like a *ghaṭa*, the Brahman should be considered as impermanent, while the Śruti describes it as permanent! The answer is: Yet, the Śruti statement *vijñātāram are kena vijānīyāt* has negated any seeing of the object.

तस्मान्न कश्चिदप्यत्र कात्स्न्र्यात्मावगमे भवेत् ।
दोषो ऽतः सांप्रतं भाष्यग्रन्थं व्याचक्ष्महे स्फुटम् ॥१३११॥

Therefore, here in understanding the wholeness (of the Ātman/Brahman) there is not (lit. would not be) any fault whatever. As such, we shall now clarify the text of the Bhāṣya.
[1311]

Verses 1312-1350 explain BUB: 'tat praviṣṭaḥ sraṣṭṛ brahma' with respect to BU 1.4.7: 'sa eṣa iha praviṣṭaḥ'.

यत्स्रष्टृ ब्रह्म पूर्वोक्तं स्वात्ममोहैकवर्त्मना ।
कार्यं चैतन्यबिम्बेन प्रविष्टं जलचन्द्रवत् ॥१३१२॥
ब्रह्मेति ब्रह्मशब्देन तदेवात्राभिधीयते ।
तस्य यो ऽतिशयः प्रोक्तो व्याकृताव्याकृतात्मकः ।
इदमित्युच्यते ब्रह्म तदुपाधिस्वभावकम् ॥१३१३॥

By the word *brahman* is here referred to that very Brahman which was earlier stated as the creator by following the way of ignorance about its own nature, (and which is now mentioned here as) the effect like the moon in the water that appears to have has entered (into it) with her real orb.[1] [1312-1313ab] In the word *idam* is mentioned that Brahman[2] which has the nature of its delimiting adjunts, viz. that excellence which was mentioned as having the form of the differentiated and the non-differentiated. [1313c-f]

tasya yo ... in verse 1313 explains BUB *idaṃ śarīrastham* ...

[1]This refers to *bimba-pratibimba* illustration; here the real entry is denied.

[2]Cf. NKL: *dehadvayāvacchinnam brahma idampadapratipādyam ity arthaḥ.*

वैशब्दो ऽवधृतौ ज्ञेयो ब्रह्मैव न तदन्यथा ।
अनिर्ज्ञातात्मतत्त्वं सदब्रह्मैवावभाति तत् ॥१३१४॥

(In the statement in the Bhāṣya), the word *vai* is to be understood in the sense of emphasis/specification. (That is to say that it conveys) only the Brahman and not anything else, being what has its true nature not-known, (and) it appears only as the non-Brahman. [1314]

This is another meaning as given by BUB *vaiśabdo 'vadhāraṇārthaḥ.*

यदिदंशब्दधीगम्यं सम्यग्ज्ञानोदयात्पुरा ।

अपि ब्रह्मैव तत्कृत्स्नं तन्मोहादतथेक्ष्यते ॥१३१५॥

Whatever is understood from the meaning of the word *idam* is only that whole Brahman; even before the rise of the knowledge of Reality. But, owing to ignorance about it, it is seen as otherwise. [1315]

This is to re-iterate the meaning of the word *idam* and to explain the sentence in the Bhāṣya beginning with *prāk*.

रज्जुवत्तदविज्ञानात्सर्पदण्डादिनेक्ष्यते ।
ब्रह्मेदंमात्रश्रवणात्कुतो ऽग्र इति भण्यते ॥१३१६॥

That (viz. the Brahman) is understood through ignorance (about it) like a rope (being seen) as a serpent or a stick etc. Now only on hearing the word *brahmedam* (the question arises:) Why is it said (that there was the Brahman) before (*agre*)? It is (now) said (in answer): [1316]

सूत्रान्तजगतो व्यक्तेः प्राक्तनः काल उच्यते ।
यद्वै तदिति तच्चापि स्पष्टमूर्ध्वं प्रवक्ष्यते ॥१३१७॥

Here is mentioned that time (which was) before the appearance of this transmigratory world that ends with the Sūtrātman (i.e. Hiraṇyagarbha) and that will again be clearly stated later in the words *yad vai tat* ...[1] [1317]

[1]Cf. BU 4.3.26.

नाविद्यासंगतिस्तत्र तदकार्यत्वहेतुतः ।
तमोजस्यापि कार्यस्य न प्रतीच्यस्त्यकारणात् ॥१३१८॥

There, in that case there is no association of ignorance since it does not have the nature of an effect. Also, the effect of what is produced from ignorance is not (associated) with the inner self, because it is not its cause.[1] [1318]

[1]The argument is: Ignorance is not the cause of the inner self

and therefore is ruled out its association with the latter which could be in accordance with the maxim regarding *kāryakāraṇa-saṃgati*.

प्रत्यक्तयात्मसंबन्धान्मोहादेश्चिन्निभात्मता ।
आचिच्छेषादतो नासौ मृषा स्याद्धर्मकार्यवत् ॥१३१९॥

Since, being within the body, ignorance etc.[1] has connection with the Ātman (and) has similarity of nature with sentience; therefore, till when there remains (only) sentience, it is not false in the same way as an activity in ritual (is not false).[2] [1319]

[1]The word etc. refers to the products of ignorance.

[2]On the *vyāvahārika* leval, the ritual and all its pre-requisites such as qualification of a performer, the deity, the result are taken to be real. This is acceptance of *dvaita*. Similarly, *moha* etc. are taken to be real. This is only hypothetical acceptance!

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यसंबोधान्नान्यो हेतुः समीक्ष्यते ।
निरन्वयविनाशाय यो ऽलं संसाररूपिणः ॥१३२०॥

There is no other cause than the knowledge of the true nature of the inner self to be seen as what is capable of destroying completely[1] all that exists in the form of transmigratory existence. [1320]

This verse emphasises that only the knowledge of the inner self can remove ignorance.

[1]It literally means: destroying it in such a way that there is no remainder left of it.

कौटस्थ्यासंगतो नास्य मोहतत्कार्यसंगतिः ।
स्वतः सेद्धुमशक्तत्वान्मोहादेरात्मसंगतिः ॥१३२१॥

On account of its immutability and non-association (with anything else),[1] this one has no association with ignorance and its effect(s). And, in the case of ignorance etc., there

is no association of them with the Ātman, because they have incapacity to establish themselves, on their own. [1321]

[1]For there really does not exist that. *asaṅga* is for *asaṅgatva*.

काष्ण्र्येनेव वियद्योगः खवृत्तापेक्षया त्वसन् ।
आत्मनैवं तमोयोगो नात्मवृत्तानुरोधतः ॥१३२२॥

(As) in the case of the sky, there is association with darkness etc. though it (the latter) is not in existence by its (i.e. of the sky's) own doing, in the same way there is no association of ignorance with the Ātman; (indeed) not following its own doing. [1322]

Refer to Adhyāsabhāṣya (p.39): *apratyakṣe 'py hy ākāśe bālās talamalinatādy adhyasyanti.*

अन्यतः संगतिः सेयमविचारितसिद्धिका ।
अविज्ञातचिदुत्सङ्गसंस्थैवेयम् न वस्तुनि ॥१३२३॥

This so far talked about (*seyam*) association of the Ātman with another (viz. the non-Ātman) gets established by the absence of proper thought (reasoning); this is (indeed) supported on the basis (lit. lap) of sentience which is not known[1]; (and) this is not (supported) by the real object. [1323]

[1]It means: before the proper knowledge of it has arisen from the understanding of the Śruti.

अविद्याद्वारिकाप्यस्य संगतिर्नाञ्जसेष्यते ।
निरात्मकपरार्थत्वहेतुभ्यां शुक्तिरूप्यवत् ॥१३२४॥

And even the association of this (Ātman with the non-Ātman), though (understood) through ignorance, does not follow smoothly because (it is like the association) of a shell and silver[1] for two reasons, viz. (i)that it does not have any essence[2] and (ii)that it exists for the benefit of another.[3] [1324]

[1]This use of suffix *vat* after *śuktirūpya* is according to Pāṇini Sūtra 5.1.116: *tatra tasyeva*.

[2]It means: the character of a real thing.

[3]Like Prakṛti, every non-Ātman is *parārtha* as in the Sāṃkhya view.

प्रत्यग्रूपातिरेकेण नान्यद्रूपमनात्मनः ।
वादिभिर्युक्तिभिः शक्यं क्वचित्साधयितुं सदा ॥१३२५॥

It is not at all possible for the opponents ever to establish with reasons that the non-Ātman has a form beside that of the inner self. [1325]

This is to explain the idea of *nirātmakatva* of the preceding verse.

कूटस्थादितमोन्तेन नित्यमव्यतिरेकतः ।
बुद्ध्यादेर्विषयान्तस्य नित्यमेतदतो जगत् ॥१३२६॥

Therefore, owing to its being non-different (*avyatirekataḥ*) from the immutable, the beginning (of all) and (the one) ending with ignorance, is eternal this transmigratory world, beginning with intellect and ending with the object(s). [1326]

This is to explain the Śruti *sad eva somyedam agra āsīt*; for justifying the pseudo-identity of the Reality and the world.

अतो ऽविद्यामहानिद्रासंवीतमनसामसौ ।
जन्मादिविक्रियाषट्कं स्वप्नदर्शनविभ्रमः ॥१३२७॥

For this reason, there is on the part of persons whose mind is wrapped up in deep sleep of ignorance, that error, viz. seeing dreams, consisting in six modifications beginning with the birth[1]. [1327]

[1]Cf. BSB 1.1.2. This refers to what Yāska has said about six *bhāvavikāras* (*Nirukta* 1.2).

यथा व्याख्यातबाह्यार्थप्रधानो ऽसंहतो ऽप्रमः ।
सर्वप्रमाणभाक्तद्वत्प्रमाणाभासभागपि ॥१३२८॥

As an individual, since he attaches[1] significance to all eternal objects, is not connected (with Reality/Ātman) (and) is without proper knowledge, experiences (i.e. uses) all the means of knowing; so (does he experience) the semblance of the means of knowledge (as well). [1328]

The NKL edition uses *yathāvyākhyātabāhyārthapradhānaḥ* as one word. Translation follows the AnSS edition: *yathā* and *vyākhyāta-* as two words.

[1]It literally means: explains.

अविचारितसंसिद्धि तमोवत्स्यात्तदुद्भवम् ।
कृत्स्नं जगदतो मोहध्वस्तौ ध्वस्तं भवेच्चितिः ॥१३२९॥

Therefore, the entire transmigratory world is (lit. would be) like ignorance established in the absence of thought (reasoning), produced as it is from it (=ignorance). Therefore, when ignorance is destroyed the entire world would be destroyed and (become) knowledge. [1329]

[1]Cf. SP: *jñānād ajñānadhvastau tajjatvād dhvastaṃ jagac citir eva syād ity arthaḥ.*

भिन्नमातृप्रमाणादौ कार्यकारणवस्तुनि ।
अभिन्नमातृमानादिरात्मैवैको ऽद्वयः स्वतः ॥१३३०॥

While the things[1] are differentiated as the effects and the causes, viz. as various knowers and the means of knowing etc., only the Ātman, one without duality, is by its nature one that is not differentiated as knowers, the means of knowing etc. [1330]

[1]In the text *vastuni* is *jātāv ekavacanam*; things refer to the world.

न देशकालावस्थादावपेक्षास्त्यात्मनः स्वतः ।
अनन्यापेक्षसंसिद्धेर्देशादेस्तदपेक्षतः ॥१३३१॥

On the part of the Ātman itself, there is not any dependence on region, time, condition etc.[1] since it is not established through dependence on any other (thing), whereas the region etc. depend on the same[2]. [1331]

[1]The word etc. stands for the producer and that which informs one of it.
[2]*tat* refers to *anya*.

देशकालनिमित्तादिव्यपेक्षं वस्तु यद्भवेत् ।
तदेव तदपेक्षं स्यान्न तु देशादिसिद्धिदम् ॥१३३२॥

Whatever thing would be (lit. is) dependent on region, time, condition etc.[1], would expect that[2] and (*tu*) it does not give rise to region etc. [1332]

[1]See note 1 on the preceding verse.
[2]It refers to *deśakālādi*.

प्रमात्राद्युत्थितेरग्रे ब्रह्मैवासीद्यथोदितम् ।
यतस्ततो न साध्यं तज्ज्ञानकर्मादिसाधनैः ॥१३३३॥

Since, before the rise of (the notions) such as the knower etc.[1], there was only the Brahman in the beginning, as stated earlier, therefore, it is not what is to be accomplished by such means as knowledge, activity etc. [1333]

[1]SP explains that by *ādi* is understood the intention of producing something (*bhāvanā*).

ब्रह्मापि तत्स्वतः साक्षात्तदबोधैकहेतुतः ।
इदंरूपं समापेदे रशनेवाहिरूपताम् ॥१३३४॥

And even that Brahman, on its own, transformed itself (into the form of this (transmigratory world) owing only to not-knowing about itself, like a girdle changes into the form of a serpent. [1334]

Such occurrence is due to ignorance on the part of a worldly knower.

अविद्याफलकारूढं तदेवंरूपकं परम् ।
ब्रह्म विद्याधिकारित्वं द्वैविध्यात्प्रतिपद्यते ॥१३३५॥

That highest (Brahman, when it has) mounted on the raft (in the form) of ignorance[2], comes to have (i.e. assumes) such forms[1], attains eligibility for (receiving) instruction[3] because of its (assumed) dual nature.[4] [1335]

[1]The use of the compound *evaṃ-rūpakam* refers to *rūpaka* in the contemporary world of drama.
[2]It is explained in the note on the preceding verse.
[3]It is the Śāstric instruction regarding the Brahman.
[4]See the next verse for the explanation of this.

स्वतो मुक्तं यतस्तस्माद्ब्रह्म विद्याम् तदर्हति ।
संसारित्वमविद्यातो मुमुक्षुत्वं ततो भवेत् ॥१३३६॥

Since it is by its very nature free[1], that Brahman is eligible for (receiving) that instruction. The state of transmigratory existence (in the case of the Brahman) is owing to ignorance (and), for that reason, there would arise a desire to be liberated. [1336]

The word *dvaividhya* used in verse 1335 is explained in the second half of this verse.
[1]That is, in the state of release.

Up to the end of verse 1336 Sureśvara has explained the sentence 'brahmevedam agra āsīt' in BU. And now follows the explanation of the word tat in the subsequent sentence.

अध्यात्ममधिभूतं च तथा चैवाधिदैवतम् ।
परं तदभिमानेद्धं तच्छब्देनाभिधीयते ॥१३३७॥

That highest (Brahman), which is inflamed (i.e. affected) by Ego with reference to what is existing in bodies, what in elements, and what in deities, is expressed by the word *tat*. [1337]

हिरण्यगर्भतां नीत्वा कृत्स्नमध्यात्मरूपकम् ।
तस्मै हिरण्यगर्भाय ब्रूयाद्विद्यां तमस्विने ॥१३३८॥

Having led the entire (world) of forms in the bodies to the status of Hiraṇyagarbha, let one[1] declare that instruction[2] to that Hiraṇyagarbha who is wrapped by ignorance. [1338]

This has a reference to the earlier portions of BU talking about Hiraṇyagarbha existing in every individual sacrificer. Sureśvara has already referred to the *sūtrānta jagat* in verse 1317 above.

[1]This refers to the knower of the Brahman.

[2]Regarding the nature of the Brahman.

एवं निःशेषसंसारप्रत्याख्यानेन निर्वृतिम् ।
सर्वाविद्यापनिह्नुत्या विद्यया प्रतिपद्यते ॥१३३९॥

Thus, one obtains the highest delight by discarding (the notion) of the entire transmigratory existence, and by (acquiring) the instruction which effects destruction (lit. concealment) of all ignorance. [1339]

आत्मानात्मात्मकं विश्वं प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणकम् ।
आत्मानमेव तदवेन्निष्ठां कात्स्न्र्यात्मनः पराम् ॥१३४०॥

That (Brahman) knew (this) world consisting of Ātman and non-Ātman objects having for it the direct perception and other means, i.e. in fact itself, the highest basis of its nature of totality. [1340]

This explains the meaning of the sentence *tad ātmānam avet*. It is the Brahman which receives the instruction as said before and comes to realise only itself as the basis of all supposed duality.

अविचारितसंसिद्धि सर्वानर्थैककारणम् ।
प्रत्यङ्मात्रैकसाक्षित्वात्तमस्तत्प्रत्यगात्मनि ॥१३४१॥
प्रतीच्येव यतो ऽज्ञानमतस्तत्तत्त्वविद्यया ।
सकार्ये तमसि ध्वस्त आत्मैवैको ऽवशिष्यते ॥१३४२॥

Ignorance (lit. darkness) on the part of the inner self has got established (only) in the absence of thought (and) has been the sole cause of all undesirable effects, on account of its being experienced only by the inner self. [1341]
Since, ignorance rests only in the inner self, therefore, by knowing the true nature of that, there remains only the Ātman, when ignorance together with its effects, is destroyed. [1342]

विरक्तः सर्वसंसारान्निविवृत्सुः स्वतस्ततः ।
संसारानलसंतप्तस्तद्विरुद्धं परीप्सति ॥१३४३॥

That individual, who has turned averse to all transmigratory existence, himself desiring to withdraw[1] from that (and) then tormented by the fire of the transmigratory existence, wishes to embrace fully what is opposed to that[1]. [1343]

The metaphorical expression *saṃsārānalasaṃtaptaḥ* forces the use of embracing what is cool in opposition to the fire of transmigratory existence.

[1]The word 'that' in both the cases refers to 'transmigratory existence'.

तस्याकृत्स्नापवादेन कृत्स्नैकात्म्यावबुद्धये ॥१३४४॥
अन्वयव्यतिरेकाख्यो व्यापारो विहितः पुरा ।
आत्मेत्येवेति विधिना पराक्प्रत्यग्विवेककृत् ॥१३४५॥

(Therefore), in order that the complete uniqueness of the Ātman is understood by explaining away (i.e. disproving) the incom- pleteness of that (transmigratory existence), [1344]

the Śruti has earlier made an effort[1], called (adoption of the method of) Anvaya and Vyatireka in the statement (lit. injunction) *ātmety eva* which makes difference between what is outside and what is within.[2] [1345]

[1]It literally means: activity.
[2]This refers to the Brahman and the inner self.

ऐकात्म्यं वीक्ष्यते तेन त्यक्त्वा सर्वाननात्मनः ।
कृत्स्नमेव यतो वस्तु तदन्यत्तदबोधजम् ॥१३४६॥

Thereby is expressed (lit. seen) by one the uniqueness of the Ātman, after one has abandoned all non-Ātman (objects); for, Reality is one whole thing and anything else than that is (but) the product of the absence of knowledge. [1346]

[1]The word *tena* refes to *vyāpāra* in the preceding verse.

कृत्स्नं पश्येदिति ततो वाक्यं वस्तुनि वर्तते ।
प्रविष्टो ऽकृत्स्नरूपत्वात्संसारानर्थचोदितः ।
आत्मेत्यनेन कृत्स्नात्मदर्शनाय नियुज्यते ॥१३४७॥

For that reason, the sentence 'He should see the whole.' has reference to the real thing[1] (and) the one that has entered into it and (therefore) is urged by the undesirable effects of the transmigratory existence, and, as such, on account of its own incomplete/defective form enjoined on one to be seen as the complete Ātman (viz. the Brahman) in (the sentence) *ātmetyeva* ... [1347]

This explains the *vyākṛtāvyākṛta* forms of the Brahman, or, in other words, *dvaividhya* of the Brahman mentioned in verse 1335 above.

[1]Locative case is objective in sense (*viṣayasaptamī*).

कृत्स्न आत्मेत्यतो वाक्यात्तथारूपं दिदृक्षति ।
अन्योन्यार्थसमाप्तित्वान्न भेदो ऽत्र पदार्थयोः ॥१३४८॥

Therefore, from the sentence *kṛtsna ātmā*,[1] an individual becomes desirous to see (the Ātman) of that nature; there is no difference between the two things,[2] since they satisfy the need of each other. [1348]

[1]BU 4.5.13.

[2]These refer to the Ātman, i.e. the inner self and the Brahman, the highest Reality.

अकृत्स्नानात्मनः सर्वान्कृत्स्नांश्चानात्मनस्तथा ।
अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां तथा कृत्स्नाननात्मनः ॥१३४९॥
निर्माल्यवत्परित्यज्य चैतन्याभासवर्त्मना ।
अनुमीयात्मनात्मानं कृत्स्नात्मानं प्रपश्यति ॥१३५०॥

Then, accordingly (*tathā*), an individual, (having first made between) all incomplete Ātmans[1] and all complete non-Ātmans by (adopting) the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka and then, [1349]
having abandoned all incomplete non-Ātmans like once-used-flowers, and then, following the path (shown by) the flash of sentience[2], thereby pleasing the Ātman (viz. Brahman) himself, finally sees himself (as) the full Ātman (viz. Brahman). [1350]

[1]This refers to the individual selves.

[2]This refers to *prāṇopāsanā*.

उक्तदोषापनुत्त्यर्थं प्रत्युक्तिर्गौरवी त्वियम् ।
ब्रह्म वा इदमित्यादिर्नीतो दोषो ऽत्र कश्चन ॥१३५१॥

[Verses 1351-1364 are an exposition of *tad ātmānam evāvet*.]

The weighty answer (of the Śruti)[1] which begins with the words *brahma vā idam* is (intended) for the removal of the fault stated (in the introductory) and, therefore, there is not any fault in this (statement) whatever. [1351]

[1]This can be alternatively translated as: the teacher's statement —

this on the basis of a footnote by the editor of NKL. But the reply-sentence is: *brahma vā idam agra āsīt, tad ātmānam evāvet, aham brahmāsmīti, tasmāt tat sarvam abhavat.*

प्रमेयं यत्पुरा पृष्टं तद्ब्रह्म किमवेदिति ।
सर्वं चाप्यभवद्यस्माज्ज्ञानं ज्ञेयं च भण्यते ॥१३५२॥

In the question, 'What did the Brahman know?,' the subject (matter) of the discussion was first sought and in the statement 'And it became all.' is stated what is knowledge and the means of knowing (it).' [1352]

तद्ब्रह्मात्मानमेवावेन्मेयं मानं च भण्यते ।
आत्मा मेयस्तथा मानमात्मप्रत्यय एव तु ॥१३५३॥

In the statement 'That Brahman knew only itself.', there are stated both the object of knowing and the (actual) knowledge. The Ātman is thus the object of knowing and the means of knowing is the awareness of the Ātman within. [1353]

नात्मज्ञानाद्यतो ऽज्ञानं विद्यते ऽनात्मनस्ततः ।
नात्मयाथात्म्यविज्ञानाज्ज्ञानमन्यदनात्मनः ॥१३५४॥

Since ignorance does not continue to be there on the part of a non-Ātman, after the knowledge of the Ātman has occurred to it, therefore, there is no knowledge for the non-Ātman other than the knowledge about the true nature of the Ātman (viz. Brahman). [1354]

This implies that a non-Ātman cannot exist apart from the Ātman.

प्रमात्रादिविभागेन यज्ज्ञानं प्रथते क्वचित् ।
तज्जन्मनः पुरेवार्थो न तेन ज्ञायते ऽञ्जसा ॥१३५५॥

Whatever and wherever occurs (some) knowledge as divisible into the knower etc.,[1] even before the rise of that, the real object (has existed) and therefore it is not smoothly known by that (knowledge[2]). [1355]

[1]This refers to knowledge and the means and the object of knowing.

[2]Namely, that which is mentioned in the first part of the verse.

तमोमात्रावसायित्वान्न यथावस्तु तत्ततः ।
प्रत्यग्वस्त्वात्मकत्वे ऽपि चित्रमज्ञानचेष्टितम् ॥१३५६॥

Since that (knowledge[1]) culminates into ignorance alone, it is not in accordance with the real thing; and, even if it is of the nature of the inner self, it is indeed the wonderful doing or effect of ignorance!

[1356]

[1]Which is referred to in the preceding verse.

यत्प्रसादात्तमःसिद्धिस्तत्स्वसाक्ष्यप्यपह्नुते ।
तमो ऽप्यनुभवादेव प्राक्तद्व्युत्पत्तिजन्मनः ॥१३५७॥

That (knowledge[1]), viz. its (own) witness (or seer) through whose favour (i.e. help) is ignorance (lit. darkness) established,[2] conceals even that; ignorance also results from (one's) experience and it occurs before the rise of the knowledge[3] of that.

[1357]

This verse explains the power of darkness in concealing the nature of the inner self: (i)the experience of a worldly being and (ii)the knowledge of its true nature.

[1]That which is mentioned in verse 1355 above.

[2]That is, becomes known; not through experience.

[3]The word *vyutpatti* means knowledge coming from instruction hat is based on *mānameya* relation . Ignorance prevailed before *mānavyāpāra*.

प्राक्प्रवृत्तेः प्रमाणानामज्ञातं यदिहोदितम् ।
अक्षादि तत्तमोबाधान्न मानं रज्जुसर्पवत् ॥१३५८॥

Whatever is mentioned as sense-organs etc. was not known before the activity of the various means of knowing on account

of the obstruction by darkness[1] — (and) that[2] is not therefore the (correct/right) means of knowing like a serpent in (the knowing of) a rope. [1358]

[1]That is, ignorance.
[2]It refers to *akṣādipramāṇa*.

न पश्यन्तीत्यतः प्राह बोद्धृत्वादिसमन्वयम् ।
न हि मोहैकनिष्ठेन तद्धीनं वस्तु मीयते ॥१३५९॥

Therefore, in the (sentence) *na taṃ paśyanti* the Śruti has declared the connection (of the Ātman) with the capacity of a knower etc.[1] Indeed, one who is given to[2] ignorance cannot see what is devoid of that[3]. [1359]

The verse explains the meaning of Śruti *taṃ na paśyanti* in BU 1.4.7.
[1]The notion of this and others like, the object of knowing, the means of knowing etc. are based on ignorance.
[2]It means: overpowered by.
[3]Namely, the thing not wrapped up in ignorance, or Reality.

आत्मानं विरहय्यान्यो नालमात्मावबुद्धये ।
असाधारणतन्मातृमानमेयात्मकत्वतः ॥१३६०॥

A person (lit. Another, viz. a non-Ātman) is not able to grasp (the nature of) the Ātman by keeping the Ātman aside,[1] since (the Ātman) is of the unique nature of (the unity of) the ensemble, viz. the knower, the means of knowing and the object of knowing. [1360]

[1]That is, by being *mohaikaniṣṭha* as said in the preceding verse, or not having received the favour of the Ātman.

असाधारणमात्रादि प्रत्यग्वस्तु यतस्ततः ।
नियोगो ऽपीह नायाति भिन्नकर्त्रादिगो ह्यसौ ॥१३६१॥

Since the real thing, viz. the inner self, is (itself) the unique

(unity of the) knower etc.[1], therefore, here (i.e. in the case of this one, viz. the inner self) there cannot occur any injunction also for the reason that (injunction) has a reference to diverse (things) such as the agent etc. [1361]

[1]As said in the preceding verse.

सर्वमज्ञातमेव स्याद्यस्मिन्नज्ञात आत्मनि ।
ज्ञाते ज्ञातं च तत्कात्स्न्र्यात्तावत्त्वात्सर्ववस्तुनः ॥१३६२॥

On account of all the objects forming a wholeness of that and being only of the dimention of that[1], all would remain unknown indeed (*hi*) if this Ātman (the inner self) remained unknown and (it would be) known when that (latter) was known. [1362]

[1]That is, if we talk in terms of dimention and variety.

युक्त्या निरूप्यमाणस्य ह्यात्मा तत्त्वमनात्मनः ।
प्रत्याख्यातः स चेत्तेन क्वानात्मा सिद्ध्यतां ततः ॥१३६३॥

Indeed the Ātman is (known as) the truth (underlying) the non-Ātman when it is carefully observed with reason; (and) if that (Ātman) is discarded by that[1], on what basis can the non-Ātman get established? [1363]

[1]It refers to the non-Ātman. Cf. *ātmānaṃ virahayya* in verse 1360 above.

अनात्मतत्त्वमन्वेति ह्यात्मासङ्गो ऽगुणो ऽद्वयः ।
असिद्ध्यन्स स्वतःसिद्धौ सिद्धिं क्वान्यत्र लप्स्यते ॥१३६४॥

Indeed the Ātman, not-attached (to anything else), not having any qualities, and not having any duality, runs through[1] the nature of the non-Ātman (objects); (that same Ātman), not itself getting established, (i.e. unless it has existed) on which other basis does it get established? [1364]

[1]It literally means: is associated with (all); i.e. is really the basis of all the world — this is because of *avidyā*/*māyā*/ignorance.

Verses 1365-1415 discuss 'anubhava' i.e. experience as a unique means of knowing Reality, a means undisputed by even mutually disputing theorists. Also, about their argument on that the beginningless ignorance is removed by knowledge (of Reality).

सर्ववादिविरोधे ऽपि संवादो ऽनुभवे यथा ।
वादिनामविसंवादस्तथाज्ञाने ऽप्यसंशयः ॥१३६५॥

And as there is concord among all the different exponents of theories in respect of experience, even while there exists opposition among themselves; so also is there absence of any discord among these opponents (lit. variously arguing persons) in respect of ignorance — there is not any doubt about this. [1365]

तद्बद्धाधो ऽप्यबोधस्य बोधेनाभ्युपगम्यते ।
एतावतैव पर्याप्तमस्मद्बाद्धान्तसिद्धये ॥१३६६॥

In the same way, it is accepted (by all of them) that the absence of knowledge (i.e. ignorance about Reality) is removed by knowing (the real object of knowing). This much (about the method of argument among debaters) would be (i.e. is) sufficient for establishing our doctrine. [1366]

अस्मद्बाद्धान्तसंसिद्धौ नान्यद्बाद्धान्तसिद्धता ।
तत्सिद्धावस्य संसिद्धिर्न कथंचिन्निवार्यते ॥१३६७॥

When our doctrine is established there cannot be the establishment of the doctrine of another. And, even if the other's doctrine is established (we point out) the establishing of this (i.e. doctrine) can in no way be avoided.[1] [1367]

[1]This is because the opponent also has to accept Jñāna as a *pramāṇa* or proof for his doctrine. And Jñāna is the nature of the Ātman, in our view. Therefore, our view is automatically proved.

अज्ञानं संशयज्ञानं मिथ्याज्ञानमिति त्रिकम् ।
अज्ञानं कारणं तत्र कार्यत्वं परिशिष्टयोः ॥१३६८॥

Absence of knowledge, knowing the doubt, and false knowledge are the triad (which characterizes other doctrines[1]); among those three (*tatra*), the absence of knowledge is the cause, whereas the remaining two are of the nature of the effect (of the first). [1368]

This points to the importance of Jñāna in every doctrine; particularly in Vedānta.

[1]We understand this from SP: *pratyagajñānavijṛmbhitāḥ sarve parasiddhāntā aprāmāṇikabhedāśrayatvād atas teṣāṃ bhrāntatvam iti bhāvaḥ.*

कूटस्थज्ञानमात्रत्वान्न तमो ऽस्य स्वभावतः ।
नाप्यागन्तु तथाज्ञानं हिरुक्सिद्धेरसंभवात् ॥१३६९॥

This one (i.e. the inner self) does not, by its nature, have darkness[1], since it is only (of the nature of the) immutable knowledge. So also, ignorance cannot come to it, because there is no possibility of its existence apart from it.[2] [1369]

[1]That is, ignorance associated with it.

[2]Ignorance has a basis in *avidyā* of the Ātman; it cannot be ny characteristic of the same. Nor can it be a distinct entity.

अविद्यातज्जकार्याणामात्मना संगतिस्ततः ।
आत्मात्मवत्त्वरूपा स्यान्न तु सोभयकर्मजा ॥१३७०॥

For that reason,[1] the association of ignorance and the effects produced by it with the Ātman is only of the nature of the Ātman and what has (i.e. is possessed of) the Ātman; but it does not result from the activity of the two (Ātman and ignorance) together. [1370]

[1]This is *tataḥ=nāvidyātirekeṇa* 'not apart from *avidyā*' (SP).

एकमेव हि सद्वस्तु यद्वेदान्तप्रमाणकम् ।
तावन्मात्रैकनिष्ठत्वादात्मज्ञानं सदास्पदम् ॥१३७१॥
सर्ववादिविरोधे ऽपि यत्सिद्धान्तबलाश्रयम् ।
साधनं दूषणं सर्वं न तन्निह्नुतिरिष्यते ॥१३७२॥

The existent thing which is known from Vedānta is but unique[1] (and therefore) the knowledge of the Ātman, supported as it is only by it (viz. the Ātman), has an abode in that existent, [1371]
even while there is opposition among all the opponents, that, on the strength of whose doctrine all the means (of knowledge) are seen as fault, cannot be denied (lit. concealed). [1372]

The verses convey that Jñāna cannot be unreal.
[1]Or, all alone.

साधनं दूषणं सर्वं यस्य पादव्यपाश्रयात् ।
सिद्धायते तीर्थदृशां कुतः स्यात्तस्य निह्नुतिः ॥१३७३॥

How can there be the concealment of that (means of knowing) by resorting to whose strength (lit. feet) all the means of knowing are proved as false for them who see the adorable (i.e. Reality)? [1373]

This is directed against the Śūnyavādin, who denies even the existence of experience.

अभावो येन भावेन भाव्यते ऽस्ति न नास्ति सः ।
तस्य भावस्य सद्भावो वद केन निवार्यते ॥१३७४॥

That one exists and it is not that that does not exist — that (i.e. experience) on account of whose existence the absence of another (i.e. unreal) is understood. Tell me, 'Who can ward away the existential character of that existence?' [1374]

व्यभिचारि न यत्रास्ति प्रमाणं सर्ववादिनाम् ।
स्वमहिम्ना च यत्सिद्धं तदपह्नयते कथम् ॥१३७५॥

That, in respect of which there is not any contradictory means of knowing[1] (even) in (the opinion of) all disputants, and that which has existed (*siddham*), on its own strength — how can that be concealed (i.e. denied)? [1375]

The argument is: No one can deny *anubhava* as an authoritative means of knowing.

[1]This stands for argument.

तस्यैवाव्यभिचाद्रित्वात्सर्वेषु व्यभिचारिषु ।
तदेवैकं प्रमाणं नः सर्ववाद्यविरोधि यत् ॥१३७६॥

Only that is for us (an authoritative) means of knowing (Reality) which, amongst all the disputants, is not disputed, namely that which has an invariable character[1] among all the variable means of knowing. [1376]

Sureśvara points out that (this indicates the Ātman, the expe-iencer — not distinct from experience) is accepted for *anubhava* experience' its greatness as an existent among all the changing orms etc.; it is not denied to be so existing and therefore is n authoritative means for establishing Reality and its nature.

[1]That which invariably exists.

देहादावात्मबुद्धिर्नो न कदाचिद्विहन्यते ।
जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तेषु शुक्तिकारजतादिवत् ॥१३७७॥

In respect of the body etc., our awareness of the existence of the Ātman is not lost (lit. struck down) any time — (it continues to be there) in (all) the (states of) waking, dream and deep sleep, in the same way as the notion of silver in a conch-shell. [1377]

The word *dehādi* has refernce to the next verse. The instance f silver in a conch-shell emphasises the effect of ignorance or *vidyā* and *tajja*. Thereby is indicated the false identification of ody etc. with the Ātman/inner self.

देहान्तात्कर्तुरन्यो यो बुद्ध्यन्ताद्बोद्धुरेव च ।
प्राणान्तात्करणाच्चान्यः प्रत्यग्दृष्ट्या य ईक्ष्यते ॥१३७८॥

He[1] is understood as the inner self, who is other than the agent of the body etc.[2], so also from the knower, viz. intellect etc., and yet again from various operative organs ending with *prāṇa*. [1378]

Sureśvara mentions three different opponents though he has not mentioend them specifically. In the preceding verse also, he has vaguely referred to them and emphasised that the awareness of the existence of the inner self is acceptable even to them. The three opponents are: the followers of the Cārvāka, the Mīmāṃsakas and those devoted to Hiraṇyagarbha. (NKL refers to one called Gārgya.)

[1]The use of 'He' is implied in the verse, for the verse uses *yaḥ*; on this SP and NKL rightly observe, one *yaḥ* stands for *sa*— we take the last to be that.

[2]It shows the nature of man who holds intellect, Ego and *manas* as identical with the Ātman. SP points to that the body, the sense-organs and *manas* are understood by *dehānta*. (This, we can say, is the view of Cārvākas.) *buddhyanta* indicates the function of *ahaṃkāra* also. And finally, *prāṇa* shows connection with Hiraṇyagarbha. Cf. NKL for this explanation.

अदेहतो ऽजरो ऽमृत्युरस्वान्तो ऽमोहशोकवान् ।
अबुभुक्षो ऽपिपासश्च प्राणकारणवर्जनात् ॥१३७९॥

Since it does not have a body[1], it never ages, it never dies, it never has any inner parts for itself, it never has infatuation and grief, it never has hunger (lit. desire to eat), it never has thirst (lit. desire to drink), never devoid as it is of the causes (of these, viz.) *prāṇa* (etc.) [1379]

[1] *dehataḥ = adehavattvataḥ.*

अहीनो हीयते यो ऽसौ तथानागत एति यः ।

जानीयात्तमनात्मानं जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तिषु ॥१३८०॥

One should know that as non-Ātman who, though not abandoned (in reality), is abandoned and also, though not coming, does come — in (the states of) waking, dream and deep sleep.

[1380]

न हीयते हीयमान आगच्छति न चैति यः ।
आगमापायसाक्षित्वादात्मा सो ऽनुभवाश्रयात् ॥१३८१॥

(And) that is the Ātman which is not abandoned though being abandoned, which does not come and does not go, and has the nature of being the witness of coming in and going out (of the body etc.) — this is so on the basis of experience.

[1381]

नाविद्यामनुपादाय प्रत्यक्कारकतां व्रजेत् ।
नाकारकः क्रियां कर्तुमलं जगति वीक्ष्यते ॥१३८२॥

(Indeed) the inner self does not become the agent (of any action) unless it has taken recourse to ignorance[1]. Nowhere in the world is noticed a non-agent to be capable of doing any act[2].

[1382]

[1]The inner self is taken to be the agent of actions because of ignorance, as said earlier.

[2]This *vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta* 'example of opposite nature' is given with a view to pointing out that the Ātman does not in reality undertake any activity and, therefore, in the world no activity can be attributed to it. If it is so done, it is wrongly done!

द्रष्टुर्दृष्ट्या न चानाप्तो ऽनात्मा कश्चित्प्रसिद्ध्यति ।
मिथ्याज्ञानमतो ऽनात्मा ह्यात्माज्ञानसमुत्थितेः ॥१३८३॥

No non-Ātman whatever gets established, nor is it seen as it is by the sight of the seer. Therefore, seeing (i.e. accepting) (that there is) the non-Ātman is only false knowledge and that has arisen from ignorance about the (true nature) of the

Ātman.

[1383]

नाविद्यामनुपादाय जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तिषु ।
अनात्मानं विजानाति तज्जज्ञात्राद्यनन्वयात् ॥१३८४॥

One does not know (any) non-Ātman in (the states of) waking, dream and deep sleep, unless one has taken recourse to[1] ignorance, for there is, in reality, no connection of one with the knower etc. which are products of that (viz. ignorance).

[1384]

[1]That is, one is overpowered by.

न च ज्ञात्रनुरोधिन्या दृष्ट्याज्ञानासमन्वितम् ।
आत्मात्मानमलं द्रष्टुं रूपं श्रोत्रधिया यथा ॥१३८५॥

And the Ātman is not able to see, with a sight which follows (the notion of) a knower etc., the non-Ātman which is associated with ignorance, in the same way as one cannot see a form with an ear or intellect.[1]

[1385]

For any seeing etc., which is a worldly experience, one requires an eye etc. This means that there must be association of the Ātman and the non-Ātman through ignorance — only then a proper mechanism of seeing etc. obtains. If such mechanism is wanting any seeing etc. does not become possible. Now, the Ātman has no such mechanism, this is reality; therefore, it cannot see any non-Ātman. For clarifying this, an example is given in the last line. An ear and intellect are not the proper means of seeing an object. Since the Ātman is not overpowered by *avidyā*, it is unable to see the non-Ātman.

[1]*śrotradhiyā* is an optional Dvandva compound, meaning *śroteṇa dhiyā vā*.

उत्सार्यानात्मनः सर्वानन्वयव्यतिरेकतः ।
प्रत्यक्प्रधानया दृष्ट्या पश्येदात्मानमद्वयम् ॥१३८६॥

(Therefore) having set aside all the non-Ātman (objects) by

adopting (the method of) Anvaya and Vyatireka, and holding a proper view of the inner self, one should see the Ātman which is without any duality. [1386]

त्वं ब्रह्मेति गुरोर्वाक्यात्तन्निविष्टपदार्थयोः ।
उक्तान्वयादिनोत्पन्नविवेकः सन्नबुध्यत ॥१३८७॥

On hearing the preceptor's instruction *tvam brahma*, one, who had acquired discrimination between the two objects conveyed by the words mentioned in the instruction by (the method of) Anvaya and Vyatireka as stated earlier, became awakened (to Reality). [1387]

This reference is perhaps to Śvetaketu who learnt from Āruṇi the lore of the Brahman in the words *tat tvam asi*. Yet, by replacing the imperfect tense by the present, one could make this verse a general statement.

तद्ब्रह्मात्मानमेवावेद्यदनात्मेत्यभूत्पुरा ।
अविद्यया विद्यया तु ब्रह्मात्मैवाभवत्स्वतः ॥१३८८॥

That Brahman, which had formerly become a non-Ātman (as it were),[1] knew only itself. By *avidyā* and knowledge the Brahman itself became the Ātman.[2] [1388]

[1]This is the force of *iti*.
[2]Cf. *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 7.9: *vidyāṃ ca avidyāṃ ca* ...

एवेत्यवधृतौ ज्ञेयं ब्रह्मात्मार्थविशेषणम् ।
आत्मैव ब्रह्म विज्ञेयं ब्रह्मैवात्मेति संभवात् ॥१३८९॥

The word *eva* is to be understood in the sense of specification; (and) *brahman* as an attribute of the object, viz. of the Ātman, for it is possible to accept only the Ātman itself as the Brahman and only the Brahman itself as the Ātman. [1389]

ब्रह्मता नात्मनो ऽन्यत्र नात्मता ब्रह्मणो ऽन्यतः ।
तद्याथात्म्याप्रबोधात्तु तयोरेष विपर्ययः ॥१३९०॥

The character of the Brahman does not obtain elselwhere than in the Ātman; so also, the character of the Ātman does not obtain elsewhere than in the Brahman. But this differentiation between them (in language) is owing (only) to the non-knowing of the real nature of the two. [1390]

आत्मापि साक्षात्तद्ब्रह्म परोक्षं तदबोधतः ।
ब्रह्मैव तद्वदात्मापि सद्वितीयवदीक्ष्यते ॥१३९१॥

Also the Ātman is the Brahman itself and it is imperceptible on account of the absence of knowledge (about its true nature). In the same way, the Brahman itself is the Ātman and is yet seen to be having a second as it were. [1391]

वाक्योत्थसम्यग्विज्ञानप्रध्वस्ततमसो यतेः ।
विभागहेतोरुच्छित्तेः सर्वमात्मैव शिष्यते ॥१३९२॥

All (this world) remains only as the Brahman for a person, who has renounced, (and) who has his ignorance destroyed by the right knowledge which arose from the Śruti statement, since there is the removal of the cause of the division (of the non-Ātman and the Ātman). [1392]

This conveys that even one who has renounced worldly connections gets to know about the Brahman from the Śruti.

विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयादिति श्रुतेः ।
ननु विप्रतिषिद्धार्थं तदात्मानमितीर्यते ॥१३९३॥

(Now an objection is raised:) On the basis of the Śruti *vijñātāram are kena vijānīyāt*,[1] the statement *tad ātmānam ...*[2] is stated indeed contrarily (to the earlier Śruti). [1393]

[1]BU 2.4.14.
[2]BU 1.4.10.

दृष्टेर्द्रष्टेति विज्ञानान्नात्र विप्रतिषिद्धता ।

प्रत्यग्बुद्धिः प्रमात्रादौ सर्वत्रैवोपजायते ॥१३९४॥

(The answer is:) Here there is no contrariety on account of the knowledge (imparted by the Śruti in) *dṛṣṭer draṣṭā*,[1] (for) awareness of the inner self in respect of the knower etc. does arise everywhere. [1394]

[1]Cp. BU 3.4.2: *na dṛṣṭer draṣṭāraṃ paśyeḥ*.

युष्मदस्मद्विभागाभ्यां यावद्वस्त्विह मीयते ।
तेन तेन विशेषेण प्रत्यगर्थः प्रतीयते ॥१३९५॥

Whatever be the things (here) known as divided in classes (marked by the awareness of) *yuṣmat* and *asmat*, by each one (of them as) an attribute becomes known the inner self. [1395]

This refers to every knowledge situation wherein *yuṣmad-asmadvibhāga* is employed, but all that points to only one thing, viz. the inner self. This is in a way the essence of superimposition so well known from Śaṅkara's writing. *vastu* is *jātāv ekavacanam*.

प्रत्यगर्थमनालिङ्ग्य न पराग्वर्ति जायते ।
विज्ञानं तेन तत्पूर्वं सर्वमन्यत्प्रतीयते ॥१३९६॥

(Verily) knowledge cannot touch[1] the object beyond,[2] without having referred to (lit. embraced) the object called the inner self. Therefore, everything else (than that) becomes known (only if) preceded by that[3]. [1396]

[1]It literally means: turn to.
[2]It means: what is outside the body.
[3]It refers to *vijñāna*.

आब्रह्मास्थाणु चान्वक्षं सर्वेषु व्यभिचारिषु ।
प्रत्ययो ऽव्यभिचार्येकश्चैतन्यप्रतिबिम्बितः ॥१३९७॥

In the case of all the variable (objects), from the Brahman up to a pillar which are directly perceptible[1], only the

knowledge (of them all) which is reflected in the sentience (within) is invariable. [1397]

This refers to the commonly accepted notion about knowledge that every object of knowledge finds a reflection in the sentience within the body of the perceiver.

न च विप्रतिपद्यन्ते वादिनो ऽनुभवात्मनि ।
तत्र चेत्स्याद्विसंवादः केनान्येन चिकित्स्यते ॥१३९८॥

And (whoever may be among) the disputants, they do not hold different views as regards the nature of the experience of one; if they were to dispute about that[1] (also), by what other means could that (Reality) be[2] to be known? [1398]

[1]It refers to *anubhava*.
[2]Or alternatively, by what other means is that (Reality) sought?

अन्योऽपि योऽत्र कल्प्यः स्यात्सोऽप्यस्मान्नैव भिद्यते ।
सर्वभेदात्मरूपत्वात्कः सन्स्यादात्मना विना ॥१३९९॥

And whosoever other[1] is to be understood as different is also not distinct from this one. Since that one is the nature of all the discrete objects, how can that be existent without the Ātman?[2] [1399]

[1]Any other than the inner self, i.e. the object to be known.
[2]That is, unless it is one with the Ātman.

प्रत्यगात्मनि विश्वस्य ततो ऽनात्मनि तद्वशात् ।
आविद्वदङ्गनाबालं विश्वसित्यनपेक्षतः ॥१४००॥

Therefore, having depended[1] on the inner self, everyone, from the learned[2] to a women and to a young one, thereby depends on the non-Ātman, without having any expectation (from it). [1400]

[1]That is, having accepted the existence of the Ātman as one

without a second.

[2]The AnSS edition says *avidvat-* while the NKL edition reads *āvidvat-*. We adopt this latter. The reading in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-vārtikasāra* 10.38 supports this. The reading in AnSS edition is difficult to explain.

आत्मनैवात्मविज्ञानं ज्ञेयज्ञात्रादिवर्जितम् ।
स्वयमेव फलात्मत्वात्फलं चास्मान्न भिद्यते ॥१४०१॥

Since the knowledge on the part of the inner self (about itself occurs) only on its own and is devoid of (all differences) such as the knower, the object of knowing etc.[1]; therefore, that (viz. the knowledge about the nature of the self), being of the nature of the fruit, and the fruit does not differ from this one (viz. Ātman). [1401]

[1]The word etc. refers to the sense-organs.

प्रमाणव्यवहारो ऽयं सर्वेषामपि वादिनाम् ।
स्वतो ऽनुभवनिष्ठः स्यान्न चेत्षष्ठेन्द्रियार्थवत् ॥१४०२॥

Also this dealing (involving various) means of knowing is for all the disputants resting on experience, by its nature; if it were not so, it would have been like the object of the sixth sense[1]. [1402]

[1]It refers to *manas*, therefore the object of this sense is only imaginary or meaningless. It is not real, and therefore, if a dealing involving various means of knowing were not rooted in one's experience, they also would be imaginary likewise. This stresses the importance of *anubhava*. Cf. Sureśvara's use of *ṣaṣṭhagocara* which (we believe) is a cyptic expression for *ṣaṣṭhendriyārtha*. See our book [Vol.1:1982] p.280.

चैतन्यमात्ररूपो ऽयं सदानस्तमितोदितः ।
अविद्यामस्पृशन्नास्ते निष्क्रियो ऽकारको ऽफलः ॥१४०३॥

This one (viz. the inner self) is of the nature of only sentience,

ever existent (lit. has never arisen), and never disappearing, nor touching ignorance[1] and ever non-active, non-agent, and non-productive and without any fruit. [1403]

[1]That is, not being affected by it.

स्वतो ऽसङ्गस्वभावत्वात्खचरादि वियद्यथा ।
नाविद्या नापि तत्कार्यं प्रत्यक्स्थमपि ढौकते ॥१४०४॥

As a bird etc. does not touch[1] the sky, which by its own nature does not have connection with anything else, so also neither ignorance nor its effect, though abiding in the inner self, touches it. [1404]

[1]The verb root √*ḍhauk* is 'to push/urge'; but here the Ātma-nepada indicates its meaning of 'touching' without affecting the touched.

स्वतः सेद्धुमशक्तत्वात्खमृते वायुवत्सदा ।
प्रत्याख्यातस्वभावो ऽपि सिद्ध्यतीवाग्रहो दृशौ ॥१४०५॥

Since it cannot get established on its own, like the wind without the sky, ignorance[1] gets, as it were, established[2] in the seer[3] even though its nature is (finally) discarded. [1405]

[1]*agrahaḥ sakāryaṃ ajñānam* (SP), ignorance is what is not being received by the Ātman.

[2]That is, seems to be existent.

[3]That is, in the inner self.

युतिं साधारणात्मा हि यात्यसाधारणात्मभिः ।
अनन्यवृत्तितो नात्मा संसर्गं प्रैत्यनात्मभिः ॥१४०६॥

Indeed, what is of the nature of a common property (of many) gets connected with (other objects or properties), which are objects of different nature, (but) the Ātman, which does not have existence elsewhere,[1] does not get connected with the non-Ātman objects. [1406]

विभज्यमानो ऽन्येभ्यो हि विशेषो ऽपि प्रसिद्ध्यति ।
एकत्वादात्मनो भेदो द्वयाभावान्न चेष्यते ॥१४०७॥

Further, even an uncommon or a particular property gets established as such when it is distinguished from others; (but) in the case of the Ātman there is only uniqueness[1] and, therefore, in the absence of duality (associated with it), no (such) distinction is or can be accepted. [1407]

[1]It alone exists, without a second.

भेदसंसर्गहीनत्वात्पदवाक्यार्थतात्मनः ।
दुःसंभाव्यात आत्मायमात्मनैवानुभूयते ॥१४०८॥

On account of (the Ātman), being devoid of any connection with discrete objects, it is difficult (to accept) that Ātman can be an object which is conveyed by words and sentences[1]. Therefore, this Ātman is experienced by itself[2]. [1408]

[1]See, for example, *nīlam utpalam* where *nīla* and *utpala* are distinct from each other and therefore they stand in relation of *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya*; such cannot be the case of the Ātman on one hand and any other thing which is conveyed by some word on the other. In a sense, this entails the next part of the verse.

[2]We do not convey any particularity or distinction of the Ātman. It is the thing only to be experienced.

यादृगस्य द्वये तत्त्वमात्मनैवानुभूयते ।
निषिद्धाशेषभेदस्य तावदेवात्मसाक्षिकम् ॥१४०९॥

Whatever kind of truth is experienced by the Ātman in respect of its duality[1] — only that much is the object to be witnessed by the Ātman. [1409]

This refers to duality only on the level of words, though, by nature, the inner self and the Self are but one.

[1]Namely the inner self and Supreme Self about which all (the

notions of) distinction are negated.

अपास्ताशेषतमसो यत्तत्त्वं प्रत्यगात्मनः ।
तदवच्छित्तये नालं प्रत्यग्बोधादृते ऽन्यधीः ॥१४१०॥

Whatever be the truth obtaining in the inner self that has given up[1] entire darkness, no knowledge other than the knowledge of (the true nature) of the inner self is capable of grasping it. [1410]

[1]That is, discarded.

प्रत्यङ्मात्रेक्षणादात्ममोहतज्जनिराकृतेः ।
असंभवाद्द्वितीयस्य स्यामपूर्वादिमानहम् ॥१४११॥

(Therefore one thinks:) Since there is no possibility for a second (to exist apart from the Ātman), let me be possessed of (the properties) *apūrva* etc. by seeing only the inner self and by removing ignorance about the inner self and also the product of it. [1411]

This verse states the outcome of the knowledge about the inner self which is evoked by the Śruti statement.

व्यपेततमसस्तत्त्वमागमापायसाक्षिणः ।
ज्ञानेन गम्यते साक्षात्तावन्मात्रानुरोधिना ॥१४१२॥

In the case of one whose ignorance is removed (and) who is the witness of the incoming and the outgoing (of transmigratory objects), the truth becomes known by directly knowing (the inner self) (which) follows only that much (as Reality). [1412]

कालादिप्रविभक्तं सद्यद्ब्रह्माभूदविद्यया ।
तत्प्रत्यक्त्वसंबोधाद्ध्वस्ते ध्वान्ते ऽन्तरात्मनि ।
आत्मानमेव तद्ब्रह्म ब्रह्मैवात्मेत्यवेच्छुतेः ॥१४१३॥

That existent, the Brahman, which had, through ignorance,

become differentiated by time etc.[1] knew itself to be the Brahman from (the statement in) the Śruti (saying) 'The Brahman itself is the Ātman.', on coming to know the true nature of the inner self, when the darkness in respect of the inner self was destroyed. [1413]

Here is concluded the exposition of the meaning of *tad ātmānam evāvet*.

[1]The word etc. refers to *deśa* and other things (*vastvantara*).

अब्रह्मानात्मताहेतौ प्रत्यग्ध्वान्ते निवर्तिते ।
व्यावृत्त्यनुगमाभावात्सर्वं तदभवत्ततः ॥१४१४॥
व्यावृत्त्यनुगमौ यस्माद्द्वितीये सति वस्तुनि ।
दृष्टिमात्रात्मवस्तुत्वात्कार्यकारणवस्तुनः ॥१४१५॥

[Verses 1414-1415 discuss the meaning of *tasmāt tat sarvam abhavat*.]

When the ignorance on the part of the inner self, which was the cause of its not being the Brahman and the Ātman, was removed, it became all owing to the absence of (any) differentiation and similarity, [1414]
(and) since differentiation and similarity are possible (only) when there exists a second thing (and) since the real thing comprising causes and effects is merely the seeing one alone. [1415]

The cause-effect relation presupposes duality; so also do *vyāvṛtti* and *anugama* require duality. None of these is possible to be existing, for the Brahman alone is existent.

नाज्ञातं किंचिदप्यस्ति नानपास्तं तमो ऽप्यतः ।
सामानाधिकरण्यार्थमस्मीत्येतत्पदं भवेत् ॥१४१६॥

[Verses 1416-1436 explain the meaning of *aham brahmāsmi*.]

(Since) there is no thing which is not known and also there is no darkness that is not removed, therefore, the word *asmi*

(in the sentence *aham brahmāsmi*) is used for conveying the same-case-relation (of them). [1416]

This is the meaning of the wore *asmi*.

Being in the same-case-relation can be possible of two words which have the same status and/or which do not exist apart from each other.

adhikaraṇa refers to grammatical case. Therefore, two words in the same case are taken to refer to (or signify) but one thing, e.g. *nīlaṃ kamalam*. *adhikaraṇa* can also mean substratum. Therefore, two properties/words which refer to but one and same substratum are also mentioned in a sentence in the same case. Thus, here *aham* and *brahma* are both in the Nominative case. This is explained in the next verse.

ब्रह्माहंपदयोरर्थौ यौ तयोः संगतिर्मिथः ।
अहमर्थो विशेष्यो ऽत्र तत्प्राधान्यप्रसिद्धितः ॥१४१७॥
तद्याथात्म्यप्रसिद्ध्यर्थं ब्रह्मार्थस्तु विशेषणम् ॥१४१८॥

Those two objects, which are signified by the words *brahman* and *ātman*, have a close (*sam*) association between them; (and) here the object (signified) by the word *aham* is what is to be qualified (by the other), because of its pre-eminence (in worldly existence). [1417]

And (*tu*) the object (signified) by the word *brahman* is its qualifier for establishing the true nature of that (=the inner self signified by *aham*). [1418]

विशेषणानां संबन्धो विशेष्येण विशेषणैः ।
विशेष्यस्यापि संबन्धः स्वातन्त्र्यपारतन्त्र्यतः ॥१४१९॥

The relation of the qualifiers to what is qualified and (the relation) of what is qualified to the qualifier is owing to the independence and/or the dependence (of the signified). [1419]

There follows now a discussion on the relation between the qualifier and the qualified; particularly that between *aham* and *brahma*.

In verse 1419 Sureśvara gives us the philosophical basis of the qualifier-qualified relation which presupposes duality. So also does he imply that those that are qualified can at times become the qualifiers of others as well — this is their dependence so far as worldly existence is concerned. It is only the Brahman which is purely what is ever qualified. This (is implied) and explains its independence.

विशेषणविशेष्याणां साकल्येनैव संगतिः ।
उपात्तान्योन्यरूपाणां विशेषणविशेष्यता ॥१४२०॥

Those, that are (known as) the qualifier and the qualified, have a close association (between them) only in their entirety.[1] The relationship of the qualifier and the qualified obtains between such two things as have assumed the forms of each other.
[1420]

To explain: Now *aham* and *brahman* can stand as the qualifier and the qualified. This their relation requires complete identity of the two — those two which are assumed to be two different objects. This is possible owing to *avidyā*. This relationship is different from the relation of the qualifier and the qualified in worldly language and dealings.

[1]That is, by being identical.

उपात्तद्रव्यकाण्येव विशिषन्त्युत्पलादिकम् ।
द्रव्यं विशेषणान्येति तथोपात्तविशेषणम् ॥१४२१॥

Only those which have come to occur[1] in substances (can) qualify a lotus etc. In the same way, a substance which has come to have qualifiers goes to them.[2]
[1421]

This refers to the qualifier and the qualified relation in language.

[1]This has a reference to *utpannaṃ dravyam ādye kṣaṇe nirguṇaṃ tiṣṭhati*. Accordingly, *nīlatva* 'blueness', *sugandhitva* 'fragrance' come to occur in the lotus from the second moment of its existence.

[2]This is to say, becomes associated with them.

नायःशलाकाकल्पानां विशेषणविशेष्यता ।
परस्परानपेक्षत्वाद्धिमवद्विन्ध्ययोरिव ॥१४२२॥

There does not occur the relation of the qualifier and the qualified between those which resemble two pieces of iron, on account of their not having any mutual expectancy as in the case of Mt. Himalaya and Mt. Vindhya. [1422]

The instances mentioned in the verse are of two pairs of substratums; one substance exists independently of the other. Thus there cannot be the relation of the qualifier and the qualified between the two.

Both SP and NKL point out the instance of *daṇḍa* 'staff' and (a man called) Devadatta. *daṇḍa* cannot be a qualifier of the latter, while *daṇḍin* 'one having a staff' can be.

एकदा निर्विभागेन कात्स्न्र्यसंगतिकारणात् ।
सामर्थ्यात्स्वविरुद्धानां न विशेष्ये ऽस्ति संभवः ॥१४२३॥

There is no possibility of what are opposed (in nature to), on account of their own propriety (or capacity), to be existent in a substantive only on the ground that they are (at least) at one time inseparably assoicated with fullness/completeness. [1423]

aham and *brahman* can be at some time realised/seen to be together but it does not mean that *aham* connected with *buddhatva* etc. can be a qualifier of the Brahman.

परस्पराविरोधेन विशिंषन्त्यात्मसंश्रयम् ।
विशेषणानि येनातस्तद्विरुद्धं न ढौकते ॥१४२४॥

Since qualifiers qualify (the substance of) their own support, without mutual opposition, therefore, what is opposed to that [1] does not touch (it). [1424]

This points to the qualifiers of *aham*, viz. *saṃsāritva* etc. which can hold in the case of the inner self only, since these, viz. *ahaṃkāra*

and the inner self obtain in one substratum. But since *aham* etc. are opposed in nature to the Brahman, they do not qualifiy the Brahman.

[1]Namely, the Brahman — this is implied. Yet, 'that' can signify the substratum which is already mentioned. Thus, the whole verse can be taken to state a general rule regarding *viśeṣaṇa*s in *sāmānādhikaraṇa*.

विशेषणयुतिः शाब्दी तद्विरुद्धनिराकृतिः ।
मोहमात्रेन तत्प्राप्तेः सामर्थ्यात्स्यान्न शब्दतः ॥१४२५॥

The association of the qualifier (*aham* with the Brahman) is only on the word level; (it results into) setting aside of what is opposed to that, inasmuch as it has occurred only through ignorance and not from the meaningfulness (lit. capacity) of the word (to convey Reality). [1425]

Here, there is a specific statement about *aham* and *brahman*.

एकैकरूपासंसर्गबोधमात्रस्वभावतः ।
विशेषणानां संप्राप्तिर्नाञ्जसी प्रत्यगात्मनि ॥१४२६॥

Since the nature of (the inner self) consists only in knowledge that is without any association with any qualities, whether similar or dissimilar,[1] therefore, the qualifiers do not come into association with the inner self in a smooth way. [1426]

[1]Cf. *sajātīyabhedavyudāsārtham ekapadam, vijātīyabhedāpavādārtham ekarūpety uktam* (SP).

विशेषणानां संबन्धो यतो न प्रत्यगात्मनि ।
लक्ष्यलक्षणता तस्मात्प्रतीच्यध्यवसीयते ॥१४२७॥

Since connection of qualifiers is not (possible) in the case of the inner self, therefore it is concluded that (in the case of the proposition) of the inner self there is the relation of the indicator and the indicated. [1427]

The words *aham* and *brahman* seem to be used as qualifiers of the Ātman (viz. inner self), but in verse 1426 it is pointed out that there cannot be any qualifier in the case of the inner self. Therefore, Sureśvara points out that, in the sentence *aham brahmāsmi*, *aham* is to be understood as the inner self which is *aśuddha* and *mugdha*; but since, in reality, the inner self is *śuddha* and *buddha* (as understood from *aham brahma*— in the same-case-relation), the relation between *aham* and *brahma* is to be understood as that between an indicator and the indicated. This is clarified in the next verse.

अनन्यापेक्षि प्रत्यक्त्वमहंरूपेण लक्ष्यते ।
तथैव ब्रह्मरूपेण प्रतीचो ऽप्यद्वयात्मता ॥१४२८॥

The nature of the inner self (which is) not dependent on anything else is indicated by the (word-)form *aham*; in the same way, (is indicated) the character of the inner self without duality in the form of the Brahman. [1428]

निवर्त्यभेदाद्भिन्नो ऽर्थो ऽमानित्वादेर्यथा तथा ।
ब्रह्माहमर्थयोर्ज्ञेयस्तयोरैकार्थ्यहेतुतः ॥१४२९॥

As some entity from which all distinction (caused by ignorance) has to be removed on account of its not having any Ego etc. (has to be ascertained), so also (the non-distinction) has to be known between the two entities *brahman* and *aham* on account of their having reference to but one entity. [1429]

अनात्माब्रह्मताहेतौ प्रत्यग्ध्वान्ते निवर्तिते ।
पदार्थ एक एव स्याद्ब्रह्माहंपदयोः परः ॥१४३०॥

When darkness on the part of an individual self, which has been the cause of its being the non-Ātman and the non-Brahman, is removed, there would remain only one entity (and which would be) beyond the two words[1] *aham* and *brahman*. [1430]

[1]That is, beyond the expression by the two words.

भेदसंसर्गनाशार्थो नात उक्तेरिहेष्यते ।
अहंब्रह्मश्रुतेः साक्षात्तादात्म्यमिह गम्यते ॥१४३१॥

Therefore, no thing like distinction or connection or negation[1] (in relation to things) is here desired (i.e. understood) from the (Śruti) statement. From the (Śruti) statement *aham brahma* (*asmi*) is understood here the direct oneness (or, identity) of the two. [1431]

[1] *bheda* here is a thing to be distinguished from another, i.e. it is a discrete object; *saṃsarga* means connection, but here it stands for a thing to be shown to be connected with another; and *nāśa* which means destruction stands for a thing to negate something else. *bhedasaṃsarganāśa* is an optional (*vaikalpita*) Dvandva compound word joined to *artha*.

कर्तुर्ज्ञातुर्हि या दृष्टिः साविद्योत्थार्थलोहिनी ।
तत्प्रत्यगात्मदृष्ट्या तां प्रत्याख्यायाश्नुतेऽद्वयम् ॥१४३२॥

Whatever seeing on the part of the agent or the knower (is understood in the sentence) is the destroyer of the notions which have arisen from ignorance; therefore, having set aside[1] that[2] by (giving rise to) the seeing of the inner self as the Brahman, one obtains (i.e. experiences) non-duality[3]. [1432]

[1] That is, having negated or removed.
[2] Namely, ignorance.
[3] *advayam* here refers to *advayatā*.

अस्मीतीहत्यनिर्देशाद्विद्याकालैव मुक्तता ।
सिद्धातो ऽसौ न साध्या स्यादग्निहोत्रादिकार्यवत् ॥१४३३॥

By the mention here of *asmi* (it follows that) there is liberation achieved at the very time of (obtaining) instruction; therefore, it is not to be accomplished (later) like an effect, viz. Agnihotra[1] (ritual) etc. [1433]

[1]The Śruti statement regarding Agnihotra etc. merely gives information about the same. Then the Agnihotra etc. has to be performed. As a consequence, there follows the result. Thus, there is a time gap between knowing the meaning of the statement regarding Agnihotra etc. and performing what is signified by it. As against this, instruction regarding the Brahman brings liberation along with itself; there is never any time gap or any intervention whatever.

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यविज्ञानमात्रव्युत्पत्तिसिद्धये ।
तस्मादिति श्रुतिर्वक्ति ह्युत्पत्त्यादिनिवृत्तये ॥१४३४॥

The Śruti states the word *tasmāt* in order that there arises the knowledge (of the Brahman) from mere knowing (*vijñāna*)[1] about the true nature of the inner self (and) in order to ward off the idea of production[2] etc. (of the same at some later point of time). [1434]

[1]It is mere information and not the knowledge of Reality.

[2]Sureśvara has still in mind *agnyādivākya* which expects some action to be performed after the resulting of *vijñāna* from the *vākya*.

अविद्यातज्जनिर्मुक्तौ ब्रह्म ब्रह्माभवत्स्वतः ।
सर्वः कृत्स्नस्तथा पूर्णः शब्दाः पर्यायवाचकाः ॥१४३५॥

The Brahman (i.e. the inner self) itself became the Brahman (viz. the Supreme Self), when there was release (of it from) ignorance and its effect. As such, the words *sarva*, *kṛtsna*, and *pūrṇa* are all synonymous.[1] [1435]

[1]SP points out that they are synonyms of the Brahman.

आत्माविद्यासमुत्थानामात्मयाथात्म्यमात्रतः ।
कर्मवत्काङ्क्षते ज्ञानं विशिष्टं नाधिकारिणम् ॥१४३६॥

[Verses 1436cd-1442 explain the sentence *tad yo yo devānām.*]

Since (the various things of the transmigratory world) which have arisen from the ignorance about (the true nature of) the Ātman are only of the nature of the Ātman (itself)[1], knowledge (about) the Ātman) does not expect any (particular) eligible person as does (a ritual) activity.[2] [1436]

[1]The first half of this verse explains how *sarva* is a synonym of the Brahman.

[2]The second half of the verse begins the discussion on *tad yo yo devānām*.

देवादीनामतो यो यो यथोक्तेनैव वर्त्मना ।
प्रत्यबुध्यत तद्ब्रह्म स स तदभवत्परम् ॥१४३७॥

Therefore[1], whosoever among the gods came to know that Brahman by the very path stated (herebefore) became the highest (Brahman). [1437]

This is the substance of the sentence *yo yo* ...

[1]This justifies *kāṅkṣate nādhikāriṇam* in the preceding verse.

प्रत्यग्बोधातिरेकेण साधनान्तरनिह्नुतौ ।
एवेत्यवधृतिर्ज्ञेया ज्ञानादेव ततो भवेत् ॥१४३८॥

From the word (*eva*) is to be understood specification of the denial (lit. concealment) of any other means beside knowing about (the true nature of) the inner self; then there results (liberation) only from knowledge. [1438]

आत्मयाथात्म्यविज्ञानाद्यदन्यत्साधनान्तरम् ।
ज्ञानाभावो ऽथवा सर्वमविद्यैवेति निश्चितिः ॥१४३९॥

Whatever means other than the knowing about the true nature of the Ātman has as its result either absence of knowledge or all that is only ignorance. This is the decision. [1439]

मनुष्या यदमन्यन्त साध्वेवातस्तदीरितम् ।
न कश्चिदपि दोषो ऽत्र पूर्वो ऽतः प्रसज्यते ॥१४४०॥

Whatever men thought about (or, expected) was therefore only well said; there is in this no fault whatever that was pointed out[1] before that can become contingent. [1440]

[1]Supply: by opponents. This refers to the faults pointed out in the introductory (*upoddhāta*).

प्रत्यक्तयैव संबन्धादात्मनो ऽनात्मवस्तुना ।
विशिष्टेनाविशिष्टस्य क्लृप्तेनाकल्पितात्मनः ॥१४४१॥
यतो ऽतो लोकबुद्ध्यैव देवादीनामितीर्यते ।
तुल्यो देवादिसंबन्धो ब्रह्मणो मशकादिभिः ॥१४४२॥

Since the Ātman has connection with (all) the non-Ātman objects[1] only by being their inner self, viz. the connection between with what is qualified (by attributes) and what is not qualified, and that between what is imagined and what is not imagined, [1441]
therefore, only in accordance with worldly notions (lit. knowledge) it is said 'among the gods ...'; the connection of the Brahman with the gods etc. is similar to that with the insects etc. [1442]

This explains how the Brahman is understood from the Śruti statement as connected with all sorts of non-Ātman objects and beings.

[1]This is *jātāv ekavacanam*.

अन्तरेणाधिकारं चेन्नात्मबोधस्य संभवः ।
न जन्मान्तरसंस्काराद्वामदेवस्य तद्भवेत् ॥१४४३॥

[Verses 1443-1457 explain *tad dhaitat*.]

If (it is said:) There is no possibility of (acquiring) the knowledge about the Ātman unless (one has) the eligibility (for it), (then we say:) That could not have become[1] possible as in the case of Vāmadeva, on account of the impression(s) of the previous life[2]. [1443]

[1] *bhavet* = *abhavat* in Vedic style.

[2] 'Impression(s) of the previous life' here refers to *antaḥkaraṇa-śuddhi* acquired by the performance of ritual etc. which are prescribed in the Śruti. Reference to previous life (or lives) points to the world of human beings. There is a reference here to a Vedic sage Vāmadeva verse whose 'I became Manu ...' (*Ṛgveda* 4.26.1) points to his excellent knowledge consequential to his knowledge about the Brahman.

श्रुत्युक्तार्थस्य वा स्थेम्ने मन्त्रोदाहृतिरिष्यते ।
प्रमाणान्तरसंवादात्पुंसां विश्वासधीर्यतः ॥१४४४॥

Or rather, it is for establishing more firmly the meaning of the Śruti that there is intended the citation of a Mantra[1], since there occurs the faith in men only by (pointing out) agreement of an argument with another (accepted) means of knowing. [1444]

This justifies the meaningfulness of the citation of a Ṛgvedic Mantra.

[1] This refers to *aham manur abhavam* (*Ṛgveda* 4.26.1).

अव्यावृत्ताननुगतं तद्धैतत्प्रत्यगात्मनि ।
तद्दर्शनादृषिः साक्षात्पश्यन्सर्वम् प्रपन्नवान् ॥१४४५॥

This (Brahman) then (is existent) indeed in the inner self, the one undifferentiated (from others), not similar[1] (to anything else); on visualizing that, i.e. directly seeing that the seer obtained all. [1445]

This is the meaning of the words in the Mantra quoted.

[1] It literally means: followed by.

सूक्तादिज्ञापनार्थाय ह्यहं मनुरितीरणम् ।
ऐकात्म्यं सर्वभूतेषु प्रतीचोऽसौ ददर्श ह ॥१४४६॥

In order to convey the beginning of a (full) hymn, there is

the Śruti statement *aham manuḥ*[1]. (The purpose is to say:) He indeed saw in all those beings[2] (only) oneness of the Self. [1446]

[1]Sureśvara points out the significance of the beginning (*pratīka*) of the hymn, conveying thereby that the *ṛṣi* saw the whole of the hymn.

[2]This refers to the mention of the various beings and objects in the hymn *Ṛgveda* 4.26.

तत्पश्यन्नित्यनेनात्र ब्रह्मविद्या प्रदर्श्यते ।
अहमासं मनुरिति विद्यायाः फलमुच्यते ॥१४४७॥
पश्यन्प्रतिपेद इति प्रयोगादवसीयते ।
विद्याकालैव कृत्स्नाप्तिरिति तन्मोहहानतः ॥१४४८॥

By the phrase *tat paśyan* is here conveyed the lore of the Brahman; and by the sentence *aham āsam manuḥ* is stated the fruit of the lore (of the Brahman); [1447] (and) by the employment (of the words) *paśyan pratipede* it is brought out that the obtainment of all is just simultaneous with (the acquiring of) the lore, (resultant) from the loss (i.e. abandoning) of ignorance about it (viz. the Brahman). [1448]

ब्रह्मप्राप्त्यन्तरायस्य प्रत्यक्संमोहमात्रतः ।
प्रत्यग्विज्ञानतो ध्वस्तेस्तत्प्राप्तिर्नान्यसाधना ॥१४४९॥

Since the hindrance to the obtaining of the Brahman is merely total (*sam*) ignorance about the inner self, there is the obtainment of that (Brahman) only after the destruction of some particular knowledge[1] about the inner self, not by any other means. [1449]

[1]This is *vijñāna*, viz. understanding the inner self as having various attributes etc.— this is in fact *avidyā*.

अविद्याध्वंसमात्रेण पुमर्थस्य समाप्तितः ।
तावतावसितेर्विद्या स्वार्थैवेति विनिश्चयः ॥१४५०॥

Because the end of human endeavour is acquired only by the destruction of ignorance, only therewith[1] is there the completion (of the lore of the Brahman). Therefore, indeed, the lore (of the Brahman) is for its own sake[2]. [1450]

[1]That is, only by effecting the destruction of ignorance.
[2]It is not for achieving any other purpose (*parārtha*).

सकृदात्मप्रसूत्यैव निरुणद्ध्यखिलं भवम् ।
ध्वान्तमात्रनिरासेन न ततो ऽन्यान्यथा मतिः ॥१४५१॥

By its rise only for once does (the knowledge about the nature of the Brahman) check (lit. destroy) entire (transmigratory) existence (and consequently) by removing merely the ignorance (about it,) therefore, there is not any knowledge other than that (to be sought). [1451]

देशकालाद्यसंबन्धाद्देशादेर्मोहकार्यतः ।
नानुत्पन्नमदग्धं वा ज्ञानमज्ञानमस्त्यतः ॥१४५२॥

Therefore, owing to (the fact that there is) absence of any connection (of the inner self) with region, time etc. and because region etc. are effects of ignorance, knowledge does not really get produced or ignorance does not get burnt. [1452]

नाबाधित्वेह बाध्यार्थं बाधको बाधकात्मताम् ।
लभते मेययाथात्म्यहेतुमात्रव्यपेक्षतः ॥१४५३॥
यतो ऽतोऽविद्यातज्जानां बाधितत्वात्प्रबोधतः ।
सकृदेव च मायोगान्नोर्ध्वं तच्चोदनेष्यते ॥१४५४॥
सम्यग्ज्ञानशिखिप्लुष्टमोहतत्कार्यरूपिणः ।
सकृन्निवृत्तेर्बाध्यस्य किं कार्यमवशिष्यते ॥१४५५॥

Since, here (in the context of this lore), what stultifies does not acquire the nature of the stultifier without having removed the object which is to be removed, depend as it does only on one cause, viz. (acquiring the knowledge of) the true nature of object to be known (viz. the Ātman), therefore, ignorance and its effects being stultified by (that) knowledge and through

the connection (of the inner self afflicted by ignorance) with right knowledge just once, there is not required any impulse further. [1453-1454]

(Tell me then) what remains to be done of ignorance which is to be stultified and which has, once for all, ceased to be the one, which has the form of error and its effects which are burnt by the fire of right knowledge? [1455]

ध्वान्तादिघस्मरे प्रत्यक्चैतन्यात्मैकनिष्ठिते ।
प्रत्यर्थिनि स्थिते ऽनात्मधियां स्यात्सत्यता कुतः ॥१४५६॥

(When there has occurred knowledge) which is inimical (to ignorance), the destroyer of darkness etc., and which abides only in the sentience of the inner self, whence can there be truth in the knowledge of the non-Ātman (objects and beings)? [1456]

अज्ञातमिथ्याविज्ञाततत्त्वमात्रावलम्बिना ।
ज्ञानेन किं न विज्ञातं वद किं वा न बाधितम् ॥१४५७॥

What does not become known by knowledge which has taken resort to only the truth that underlies what is unknown (and) what is false?; (and) tell me, what is not stultified? [1457]

In verses 1456-57, the word knowledge stands for the knower also.

सर्वापत्तिरियं युक्ता देवादीनां महात्मनाम् ।
अस्मदादेस्तमस्वित्वान्न संभाव्येति चेन्न तत् ॥१४५८॥

[Verses 1456-1461 explain *tad idam apy etarhi.*]

This becoming all is reasonably acceptable in the case of gods etc., who have greatness of their own, but it is not possible (to be thought of) in the case of us and others. — if this is (the argument), (the answer is:) That is not so. [1458]

एतर्ह्यपि तु तद्ब्रह्म यो यः साक्षादबुध्यत ।

स एव तदभूद्यस्मान्नातो ऽभिजनकारणम् ॥१४५९॥

Since, even now, whosoever became directly aware (of the true nature of his inner self) is (i.e. becomes) the Brahman; (and) since he himself became that, therefore there is not (here) any cause in one's birth in some high family. [1459]

This emphasises that only knowledge about the nature of the Brahman (or inner self) is the pre-requisite for liberation. Being born as a god, or in a high family are not necessary for it.

अप्येतर्हि यथान्यायं यो वेदात्मानमद्वयम् ।
स इदं सर्वमात्मैव भवत्यज्ञानहानतः ॥१४६०॥

So also, even now, whosoever has, in the manner[1] (mentioned before), known the Ātman which is without any duality, becomes all this, viz. the Ātman itself, owing to the disappearance (lit. loss) of ignorance. [1460]

[1]By applying the method of Anvaya and Vyatireka as in verse 1437 above..

न हीहोत्कृष्टसत्त्वेषु देवादिषु परात्मनः ।
नापि चात्यन्तमूढेषु विशेषः कश्चिदीक्ष्यते ॥१४६१॥
प्रत्यक्त्वधियो वास्ति स्वतोबुद्धैकतात्मनः ।

Indeed, there is not seen any differentiating attitude on the part of the Supreme Self in the case of those who are excellent beings such as gods and those who are extremely ignorant; [1461]
and (not also) in the case of the one, who has acquired the knowledge of the true nature of the inner self; for, in the case of the Ātman, there is only the state of being knowledge. [1462ab]

श्रेयांसि बहुविघ्नानीत्याशङ्क्यैतदथोच्यते ॥१४६२॥
तस्य ज्ञातात्मतत्त्वस्य प्रध्वस्ततमसो यतेः ।
इन्द्रादयो ऽपि नैवालं कैवल्याप्तिनिवारणे ॥१४६३॥

[Verses 1462cd -1466 explain *tasya ha devāś ca* in the light of the comments of Śaṅkara and Bhartṛprapañca.]

Now (what follows) is said with a fear in mind that all good things are beset with many obstacles. [1462cd]
In the case of that person, who has renounced[1], has known the (true) nature of the Ātman, and has his ignorance destroyed, even Indra and others are not able to ward away his obtaining liberation. [1463]

Verses 1463-1466 explain the meaning of *tasya ha devāś ca nābhūtyā īśate, ātmā hy eṣāṃ sa bhavati*, according to Śaṅkara. The purpose of verse 1463 is: The knower of the true nature of the inner self (viz. the Supreme Self) has a power higher than that of known high powers in mythology, such as Indra and others.

[1]Cf. verse 1392 above.

देवाद्यैश्वर्यविषयव्यतिक्रान्तत्वहेतुतः ।
कैवल्याभूत्या उद्युक्ता ईश्वरा अपि नेशते ॥१४६४॥

Since the experience of the state of liberation has for its cause the state of being beyond all the objects of excellence (enjoyed by) gods and others, even the masters (of great wealth), though out (to possess, i.e. to acquire) it, are unable (to do so). [1464]

The knowledge of the Brahman cannot be outdone by any so-called precious wealth of the world. Therefore, possession of riches would not enable a person to acquire liberation. It is only knowledge of the self that is a pre-requisite for achieving liberation.

ईशेशितव्यसंबन्धः प्रत्यगज्ञानहेतुजः ।
सम्यग्ज्ञानात्तमोध्वस्तावीश्वराणामपीश्वरः ॥१४६५॥

Relation of the controller and what is to be controlled proceeds from ignorance about (the true nature of) the inner self. Once when one has one's ignorance destroyed by right knowledge

(of the nature of self), one is the Lord of Lords. [1465]

ईश्वराणामनैश्वर्यं कस्माद्ब्रह्मविदीति चेत् ।
आत्मा ह्येषामितीत्याह तद्धेतुप्रतिपत्तये ॥१४६६॥

If someone were to ask: Why are the Lords powerless in respect of the knower of the Brahman?', (the answer is: The Śruti) has pronounced the words *ātmā hy eṣāṃ* in order that one knows the cause for that (happening). [1466]

भोज्यत्वेन जगत्कृत्स्नं कर्मविद्यादिसाधनैः ।
उपात्तं तदभुक्त्वा तु कैवल्यं लभते न चेत् ॥१४६७॥
इत्याशङ्कापनुत्त्यर्थं परो ग्रन्थो ऽवतार्यते ।
कैवल्यावाप्तिविघ्नाय नालं देवा अपीश्वराः ॥१४६८॥
अविद्याविषये यस्मात्तेषामधिकृतिः स्मृता ।
न तु प्लुष्टात्मयाथात्म्यविज्ञानतमसामसौ ॥१४६९॥

[Verses 1467-1469 are Bhartṛprapañca's explanation of the same sentence.]

If it is said that one does not achieve liberation without enjoying this entire world as an object of enjoyment that is obtained through such means as (ritual) activities, (various) lores etc., [1467]
(then) for the removal of this doubt, the subsequent section (of the text) is introduced: Even gods of great powers are not capable of (causing) any obstacle to (one's) obtaining liberation, [1468]
since their ability (lit. eligibility) is recognised (only) in the sphere of ignorance, and not in respect of them who have burnt their ignorance by the knowledge of the true nature of the self. [1469]

ब्रह्मविद्याफलप्राप्तौ विघ्नं कुर्वन्ति देवताः ।
इत्यत्र किंनिमित्तेयमाशङ्केत्यभिधीयते ॥१४७०॥
युक्तासङ्गा यतो मर्त्या देवान्प्रत्यृणिनः श्रुतेः ।
पशुलोकत्ववाक्याच्च पारतन्त्र्याच्च कर्मिणः ॥१४७१॥

[Verses 1470-1473 discuss whether the sentence *tasya ha devāś ca nābhūtyā īśate* is *aprāptaniṣedha* 'denial of what is not already stated or prescribed'.]

What is the cause for this doubt, viz. in (respect of) the statement 'Gods cause obstacles to one's achieving the fruit of the lore of the Brahman.'? (In answer) it is said (now): [1470]

The doubt is justified, since the mortals are debtors to the gods (as we hear) from the Śruti, the sentence about (the human beings') becoming the animals (for the sacrifice) and also (about the Ātman), the *loka* ('region' as the object of enjoyment) and also because of the dependence of the performer (of rituals).[1] [1471]

BU 1.4.10 and 16 are the basis of this argument, viz. the reference in the Śruti to *śreyāṃsi bahuvighnāni bhavanti mahatām api* is uncalled for; it was necessary to explain away the same by *tasya ha* ... (*aprāptapratiṣedha*). These verses answer that argument. Here we notice the mixture of mythology and philosophy in Sureśvara's writings, owing to the effort of the seer of BU to bridge philosophy and ritual together.

[1]Cf. *paśur eva sa devānām* (BU 1.4.10) and *atho ayaṃ vā ātmā sarveṣām bhūtānāṃ lokaḥ* (BU 1.4.16).

ब्रह्मवित्त्वे च पारार्थ्यं देवादीन्प्रति हीयते ।
तस्य ब्रह्मतमोहेतोस्तन्निवृत्तौ निवर्तते ॥१४७२॥

And in relation to a person's being the knower of the Brahman his dependence on the gods[1] gets lost; since caused by ignorance about (the nature of) the Brahman (that it is), that (dependence) comes to an end when that (i.e. ignorance) has receded. [1472]

[1]Namely, that which is mentioned in the preceding verse.

अप्रियारिष्टवाक्याभ्यामयमर्थो ऽवसीयते ।

तस्माद्विद्याफलावाप्तौ विघ्नं कुर्वन्ति देवताः ॥१४७३॥

This matter is decided from the Śruti sentences regarding *apriya* and *ariṣṭi*, therefore (it is said that) the deities cause obstacles to one's obtaining the fruit of the lore (of the Brahman). [1473]

The ritual activities are accepted by the Siddhāntin as necessary for *cittaśuddhi*. This *cittaśuddhi* is connected with the gods who would cause obstacle to one's liberation.

Now is introduced a new argument about the gods' causing obstacles to one's securing the result of ritual performances also. There is the counterargument also. Thus, verses 1474-1491 discuss these fully.

नन्वेवं तर्ह्यविश्रम्भो ह्यदृष्टफलसंपदि ।
प्राप्तो ऽभ्युदयमोक्षार्थसाधनव्यापृताविह ॥१४७४॥

[Verses 1474-1477 point out how gods' power which causes obstacles to men's doing would destroy their faith in ritual activity.]

(The objector says:) Indeed, this being so, there will be want of faith[1] (of the people) in respect of the rich of fruit called *adṛṣṭa*, since a person of this world has set himself upon the activity which brings about worldly rise and liberation. [1474]

[1]It literally means: disbelief.

तथेश्वरो ऽपि नो विघ्नं कुर्वन्केन निषिध्यते ।
कालमन्त्रौषधादीनामचिन्त्या शक्तिरिष्यते ॥१४७५॥
कर्ममन्त्रौषधितपःकालादीनां च विद्यते ।
महती शक्तिरित्यत्र युक्तमाशङ्कितुं फले ॥१४७६॥

And also how can a (mighty) lord causing obstacle to us be warded off? It is accepted that (he has) unthinkable power in respect of time, Mantras and herbs etc. [1475]
And there exists great power in (magical) activities, Mantras,

herbs, penances, time etc.; therefore, it is reasonable to entertain the doubt (which is stated above) in respect of the fruit (of the lore of the Brahman). [1476]

देवादयः स्वतन्त्रत्वात्फलप्राप्तिविघातयोः ।
सर्वं कुर्युरनाश्वासस्तस्मात्प्राप्नोति कर्मसु ॥१४७७॥

Gods and others, because they are independent in respect of (causing the) obtainment of or obstruction to fruit, would do everything;[1] therefore, there occurs (in the mind of the people) want of faith in the rituals. [1477]

[1]This refers to the obstacle to the lore of Brahman.

नैवं सर्वपदार्थानां नियतादानकारणात् ।
जगद्वैचित्र्यदृष्टेश्च स्वभावे तदसंभवात् ॥१४७८॥

(Now the Siddhāntin answers:) This is not so, because all objects and beings (in the world) take (i.e. require) some specific causes (for their origination or production); also because there is variety seen in respect of the worldly happenings; and because it is impossible that such is the happening in the nature of the things.[1] [1478]

This is in refutation of the Svabhāvavādins.

[1]That is to say: Determined relationship of causes and effects and variety of the objects/things in the world could not occur if one accepoted *svabhāvavāda* 'Naturalism'.

सुखादिफलदं कर्मेत्यस्मिन्पक्षे व्यवस्थिते ।
श्रुतिन्यायादिसंसिद्धेर्नातो विघ्नकृतः सुराः ॥१४७९॥

When the view that ritual activity brings about results such as happiness is (thus) established, (it has to be said that) gods cannot cause obstacles, since that view is established by Śruti, reasoning etc.[1] [1479]

This is an argument against those who do not hold Svabhāvavāda.

[1]For 'Śruti', SP refers to *puṇyo vai puṇyena karmaṇā* ... (BU 3.2.13); *karma haivā* ... (BU 3.2.13), for 'reasoning', *jagadvaicitrya-dṛṣṭi* in verse 1478 above, and for 'etc.', *karmaṇā badhyate jantur* ... (*Mahābhārata* 12.233.7). SP further refers to a passage in *Kāma-sūtra* 23.2: *puruṣakārapūrvakatvāt sarvapravṛttīnām avaśyambhāvino 'pyarthasyopāyapūrvakatvād eva na niṣkramiṇo bhadram asti.*

कर्मणैव स्वसिद्ध्यर्थं तेषां क्रोडीकृतत्वतः ।
नात्मानं लभते कर्म देवेशाद्यनपेक्षि सत् ॥१४८०॥

Since they, i.e. gods have been accepted (in its system) by the ritual activity in order that it gets established; therefore, ritual cannot come into existence if it is without any dependence on gods. [1480]

फलदाने ऽनुलोमत्वान्नामी स्युर्विघ्नकारिणः ।
यथा कर्म तथेशादि कर्मापेक्ष्यैव सिद्ध्यति ॥१४८१॥

(And) these would not cause obstacles (to the fruit of the ritual), since they are prone to yield suitable fruits. (This means:) As activity (depends on gods etc.); likewise, the deity of it etc. is dependent on that activity; only then (that activity) gets reward. [1481]

For *phalādāne* translation and text follow the variant reading of the AnSS edition and also the NKL edition, *phaladāne*. *Bṛhad-āraṇyakavārtikasāra* 1.4.1092 also follows this.

सर्वं सर्वमपेक्ष्यैव संहतत्वात्प्रसिद्ध्यति ।
प्रधानगुणभावश्च क्वचित्कस्यचिदिष्यते ॥१४८२॥

All these come into existence, only depending on all else, because they are closely knit together and the relation as the principal and the subordinate of someone to another is accepted at some or another place. [1482]

विघ्नकार्ये ऽपि चाप्येते नानपेक्ष्य प्रकुर्वते ।
तत्सामर्थ्याप्रणोद्यत्वात्सर्वेषां सर्वकर्मसु ॥१४८३॥

And further, in respect of obstacles to be caused, these (gods) do not cause (the same) without keeping in view[1] (some activity or reason), since all these are (effective) in resepct of all activities such as are not to be impelled by their (own) strength (alone). [1483]

[1]It literally means: without depending on ...

गुणप्रधानभावश्च देवकालेश्वरादिषु ।
कर्मस्वनियतो दृष्टो नान्यथा चोपपद्यते ॥१४८४॥

And the relation of the principal and the subordinate in the case of gods, time and a lord etc. is seen as not definitely fixed in point of activities and it does not get reasonably explained otherwise. [1484]

यदैकस्य प्रधानत्वं तदान्यस्याप्रधानता ।
एवं नृत्यज्जगन्नित्यमतद्भृत्त्यात्मनि स्थितम् ॥१४८५॥

When one has the status of being the principal, then the other has the status of being subordinate to it; thus is the world ever changing its states (lit. dancing up and down) and is abiding in the Ātman, without becoming that. [1485]

This verse clarifies the not-fixed change in the world.

The world continuously seems to change its states; but this is the effect of ignorance about the nature of the Ātman. It exists because it has the basis only in the Ātman.

गुणप्रधानभावश्च पदार्थानामनन्ततः ।
क्षेपीयस्त्वाच्च कालस्य दुर्ज्ञेयो मतिविभ्रमात् ॥१४८६॥

[It should be noted here that the NKL does not comment on verses 1486-1489 — i.e. NKL did not have the four verses before it!]

Further, since the relaion of the principal and the subordinate

which obtains among various objects and beings is (of) infinite (variety), and since time is more quick than (everything else), it (i.e. the true nature of the relation) is difficult to understand owing to a chance of there being an error in thought (about the same). [1486]

The word *mativibhrama* is to be noted: This stands for error which is known in Sanskrit more commonly as *adhyāsa*. Maṇḍana-miśra is reported to have written a book *Vibhramaviveka* wherein he discusses various types of error. This name *vibhrama* could have also been at the basis of, the some-time-back-held equation of Maṇḍanamiśra and Sureśvara.

कर्मैव कारणं केचित्फलप्राप्तौ प्रचक्षते ।
दैवमेके ऽपरे कालं स्वभाव इति चापरे ॥१४८७॥

Some[1] point out (lit. declare) that, for the acquisition of the fruit (viz. liberation), the cause is only ritual activity; others[2] (declare that to be) fate. And yet others[3] say it to be Time and (still others[4]), the nature of things. [1487]

[1]This refers to the Mīmāṃsakas.
[2]This refers to the author(s) of *Devatākāṇḍa* (of ritual).
[3]This refers to the Astrologers.
[4]This refers to the Lokāyatas.

श्रुतयः स्मृतिवादाश्च कर्मप्राधान्यमेव तु ।
अङ्गीकृत्य प्रदृश्यन्ते प्रवृत्ताः सर्व एव हि ॥१४८८॥

But all Śruti texts and discussions in the Smṛti texts are seen to have put forth (their subject matter) after having accepted the principal significance (or greater importance) of the ritual activity. [1488]

पुण्यः पुण्येन भवति पापः पापेन कर्मणा ।
वचांस्येवं सुबहुशो लक्ष्यन्ते शास्त्रभूमिषु ॥१४८९॥

(Thus) in (various) portions of the Śruti are seen a large

number of statements like *puṇyaḥ puṇyena bhavati pāpaḥ pāpena karmaṇā*[1]. [1489]

This has a reference to the Śruti mentioned in the preceding verse 1488.

Cp. BU 3.2.13: *puṇyo vai puṇyena karmaṇā bhavati pāpaḥ pāpeneti*; BU 4.4.5: *puṇyaḥ puṇyena karmaṇā pāpaḥ pāpena.*

यद्यप्येषां स्वविषये प्राधान्यम् कस्यचित्क्वचित् ।
अप्राधान्यं तदन्येषां तथापि तु न कर्मणाम् ।
फलप्राप्तावहेतुत्वं शास्त्रन्यायावधारणात् ॥१४९०॥

Though in the case of some of these statements (we notice that) some have attached in their sphere greater significance to some things in some places and less significance to others; yet they (have not attached) less significance to rituals in respect of their being the causes of the fruit — this, on account of the accepted principle of the Śāstra. [1490]

कर्मणः फलसंप्राप्तिरप्राप्तिश्चेह येक्ष्यते ।
सादगुण्यविगुणत्वाभ्यां सा स्यात्कर्मण एव च ॥१४९१॥

And obtaining or non-obtaining of the fruit from certain activity, whatever it be, is seen here only on account of the excellence or shortcoming[1] of the activity itself. [1491]

[1]The word *sādguṇyaviguṇatvābhyām* is an optional Dvandva compound.

विघ्नं कुर्वन्ति नो देवा विद्योत्थफलसंगतौ ।
उक्तं यदपनुत्त्यर्थं तत्र प्रतिविधीयते ॥१४९२॥

[Verses 1492-1505 refute the idea that gods cause obstacles to one's achieving the knowledge of the Brahman.]

As to what is said, viz. gods cause obstacle to us in respect of (our being associated) with the fruit (viz. liberation) which arises from the knowledge (of the inner self), the following

is said in answer: [1492]

अविद्याहानमात्रत्वात्कैवल्याप्तिफलात्मनः ।
तत्प्राप्तेर्ज्ञानकालत्वान्नालं विघ्नाय देवताः ॥१४९३॥

Because what has the nature of fruit, viz. obtaining release has resulted only from abandoning of ignorance and because it has occurred at the same time (when there is the rise of) knowledge, therefore gods are not capable of (causing) any obstacle. [1493]

चक्षूरूपाभिसंबन्धसमकाला यथेष्यते ।
रूपाभिव्यक्तिरेवं स्यादविद्याध्वस्तिरात्मनः ॥१४९४॥

As the appearance of a form is accepted to be simultaneuously occurring with the connection of the eye and the form, so also it is accepted (by us) in respect of the connection of the destruction of ignorance and (the rise of the knowledge about) the Ātman. [1494]

यथास्थितात्मयाथात्म्यज्ञानजन्मातिरेकतः ।
न तत्तमोनिवृत्तिः स्यात्तदुत्थस्य च वस्तुनः ॥१४९५॥

There would not be (lit. there is not) the cessation of darkness (i.e. ignorance) and also of that which has arisen from it (viz. darkness) in addition to the rise of the knowledge of the true nature of the inner self as it exists. [1495]

सर्पात्मना गृहीतायां न दण्डादीक्ष्यते स्रजि ।
प्रतीच्येकतनुग्राह्ये तदन्यन्न तथेक्ष्यते ॥१४९६॥

In the place of a garland which is taken to be having the nature of a serpent, there is not seen a stick etc., so also in the case of the inner self which is noticed only in a body anything else than that is not seen. [1496]

Both SP and NKL point out to *sarvātmana* as a variant for *sarpātmana* and explain the meaning accordingly. But that is not

convincing. However the texts in the editions of both AnSS and NKL do not show this variant!

अन्योन्यव्यभिचारित्वमज्ञाने ऽपि ह्यनात्मनाम् ।
किमु विध्वस्तनिःशेषघनाज्ञाने ऽन्तरात्मनि ॥१४९७॥

Even when ignorance prevails, there is noticed in the case of the non-Ātman objects mutual exclusiveness; what then to say about the same when there exists (only) the inner self from which is destroyed the entire mass of ignorance. [1497]

रूप्याभज्ञानवेलायां शुक्तिकाधीर्न बाधते ।
तदसूतेरिह त्वात्मन्यादिमध्यान्तबाधधीः ॥१४९८॥

At the time of having the knowledge of what appears as silver, the knowledge of the shell does not act as a stultifier, since there is no rise of it;[1] but, here in the case of the inner self, the knowledge of it as a stultifier (of ignorance) exists in the beginning, in the middle and in the end. [1498]

[1]Namely, the knowledge of the shell as it is.

निर्निमित्तं प्रमात्रादेः प्रत्यग्रूपमनात्मनः ।
सनिमित्तं प्राग्रूपमात्मनो मोहहेतुतः ॥१४९९॥

The knowers etc., (which are) the non-Ātmans, have the form of the inner self for no reason (whatever); (and) they have the form of what is outside world because of the ignorance (about the nature) of the Ātman. [1499]

एक आत्मेति विज्ञाने दोषो ऽप्यप्रतिबन्धकः ।
मूढात्मनामपि ह्येतन्न विसंवादमृच्छति ॥१५००॥

When there arises knowledge that the Ātman is one (without a second), that fault[1] is not obstructive, and in the case of those who have remained ignorant about the self also, this does not vary. [1500]

The verse is preceded by a possible doubt that the knowledge of the Ātman also is like every other knowledge affected by ignorance.

[1]The fault of being affected by ignorance.

मिथ्यासंशयविज्ञानमनात्मानं प्रतीष्यते ।
प्रत्यगात्मनि तद्यस्मात्सम्यग्ज्ञानान्न भिद्यते ॥१५०१॥

False knowledge, doubt and (so-called) knowledge, on the part of (an individual) is accepted to be what refers to the non-Ātman, since that referring to the inner self does not get differentiated (likewise). [1501]

अज्ञानं चेच्चिदाकारं संशयादिषु का कथा ।
प्रमितिसते प्रतीच्यस्मान्न दोषो नापि बाधकम् ॥१५०२॥

If it were that ignorance had really the form of sentience, then where could one talk of doubt etc.? From this (it follows that) when the inner self is sought to be known there is no fault and it does not affect (as well). [1502]

महिमानो यदामी स्युरविद्याया न वस्तुनः ॥१५०३॥
काला देवादयस्तस्यां ध्वस्तायां तद्विनाशतः ।
देवेश्वरादयः के स्युर्विघ्नं वा कस्य कुर्वते ॥१५०४॥

When these great ones, viz. (periods of) time, gods etc., belong to ignorance and they do not belong to the real object, then, that ignorance being destroyed, these, viz. (its effects) gods, lords etc. also get destroyed; how then could they be what they are, and for whom will they cause obstacles? [1503-1504]

यत्र त्वस्येति श्रुत्यैव सर्वमेतत्स्फुटीकृतम् ।
इहापि हेतुसंसिद्ध्यै तत्स्पष्टमभिधीयते ॥१५०५॥
यतो विघ्नकृतामात्मा प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यविद्भवेत् ।
तद्गोचरातिवर्तित्वं विद्याकाले तमोहतेः ॥१५०६॥

All this is made quite clear by the very Śruti statement *yatra tv asya* ...[1] (but) here also it is stated in clear terms with

a view to establishing the cause of (effecting) the release of the bound self— [1505]

Since the inner self of (each of) them who cause obstacle (to men) would be the knower of the true nature of the inner self thanks to the destruction of ignorance at the time of acquiring the knowledge of the Brahman, (there would be) the capacity to transcend the sphere (lit. object(s)) of that (viz. ignorance). [1506]

This is an additional argument about why it is said that gods etc. do not cause any obstacle to a man's pursuit of knowledge. Gods etc. are also, like men, some individual selves affected by ignorance and, therefore, in their case also, ignorance would be destroyed at the time of their acquiring the knowledge of the Brahman. This renders it impossible that they would cause any obstacles.

[1]BU 4.5.15.

आत्मामीषां तदा ब्रह्म देवादीनां भवेद्वशी ।
कालाद्यन्तरितं यत्स्यात्प्राप्त्युत्पत्त्यादिलक्षणम् ॥१५०७॥
अनात्मैव फलं तत्र देवानामीशता भवेत् ।

At that time, the inner self of (each of) these gods etc. would become the all-powerful Brahman, which was earlier (obscured by) time etc. and was of the nature of having an origin etc. as its character. [1507]

That being so (*tatra*), the lordship of the gods is (but) the fruit, (viz. becoming) the non-Ātman. [1508ab]

In verses 1508cd-1527, there is discussion of the doubt of some Vedāntin (of the same school) regarding: What removes ignorance— the final moment of one's life or the continuous stream of that knowledge. The role played by the lore of the Brahman is also discussed.

अपि ज्ञातात्मतत्त्वानामभावाज्ज्ञानसंततेः ॥१५०८॥
अन्त्यो ऽविद्यापनुद्बोधो रागादिप्रत्ययोत्थितेः ।
इति चेन्नैतदेवं स्यादाद्ये ऽनैकान्तिकत्वतः ॥१५०९॥

If (it is argued:) Because in the case of them who have (later on) known the true nature of the Ātman also, there is noticed absence of continuous stream of knowledge [1508cd] (and) it is only the last moment (in their life), (viz. the moment) of knowing which removes ignorance, since (after every moment of knowing) there has arisen the feeling of attachment, (our answer is:) This is not so, because (even) at the first moment of knowing (the nature of Brahman) there would arise the fault of the argument having two (opposite) results. [1509]

नान्त्याविद्यापनुद्बुद्धिरात्मैकविषयत्वतः ।
आद्यात्मबुद्धिवद्धेतोरनैकान्तिकतेक्ष्यते ॥१५१०॥

Not indeed (knowledge) at the last moment (in one's life) removes ignorance, because it has only the Ātman as its object and it would be like the first (earlier) moment of knowing the Ātman and thus here also is there the fault of having two (opposite) results. [1510]

अनैकान्तिकता हेतोस्तद्वत्संततिवादिनः ।
न चाभ्यासात्प्रमाणानि कुर्वन्त्यर्थावबोधनम् ॥१५११॥

This having two (opposite) results by means of knowledge (lit. cause of it) (would occur) in the same way in the case of one who argues the stream of (knowledge) also and the means of knowledge do not bring about the truth of the object of knowing (merely) by their repetition. [1511]

Once the knowledge of the Brahman is acquired, there is no need of repeated use of that means of knowing. The example of a lamp makes this clear. Once a lamp is brought to a place, it reveals the objects there. That is all! This is contrary to the example of taking food. It removes hunger, but not once for all. Hunger returns and, therefore, taking food has to be repeated.

संबन्धमात्राभिव्यक्तेर्व्यञ्जकत्वात्प्रदीपवत् ।
भोजनादौ न च सति ज्ञानसंततिरिष्यते ॥१५१२॥

Since (the means of knowing) has a capacity to reveal (the object) by its mere connection (with the same), as in the case of a lamp, and not as in the case of taking food etc.; therefore, continuity of knowing (in the case of a *jīvanmukta*) is not desired. [1512]

This continues the thought of the second line of the preceding verse. The purpose of the means of knowing is revealing the nature of the object of knowing. There should not be repetition of an attempt to know the Brahman.

तदन्तरायबाहुल्यात्सुषुप्तादौ च नेष्यते ।
प्रत्यक्प्रमेयपूर्वैवं सर्वासां नो यतो धियाम् ।
सूतिराम्रेडनं तस्मात्सिद्धमात्मधियः सदा ॥१५१३॥

And (i.e. but) in the state of deep sleep etc.[1] it is not accepted, because there are many hindrances to it. Since again there is impulse of all our cognitions (i.e. intellect) preceded by the inner self,[2] the object of knowing, therefore it is established that there is (the necessity of) repetition of the knowing of the Ātman. [1513]

This can yet be an argument against the thought of the preceding verses.

[1]The word etc. refers to swoon, utter destruction of the world and *asamprajñāta samādhi*.

[2]This is characterized by *aham*, viz. Ego.

ज्ञानस्य वस्तुतन्त्रत्वान्न कर्त्रनुविधायिता ।
शीतोष्णज्ञानवत्तस्मान्नेष्यते ज्ञानसंततिः ॥१५१४॥

Since knowledge (of the Brahman) depends on the thing itself, it is not what is to be accomplished by (the performance of) some agent; and is like the experience of cold and heat; therefore, continuous stream of knowledge is not accepted. [1514]

भोजनादिनिरोधेन संततिश्चेत्समर्थ्यते ।
उक्ता परिहृतिस्तत्र न भूयो ऽपि व्यपेक्ष्यते ॥१५१५॥

If continuity (of the knowledge of Brahman) is justified by (pointing out) obstruction (caused) by food etc.; then, in that respect (*tatra*), we have (already) stated the argument in refutation of it[1]; it is not desired[2] (to be given) once again. [1515]

[1]Cf. *jñānasya vastutantratvāt* above.
[2]Text and translation adopt the variant reading *vyapekṣyate*. The textual reading is rejected.

क्षुत्पिपासापरिम्लानचेतस्त्वान्नितरां न सा ।
भोजनादिनिरोधेन न च तस्याः प्रमेक्ष्यते ॥१५१६॥

That (=continuous stream of knowledge) is not at all (there) because the mind of the person is overpowered by hunger and desire, in the case of obstruction (caused by) food etc.; the awareness of it (i.e. nature of the Ātman) is not noticeable. [1516]

संतत्यारम्भकधियामियत्तानवधारणात् ।
शास्त्रार्थानिश्चयो दोषः स चानिष्टः प्रसज्यते ॥१५१७॥

In the case of them who hold that there is a beginning of the continuous stream of knowledge, there is no specification (possible) of its magnitude and there follows the contingent fault, viz. indecision regarding the meaning of the Śruti; and that is not desired. [1517]

मतं संततिमात्रत्वे निश्चितिः स्यात्तथापि च ।
अनैकान्तिकता हेतोराद्यसंततिवद्भवेत् ॥१५१८॥

If it is held that there would be decision at least in that there is the continuity (of the awareness); there would be the fault of having two opposite conclusions (from it) as in the case of the continuity of knowledge in respect of the first moment (of experience). [1518]

समानविषयत्वे ऽपि नाद्याविद्यां निहन्ति चेत् ।
ज्ञानसंततिरन्त्या नः सेत्स्यतीत्यत्र का प्रमा ॥१५१९॥

When there is but one object of knowing and the first (posited stream of knowledge) does not destroy ignorance; then what correctness would there be in saying that the final moment of knowledge will result for us (into liberation)? [1519]

This verse explains *anaikāntikatā* of *hetu* as mentioned in the preceding verse.

मरणे ऽपि न विश्वासो हिक्किकावशवर्तिनः ।
ज्ञानसंततिनिष्पत्तौ तमोमात्रसमाप्तितः ॥१५२०॥

In the case of a person who is overpowered by hiccups, at the time of his death, there is no decision about truth by (any) stream of knowledge, overpowered as it is by darkness (viz. ignorance). [1520]

कर्मच्छिद्रेषु कुर्वन्ति ये ऽपि सम्यग्धियं बलात् ।
नूनं ते नासिकाग्रेण वीक्षन्ते सूर्यमडलम् ॥१५२१॥

And those, who achieve right knowledge (lit. the knowledge of the Brahman) even while there are shortcomings in their (performance of ritual) activities, are indeed looking at the sun's orb through the tip of the nose. [1521]

Thus the Siddhāntin proves the impossibility of achieving the knowledge of the Brahman and thereby the final release by ritual performance (even if they are defective).

वस्तुतन्त्रं न हि ज्ञानं नृतन्त्रं लोकवह्निवत् ।
अनन्यज्ञातृकत्वाच्च प्रत्यग्ज्ञानस्य सर्वदा ॥१५२२॥

Knowledge (which) is indeed dependent on the thing (of Reality) is not like (the maintenance of) fire in the common world dependent on a man (i.e. his activity), because knowledge of

the inner self is to be acquired by no other knower.[1] [1522]

[1]That is, none other than the inner self.

न चानिवर्तकं ज्ञानं प्रत्यङ्मोहस्य युज्यते ।
स्वानुभूतिविरुद्धत्वादग्निदाहादिबोधवत् ॥१५२३॥

Further, it is not properly argued that knowledge (on the part of an individual) is what does not ward off ignorance about the inner self, for (that would be) opposed to one's own experience which is similar to (the experience of) the burning sensation caused by fire etc.[1] [1523]

[1]The word etc. refers to the cool touch of water.

सर्ववेदान्तवाक्यानामेतावन्मात्रनिष्ठतः ।
न चार्थवादता तेषामन्याशेषत्वकारणात् ॥१५२४॥

Since all the sentences of the Vedānta are related only to this much (viz. the exposition of the true nature of the inner self), they do not have the character of a eulogistic statement, for the reason that they are not subordinate to any other (ritual etc.) [1524]

This refutes the idea that the Vedānta sentences could be treated as eulogistic statements (Arthavāda). Cf. discussion on *sarvo 'py ayaṃ vedaḥ* ...; SV 556ff., particularly 568-575.

अहंधीविषयत्वाच्चेत्तेषां स्यादर्थवादता ।
नोक्तत्वात्परिहारस्य न चाहंगम्यतात्मनः ॥१५२५॥

If (one would say:) They have the character of a eulogistic statement, since they pertain to the sense of Ego. (The answer is:) No, because the refutation in respect of this has been already made (lit. stated) by us; indeed the Ātman is not to be known by the sense of Ego. [1525]

The answer has the following argument: *ahaṃdhīgamyaḥ pramātā*,

tatsākṣiṇo brahmatvaṃ vedāntā bodhayanti (NKL).

अहंबुद्ध्येक्ष्यते प्रत्यक्प्रतीचा चाप्यहंमतिः ।
अन्योन्याश्रयता दोषः स्यादहंवृत्तिवीक्षणे ॥१५२६॥

(The answer is: In the above argument) the sense of Ego expects (i.e. depends on) the inner self and the inner self also (expects) the sense of Ego — thus there is the fault of mutual dependence in holding (lit. seeing) the theory of such functioning of Ego.[1] [1526]

[1]That is, the function of Ego in seeing the inner self.

यत एवमतो यो नः प्रत्यक्संमोहहानिकृत् ।
आद्योऽन्त्यः संततो वासौ बोधो मुक्तिफलः स्मृतः ॥१५२७॥

Since this is so, therefore, that which is for us the first (i.e. an earlier) experience (of the inner self) or even the last one which brings about the destruction of ignorance about the inner self, and is continuous (and therefore) is accepted by us as the one resulting into liberation. [1527]

The Siddhāntin states that he does not make any distinction between the first or the last (=the one occurring at the time of death) experience in relation to liberation.

Verses 1528-1557 refute the argument that knowledge does not remove ignorance, for one notices attachment etc. on the part of knowers of Reality, by explaining the nature of a 'jīvanmukta'.

यत्तत्तं ज्ञाततत्त्वानामपि रागादिदर्शनात् ।
नाविद्याहानिकृज्ज्ञानमत्र प्रतिविधीयते ॥१५२८॥

As to what is said,[1] viz. there is noticed a feeling of attachment etc. on the part of them who have known the true nature (of the individual self) also[1] and their knowledge does not therefore effect the removal of ignorance — this is now refuted. [1528]

[1]In verse 1509 above.
[2]The word also indicates: even the ignorant ones.

आरब्धफलशेषैकहेतुत्वाद्देहसंस्थितेः ।
रागादिप्रत्ययोद्भूतिरिषुचक्रादिवेगवत् ॥१५२९॥

(This is so)[1], because there remains the body on account of the mere remainder of the fruit (of the actions) which have begun (to show it) and the rise of the experience of attachment etc. there is just like the speed of an arrow or a wheel etc. [1529]

This asserts the known maxim: *prārabdhakarmaṇām bhogād eva kṣayaḥ*. The author refers to the well-known example of an arrow which when shot stops only after its speed is arrested; similar is the case of a rotating wheel.

[1]This refers to *rāgādidarśana* in the case of those who have known the nature of the Ātman.

तस्य वृत्तफलत्वान्नो ज्ञानं स्यात्तन्निवृत्तिकृत् ।
अतीतत्वाच्च तद्धान्यै नालमात्मावबोधनम् ॥१५३०॥

Since the fruit has already occurred, in the case of that person (who has acquired the knowledge of the Brahman), his knowledge would not be the cause of the removal of that (ritual activity) and the knowledge of (the true nature of) the Ātman is not necessary (lit. capable) for the abandoning of that which has already occurred. [1530]

SP compares the thought in the first half of the verse to *Sāṃkhyapravacanasūtra*3.82:*tiṣṭhatisaṃskāravaśāccakrabhramaṇavaddhṛtaśarīraḥ*.

यत्तु स्वात्माश्रयं कर्म ह्यनारब्धफलं भवेत् ।
उत्पित्स्वनागतं कृत्स्नं ज्ञानं हन्ति तदेव नः ॥१५३१॥

But whatever be (the action) related to the Ātman and has

not begun to show its fruits — the knowledge which is about to occur or the one which has not (yet) occurred will alone destroy all that for us. [1531]

अनारब्धफलं कर्म न त्वारब्धफलं यदि ।
निरुणद्ध्यात्मविज्ञानं तदानिष्टम् प्रसज्यते ॥१५३२॥

If the knowledge of (the true nature of) the Ātman does not obstruct (ritual) activity which has not begun to show its fruit (in the same way as) that which has begun to show its fruit, then there forcefully follows (the) undesired (result).[1] [1532]

[1]That means opposition to the Śruti like *kṣīyante cāsya karmāṇi tasmin dṛṣṭe parāvare* (*Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 2.2.8).

प्रारब्धात्मफलं नो चेत्कर्म ज्ञानं निवर्तयेत् ।
अनारब्धफलं हन्तीत्यत्रापि स्यान्न निश्चितिः ॥१५३३॥

If knowledge of (the true nature of) the Ātman does not ward away (ritual) activity which has begun to show fruit, then there would not be any certainty that it would destroy (that ritual activity) also which has not begun to show its fruits! [1533]

न चेदारब्धकार्येषु ज्ञानस्वातन्त्र्यमिष्यते ।
अनारब्धेषु नितरां पुंसो ऽपि स्याद्यथेष्टता ॥१५३४॥

If it is not accepted that knowledge has freedom (i.e. capacity to destroy) in respect of those (ritual activities) which have begun to show their results, then in the case of a person there would certainly be wanton behaviour. [1534]

न च तेषु निरुद्धेषु किंचिन्नः स्यात्प्रयोजनम् ।
प्राङ्मृतेर्मुक्त्यसंसिद्धेरबीजत्वाच्च संसृतेः ॥१५३५॥

And in case they[1] are obstructed, we would not have any purpose whatsoever in life before death, so long as there has not occurred liberation and since (consequent upon death) transmigratory existence would not have any seed for it. [1535]

[1] *ārabdhakāryakarmasu* referred to in the preceding verse.

सर्वसंहारकाले च निरोधो ऽभूदशेषतः ।
तावानपि न पर्याप्तो निरोधो मुक्तये कथम् ॥१५३६॥
अल्पीयोहःसमभ्यस्तो निरोधो ऽलं विमुक्तये ।
भावनोपचयान्नापि मुक्तिः स्याद्भङ्गुरत्वतः ॥१५३७॥

And, further, at the time of destruction of all (beings and things), there has been cessation of (lit. obstruction to) (all activities) in their entirety.[1] How would not that much[2] obstruction (to ritual activity) be capable of effecting liberation? [1536]

Obstruction (to performance of ritual activity) carried on (even) for few days (by acquiring the knowledge of the Ātman) is capable of leading to liberation; but there would not be liberation like (in the other case), since there is increase of desire for ritual activity and because of its being liable to perish. [1537]

[1]This is to oppose the view of the followers of Yoga who hold that *cittavṛttinirodha* leads to liberation. No importance is attached to the knowledge of the Ātman by them.

[2]This refers to the obstruction to ritual activity caused by the knowledge of the Brahman, acquired in one's life-time, before death (i.e. in the state of *jīvanmukti*).

दुःख्यस्मीत्यपि चेद्ध्वस्ता कोटिकल्पोपबृंहिता ।
अल्पीयोभ्यासजा साध्वी भावनेत्यत्र का प्रमा ॥१५३८॥

(One would ask:) What proof is there that there is produced a good impulse by short-time-application (to the activity of acquiring the knowledge of the Brahman), in case (the feeling) 'I am unhappy.', which has become strong in the large number of previous *kalpa*s gets destroyed? [1538]

शास्त्रार्थस्य समाप्तेश्च मुक्तिः स्यात्तावता मितेः ।
रागादयः सन्तु कामं न तद्भावो ऽपराद्ध्यति ॥१५३९॥

(This is said in answer:) There is liberation, because of the fulfilment of the purpose of the Śruti (to that effect), viz. liberation by that much right knowledge; let there be the feelings of attachment etc., their being there does not in any way affect the occurrence of liberation. [1539]

आगमाद्वेद चेद्ब्रह्म ब्रह्मैव भवतीति हि ।
फलावस्थस्य च सतः कुतो रागादिसंप्लुतिः ॥१५४०॥

Since if one knew the Brahman from tradition of the Veda (or from the Śruti) 'He would indeed be the Brahman.', how could there be overpowering by attachment etc. of the one who is in the state of liberation (which is) the fruit? [1540]

This verse explains the second line of the preceding verse.

न च ब्रह्मपरिज्ञानहुताशाप्लुष्टमण्वपि ।
संभाव्यते ब्रह्मधियः सर्वान्त्यत्वैकहेतुतः ॥१५४१॥

Further, there cannot be even a little thing which is not burnt by the fire in the form of complete knowledge of the Brahman on the part of one who has acquired the knowledge of the Brahman, for it is the one cause of the end of all (other things). [1541]

सम्यग्ज्ञानविरुद्धा धीर्न चैकात्म्यं विजानतः ।
उत्पद्यते निर्विषया विषयाशयहानतः ॥१५४२॥

And there does not arise on the part of one who has known the uniqueness of the Ātman any awareness which is opposed to right knowledge. There arises on the part of him a knowledge which has no object, since there has been abandonment of the contents of all objects. [1542]

लोके ऽनिर्ज्ञाततत्त्वस्य मिथ्याधीरुपजायते ।
प्रध्वस्ततत्त्वतमसः कुतः स्यात्कारणादृते ॥१५४३॥

In the world there arises false knowledge on the part of one

who has not determined the true nature of the Ātman; how could that (=false knowledge) be (on the part of one) who has destroyed the darkness which had earlier overpowered that truth, unless there was any reason?[1] [1543]

[1]There is right knowledge, therefore that happening is not at all possible.

सम्यग्ज्ञाने ऽपि चेत्सा स्यादविश्रम्भः प्रसज्यते ।
एवं सत्यप्रमाणत्वं मितेश्चापि प्रसज्यते ॥१५४४॥

Supposing it[1] would be there even when was right knowledge (on the part of one), then there would be the contingency of disbelief in (the teaching of the Śruti) and, this being so, even right knowledge would cease to be an authoritative means of knowing. [1544]

[1]It refers to *mithyājñāna* mentioned in the preceding verse.

सम्यङ्मिथ्याधियोर्यस्माद्विशेषो नोपलभ्यते ।
व्यवहारस्य लोपो ऽतः सर्वस्य स्यादसंशयः ॥१५४५॥

(And that being so),[1] since there would be no difference noticeable between right knowledge and false knowledge, therefore there would be a doubtless (i.e. decided) loss of the entire dealing (of human beings). [1545]

[1]This means: if there is *miter apramāṇatva* (which is stated in the preceding verse).

सम्यग्ज्ञानसमुत्पत्तिसमनन्तरमेव च ।
शरीरपातः कस्मान्नेत्येतच्चाप्यपहस्तितम् ॥१५४६॥
पूर्वोक्तेनैव न्यायेन वक्तव्यं नावशिष्यते ।

As to the question, 'why there is no fall of the body immediately after the rise of right knowledge?', that also is refuted [1546]
by the very reason already stated.[1] (As such), there is nothing

left to be said. [1547ab]

[1]Namely, the argument already stated in verse 1529 above and note thereon, viz. *prārabdhakarmāṇām bhogād eva kṣayaḥ*.

ज्ञानोत्पत्तावतो ध्वस्तिः सर्वेषामपि कर्मणाम् ॥१५४७॥
यथैधांसि समिद्धो ऽग्निर्भस्मसात्कुरुते ऽर्जुन ।
ज्ञानाग्निः सर्वकर्माणि भस्मसात्कुरुते तथा ॥१५४८॥

Therefore, when there arises knowledge (viz. the true nature of the Self), there is destruction of all the (ritual) activities also. (The following is said by the Lord in this context:) As an enkindled fire renders fuel sticks to ashes, O Arjuna, so does the fire of knowledge render to ashes all actions of man.[1] [1547cd-1548]

[1] *Gītā* 4.37.

सर्वदृष्टान्तसारूप्यप्रसक्तौ तन्निषेधकृत् ।
तावदेव चिरं तस्येत्यपवादः श्रुतीरितः ॥१५४९॥

Now there might follow contingently the similarity (or, the sameness) of illustrations in their entirety, therefore, there is stated in the Śruti an exception to that in the words, 'For him only that much delay.',[1] which negates that.[2] (Thus:) — [1549]

[1]For the sake of metre, Sureśvara changes the order of words from *tasya tāvad eva ciram* (CU 6.14.2).

[2]Namely, the contingent sameness of illustrations.

नेत्रबन्धविनिर्मोकादुपदेशः स्मृतिं प्रति ॥१५५०॥
ततस्तदर्थग्रहणमनुष्ठानं ततः परम् ।
स भूरिगत्युपचयाद्ग्रामाद्ग्रामान्तरं व्रजेत् ॥१५५१॥
सम्यग्ज्ञातोपदेशार्थः स्वयं च प्रतिभानवान् ।
द्राघीयसा स कालेन गन्धारान्प्रतिपद्यते ॥१५५२॥

There is (in CU instruction as to the memory of a country

lost to some person) after removing the bondage on the eyes (of him), [1550]
(and) thereafter, there is (or the part of that person) grasping of the meaning of that (=instruction) and, thereafter, there is some activity (on his part), namely that 'and (then) by going about here and there (lit. variously or a long way) he moves from one village to another — [1551]
(and) having well understood the meaning of the instruction, he himself becomes fully aware[1] (of Reality and) arrives, after some long span of time, at the region of Gāndhāra.' [1552]

This is the summary of CU 6.14.1-2. It seeks to answer away the contingent similarity with the illustrations in entirety.

[1]Knowing fully the bearings of the country etc.

यथैवमेवेहापि स्याद्य इहाचार्यवानरः ।
निःशेषदृष्टान्तोक्त्यर्थप्रसक्तिविनिवृत्तये ।
अपवादं श्रुतिरियं तस्य त्विति जगाद नः ॥१५५३॥

As this (happens), so here also it would be (i.e. happen) (in the case of) a person who has a teacher.[1] And then, in order to ward away the contingent meaning of the (similarity with) illustration in its fullness, this Śruti declared to us *tasya tu* ...[2], as an exception.[3] [1553]

[1]He obtains the knowledge of the true nature of their inner self.

[2]*tasya tu* ... is for *tasya tāvad eva ciram* ... (CU 6.14.2); as seen in the next verse.

[3]A statement for excluding some contingent matter.

तस्य त्वेवंविदः पुंसस्तावदेव चिरं भवेत् ।
यावदैकात्म्यसंमोहपट्टको नापनीयते ॥१५५४॥

In the case of that person, who knows thus; there is only that much delay so long as the bondage of ignorance about the uniqueness of the Ātman is not removed (from his eyes). [1554]

This is explanation of the last line of the preceding verse.

प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यविज्ञानजन्मनो नातिरेकभाक् ।
प्रत्यङ्मोहाभिनहनध्वंसश्चाप्यन्यथामतेः ॥१५५५॥

And the removal, lit. destruction of the bondage of ignorance about (the inner self) in the case of one, who had a notion (about it) as other (than what it really is), is not apart from[1] the rise of the knowledge of the true nature of the inner self. [1555]

[1]It literally means: is not in addition to ...

तस्माद्याथात्म्यविज्ञानसमुत्पत्तेः पुरैव तु ।
आत्माज्ञानं सकार्यं स्यात्तस्य बाध्यत्वकारणात् ॥१५५६॥

Therefore, only before the rise of the knowledge of the true nature of, Self there exists (on the part of a person) ignorance about the inner self together with its effects, because there has existed (earlier) the cause of its obstruction. [1556]

यस्मिन्प्राप्ते यद्भवति तत्तस्मात्स्यात्कथं पुरा ।
अन्त्यं तस्मात्परिज्ञानं सर्वबाध्यस्य बाधकम् ॥१५५७॥

(The objector asks:) How could a thing exist before that which obtaining (only) it obtains? Therefore, knowledge which stultifies all that is to be stultified is what exists last. [1557]

This objection pertains to the dispute about the state of *jīvan-mukti*, which results from acquisition of knowledge about the true nature of the Ātman at some moment in life, and the state after realising the nature of the Brahman at the time of death. The idea of the objector is that, in the state of *jīvanmukti*, there would not be any existence which is already stultified by the knowledge of the Brahman. It is only logical that the last moment in one's life stultifies every worldly thing.

This is the conclusion of the discussion.

ऋणिनो ऽप्यस्य देवाद्या नेशते ब्रह्मवेदिनः ।
इत्युक्तं किंनिमित्तं चेत्तत्र प्रतिविधीयते ॥१५५८॥

[Verses 1558-1562 state that even the gods cannot take liberty to stop one's attaining liberation.]

If (it is asked:) What is the reason for the statement that gods and others do not have control over this knower of the Brahman, even though he is bound in debt to them? (To this) an answer is given (now): [1558]

This question has a basis in verses 1507-1508 above.

न विज्ञातात्मयाथात्म्यं प्रत्यृणित्वं भवेद्यतः ।
अविद्याविषयं तत्स्यात्तस्य कर्तृत्वकारणात् ॥१५५९॥

The state of being indebted (to gods and others) would not be on the part of him who has known the true nature of the Self, since that (state) is within the purview of ignorance for the reason that his nature of an agent (of some activity is understood thereby). [1559]

यत्र वा अन्यदित्यादि तथा च श्रुतिशासनम् ।
ध्वस्ताविद्यस्य तन्न स्यात्तस्यैकात्म्यस्वभावतः ॥१५६०॥

And to that effect is there the instruction in the Śruti *yatra* ...[1] or *anyad* ...[2] and so on. That[3] would not be on the part of one whose ignorance is destroyed, since his nature is now that of the unique Ātman.[4] [1560]

[1]BU 4.5.15: *yatra tv asya sarvam ātmaivābhūt*. This is referred to in verses 571, 1185 and 1505 above.

[2]*Kenopaniṣad* 1.4: *anyad eva tad viditād atho aviditād adhi*. This is referred to in verses 565, 719, 873(note) and 1117 above.

[3]That is, *kartṛtva*.

[4]That is to say: He is one with the Ātman and, therefore, there

is nothing else that would govern him.

न चेहाविदुषो ऽपि स्यादृणित्वम् हेत्वसंभवात् ।
न किंचिन्नः सुरैः प्रत्तमृणित्वं येन नो भवेत् ॥१५६१॥

Further, there is not (in reality) on the part of even a non-knower of the Brahman the state of being bound in debt, because there is no cause (for his being so). Indeed, nothing is given to us by gods on whose account we would be in the state of being bound in debt. [1561]

वचनादिति चेन्नैवं तदुक्तेरर्थवादतः ।
अवदानविधेः शेषो ह्यर्थवादो हि तद्वचः ॥१५६२॥

If (it is argued:) (It is so) because there is a statement in the Śruti (about man's being bound to gods etc. in debt). (It has to be said:) No, that statement is but an Arthavāda[1]. Indeed, that statement is an Arthavāda, since it is the remainder of the injunction about the cutting (of the oblation). [1562]

[1]It means: the statement of some ancillary matter.

विद्वांसं प्रति नेशाना यदि देवादयो मताः ।
कस्मिन्विषय ऐश्वर्यं तेषां स्यात्सो ऽधुनोच्यते ॥१५६३॥

[Verses 1563-1589 explain the meaning of *atha yo 'nyām.*]

If the gods and others are considered as unable to control a learned man, (then the question is:) In what area do they have a capacity to control? That (particular area) is now stated: [1563]

In three quarters of the verse, the objector has asked a doubt about the meaningfulness or otherwise of the gods and others having a control over human beings. This doubt is answered in the verses which follow.

प्रामाण्यं कर्मकाण्डस्य यस्मिन्विषय इष्यते ।

अविद्याविषयः साक्षादथ यो ऽन्यामितीर्यते ॥१५६४॥

That area (viz. portion) of the Śruti in which its authoritativeness is accepted with reference to rituals is in reality (*sākṣāt*) the area of ignorance and that is stated in the words *yo 'nyām* ... [1564]

सम्यग्ज्ञानसमुत्पत्तौ कर्मकार्यसमाप्तितः ।
नापेक्षा कर्मकाण्डे स्यात्तत्प्रामाण्यकृतार्थतः ॥१५६५॥

When there arises right knowledge (about the nature of the Brahman) there is obtainment (of the result of) all the activity and, therefore, there is no expectation of the portions pertaining to rituals, because the purpose of its authority is already fulfilled. [1565]

This verse refers to *karmakārya*.

प्रकृतैकात्म्यविद्याया व्युत्थानायाथगीरियम् ।
न हि संगच्छते विद्याविद्यायोगं विरोधतः ॥१५६६॥

This (use of the word) *atha* is to express the rise of the knowledge of the uniqueness of the Ātman which is the subject matter under discussion, and indeed (that statement) does not go (well) with knowledge and ignorance together on account of their mutual conflict. [1566]

प्रतीच्यनन्य एकस्मिन्नविद्यापिहितेक्षणः ।
अनन्यो ऽप्यात्मनो भिन्नामुपास्ते देवतां नरः ॥१५६७॥

A man whose eye is covered by ignorance in respect of the inner self, which is one without a second, worships a deity other than his own self, even if he is not different from the Ātman. [1567]

अन्यो ऽसाविति वाक्येन व्याख्योपासापदस्य तु ।
भेददर्शनमेवात उपास्त इति भण्यते ॥१५६८॥

In the statement *anyo 'sau* there is the explanation of the term *upāsā*[1]; therefore what is said in the word *upāste* is described only as seeing (that is accepting) duality. [1568]

[1]See our book [Vol.4:1991] Introduction for a discussion on Upāsana/Upāsanā.

किं मूलं भिन्नदृष्टेः स्यादिति श्रुत्या तदुच्यते ।
न स वेदेत्यविद्येयं नामरूपप्रपञ्चकृत् ॥१५६९॥

(One would ask:) 'What is the root of this notion of distinction (between the Brahman and the other thing)?' and (to answer this,) it is said: The Śruti states *na sa veda*, 'Thus this is ignorance which creates variety in name and form.'. [1569]

आत्माविद्याग्रहग्रस्तः संहतस्तज्जवस्तुभिः ।
स एष पशुतामेति देवादीनां स्वकर्मभिः ॥१५७०॥

This one, who is oppressed by (lit. swallowed by) the evil spirit in the form of ignorance about (the nature of) the Ātman and bound by the objects that are the products of it, becomes by his own activity an animal for gods and others. [1570]

बहूपकारकृद्यद्वद्गवादिर्लौकिकः पशुः ।
देवादीनां तथाविद्वान्पशुः स्यादुपकारकृत् ॥१५७१॥

As an animal of this world, such as a cow, renders various sevice (to human beings), so also does an ignorant person, an animal, render service to gods and others. [1571]

एकैकस्वामिको लोके गवादिः पशुरिष्यते ।
ततो ऽप्यतिशयः पुंसां सर्वलोकोपकारिता ॥१५७२॥

In the world, they hold that an animal, such as a cow, has one master, but there is, in the case of human beings, some additional aspect of them, viz. they have usefulness for all the people. [1572]

एकैकक्रियया लोक एकैकस्वामिकः पशुः ।
अनेकैः संहतश्चैवं कदाचिदुपकारकः ॥१५७३॥

In the world, an animal which performs one activity and has one master (for itself) it could at some time be (variously) useful (to the master) as flocked with many others also. [1573]

भूरिक्रियावांस्तु नरस्तथानेकेश्वरो ऽवशः ।
एकैको निखिलं विश्वं बिभर्त्यज्ञो दिवानिशम् ॥१५७४॥

As against this (*tu*), a human being, capable of doing many actions, not having one master, a servant, the ignorant one, performs day and night all (numerous duties) without exception, though even a single (person). [1574]

अस्यैवार्थस्य दृष्टान्तो यथा हेत्यभिधीयते ।
यत एवमतो युक्तं देवादेर्भृशमप्रियम् ॥१५७५॥

For conveying this very meaning is here stated the illustration in the words *yathā ha* ...; since this is so, it is reasonable (to hold that) this is very disagreeable to gods and others. [1575]

This is clarified in the next verse.

अपि भूरिपशोः पुंस एकस्मिन्नपि तस्करैः ।
ह्रियमाणे पशौ तीव्रं दुःखं समुपजायते ।
किमु सर्वस्वहरणे वक्तव्यं दुःखकारणम् ॥१५७६॥

For a human being who has a large stock of animals, there is a very intense sorrow even when a single animal is stolen away by thieves; how great a cause of sorrow there would be when the all-in-all of his life is taken away (from him)? [1576]

This is the meaning of the sentence *yathā ca*.

सर्वस्वतुल्ये नृपशौ ब्रह्मधीपरिमोषिणा ॥१५७७॥
ह्रियमाणे महद्दुःखं तस्मादेषां तदप्रियम् ।
यद्यथोक्तं परं ब्रह्म मनुष्या विद्युरञ्जसा ॥१५७८॥

Therefore, for these persons it is greatly disagreeable when the animal in the form of man, which is (for them) as good as all of (their) property, is (being) stolen away by the thief in the form the knowledge about the Brahman, for, as is already said, men knew the Brahman clearly. [1577-1578]

This is the meaning of *tasmād eṣām* ...

सर्वाधिकारहेत्वग्निब्रह्मज्ञानस्य जन्मनि ।
अव्यावृताननुगतात्प्रतीचो ऽन्यन्न शिष्यते ॥१५७९॥

At the rise of the knowledge of the Brahman, which is fire (that burns away) every ground of eligibility (for ritual activity), there does not remain anything else than the inner self which is undifferentiated and not similar to anything (else). [1579]

This explains why the knowledge about the Brahman is called a thief (in the preceding verse).

नावशिष्यत एतस्मात्तदविद्योत्थमण्वपि ।
प्रध्वस्तत्वादविद्याया ब्रह्मात्मज्ञानवह्निना ॥१५८०॥

For this reason, not even a little of what had arisen from ignorance about that (viz. the inner self) remains, since ignorance is completely destroyed by the fire in the form of the knowledge of the inner self as the Brahman. [1580]

This refers to the preceding verse.

क्रियावद्भिर्हि कौन्तेय देवलोकः समावृतः ।
न चैतदिष्टं देवानां मर्त्यैरुपरि वर्तनम् ॥१५८१॥

For, the world of gods is all crowded, O son of Kuntī, by them who perform rituals and this, viz. rising of men above

(their normal condition), is not desired by gods. [1581]

This is *Mahābhārata* 14.19.54; it clarifies the word *apriya* in the text.

तस्मान्मुमुक्षुर्देवादीन्सम्यगाराध्य कर्मभिः ।
उन्मुक्तबन्धनस्तैः सन्नापित्सेज्ज्ञानमात्मनः ॥१५८२॥

Therefore, a person who is desirous of securing liberation should first please the gods through various services, and, having become free from ties (of worldly existence), he should seek to acquire the knowledge of Ātman. [1582]

तद्विपक्षस्तु यो बालो बलादेव मुमुक्षति ।
स्वर्गादेरपि विभ्रष्टो नरकं स निगच्छति ॥१५८३॥

But the one who, opposed to him (in nature or action), the ignorant one, would perforce seek to obtain liberation, would fall even from a heaven and go down to the hell. [1583]

प्रमादिनो बहिश्चित्ताः पिशुनाः कलहोत्सुकाः ।
संन्यासिनो ऽपि दृश्यन्ते देवसंदूषिताशयाः ॥१५८४॥

There are seen even ascetics who have mistaken[1], whose mind is prone outwards, who are wicked, who are ever ready to pick up quarrels and who have their minds spoilt by gods.[2] [1584]

[1]Or, who falter or take wrong steps.
[2]That is, because they are not worshipped by the ascetics.

न कर्मणामनारम्भान्नैष्कर्म्यं पुरुषो ऽश्नुते ।
न च संन्यसनादेव सिद्धिं समधिगच्छति ॥१५८५॥

A man does not become free from *karman* by (mere) not beginning the rituals/activities. Also he does not obtain liberation (or better, *siddhi* 'fulfilment of his life') by only abandoning the same. [1585]

This is *Gītā* 3.4.

कषायं पाचयित्वा तु श्रेणीस्थानेषु च त्रिषु ।
प्रव्रजेच्च परं स्थानं पारिव्राज्यमनुत्तमम् ॥१५८६॥

And, having exhaused (lit. covered) the evil in the three stages of ascending[1], a person should take to the ultimate stage, viz. excellent renunciation. [1586]

This is comparable to *Mahābhārata* 12.237.3 where the second line ends in *parivrajyāmanuttamām*.

[1] *brahmacarya*, *gārhasthya* and *vānaprastha* are meant.

भावितैः करणैश्चायं बहुसंसारयोनिषु ।
आसादयति शुद्धात्मा मोक्षं वै प्रथमाश्रमे ॥१५८७॥

And this person who, having purified his inner self by means of his various sense-organs that are satisfied in the course of many births in transmigratory existence, indeed obtains liberation (even) in the first stage (of life). [1587]

This is *Mahābhārata* 12.313.26.

तमासाद्य तु मुक्तस्य दृष्टार्थस्य विपश्चितः ।
त्रिष्वाश्रमेषु को न्वर्थो भवेत्परमभीप्सतः ॥१५८८॥

And (*tu*) in the case of the person, who has obtained that[1] and is liberated, who has seen the (real) thing, who is an excellent knower, what significance would there be in the three remaining stages when he is desiring for only the highest (bliss of Brahman)? [1588]

This is *Mahābhārata* 12.313.27.

[1] *mukti* stated in verse 1587.

इत्येवं भगवद्व्यासवचांस्यत्र सहस्रशः ।
श्रूयन्ते न्यायदृब्धानि तस्मात्तान्यादराच्छ्रयेत् ॥१५८९॥

This and such other thousands of (i.e. numerous) statements of venerable Vyāsa are heard and they are supported with reasoning; therefore, one should take recourse to them with respect. [1589]

The point of all the statements of Vyāsa is that a person should be worshipful to gods (as stated in BUB).

Now begins the explanation of BU 1.4.11-13.

शास्त्रार्थः सूत्रितस्तावदात्मेत्येवेति यत्नतः ।
उक्तश्च तस्य सूत्रस्य संबन्धः सप्रयोजनः ॥१५९०॥

[Verses 1590-1597 narrate the origination of the four Varṇas.]

Thus, the meaning of the Śruti, has been carefully explained in brief in the words *ātmety eva* and its relation to the Sūtrātman (i.e. Hiraṇyagarbha), has also been stated together with the purpose of the same. [1590]

संसारानर्थहेतुत्वमविद्यायाश्च वर्णितम् ।
यो ऽन्यामित्यादिवाक्येन तत्कार्यमपि सूत्रितम् ॥१५९१॥

Further, there has been pointed out how ignorance is the cause of all the undesirable in the transmigratory world and its effect also is expounded by the statement *yo 'nyām* ... [1591]

विद्यावत्सह कार्येण ह्यविद्यापीह सूत्रिता ।
सामर्थ्याद्विस्तरस्तस्या आध्यायान्तादिहोच्यते ॥१५९२॥

Like the knowledge of the Brahman, ignorance, together with its effect also has been expounded here because of the propriety (of it in this context) — this is stated at length up to the end of this chapter. [1592]

यथोक्तात्मानभिज्ञो यो ऽविद्याकार्याभिमानवान् ।
पशुवद्देवताः पाति स जुहोत्यादिकर्मभिः ॥१५९३॥

He, who is a non-knower of the Ātman as already described and has the Ego that he does activity (which is really) ignorance,[1] serves[2], like animals, the deities by the performance of rituals of offering etc. [1593]

[1]That is, which is really under the influence of ignorance.
[2]This is a peculiar use of the verb root √*pā* (in the sense of *upa-*√*kṛ*) 'to render service to'.

आध्यायावसितेस्तस्मादविद्याया विभूतयः ।
वक्ष्यन्ते विस्तरेणातः परो ग्रन्थो ऽवतार्यते ॥१५९४॥

Therefore, up to the end of the chapter are described at length the various forms (lit. excellences) of ignorance; as such, now is introduced the subsequent (part of the) text. [1594]

अस्यैवार्थस्य सिद्ध्यर्थमग्निसर्गादननतरम् ।
इन्द्रादिसर्गः प्राङ्नोक्तो मोहकार्यविवक्षया ॥१५९५॥

In order to establish this very thought it is that after (the description of) the creation of fire (the description) of Indra and others was not stated earlier; this was with a desire to expound (the nature of) the effects of ignorance. [1595]

परिपूरणाय सृष्टेस्तु ह्यग्निसर्गः पुरोदितः ।
यत एवमतो ऽविद्याकार्यो ऽनर्थो ऽखिलो भवेत् ॥१५९६॥

Since the creation of Agni was mentioned earlier with a view to completing (the description of) the creation. Since this is so, the entire creation of undesirable effects, which is to be produced by ignorance, would be similarly (described). [1596]

इन्द्रादिसर्गस्तत्रैव तच्छेषत्वात्समीक्ष्यताम् ।
अविद्याकार्यसिद्ध्यर्थमिह त्वस्य प्रपञ्चनम् ॥१५९७॥

The creation of Indra and others should have been described just there, since it is subordinate to that[1] — thus this should

be accepted; yet, it is explained at length here for revealing fully the effects of ignorance. [1597]

[1] *sṛṣṭi* of the preceding verse.

स्रष्टृ यज्जगतः पूर्वमात्मैवेत्यभिशब्दितम् ।
तदग्न्याद्यभिमान्यत्र ब्रह्मेति व्यपदिश्यते ॥१५९८॥

[Verses 1598-1613 explain the meaning of *brahma vā*.]

That creator of the world, which was earlier mentioned by the word *ātman* itself[1], is here mentioned (now) as the Brahman, having the notion that it is fire etc. [1598]

This verse points to but one significance of the two words *ātman* used earlier and *brahman* now. Thus, there is continuity of but one thought.

[1] Refer to BU 1.4.1.

ब्रह्मैकजात्यवच्छिन्नं यस्मादग्रे व्यवर्तत ।
नानेकजातिमद्धेतुकर्मणे ऽलं ततो भवेत् ॥१५९९॥

Since the Brahman existed in the beginning as marked by only one caste, viz. Brāhmaṇa, and was not having more than one caste; therefore it was not capable of activity. [1599]

This explains *ekam eva*.

The idea of the four castes as found in *Gītā* 4.13: *cāturvarṇyaṃ mayā sṛṣṭaṃ guṇakarmavibhāgaśaḥ* is explained by Sureśvara.

चातुर्वर्ण्यप्रसाध्यं सन्नैकजातिप्रसाधनम् ।
कर्मालं सिद्धये लोके शिबिकोद्वहनं यथा ॥१६००॥

Being what can be accomplished by four castes, activity, which has many castes as its agents, is not possible to come into effect like the bearing of a palanquin. [1600]

All the social functions are not carried out by one caste, viz.

the Brāhmaṇa caste; they were carried out by all the castes working together. This is clarified by the illustration of a palanquin which is borne by more persons than one.

गृहीतिरभिषिक्तानामिन्द्रादीनां श्रुतौ श्रुता ।
श्रेयोरूपप्रसिद्ध्यर्थं क्षत्रस्येत्यवगम्यते ॥१६०१॥

It is heard in the Śruti and it is understood that there is acceptance of Indra and others, who are consecrated, for declaring the excellent forms of the Kṣatriya[1] caste. [1601]

This conveys the purport of *yāny etāni*.

[1]The Kṣatriya is recognised in society as the most excellent being. This is because Indra and others are also considered as the most capable of gods, the one who was consecrated.

धर्मान्तैः संहतैर्यस्मात्कर्म सिद्ध्यति नान्यथा ।
तेन तेन विना शक्तमतस्तत्तदचीक्लृपत् ॥१६०२॥

Since activity is accomplished by all of them, ending in *dharma*, together and not otherwise; therefore, the Brāhmaṇa created everyone of them as capable (in a limited measure[1]) without each one of them. [1602]

[1]Translation follows the reading of the verse in both the editions NKL and AnSS, viz. *vinā śaktam* as separate words; but we suspect that the proper reading may be *vināśaktam = vinā aśaktam*. Therefore to justify the reading of the text we have added '(in a limited measure)' but we are still not happy with it. Further, it would have been better to accept the variant in the AnSS edition *saṃtataiḥ* after *dharmāntaiḥ*, not *sahitaiḥ*.

ब्रह्मासृजद्यतः क्षत्रमात्मनो ऽप्यतिवीर्यवत् ।
बलवत्क्षत्रतस्तस्मान्नान्यद्भूतमिहेष्यते ॥१६०३॥

Since the Brahman created the Kṣatriya (caste), very much stronger than itself, therefore, no other being is known (lit. accepted) as stronger than the Kṣatriya. [1603]

This explains *tasmāt kṣatrāt.*

तस्माच्च ब्राह्मणो ऽध्यस्ताद्राजसूये महाक्रतौ ।
आसन्दीस्थमुपास्ते त्वं राजन्ब्रह्मेति संभ्रमात् ॥१६०४॥

And, for this reason, the Brāhmaṇa takes, in the great sacrifice (called) Rājasūya, his seat on bare earth (lit. below), with the notion[1] (about the king:) 'You are, O King, a Brāhmaṇa.'. [1604]

This explains *tasmād brāhmaṇaḥ.*

[1]The word *saṃbhrama* does not express doubt; it signifies uncertainty which is caused by ignorance.

ब्रह्मेति श्रावितो राज्ञा ब्रह्मा प्रत्याह तं नृपम् ।
त्वमेव राजन्ब्रह्मेति क्षत्रे तद्यश आत्मनः ॥१६०५॥
दधाति भास्वद्ब्रह्माख्यं यस्मिन्सर्वं प्रतिष्ठितम् ।
क्षत्रस्य योनिर्ब्रह्मेदं क्षत्रं ह्याविरभूत्ततः ॥१६०६॥
यतो ऽतो यद्यपि क्षत्रं ब्राह्मण्यं प्रतिपद्यते ॥१६०७॥

The priest, who was addressed by the king 'O Brāhmaṇa', answered the king: 'You yourself are the Brāhmaṇa, O King.' In (doing) this, he places in the Kṣatriya his own bright lustre, called Brahman, in which everythig is resting. Since this Brāhmaṇahood is the origin of the Kṣatriya, the Kṣatriya arose from that, [1605-1606]
therefore, even though a Kṣatriya, he attains Brāhmaṇahood.[1] [1607]

[1]In the Rājasūya sacrifice, the king is consecrated for the performance and he is taken to have become a Brāhmaṇa. He so remains till the completion of his sacrifice. This is clarified in the following verse.

परमत्वं तथाप्यन्ते राजसूयक्रतोः पुनः ।
उपनिश्रयति ब्रह्म गुणभावेन पूर्ववत् ॥१६०८॥

So also, at the end of the (great) sacrifice Rājasūya the state of the highest resorts to the Brāhmaṇa (clan/person) as his quality, once again, even as before. [1608]

ब्रह्मैव चान्ततः क्षत्रमुपनिश्रयतीत्यतः ।
क्रतुकालैव ब्रह्मप्तिः क्षत्रस्येत्यवसीयते ॥१६०९॥

Since, finally the Brāhmaṇa himself resorts to the Kṣatriya, therefore, it is concluded that obtaining the status of the Brāhmaṇa by a Kṣatriya is only for the duration of the sacrificial performance. [1609]

स्वां योनिमिति हेतूक्तिः कार्यं कारणसंश्रयम् ।
न हि कारणतो ऽन्यत्र वृत्तिः कार्यात्मनः क्वचित् ।
ब्रह्मैककारणो राजा तस्माद्ब्रह्मैव संश्रितः ॥१६१०॥

This Śruti statement *svāṃ yonim* is a statement about the cause or origin, since an effect which depends on (its) cause is not any time present anywhere else than in the cause; therefore, the king who is brought into existence by the Brāhmaṇa resorts to the same. [1610]

यस्तु बाहुबलोन्मत्तः स्वां योनिं ब्राह्मणं नृपः ।
वाङ्मात्रेणापि सक्रोधो हिनस्तीह प्रमादतः ॥१६११॥
ब्रह्मोपमर्दनात्पापः प्रागपि क्रूरकर्मकृत् ।
ततो ऽपि पापात्पापीयान्स स्याद्ब्रह्मापवादतः ॥१६१२॥

But a king who, proud of his prowess, full of anger, would harm a Brāhmaṇa, who is his origin, even by this speech (or) through a fault [1611]
shall, by insulting the Brāhmaṇa, be a sinner, a doer of cruel act already[1] and, for that reason also, viz. by slighting the Brāhmaṇa he would be a greater sinner than any. [1612]

[1]That is, by nature.

उत्तमाभिजनोपेतं भूर्युदारगुणं द्विजम् ।
यथा श्रेयांसं हिंसित्वा पापीयान्स्यात्तथैव सः ॥१६१३॥

Similarly, he would be greater sinner by harming his superior, a Brāhmaṇa, who was born in the highest family and who had many excellent qualities. [1613]

This clarifies the idea expressed in verses 1611-1612.

Now follows in verses 1614-1633 an exposition of BU 1.4.14, pertaining to the origin of Dharma etc.

सृष्ट्वापि चतुरो वर्णान्व्यवस्थाकारणं विना ।
कर्मणे नैव पर्याप्तं ब्रह्माभूत्पूर्ववत्ततः ॥१६१४॥
ब्रह्मक्षत्रादिरूपाणि यतो ऽतीत्यासृजत्प्रभुः ।
श्रेयोरूपस्ततो धर्मः सर्वानप्यनुशास्त्यसौ ॥१६१५॥

Even after creating the four castes, yet without (producing) the cause of governing[1] them, the Brāhmaṇa could not be sufficiently able to accomplish his (desired) duties[2]; (and) then, [1614]
since the great Lord created (Dharma) beyond the various forms, viz. Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya etc., therefore, Dharma which is of the best form governs all of them (created before). [1615]

The words *dharmāntaiḥ sahitaiḥ* in verse 1602 above appear to be justified here.

[1]That is, the governing principle.

[2]The singular form *karmaṇe* stands for *karmabhyaḥ*— these are duties/activities prescribed by Dharmaśāstra.

तदेतत्सृष्टं धर्माख्यं क्षत्रस्याधिपतेरपि ।
प्रशास्तृ तद्भयाद्यस्मात्क्षत्रं भीतं प्रवर्तते ॥१६१६॥

Thus is created this principle called Dharma governing even the ruler, the Kṣatriya; (and), for that reason, being afraid of it, the Kṣatriya, full of fear, proceeds (to do his duties). [1616]

क्षत्रस्यापि यतो धर्मः साक्षादधिपतेस्ततः ।

धर्मादन्यन्महद्भूतं न भूतं न भविष्यति ॥१६१७॥

Since Dharma is the actual ruler even of a Kṣatriya, therefore, there is no other thing greater than Dharma, (viz.) that which ever was and will ever be. [1617]

This explains *tasmād dharmād paraṃ nāsti.*

श्रेयोरूपप्रसिद्ध्यर्थं प्रसिद्धिरुपवर्ण्यते ।
अथो इत्यादिना धर्मविशिष्टत्वावबुद्धये ॥१६१८॥

Now with the words *atho* ... there is described the origin of Dharma in order that its excellent form is established and also that one knows the excellence of Dharma. [1618]

This is the purport of *atho abalīyān balīyāṃsam āśaṃsate dharmeṇa yathā rājñaivam.*

[1] *dharmaviśiṣṭatva- = dharmasya viśiṣṭatva-.*

आशंसते बलीयांसमबलीयानपि स्वयम् ।
धर्मं बलं समाश्रित्य जेतुं लोके तथा यथा ॥१६१९॥
राज्ञा बलेनाल्पबलो बलीयांसं कुटुम्बिनम् ।
जेतुमाशंसते तस्माद्धर्मः स्याद्बलवत्तमः ॥१६२०॥

As a weaker person, expects to be successful in the world, resorting, on his own, to a stronger person, i.e. strength; so also having resorted to Dharma, viz. the *strength*, in order to overcome (lit. win), in (this) world, [1619]
one, who has small strength, seeks to prevail over a stronger family-man through the king, viz. the strength. Therefore, Dharma is the strongest. [1620]

This is another explanation of *yathā rājñaivam.*

बलीयसापि राज्ञेह स्पर्धमानो ऽबलो ऽपि सन् ।
जेतुमुत्सहते भूपं धर्मात्मकबलाश्रयात् ॥१६२१॥

(Therefore) a person, being weak and (yet) vying with even

a strong king, would dare to conquer that king by resorting to the strength in the form of Dharma. [1621]

एतदेव यतो ज्यायो रूपं धर्मेत्युदाहृतम् ।
रूपान्तरेभ्यः सर्वेभ्यस्तद्धि सत्यात्मकं यतः ॥१६२२॥

Since it is said that this very form, called Dharma, is greater than all other forms (of life), therefore, that[1] has the nature of the truth. [1622]

This is the purport of *yo vai sa dharmaḥ ... ubhayam bhavati.*
[1]The construe is: *tat* (*rūpam*) *hi* ... and the last word *yataḥ* is to be read for *tataḥ.*

तस्यास्य धर्मरूपस्य कार्यकारणतां मिथः ।
यो वै स धर्म इत्युक्त्या वक्तुं प्रववृते श्रुतिः ॥१६२३॥

Therefore does the Śruti proceed with the words *yo vai sa dharmaḥ* to declare the mutual relation of that[1] and this (which is called) Dharma, namely their being mutually the cause and the effect. [1623]

[1]That is, truth; the construe is: *tasya* (*satyasya*) *asya dharmasya ... mithaḥ ...*

प्रयोगलक्षणो यो ऽयं श्रुतिस्मृत्युदितो मतः ।
स धर्म इति विज्ञेयः सत्यं शास्त्रार्थलक्षणम् ॥१६२४॥

This one, which has *employment*[1] as its characteristic, as prescribed (lit. stated) by the Śruti and the Smṛti, is to be known as that Dharma, and truth is characterized as the thing conveyed by the meaning of the Śāstra.[2] [1624]

This verse points out that Dharma is a matter of performance and *satya* 'truth' of knowledge.
[1]The word *prayoga* means: the employment or procedure in ritual performance.
[2]This refers to the meaning of the Vedānta sentences.

अक्षरानुगतो ऽप्यर्थो यदि संशय्यते तदा ।
नित्यप्रयोगरूपोत्थविज्ञानात्तद्विनिश्चितिः ॥१६२५॥

If the meaning conveyed by the letters (i.e. words in the Śāstra) is doubted, then it is determined from the knowledge that arises from its daily performances. [1625]

This and the next verse explain how Dharma and *satya* are mutually cause/effect.

[1]See note 2 on the preceding verse.

प्रयोगे ऽपि च संशीतौ वाक्यार्थज्ञानसंश्रयात् ।
निर्णुदेत्संशयं प्राज्ञ एवमन्योन्यहेतुता ॥१६२६॥

And the wise one would remove his doubt, in case a doubt arises as regards *employment* by resorting to the knowledge which arises from the meaning of the sentence — thus is here mutual dependence. [1626]

यथा प्रयोगमुल्लङ्घ्य व्याख्यातुं शक्नुयात्सुधीः ।
यथाशास्त्रं तथोल्लङ्घ्य कर्तुं शक्नोत्यथापरः ॥१६२७॥

As a very intelligent person could explain (some ritual), without paying attention to[1] (actual) *employment*, so can another person perform (ritual) without paying attention to (what is prescribed) according to the Dharmaśāstra (text). [1627]

This supplies the reason as to why they have accepted mutual dependence of Śāstra and *prayoga* as said in the preceding verse.

[1]In other words, disregarding (actual) ...

अतथ्यान्यपि तथ्यानि दर्शयन्तीह वादिनः ।
समे निम्नोन्नतानीव चित्रकर्मविदो जनाः ॥१६२८॥

(For example) disputants present even untruths as truths as a person who knows the art of painting can show ups and

downs on even a flat (surface). [1628]

शास्त्रार्थस्तत्प्रयोगश्च यदा त्वन्योन्यसंश्रयात् ।
प्रवर्तते तदा कर्तुर्न प्रमादो मनागपि ॥१६२९॥

But (*ca*) when the meaning of the Śruti and *employment* are operative, with mutual dependence, there is not even a little blemish on the part of a performer. [1629]

नायं धर्म इति ज्ञेयो यो ऽयं सृष्टाविहेरितः ।
क्षत्रादिनियमाशक्तेस्तस्याचैतन्यरूपतः ॥१६३०॥

This, which is described in relation to this creation as Dharma, should not be (really) known as Dharma since it has no capacity for controlling the Kṣatriya and others and also because it does not have (for its purport) the form of sentience. [1630]

Now is introduced another meaning of the word 'dharma'-- earlier it referred to ritual activity such as Agnihotra, prescribed by scrip- tural texts (shown by us as Dharma); this indicated apūrva or adṛṣṭa. This was understood in 'tato dharmaṃ śreyorūpam asṛjata'.

देवता तु ह्यधिष्ठात्री धर्मो ऽस्मीत्यभिमानिनी ।
सैवेह सृज्यते धात्रा नियमार्थप्रसिद्धये ॥१६३१॥

However, the superintending deity (of a ritual activity) has a strong feeling 'I am Dharma.' and that itself is created by the creator with a view to effecting control (over the creation). [1631]

The Mīmāṃsā principle is that Dharma is insentient; it cannot act in the way described in the preceding verse. Therefore, they have acknowledged the need of a deity which superintends over a ritual activity.

धर्मस्यैव तु रूपेण देवता रूपिणी मता ।
तन्नाम्ना नामवत्येवं देवतान्तरयोजना ॥१६३२॥

And (*tu*) the deity is understood to be having a form, through that of Dharma (superintended over by it) has a form; so also, it has a name on account of the name of that — thus is the arrangement in respect of other deities. [1632]

This is to express the meaning of *dharma*.

एकैव देवता तस्मान्नामरूपाद्युपाधिभिः ।
आभाति बहुरूपेव तत्पराधीनचेतसाम् ॥१६३३॥

Therefore, there is (in reality) but one deity which appears to them whose minds are prone to it as having many forms on account of its having various delimiting adjuncts such as names and forms. [1633]

This establishes non-duality as the Reality.

Verses 1634-1779 explain the contents of BU 1.4.15.

यथोक्तार्थोपसंहार उत्तरार्थविवक्षया ।
ब्राह्मणस्य पुरानुक्तेस्तदुक्त्यर्था परा श्रुतिः ॥१६३४॥

(This is) the conclusion of the matter so far stated; (now), with a desire to explain the next (lit. subsequent) thought, proceeds the subsequent Śruti, since (the nature of) the Brāhmaṇa[1] is not stated before. [1634]

In the previous verse, there is concluded the discussion of *cāturvarṇya*. Now, this and the next three verses state the purport of *tad etad brahma kṣatram viṭ śūdraḥ*.

[1] *brāhmaṇasya = brāhmaṇatvasya* (SP). Earlier, only the Kṣatriya among the gods was stated. Now, *agninaiva* ... will state Agni as the Brāhmaṇa among them.

दैववर्णविभागस्य मनुष्येष्वपि भण्यते ।
विनियोगो यथोक्तो ऽयं वर्णानां प्रविभागशः ॥१६३५॥

This so far described arrangement in respect of the division of castes of gods is mentioned in respect of men also by specifying the division of their castes. [1635]

In BU 1.4.6 was mentioned only the kindling of fire, not its Brāhmaṇahood. That is now stated in *tad agninaiva* ...

क्षत्रादीनां पुरोक्तत्वादनुक्तेर्ब्राह्मणस्य च ।
को न्वेषु ब्राह्मण इति चोदिते स्यात्परा श्रुतिः ॥१६३६॥

Since (the origin of) Kṣatriya and others was mentioned earlier and (that of) Brāhmaṇa was not mentioned, the subsequent Śruti proceeds (to state that), as urged by the question, 'Who amongst them is indeed Brāhmaṇa?' [1636]

देवतायाः समाख्यातो विभागो वर्णसंश्रयः ।
तत्पूर्वको मनुष्येषु विभागस्त्वधुनोच्यते ॥१६३७॥

Division of gods[1] with reference to castes is already enumerated; and now is stated the division among men[2], as preceded (or caused) by that. [1637]

[1]This is *jātav ekavacana*. As such, *devatāyāḥ = devatānām*.
[2]The words 'into castes' are to be supplied after 'men'.

यदग्निनाभवद्ब्रह्म देवेष्वविकृतं नृषु ।
ब्राह्मणेन तदेवाभूद्ब्रह्मैवाविकृतात्मना ॥१६३८॥

That unmodified Brahman which appeared (lit. became) among gods as Agni itself appeared among men as Brāhmaṇa, in its unmodified nature. [1638]

Now follows the explanation of 'tad agninā ...'.

या जातिर्ब्राह्मणत्वाख्या साग्निरेवेति निश्चितिः ।
जातिरूपेण सा स्थित्वा जातिमेव नियच्छति ॥१६३९॥

What genus is called Brāhmaṇahood is but Agni itself — this

is the decision. Remaining in the form of the genus, it controls the (whole) class (of Brāhmaṇa). [1639]

This is to explain the *sāmānādhikaraṇya* of Agni and Brāhmaṇa in *agnir brāhmaṇaḥ*. Agni, the deity is the controller and the individuals in the Brāhmaṇa clan are the controlled. This relation justifies the *sāmānādhikaraṇya* in *agnir (eva) brāhmaṇaḥ*.

आग्नेयो ब्राह्मणश्चातस्तत्संबन्धाच्छ्रुतौ श्रुतः ।
अनुग्रहनियन्तृत्वे ब्राह्मणस्याग्नितो यतः ॥१६४०॥

Therefore, a Brāhmaṇa is heard in the Śruti text as a protégé of Agni, i.e. on account of his connection with that (Agni), since the capacity in a Brāhmaṇa for (doing) favour and (effecting) governance is from Agni. [1640]

Cf. *āgneyo vai brāhmaṇaḥ* (untraceable).

नियम्यमानो दैवेन क्षत्रियेण मनुष्यगः ।
इक्ष्वाक्वादिरभूत्पूर्वः क्षत्रियस्तद्वदुत्तरः ॥१६४१॥

(So also), being controlled by (the divine Kṣatriya) there came into existence (Kṣatriyas)[1] among men, viz. Ikṣvāku and others; in the same way, later (two groups of castes came into existence). [1641]

ब्रह्मैवाविकृतं यस्मात्पूर्वयोर्विकृतिं पुनः ।
क्षत्रियादौ समापेदे तेनाग्निब्राह्मणाश्रयात् ॥१६४२॥
कामितार्थस्य संसिद्धिः कर्मिणां कामिनामिह ।
स्थित्वाग्नौ ब्राह्मणे चेह लोकमीप्सन्ति कर्मिणः ॥१६४३॥

Since the unmodified Brahman itself attains modification of the first two[1], viz. in Kṣatriya and others; therefore, by resorting to Agni and Brāhmaṇa, [1642]
there is attainment of the desired objects of those who, with desire, perform ritual activities. And,[2] here (i.e. in this world), persons who perform ritual activities desire (for enjoyment[3]) after depending on Agni and Brāhmaṇa. [1643]

This is the explanation of popular belief regarding importance of Agni and Brāhmaṇa in rituals on the basis of the philosophical position taken; *avikṛta brahman* is Agni in gods and Brāhmaṇa in human beings.

[1]Namely, Agni and Brāhmaṇa.

[2]It means: Therefore.

[3]It literally means: the world full of objects of enjoyment for it.

कर्मकार्यश्च लोको ऽत्र ज्ञेयो ऽग्न्यादिसमाश्रयात् ।
प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यधीमात्रात्परलोकाप्तिरिष्यते ॥१६४४॥

[Verses 1644-1658 refute the view of Bhartṛprapañca in respect of the belief mentioned in the two preceding verses.]

Here[1], the word *loka* is to understand to be what is to be produced by ritual activity (performed) by resorting to Agni etc.[2] (And) attainment of the yonder world is sought only by (acquiring) the knowledge of the true nature of the inner self. [1644]

[1]This means: in respect of ritual performances.

[2]The effect of ritual activity indicates impermanence of what is achieved by men through their performances. This is in opposition to the view of Bhartṛprapañca, as reported by SP, viz. that the words *karmakāryaś ca lokaḥ* refer to the obtainment of the highest Ātman.

The word etc. stands for Brāhmaṇa; cf. *agnibrāhmaṇāśrayāt* in verse 1642 above.

अजातशत्रुजनकसुलभादिनिदर्शनात् ।
अविद्योत्थाधिकाराच्च लोकोक्तिर्न परात्मनि ॥१६४५॥

From the illustrations of Ajātaśatru, Janaka and Sulabha and others as also from (the statement of) the qualification (for the performance of rituals) which really arise from ignorance, (it follows that) the mention of *loka* does not pertain to the

highest Ātman. [1645]

This justifies the argument against the view of Bhartṛprapañca which is mentioned in note 2 on the preceding verse. There are two arguments: (i)Illustrations of Ajātaśatru etc. and (ii)the mention of different qualification(s) which are, as already pointed out, based on ignorance.

अव्याकृतव्याकरणात्स्वाभिप्रायाच्च नेष्यते ।
अव्याकृतव्याकरणरूपाभ्यां छाद्यते परः ॥१६४६॥

(The view: *loka* means *paramātman*) is not accepted (by the Siddhāntin for two reasons:) (i)(It) has a basis in differentiation of the undifferentiated; (ii)his own view, viz. the highest (Brahman) is wrapped by the two forms, viz the undifferentiated and the differentiation; [1] [1646]

[1]Refer to BU 1.4.7: *tad dhedaṃ tarhi vyākṛtāvyākṛta-* ... and also BU 1.4.10: *atho yo 'nyām* ... This is accepted by Bhartṛprapañca also.

आविष्कृतिस्तन्निषेधादन्यदेवेति च श्रुतेः ॥१६४७॥
उत्तरत्र स्वशब्देन लोकस्य च विशेषणात् ।
कर्मणां फलमेवात्र लोकशब्देन भण्यते ॥१६४८॥

and also (iii)from (a statement in) the Śruti, viz. *anyad eva* ... (that is first) the expression (of modification) and then (there is) its negation (also); [1647]
and (iv)yet later on there is the qualifying of *loka* by the word *sva*. Thus, here [1], the word *loka* expresses only the fruit of (the ritual) activities. [1648]

This has a reference to *lokam icchate*.
[1]Refer to the verse 1644 above.

लोकशब्देन संप्राप्तं कर्मकार्यमपेक्ष्य हि ।
स्वगिरानात्मनो लोकाद्विशिनष्ट्यात्मरूपकम् ॥१६४९॥

Keeping in view only the effect of ritual activity which is understood from the word *loka*, the Śruti (under consideration) distinguishes the form of the (Supreme) Self from the non-Ātman, by (using) the word *loka*. [1649]

This implies that, in Bhartṛprapañca's view, *sva* cannot and does not qualify *loka*.

स्वत्वेनाव्यभिचारित्वाद्व्यभिचारादनात्मनः ।
कर्मकार्यनिवृत्त्यर्थमर्थवत्स्याद्विशेषणम् ॥१६५०॥

That qualifying word (viz. *sva*) would be meaningful (i.e. useful) for setting aside the effect of ritual activity by its being invariably in its own form and by being variably associated with the non-Ātman. [1650]

त्रयाणामपि वर्णानां श्रुतौ संन्यासदर्शनात् ।
ब्राह्मणस्यैव संन्यास इति श्रुत्या विरुध्यते ॥१६५१॥

Since we notice in the Śruti (the mention of) renunciation with reference to all the three castes, therefore, (the view that) renunciation is only for a Brāhmaṇa is opposed by the Śruti. [1651]

This verse points out that Śaṅkara's view is opposed to the content of the Śruti.

SP refers to the Smṛti which is included by NKL edition as under verse 1651, without any number, because NKL cites it by the *Pratīka japyenaiva*. The editor of NKL invites attention to this. It may be possible that NKL has incorporated the full verse of the *Manusmṛti* into the main text because SP writes *nanu japyenaiva tu saṃsidhyet ityādismṛteḥ* ... The verse under reference is *Manusmṛti* 2.87. All this becomes relevant upon Śaṅkara's reference to Manu's verse in his Bhāṣya under 1.4.14 (almost towards the end) and also his remark there: *pārivrājyadarśanāc ca. tasmād brāhmaṇaiva eva manuṣyeṣu lokaṃ karmaphalam icchanti.*

लिङ्गं च न्यायरहितं प्रामाण्याय न कल्पते ।
ब्राह्मणोक्तिबलात्तस्मात्कामितो ऽर्थो न सिद्ध्यति ॥१६५२॥

And any indication, which is not in keeping with the accepted rule of interpretation, cannot become authoritative; therefore, on the strength of a statement about a Brāhmaṇa (in another Śruti), cannot be established the argument which you desire (to establish). [1652]

SP points to verses in the *Mahābhārata* which show that even a Kṣatriya can decide to renounce. Cf. 1.110.7-8 and also verse: *gatvā nāgapuraṃ vācyaṃ pāṇḍuḥ pravrajito vanam*. SP and NKL quote 7-8 and *pauravṛddhāś ca ye tatra nivasanty asmadāśrayāḥ / prasādya sarve vaktavyāḥ pāṇḍuḥ pravrajito vane* // (not in critical ed.).

उपलक्षणं वा तद्ग्राह्यं ब्राह्मणग्रहणं श्रुतौ ।
ब्राह्मणस्य प्रधानत्वाद्युक्तं तदुपलक्षणम् ॥१६५३॥

Or rather, that mention of the word *brāhmaṇa* (in respect of Saṃnyāsa) is to be accepted as an indication (of those who are eligible for renunciation); (and) that indication is reason- able for the reason that a Brāhmaṇa has the status of the principal (persons of among all the castes). [1653]

SP refers to *brāhmaṇaprādhānya* on the basis of *mukhajānām ayam* ...

NKL editor reads: *upalakṣaṇaṃ ca tad* ..., thereby showing that this verse is syntactically connected with the preceding – as the part of a compound sentence.

ब्राह्मणत्वात्मलाभो ऽपि यः स्यात्क्षत्रियवैश्ययोः ।
स्वमहिम्ना तयोर्नासावग्निब्राह्मणसंश्रयात् ॥१६५४॥

(There can be an objector's view:) Even when there has been obtaining of Brāhmaṇahood on the part of a Kṣatriya and/or a Vaiśya,[1] that was on account of their own (great) capacity and not because they had taken recourse to Agni and Brāh-

maṇa.

[1654]

[1]This refers to the performance of a Rājasūya and a Vaiśyastoma sacrifice by the two respectively.

ब्राह्मणं न ह्यनाश्रित्य राजसूयादिहेतुकः ।
ब्राह्मणत्वाभिसंबन्धः प्राधान्यं तेन पूर्वयोः ॥१६५५॥

(The objection is thus answered:) Connection with Brāhmaṇa-hood (of a Kṣatriya etc.[1]) which results from the Rājasūya etc.[2] is not without taking recourse to a Brāhmaṇa; therefore, there has been greater importance (lit. principal significance)) of the former two (viz. Agni and Brāhmaṇa). [1655]

This is a statement by Vyatireka.
In matters of sacrifice, Agni and Brāhmaṇa are considered as ore important because Kṣatriya and others have to take recourse them. Only this much is the principal significance.
[1]Reference to Vaiśya is implied.
[2]Reference to Vaiśyastoma is implied.

वर्णान्तरगतापेक्षा नाग्निब्राह्मणयोस्तथा ।
ब्राह्मणः स्वमहिम्नैव पुरुषार्थं समश्नुते ॥१६५६॥

Such is not the case of Agni and Brāhmaṇa that they have o depend on any other caste; a Brāhmaṇa secures the fulfil-ment of the end of human endeavour by his own greatness.

[1656]

अग्निब्राह्मणयोर्हेतुः प्राधान्ये भण्यते स्फुटः ।
एताभ्यामेव रूपाभ्यां यतो ब्रह्माभवत्स्वयम् ॥१६५७॥

Now) is stated the evident reason for the principal significance f Agni and Brāhmaṇa, viz. in these very two forms, indeed id the Brahman reveal itself.

[1657]

his explains *etābhyām* ...

अग्निब्राह्मणयोर्यस्माद्ब्रह्म साक्षादभूत्पुरा ।
विट्क्षत्रयोर्व्यवहितं प्राधान्यं तेन पूर्वयोः ॥१६५८॥

Since first the Brahman became manifest first to Agni and Brāhmaṇa remained, and for the Kṣatriya and Vaiśya it concealed, therefore, the former two (viz. Agni and Brāhmaṇa) have the principal significance. [1658]

This explains the purpose of *svayam*.

ब्रह्मेति जातिरेवात्र ग्राह्या न तु पराक्षरम् ।
तत्कारणत्वात्सर्वस्य हेतूक्तिस्तत्र दुर्घटा ॥१६५९॥

[Verses 1659-1666 refute Bhartṛprapañca's explanation of the word *brahman* in *etābhyāṃ hi rūpābhyām brahmābhavat*.]

Here (in the word *brahmaloka*) it should be understood that the word *brahman* signifies only the class and not the highest immutable (Brahman), since it is the origin of all, it is difficult to make a statement in that respect (*tatra*). [1659]

This means that no particular quality of the Brahman can be established, though some particular qualities of Agni and Brāhmaṇa can be thought of. Therefore, when we have to talk about the origin of any thing, we have to refer to Agni and Brāhmaṇa, i.e. *jāti*.

सर्वेषां प्रत्यगात्मत्वात्पक्षपातो ऽपि नेष्यते ।
अग्निब्राह्मणयोर्विष्णोस्तावन्मात्रसमाप्तितः ॥१६६०॥

Owing to (the fact) that all beings are of the nature of the inner self, such a partial attitude[1] is not acceptable in respect of (the superiority) of Agni and Brāhmaṇa, for (already) the all-pervader[2] who has (already) obtained (it) by that much. [1660]

[1]That is, predilection for holding Agni and Brāhmaṇa as the most superior.

[2]This is based on the derivation of the word from the verb root √*viṣ* 'to pervade'.

ब्रह्मैवेदं विश्वमिति साक्षादाम्नायशासनम् ।
विद्याविनयसंपन्न इति च स्मृतिशासनम् ॥१६६१॥

That all this is only the Brahman is the direct affirmation of the Śruti and that 'one possessed of knowledge, modesty ...' is the affirmation in the Smṛti.[1] [1661]

This supplies the basis for saying that all is but the Brahman.
[1]This is an adjective of Brāhmaṇa stated in *Gītā* 5.18.

क्षत्रादाविव तुल्याग्निविप्रयोर्विकृतिर्दृशेः ।
तेजोबन्नादिभूतानां तुल्या सत्कारणात्मता ॥१६६२॥

As there is the same modification of the seer[1] in Agni and Brāhmaṇa as in Kṣatriya and others, so also, in the case of the elements, viz. fire, water, food etc., there is the same nature of having the existent as the cause.[2] [1662]

[1]The seer stands for the Brahman, all-knower and *sat* in *satkāraṇātmatā* refers to the Brahman.
[2]Cf. CU 6.8.4: *sanmūlāḥ somyemāḥ sarvāḥ prajāḥ.*

अग्निब्राह्मणरूपेण ब्रह्म साक्षाद्व्यवस्थितम् ।
तत्प्राप्तौ हेतुताग्न्यादेरिति निर्ह्रीकवागियम् ॥१६६३॥

The Brahman has revealed itself directly in the forms of Agni and Brāhmaṇa; therefore, the statement that Agni etc.[1] are the cause of acquiring that[2] is but a statement (made) without any sense of shame. [1663]

[1]The word etc. stands for Brāhmaṇa.
[2]Namely, the Brahman.

वर्णाश्रमादिसर्गोऽयं कर्मार्थो ब्रह्मणः स्मृतः ।
धर्माख्यं कर्म च ज्ञेयं स्वाधिकारनियन्तृतः ॥१६६४॥

[Verses 1664-1669 explain *atha yo ha vā* according to both Bhartṛprapañca and the author.]

This creation of the castes and the stages of life is known to be for the sake of (accomplishing) the activity of the Brahman and that activity has to be known by the name Dharma, since it is the controller[1] of its own duty.[2] [1664]

[1]This has a basis in the well-known Smṛti statement *dharmo dhārayate prajāḥ*; cf. verse 1631 above.

[2]*karman* is literally activity. Supply: enjoined on it.

तेनैव कर्मणा मुक्तिं प्राप्स्यामः शास्वतीं वयम् ।
अज्ञात्वैव परं तत्त्वमेवं प्राप्ते परा श्रुतिः ॥१६६५॥

Here (one might say:) We shall obtain eternal liberation by that very (ritual) activity, without (even) knowing the highest truth. This being the position, there is the subsequent Śruti (as an answer:) [1665]

नियन्ता चाभिमन्ता च ब्राह्मणत्वस्य हव्यवाट् ।
कर्मैवाग्नेर्नियन्तृ स्यात्कर्मणो देवता तथा ॥१६६६॥

Agni is the controller of Brāhmaṇahood and also has the Ego of it; activity alone is the controller of Agni and so also (is Agni) the deity of the activity. [1666]

This is the view of Bhartṛprapañca whose devotion to Agni is well-known and very frequently mentioned by Sureśvara.

स्यादेतदग्निरेवैनं ब्रह्मभावाय वक्ष्यति ।
अदृष्टात्मतत्त्वमपि तच्च नैवोपपद्यते ॥१६६७॥

Let it be so; (but) Agni itself will lead[1] this one to attainment (of the status) of the Brahman and the truth, which has the nature of *adṛṣṭa*, does not stand to reason. [1667]

Here is a statement about the outcome of the relation of the controller and the controlled mentioned in previous verse.

[1]Verb *vakṣyati* is from verb root √*vah* 'to lead'.

व्याचक्षते परं ग्रन्थमेवंसंबन्धपूर्वकम् ।
न कश्चित्फलभेदो ऽत्र तस्मादुभयथापि सन् ॥१६६८॥

They explain the subsequent part of this Śruti (also) as preceded by this kind of relation (to ritual activity); (but) there is not here any distinction of the fruit, be it (explained) in (this) twofold way. [1668]

This emphasises the ultimate end, viz. liberation, as resulting from knowledge; therefore, even the view of Bhartṛprapañca cannot be set aside as ununderstandable.

न कर्मणा भवेन्मुक्तिर्नापि चाग्निसमाश्रयात् ।
ज्ञानादेव तु कैवल्यमज्ञानादेव नास्ति तत् ॥१६६९॥

Liberation is not (achieved) through activity; not also by devotion (lit. resorting) to Agni; but liberation comes only from knowledge and only from ignorance[1] it is not (possible). [1669]

This is the purport of the Vedānta sentence under discussion, according to both the views.

[1]It refers to *karman*, the result of ignorance.

आशङ्कितनिवृत्त्यर्थमथेत्यत्र प्रयुज्यते ।
ह वा इति प्रसिद्ध्यर्थं मुक्तिर्न ज्ञानतो ऽन्यतः ॥१६७०॥

In this context, the word *atha* is employed for warding off whatever could be expressed as doubt and the words *ha vā* (are used) for establishing that liberation does not come from anything else than knowledge. [1670]

कर्म कृत्स्नं समाप्यापि तत्त्वज्ञानाद्बहिष्कृतः ।
लभते निर्वृतिं नैव ज्ञानादेव हि सा यतः ॥१६७१॥

[Verses 1671-1691 explain the meaning of the sentence *atha yo ha vā* ...; verse 1671 states the meaning of *atha*.]

A person, who is kept away from[1] the knowledge of the true nature of Reality (i.e. Brahman), does not at all obtain the highest bliss even if he has accomplished all ritual activities, because that (liberation) results from knowledge alone. [1671]

[1]That is, who has remained without the knowledge.

अस्वैः पिण्डादिभिर्योग आ विरिञ्चादविद्यया ।
प्रतीचस्तद्व्युदासार्थं स्वं लोकमिति शब्द्यते ॥१६७२॥

It is on account of ignorance that the inner self is in union with bodies etc., beginning with (the body of) Viriñca, which are not its own; therefore, in order to avert (the idea of) that,[1] it is said (in the Śruti) *svaṃ lokam*. [1672]

[1]Namely, *asvapiṇḍayoga*.

अज्ञानिनः स्यान्मरणं संसर्गः कारणात्मनि ।
ज्ञानाद्ध्वान्तनिवृत्तिस्तु मरणं स्याद्विपश्चिताम् ॥१६७३॥

In the case of an ignorant person, death would mean union with his own cause; but (*tu*), in the case of the knowers (of the Brahman), death is the remover of darkness by knowledge. [1673]

This is with a view to explaining *asmāt lokāt*.

In the case of ignorant persons, their bodies etc. merge into the elements; there is no liberation. In the case of the knower of the Brahman, the result is only liberation.

मृत्योर्मृत्यवपरिज्ञानादज्ञस्य मरणं तमः ।
अविद्वन्मृतिसिद्ध्यर्थमस्माल्लोकादितीर्यते ॥१६७४॥

In the case of an ignorant (person), since there is no knowledge

of death as Mṛtyu,[1] his death is only darkness; therefore, in order to explain the nature of the death of the non-knowing[2], it is said 'from this world'. [1674]

[1]Refer to our book [Vol.3:1990] — but the stress is here on *ajñāna*— that is called Mṛtyu.

[2]That is, one who does not know the Brahman, ignorant person (already mentioned).

अज्ञात्वैव परं देवमागमापायरूपिणः ।
अस्वभूताद्देहलोकान्म्रियते यो ऽवशो नरः ॥१६७५॥
अज्ञाततत्त्वः स परो न भुनक्ति ह्यतद्विदम् ।
कैवल्यफलदानेन प्रत्यगात्मापि सन्परः ॥१६७६॥

The helpless[1] person, who departs from (lit. dies) in this world of bodies which has not been his and which has been in the form of those coming and those going; without even knowing the highest Lord (thre Brahman), [1675]
is he who has not known the true nature of that (viz. the Brahman). The highest (Brahman) does not protect[2] him who does not know the same by granting to him liberation, though the highest (Brahman) is (his) inner self. [1676]

This is the meaning of the sentence.

These verses explain the nature of the death of the common man who does not know the nature of the Brahman. Though the Brahman is within him as his inner self, it does not bring to him liberation.

[1]It literally means: who cannot control himself.

[2]Verb root √*bhuj* has the sense: to protect (SP, NKL). Possibly *bhunakti* is equivalent of the suppressed causal form of the verb *bhojayantu*— a Vedic tendency in Sureśvara.

तद्दृष्टिमात्रतः सिद्धेर्नान्यतस्तदवाप्यते ।
मोहमात्रान्तरायत्वात्तत्कर्मालं न मुक्तये ॥१६७७॥

That (highest Brahman) is obtained only by the seeing of that (i.e. acquiring the lore of the Brahman); this acquisition does

not result from (lit. is not secured from) any other thing. Therefore, a person's ritual activity is not sufficient (for effecting) liberation for him — there is the obstacle only of ignorance. [1677]

This is the meaning of *sā enam* ... This is to set aside a possible argument that the highest, even remaining unknown, would offer protection to a performer of rituals.

Seeing of the Brahman is itself the removal of ignorance.

वेदस्य ग्रहणं यद्वन्न स्यादध्ययनादृते ।
कृष्यादि वान्यदकृतं कर्म नालं फलाय च ॥१६७८॥

As one cannot grasp (the meaning of) the Veda without pursuing one's own (daily) study[1] of it, so also agriculture etc. or any other activity (which may not have been performed) cannot be the cause of the fruit. [1678]

[1]This refers to the compulsory study of Veda according to the Vedic dictum (*svādhyāyo 'dhyetavyaḥ*). SP refers to *dharmajijñāsā-sūtra*, *vinādhyayanaṃ na svādhyāyagrahaṇam arthavat*.

भूरि कर्म करिष्यामि तत्फलानन्त्यसिद्धये ।
कर्मणो ऽचिन्त्यशक्तित्वान्नैवमप्युपपद्यते ॥१६७९॥
अप्रज्ञातात्मतत्त्वः सन्यदि नाम दिवानिशम् ।
कल्पकोटिसहस्राणि कुर्यात्कर्म महच्छुभम् ॥१६८०॥
तदप्यस्य तथाभूतमन्तवत्त्वात्प्रतिक्षणम् ।
विध्वंसमेत्यपचयात्कोष्ठागारादिवद्ध्रुवम् ॥१६८१॥

(One might say:) I shall do quite a lot of (ritual) activity to secure great abundance (lit. infiniteness) of its fruit, because activity has unthinkable power. (In reply the following is said:) But this also does not stand to reason — [1679]
(A person), being a non-knower of the true nature of the Ātman, might well perform plenty of holy ritual for thousands of crores of *kalpa*s; even then that kind of activity of this one meets destruction every moment, because of its perishability and, by (such) reduction, it certainly perishes as a store-house

of grains etc. (gets exhausted). [1680-1681]

This sets aside the argument understood in *yad iha vā ... anevaṃvin mahat puṇyaṃ karoti.*

Sureśvara emphasises the transitoriness and final loss of *karman* and its fruit by using the simile in the verse.

SP points out that this is the meaning of *tad yatheha karmajitaḥ ...* (CU 8.1.6) *iyādiśruter ity arthaḥ.*

कृतस्य हि क्षयो ऽवश्यमकृतस्याक्षयात्मता ।
प्रसिद्धातीव जगति श्रुत्यैवं तेन भण्यते ॥१६८२॥

Indeed whatever is made (i.e. produced as an effect) does necessarily (or, invariably) perish and what is not made (i.e. not effected) has the nature of permanence — this is well-known in the world and, as such, it is stated by the Śruti (also). [1682]

उक्तदोषापनुत्तिः स्यात्कथमस्येति चोदिते ।
आत्मानमिति निर्वक्ति श्रुतिः परिहृतिं पराम् ॥१६८३॥

[Verses 1683-1691 discuss the meaning of *ātmānam eva loka upāsīta*, by stating a question and its answer.]

(Therefore,) when it was asked as to how there could be the removal of the fault (earlier) stated,[1] the Śruti states the following refutation (in the words) *ātmānam ...* [1683]

[1]Namely, liberation would be impermanent, if it were the result of ritual activity; cf. verses 1680-1681 above.

निःशेषानात्मसंदृष्टिनिराकरणसिद्धये ।
एवेत्यवधृतिर्ज्ञेया प्रत्यङ्मात्रेक्षणाय तु ॥१६८४॥

The word *eva* is to be understood as specification (or, emphasising) of merely seeing[1] only (the true nature of) the inner self in order to secure the removal of the seeing of all non-Ātman objects. [1684]

This explains the purposeful use of *eva* and its meaning which follows the Śruti.

[1]Or, knowing.

प्रत्यङ्मात्रदृशः पुंसो न न्याय्यः स्यात्समुच्चयः ।
ब्रह्मात्मनि समाप्तस्य न तदन्यार्थशेषता ॥१६८५॥

(Further,) combination (of knowledge and ritual activity) would not stand as reasonable in the case of a person who sees only the inner self; (the end of human endeavour) being obtained (only) in the Brahman as the Ātman, there does not remain his dependence on anything else[1]. [1685]

This is the meaning of *eva* at the verbal level (*ārthika*).

[1]Or, it literally means: ... remain anything else to be obtained.

क्षयः कर्मफलस्योक्तः कृतकत्वसमन्वयात् ।
न क्षयो ज्ञानकार्यस्य कृतकत्वाद्यसंभवात् ॥१६८६॥
प्रत्यङ्मात्रैकयाथात्म्यात्क्षेत्रक्षेत्रज्ञवस्तुनः ।
तस्मिञ्ज्ञाते ऽखिलं ज्ञातं सर्वाज्ञाननिराकृतेः ॥१६८७॥

It is declared that the fruit of activity has an end because it has an inherent relation to being what is produced; but there is no end of what is effected by knowledge, since there is impossibility of its being what is produced; [1686] since the thing called the knower of the field is in its true nature merely the inner self, therefore, that being known, all else is known, since there has been the removal of all ignorance. [1687]

This argument is against the view that liberation, being a product of knowing (*dhīkārya*), is impermanent.

सर्वसाधनसाध्यं च सुखं यच्चाप्यभीप्सितम् ।
सर्वानन्दैकहेतुत्वाद्ब्रह्मापतौ प्राप्तमेव तत् ॥१६८८॥
यद्यत्कामयते कामी कर्मभूमाववस्थितः ।
अस्मादेवात्मविज्ञानात्तत्तत्सुखमुपाश्नुते ॥१६८९॥

And whatever (be the) happiness, that can be acquired by all the different means and is therefore desired, is all of it obtained when the Brahman, the source of all delight is known. [1688]

Whatever a person, who is full of desires, longs for while he rests on the performance of activity, is all of it what he enjoys from this every knowledge of Self. [1689]

This connects the sentence *yad yat kāmayate* ... with the preceding statement.

सहस्रदशभागद्ध्यां सुखानन्त्यं परात्मनः ।
वक्ष्यते सर्वसौख्याप्तिस्तस्मिन्दृष्टे परात्मनि ॥१६९०॥

It will be declared that the highest Ātman has[1] infinite happiness owing to its richness in thousands and tens (of the same) and that there is obtainment of all happiness when the highest (Ātman) is seen. [1690]

[1]That is, affords.

अन्तर्भावः परानन्दे सुखानामाविरिञ्चतः ।
अस्माद्ध्येवेति वाक्येन सर्वेषां नः प्रबोध्यते ॥१६९१॥

There is inclusion of all happinesses beginning from (that of) Viriñca in the highest delight (viz. in the Brahman) and this is made known to all of us all by the sentence *asmād eva* ... [1691]

Verses 1692-1707 present the meaning of 'ātmānam eva lokam upāsīta' as discussed by Bhartṛprapañca.

स्थिते ऽप्येवं प्रमाणार्थे केचिद्व्याचक्षते ऽन्यथा ।
प्रमान्तरविरुद्धार्थमिमं ग्रन्थं यथोदितम् ॥१६९२॥

[Verses 1692-1699 are the argument of the *prima facie* view in Bhartṛprapañca's discussion.]

Though the meaning conveyed by the means of knowing[1] is thus established, some (thinkers) explain this (portion which is so far discussed) otherwise — that is, in a way that shows a meaning which is opposed to right meaning.[1] [1692]

[1]Namely, *jñānād eva muktiḥ.*

न कर्म कारणं मुक्तेः क्षयिष्णुत्वसमन्वयात् ।
कर्मस्वेव नियच्छन्ति देवताश्च न मुक्तिदाः ॥१६९३॥
कर्माधिकृतिहेतुत्वादग्न्यादेर्देवतात्मनः ।

Activity is not the cause of liberation, because of its inherent relation to perishability. The deities bind down the sacrificer only to activities and they do not grant liberation, [1693] since the nature of Agni and others originates one's eligibility for an activity. [1694ab]

This indicates that, by mere doing ritual activity, one does not secure liberation.

नाप्युत्थायेह कर्मभ्यो ब्रह्म ज्ञातुं क्षमो नरः ॥१६९४॥

Not also, even after rising above ritual activities is a man is able to know the Brahman. [1694cd]

There are two arguments: (i)*karman* is inseparably connected with perishability, and (ii)gods are related to rituals alone — i.e. not to liberation. Cf. SP: *devatās tāvat karmādhikṛtāḥ karmasv evainaṃ niyacchantīti bhāṣyeṇa ... dūṣayati* which seems to quote from Bhartṛprapañca's comment. Now, Bhartṛprapañca's third argument: Since one cannot give up ritual activity till the end of one's life, knowledge also does not effect liberatiion — this refers to the Śruti *tasya tāvad eva ciram* which implies *yāvajjīvaṃ karmācāraḥ.*

प्रत्यगात्माप्यसंदृष्टो मुक्त्या नैवोपतिष्ठते ।
देवताज्ञाकरत्वेन ब्रह्मविद्या विरुध्यते ॥१६९५॥

And the inner self, (so long as it is) not seen,[1] would not (of itself) attend upon one, thanks to (one's) liberation[2]. (Verily) the lore of the Brahman is opposed by one's doing the deities' commands.[3] [1695]

This is Bhartṛprapañca's fourth argument.

[1]It means: known in its true nature.

[2]That is, will not behave like a kind deity who would of itself grant some favour.

[3]It literally means: by one's being devoted to the performance of ritual as the commands of deities. This implies the impossibility of the combination of knowledge and ritual activity.

कर्मिणः कर्मशेषत्वं स्वाराज्यम् ब्रह्मवेदने ।
नातः समुच्चयान्मुक्तिर्नापि स्यात्सा विकल्पतः ॥१६९६॥

A performer of rituals is subordinate to ritual activity, whereas in knowing the Brahman, there is *svārājya*.[1] Therefore, liberation is not possible owing to the combination (of knowledge and ritual) — not from any option (among the above). [1696]

This verse justifies the statement of the impossibility mentioned in note 3 on the preceding verse.

[1]It literally means: kingdom of heaven and indicates complete freedom.

सति ज्ञाने तदुभयं तत्तु नैवोपपद्यते ।
ऋणानि चानपाकृत्य कर्म त्यक्तुं न लभ्यते ॥१६९७॥
ऋणानि त्रीण्यपाकृत्येत्येवं च स्मृतिशासनम् ॥१६९८॥
एवं न कर्मतो मोक्षः कर्मणः क्षयवत्त्वतः ।
ज्ञानाभावान्न विज्ञानान्नोभाभ्यां तदसंभवात् ॥१६९९॥

(One might argue:) While there is knowledge of the inner self (on the part of one), the two (viz. knowledge and ritual activity) can be (adopted as the course of one's action); but that is not reasonable, for (*ca*) it is not possible to give up action without repaying the debts; [1697]

(indeed) such is the dictate of the Smṛti *ṛṇāṇi trīṇi apākṛtya* ... [1698]

Thus, liberation does not result from (the performance of) action, for the reason that action itself has its destruction (and), in the absence of knowledge, there is not any possibility of liberation and from *vijñāna* and not from both, i.e. *samuccaya*. [1699]

This explains the word *ataḥ*.

वीक्ष्यापन्नस्य तस्यैवं सामर्थ्यं ज्ञानकर्मणोः ।
उद्बिभावयिषुः साक्षात्प्रवृत्तैषा परा श्रुतिः ॥१७००॥

Having thought (about) this thus distressed (person who desired liberation), the subsequent Śruti (becoming) desirous of creating (in him) the strength (or potentiality) of knowledge and ritual activity (for his achieving liberation) has itself proceeded further. [1700]

This begins Bhartṛprapañca's answer.

लोकमात्मानमेवेममुपासीतात्मविद्यया ।
इति स्यादर्थवत्त्वाय समाधिर्ज्ञानकर्मणोः ॥१७०१॥

One should worship this *loka* as the very Ātman, by securing the lore of the Ātman. Thus would be meaningful a proper combination of knowledge and ritual. [1701]

The idea is to point that one should perform the rituals but with the idea that it is for the pleasure of the Ātman, i.e. for securing oneness with the Ātman.

[1] *samādhi* is usually translated as meditation. But here it stands for a proper (combination) — a purely etymological sense from the verb root *sam-ā-√dhā*.

द्वैतैकत्वात्मिकावस्था विरिञ्चाख्या परात्मनः ।
विज्ञानकर्मीभिव्यङ्ग्या द्वैतत्वात्सा क्षयात्मिका ॥१७०२॥

There is the state of having oneness and duality (both) of the highest Ātman which is called Viriñca, which can be revealed by knowledge (*vijñāna*) and (ritual) activity, and it is perishable because of duality. [1702]

अवस्था यानभिव्यक्ता तस्यैव परमात्मनः ।
अविशेषात्मिका सास्य कारणत्वात्त्वनश्वरी ॥१७०३॥

But that condition of the same highest Ātman, which is not manifest and which does not have any differentiation as its nature, is imperishable owing to its being the cause of this (transmigratory world). [1703]

तत्रैवं सति लोके ऽस्मिन्द्वैताद्वैतात्मसंस्थितौ ।
द्वैतावस्थामुपास्ते यस्तस्यासौ क्षीयते ध्रुवम् ।
द्वैतत्वाद्यः पुनर्धीमान्कर्मावस्थां यथोदिताम् ॥१७०४॥
अव्यक्तावस्थामापाद्य सदोपास्ते परात्मना ।
न क्षीयते कर्म तस्याद्वैतत्वादेव कारणात् ॥१७०५॥

This being so, in this (world) consisting in duality and unity, he who worships the condition of duality of that (viz. the highest Ātman) certainly perishes. However, the intelligent one, who has effected the state of uniqueness from his (own) state of duality (viz.) the state of performing action,[1] as described (before), ever worships the same as the highest Ātman, does not perish, thanks to (his) action (proceeding) from only that non-duality (which is) the cause. [1704-1705]

The first two lines of verse 1704 point out the fault of the worshipper of duality; its third line and verse 1705 state the excellence of the worshipper of non-duality.

[1]This is the same *dvaitāvasthā*.

ब्रह्मोपास्तिर्भवेदेवं कर्म चानुष्ठितं भवेत् ॥१७०६॥
व्यक्तं ससाधनं कर्म ब्रह्मभावेन पश्यतः ।
न क्षीयते कर्म तस्य सदैकात्म्यावसानतः ॥१७०७॥

Thus, there would be proper worship of the Brahman and

there would be the performance of action in the case of one who sees action together with all its means as the Brahman. The action of that (person) does not perish, since it has culminated into the uniqueness of the existent. [1706-1707]

The second line of verse 1707 explains away a possible objection, viz. the sentence *na hāsya karma kṣīyate* is opposed to the entire Śruti teaching.

Verses 1708-1779 are the refutation of the meaning as proposed above by Bhartṛ- prapañca in its various details.

हिरण्यगर्भविज्ञानकर्मणोः प्रथमः किल ॥१७०८॥
समुच्चयस्ततो ऽन्यो ऽयमव्यक्तब्रह्मविद्यया ।
व्यक्तसूत्रात्मविद्यायाः परो ऽप्येष समुच्चयः ॥१७०९॥

[In verses 1708-1737 there follows the refutation of Bhartṛprapañca's theory of two *samuccaya*s.]

The first combination is said to be (*kila*) that of the worship [1] of Hiraṇyagarbha and (ritual) activity. [1708]
And there is this another (secures) by knowing the Brahman as the unmanifest (Ātman) and this is another combination, viz. the knowledge about the Ātman as the manifest form of Sūtra (viz. Hiraṇyagarbha).[2] [1709]

These verses, viz. 1708-1709, state about the two *samuccaya*s.
[1] *vijñāna* here stands for Upāsanā.
[2] This is suggestive of the question: Which combination is understood in the sentence *ātmānam eva* ...?

द्वयोर्यथोक्तयोर्मध्ये कतरो ऽयं समुच्चयः ।
प्रथमो ऽथ द्वितीयो वा न न्यायो ऽस्त्युभयोरपि ॥१७१०॥

(The Siddhāntin observes:) There is no leading principle [1] for deciding which of the two combinations thus described is the first [2] (combination) or the second (combination). [1710]

This is to say: It is not clear as to which of the two combinations Bhartṛprapañca would like to hold as correct (or satisfactory).

[1] *nyāya* is here the leading principle.

[2] That is, superior or more significant.

प्रथमश्चेत्त्वयैवोक्तं क्षीयेते कामकर्मणी ।
निःशेषभोगभुक्तत्वात्कृत्स्नप्राप्त्या द्वयात्मनः ॥१७११॥

If (you were to hold) the first combination[1] (as more acceptable), then (remember what) you yourself have said, viz. desire and action perish, because there is fulfilment of all of the enjoyments[2] and (also) the obtainment of the entire fruit (viz. completeness) in the case of what comprises duality.[3]

[1711]

[1] Cf. verses 1714-1715ab below for the internal contradiction of the argument (*vyāghāta*).

[2] This refers to attaining to the status of the Sūtrātman.

[3] This has a reference to Bhartṛprapañca's comment in respect of BU 3.2.12: *kim enaṃ na jahāti nāma*.

विशीर्यते ततः कार्यं कृत्स्नं च कारणं तथा ।
ततः क्षेत्रज्ञरूपस्य सर्वभोज्यातिलङ्घिनः ॥१७१२॥
केवलाज्ञानमात्रेण व्यवधानं परात्मनः ।
अप्राप्य परमात्मानमन्तराले व्यवस्थितिः ॥१७१३॥

Then, on account of that, the entire (world of) effect(s) perishes and so also the cause (of the same). Then there is the obscurity of the highest Ātman which is of the nature of the knower of the field, that transgresses all the enjoyables, owing to ignorance alone. And then, when one has not attained the highest Ātman, there is (for the devotee) the state which is (only) mid-way (i.e. between this transmigratory world and liberation).

[1712-1713]

इह त्वक्षितिरेवोक्ता भवता ज्ञानकर्मणोः ।
न ह्यस्य क्षीयते कर्मेत्यस्माद्ध्येवेति चोक्तितः ॥१७१४॥
पूर्वोत्तरोक्तवचसोर्व्याहतिर्वः प्रसज्यते ।

But you have stated that there is here only absence of the destruction of knowledge and action on the basis of the statement of the Śruti *na hāsya kṣīyate* ... [1714]
And thus there results contradiction between your earlier and later statements. [1715ab]

अथ द्वितीयो ऽभिमतो न तथाप्युपपद्यते ॥१७१५॥

Now, if you refer to the second (combination), then also, that does not stand to reason.[1] [1715cd]

[1]This is explained in the few following verses.

फलं त्वयैव व्याख्यातं द्वितीयस्याः समुच्चितेः ॥१७१६॥
द्वैतैकत्वधिया मृत्युं कामकर्मस्वलक्षणम् ।
तीर्त्वात्मविद्यया विद्वानमृतत्वं समश्नुते ॥१७१७॥
न हास्य क्षीयते कर्म यद्यत्कामयते ऽक्षरात् ।
तत्तत्सृजत इत्युक्त्योः पूर्वोत्तरविरुद्धता ॥१७१८॥

You yourself have declared the result of the second combination, [1716]
(viz.) (in the statements:) (i)Having overcome death whose characteristic is in desire and actions by (securing) the knowledge of the uniqueness, oneness in duality, the knower obtains immortality by the lore of the Ātman,[1] [1717]
and (ii)(the Śruti:) 'Indeed, his action does not perish.' (and) 'Whatever he wishes (for) from the imperishable, each of that it created.'.[2] Between the two statements of the Śruti, there is contradiction between (what is said) earlier and (what) subsequently. [1718]

[1]In the second line of the verse, Sureśvara uses the idea of *Īśopaniṣad* 11cd: *avidyayā mṛtyuṃ tīrtvā vidyayāmṛtam aśnute*.

[2]Sureśvara refers in verse 1718 to the text under question, i.e. BU 1.4.15; though he seems to quote, he is merely condensing the thought — this is noticed in his adding the word *akṣarāt* which does not at all occur in the passage under reference.

कामकर्मक्षये यस्मादमृतत्वं फलं श्रुतम् ।
यदा सर्वे प्रमुच्यन्त इत्येवं बहुशः श्रुतौ ॥१७१९॥

Since it is heard that immortality is the result when there is destruction of desire and action (as) in passages (like) *yādā sarve pramucyante* ...[1]; thus it is many times declared in the Śruti. [1719]

[1] *Kaṭhopaniṣad* 6.14: *yadā sarve pramucyante kamā ye 'sya hṛdi śritāḥ.*

कथमेति स कैवल्यमक्षितौ कामकर्मणोः ।
कैवल्यावाप्तौ च कथं तयोरक्षितिरुच्यते ॥१७२०॥

How will he attain liberation (*kaivalya*), if there is no destruction of desire and action, and, if there is obtainment of liberation, how could there be stated non-destruction of the two (viz. desire and action)? [1720]

इतश्च व्याहतिः स्पष्टा ब्रह्मविद्या विरुध्यते ।
देवत्ताज्ञाकरत्वेनेत्युक्तं यत्प्रणिधानतः ॥१७२१॥

From this also becomes clear the contradiction: It is stated (by you) that (a seeker) has to be following the dictates of the gods,[1] by devotedly doing which the lore of the Brahman is opposed. [1721]

This is another contradiction in the view of Bhartṛprapañca.

[1] Cf. verses 1582, 1664-1665 and 1695ff. above. The argument pertaining to the opposition between ritual performances and the lore of the Brahman.

ससाधनमिदं कर्म ब्रह्मभावेन पश्यतः ।
तदेव ब्रह्मविज्ञानं कथं नेह विरुध्यते ॥१७२२॥

How does the knowing about the Brahman not become contradicted while one is seeing this ritual activity together

with its means as becoming the Brahman? [1722]

पूर्वं कृत्वाथ तत्कर्म पश्चाद्ब्रह्मात्मनेक्षते ।
व्युत्थाय कर्मणः कृत्स्नान्मोक्षाशंसेति चेन्मतम् ॥१७२३॥
एवं समर्थ्यमाने ऽपि न मुक्तिः कर्मणो भवेत् ।
व्युत्थितस्यैव कर्मभ्यो मुक्त्यभ्युपगमत्वतः ॥१७२४॥

If it is held: Having first done (ritual) activity, one sees later the Brahman in the form of one's own inner self and then after having risen above all action there is the expectation of liberation, [1723]
(then the answer is:) Even when (this opinion) is being justified thus, there would not be effected release from ritual activity, because liberation is held to result only for one who has risen above ritual activities. [1724]

These verses pertain to the contradiction between ritual performance and achieving liberation in relation to time.

अथ गार्हस्थ्य एवायं कर्मकाले विभिन्नधीः ।
कर्म कृत्वाथ तच्छान्तौ कर्म ब्रह्मेति वेत्स्यति ॥१७२५॥
एवं समादधानस्य कामितो ऽर्थो न सिध्यति ।
पराधीनमृतेर्जन्तोर्मुक्तिः स्यात्पाक्षिकी यतः ॥१७२६॥

(One would argue:) In the state of a householder only, this one entertains different notions[1] at the time for ritual activity and later, having performed (that) ritual activity (and having secured) the removal of that[2], he will know that ritual activity is the Brahman. [1725]
The counterargument is: (But even) while you are thus explaining, your desired end will not be secured; since there would be the only optionally (possible) liberation for one who has come into being on account of a death that is dependent on another.[3] [1726]

[1] It literally means: possessing notion of the differentiated world.
[2] *tacchāntau = vibhinnadhīdvaṃse sati.*
[3] This is explained in the following verse.

भेदं पश्यन्यदि मृतो बद्ध एव भवेन्नरः ।
कर्म ब्रह्मेति संपश्यन्मृतश्चेद्ब्रह्मसाद्भवेत् ॥१७२७॥

If a man dies while seeing (this) duality, he will be only tied (to the transmigratory world); (but) if he died seeing the ritual activity as the Brahman, he would be one with the Brahman. [1727]

भेददृष्टेर्बलीयस्त्वात्तस्याः स्वाभाविकत्वतः ।
इच्छातश्चापि भाव्यत्वात्तदापि स्यान्न निर्वृतिः ॥१७२८॥

Because seeing of duality is stronger (than seeing of that oneness); because (that is only) natural (for one) and that seeing would be resulting from desire, therefore, then also there would not at all be liberation (possible). [1728]

This sets aside the possibility of an optional achieving of liberation.

कुर्वाण एव चेत्कर्म कर्म ब्रह्मेति पश्यति ।
देवताज्ञाकरत्वेन ब्रह्मविद्या विहन्यते ॥१७२९॥
इत्युक्तिर्वो विरुध्येत पूर्वोत्तरविघाततः ।
अपास्तदेवतात्यक्तद्रव्यं कर्मापि दुर्घटम् ॥१७३०॥

If he sees action as the Brahman, indeed while performing ritual activity; his knowing of the Brahman would be obstructed by (his) following the dictates of the god(s) — this your statement would stand opposed owing to the contradiction between (your) earlier and subsequent (statements) and ritual activity, wherein the material offered to the deity is set aside, would also be difficult to perform. [1729-1730]

त्यक्तद्रव्यादिसंभेददृष्ट्यैव नियततवतः ।
यागादिकर्मणस्तस्मादसमीचीनमुच्यते ॥१७३१॥
ससाधनमिदं कर्म ब्रह्मैवेति समीक्षणम् ।
ईदृङ्न लोके वेदे ऽपि प्रसिद्धं कर्म कुत्रचित् ॥१७३२॥

Since the (varied) action in sacrifice and (any other) activity is controlled only with their differences regarding the offered material etc. in view; therefore, what is stated in (your view) is unreasonable.
[1731]
And this view, viz. (all) this action, together with its means, is the Brahman itself, is not known anywhere in the world and in the Veda also.
[1732]

आत्मानमित्यतो वाक्यात्कर्मेदृक्चेत्प्रसेत्स्यति ।
वाक्यभेदप्रसङ्गत्वान्नैवमप्युपपद्यते ॥१७३३॥

Therefore, if from the statement of the Śruti *ātmānam* ... the seer of such an action is established (as successful in achieving liberation), there would result the (undesirable fault called) Vākyabheda, therefore, this way also[1] (your view) would not stand to reason.
[1733]

[1]Vākyabheda 'diversity of statements'; the fault occurs when a sentence conveys two senses against the accepted principle that one sentence must convey only one particular sense. Jaimini's rule is: *arthaikatvād ekaṃ vākyam*. The next verse explains the Vākyabheda.

एवंविधस्य कर्मत्वमुपास्तिं चात्मनस्तथा ।
उभयं विदधद्वाक्यं भिद्येतैव न संशयः ॥१७३४॥

The sentence, which is (seen) prescribing both, viz. the nature of ritual activity of this type and also the worship of the Ātman, would be a split sentence.[1] There is no doubt about this.
[1734]

[1]For, it conveys two diverse statements at one time.

ब्रह्मार्पणमिति वचो यथोक्तेनैव वर्त्मना ।
निर्धारितार्थं जानीयात्स्फुटन्यायसमाश्रयात् ॥१७३५॥

One should know that the statement *brahmārpaṇam* ...[1] will have its meaning established by the very way stated[2] [illegible]

has resorted to the very clear leading principle.[3] [1735]

[1]Cf. *Gītā* 4.24ab: *brahmārpaṇaṃ brahma havir brahmāgnau brahmaṇā hutam.*
[2]That is, without involving a Vākyabheda.
[3]Cf. verse 1733cd above.

पूर्वाभ्यामन्य एवायं तृतीयश्चेत्समुच्चयः ।
श्रुतौ स्मृतौ वा लोके वा सिद्धश्चेदस्तु नान्यथा ॥१७३६॥

If one were to say that there is this third combination (which is) different from the first two (that you have posited), let the combination be such as is accepted, i.e. known, in the Śruti or Smṛti or the world; (it can) not (be accepted as) otherwise. [1736]

This has a refernce to the third *samuccaya*, viz. the combination of ritual and worship of the Ātman. It is implied that such a combination is totally unknown.

तस्मादसदिदं गीतमात्मानमिति यद्वचः ।
तत्समुच्चयसिद्ध्यर्थमित्येतच्चोक्तयुक्तितः ॥१७३७॥

Therefore, what you have said (lit. sung) is all false and also the statement *ātmānam* ... (which you had adduced) for establishing that combinatioin is wrong just on account of the reason (already) stated.[1] [1737]

This concludes the refutation of Bhartṛprapañca's explanation of the sentence *ātmānam eva* ... by resorting to the different *samuccaya*s mentioned above.
[1]This refers to the fault of Vākyabheda.

कार्यलिङ्गसमुच्छित्तिः फलं नाद्यसमुच्चितेः ।
युक्त्या कल्पयितुं शक्यं श्रुतिवाक्यविरोधतः ॥१७३८॥

It is not possible, by any reason, to think that from the first combination follows the result, viz. the destruction of the *linga*[1]

or the effect[2], because of the opposition (to that) by the statement in the Śruti.[3] [1738]

[1]That is, *sūkṣmadeha* 'subtle body'.
[2]That is, gross body.
[3]This is explained in the next two verses.

द्वैतैकत्वात्मविज्ञानकर्मानुष्ठायिनः पितुः ।
पुत्रे न्यस्तात्मभारस्य मरणात्परतः फलम् ॥१७३९॥
पृथिव्यै चैनमित्यादि त्र्यन्नात्मावाप्तिलक्षणम् ।
श्रूयते स्पष्टवचनं देहादेर्नाशनं कुतः ॥१७४०॥

[Verses 1739-1752 refute Bhartṛprapañca's theory about the destruction of gross and subtle bodies of an individual by the first *samuccaya* posited by him.]

In the case of a father, who is performing ritual activities from the knowledge about the uniqueness of the Ātman in all this duality and also who has transferred his own responsibility unto a son, the result (viz. liberation) is far away, it is (obtained) after death. [1739]
And a very clear statement is heard in *pṛthivyai cainam ...*[1] which indicates the obtainment of the nature of the three foods; how can then there be the destruction of the body etc.? [1740]

[1]This refers to BU 1.5.18: *pṛthivyai cainam agneś ca daivī vāg āviśati.*

न चाप्यतिक्रमार्थत्वं जय्य इत्यस्य युक्तिमत् ।
तस्याविशतिवाक्येन विरोधादेव कारणात् ॥१७४१॥

And the statement *jayya ...*[1] is also not reasonable in the case of a person for transgressing (the worldly existence) lest it might be contradictory with the statement *āviśanti ...*[2] [1741]

[1]Cf. BU 1.5.16: *putreṇaivāyaṃ loko jayyaḥ.*
[2]Cf. *agneś ca daivī vāg āviśati.* This points out that the word *jayya* does not refer to only 'transgressing', but it means 'obtaining'

or 'reaching up to'.

मतं त्वन्नात्मसंप्राप्तेरूर्ध्वं भोगस्य भुक्तितः ।
सामर्थ्यात्कल्प्यते कार्यं प्राणानां नाशनं पितुः ॥१७४२॥
नैवं स्याद्ब्रह्मबोधस्य निष्फलत्वप्रसङ्गतः ।
विद्याफलस्य संप्राप्तेः प्रागपि ब्रह्मबोधतः ॥१७४३॥

(One might argue: It is) held that the destruction of the father's[1] *praṇas*[2] is (i.e. can be) imagined with propriety after the enjoyment of pleasure after (a sacrificer first) attained the nature of the three foods. [1742]
(In answering, this is said: It would) not (be) so, because there would arise the contingency that the knowledge of the Brahman becomes purposeless, for (in that case) one would have achieved the fruit of knowledge[3] even before one had (actually) obtained the knowledge of the Brahman. [1743]

[1]That is, Prajāpati's.
[2]These are subtle sense-organs, signifying his body.
[3]That is, the destruction of two bodies, viz. subtle and gross.

संसारानर्थनाशो हि विद्यायाः प्रार्थ्यते फलम् ।
विद्यामृते ऽपि तच्चेत्स्याद्ध्रुवं विद्या निरर्थिका ॥१७४४॥

They desire from the lore (of the Brahman) the destruction of the undesirable transmigratory world as the fruit, if that would be obtained even without knowing (the Brahman), it is certain that the lore (of the Brahman) becomes purposeless. [1744]

ध्वान्तनाशो ऽथ विद्यायाः कार्यं चेदभिधीयते ।
सर्वानर्थस्य नष्टत्वात्किमन्यत्स्यात्तमोहृतेः ॥१७४५॥

If it is said that destruction of darkness is to be the effect (to be achieved by) the knowledge of the Brahman, (we ask,) what else would there remain after the absence (lit. concealment) of darkness, for, already all the undesirable would have been destroyed? [1745]

This verse presupposes the argument that the destruction of ignorance is the second result of the lore of the Brahman, the first being the acquisition of the knowledge about the Brahman.

उत्खातदन्तोरगवदविद्या किं करिष्यति ।
विद्यमानापि विध्वस्ततीव्रानर्थपरंपरा ॥१७४६॥
कामकर्मादिविध्वस्तौ नाविद्यानर्थभुक्तये ।
प्रतीचो ऽलमृते कार्यं कारणं न हि कारणम् ॥१७४७॥

What would darkness do, (when it is) like a serpent whose tooth has been extracted? The one,[1] even though existing, would have its strong chain of undesirables destroyed, [1746] (for), ignorance is not able to produce experience of the undesirable in the case of an individual when desire, action etc. are destroyed. (Indeed) there is not any such means (of enjoyment) as is a means without an effect. [1747]

These verses presuppose an objection: Knowledge about the Brahman is obtained from the lore of the Brahman but ignorance has still remained. Would it not cause transmigration for a student of that lore?

[1]Namely, *avidyā*.

विद्यमाना पुनः कामं कर्म चापि प्रवर्तयेत् ।
अविद्येति मतं चेत्स्यान्नैवमप्युपपद्यते ॥१७४८॥
अविद्या विद्यमाना चेच्छक्तोत्पादयितुं बलात् ।
नाशकद्रक्षितुं नाशात्कथं ते कामकर्मणी ॥१७४९॥

If it be held that when ignorance continues to exist, it would incite desire and also action; (then the answer is,) this also is not reasonable — [1748]
If ignorance that continues to exist (or, were to be able) to create (desire and action) per force, how then it was not able to protect the desire and action from being destroyed? [1749]

This means: *avidyā* cannot again produce *kāma* and *karman* which

are destroyed by the knowledge of the Brahman.

अथ कारणसंसर्गो नाशशब्देन भण्यते ।
सर्वान्प्रत्यविशिष्टत्वात्फलं तन्न समुच्चितेः ॥१७५०॥

Now, if it is held that the contact (of an effect) with the cause is expressed by the word *nāśa*,[1] then, that would not be the (real) result of (the first) combination, since (that) would not be unrelated to all, not specified (with respect to some objects only). [1750]

[1]This presupposes that the first combination does not bring about complete destruction of *kāma* etc., some of it combining to exist.

तस्मात्संघातविध्वंसो निर्युक्तिक इहोच्यते ।
अथ सत्यपि संमोहे संघातश्चेद्विशीर्यते ॥१७५१॥
देहहेत्वन्तराभावाद्भूयो ऽपि विफलैव धीः ।
आनर्थक्यं ब्रह्मधियो न च युक्तं कथंचन ।
निःशेषोपनिषत्काण्डनैरर्थक्यप्रसङ्गतः ॥१७५२॥

Therefore, the destruction of an aggregate is here postultated without any (logical) reason. Now if (it is held) that an aggregate it would get destroyed while there is ignorance, then, owing to the absence of any other cause (for a creation of a) body, once again, the knowledge (of the Brahman) would (have to) be (considered as) useless. But the uselessness of the knowledge of the Brahman is in no way accepted as reasonable; for, (if that were accepted), there would be the contingency (of accepting) the meaninglessness of an entire section (of the Veda called) the Upaniṣad.[1] [1751-1752]

[1]This refers to all the Vedānta texts among the Vedic works.

अपि च ध्वस्तनिःशेषकार्यप्राणादिसाधनः ।
श्रवणादि कथं कुर्याद्ब्रह्मविद्योपलब्धये ॥१७५३॥

[Verses 1753-1763 present Sureśvara's refutation of the opinion

of Bhartṛprapañca that, being, which is mid-way between liberation and transmigratory existence after the destruction of its subtle and gross bodies, undertakes *śravaṇa* etc. (or worship of the Ātman).]

And, further, how can one, whose entire means of ritual activities, viz. *prāṇa* etc. are destroyed, perform hearing etc. for obtaining the knowledge of the Brahman? [1753]

वैराग्यातिशयार्थत्वाद्गौणं चेन्नाशनं मतम् ।
स्वव्याख्यानविरोधित्वान्नैवमप्युपपद्यते ॥१७५४॥

If it is held (by you) that, owing to its being (necessary) for (effecting) the excellence of detachment, there is (posited the opinion regarding) the destruction (of two bodies); that (lit. thus thinking) also, it is not reasonable because (that would involve) contradiction to your own explanation. [1754]

अत्रैव संनिमज्जन्ति प्राणाः सर्वे स्वकारणे ।
मृतः शेते स आध्मातो जीवतैतद्विरुध्यते ॥१७५५॥
फलं चैतत्त्वयैवोक्तं प्रथमायाः समुच्चितेः ।
तस्मान्न जीवतो वाच्यं गौणं विशरणं त्वया ॥१७५६॥

Here all the sense-organs (*prāṇas*) merge into their own cause and then a human being lies dead; then he is inflated by a living one[1] — (all) this is contradictory. And (listen), you yourself have stated this as the result of the first combination; therefore, it should not be argued by you that the destruction of a living body is (but) secondary. [1755-1756]

[1]SP and NKL report that the principal part of this verse (up to *jīvatā*) is Bhartṛprapañca's comment on the third chapter.

अत्रैवेति फलं चोक्त्वा प्रथमायाः समुच्चितेः ।
व्युत्थितस्याखिलाद्भोज्यान्नाममात्रावशेषिणः ॥१७५७॥
परमात्मापरिज्ञानमात्रयानाप्तनिर्द्वयः ।
ब्रह्मविद्यात आरब्धा ब्रह्माविद्यानिवृत्तये ॥१७५८॥
एतत्त्वदीयम् व्याख्यानं तद्विरुद्धमिदं वचः ।

संघातस्य विशरणं जीवतश्चेति दुःस्थितम् ॥१७५९॥

Having stated in the words *atraiva* the result of the first combination in the case of the one who has risen above the entire (collection of) the enjoyables (or eatables); i.e. who has remained only in name; [1757]
one who has not obtained the (Ātman) without duality through only ignorance about the highest Ātman, the lore of the Brahman, is begun for the removal of the ignorance about the Brahman — [1758]
This is your explanation and opposed to that is this your statement, viz. there is disintegration (or flittering) of the aggregate (of *prāṇa*s) and, at the same time, of a living one — all this is ill-stated. [1759]

Verses 1757-1758 present a gist of Bhartṛprapañca's comment n the third chapter — this is according to SP and NKL.

निषिद्धषड्विकारस्य श्रुत्यैव परमात्मनः ।
अविद्या तद्विकारश्च न युक्तस्तूषरादिवत् ॥१७६०॥

But it is not reasonable (to hold) that ignorance and this modification belong to the highest Ātman whose six modifications are denied by the Śruti itself – it[1] is like (ascribing the existence of water in) a barren land etc. [1760]

[1]Namely, saying that *avidyā* is a modification of the Ātman o holds Bhartṛprapañca), will be like saying 'there is water', even nile there is only a barren land.

हिरण्यगर्भद्वारैव मुक्तिरित्यपि यद्वचः ।
तस्यापि दूषणं ज्ञेयं यथोक्तन्यायवर्त्मना ॥१७६१॥

As to the statement, viz. there results liberation through (the knowledge of) Hiraṇyagarbha, there also is to be understood a blemish in the way of the leading principle which was argued. [1761]

This is explained in the next verse.

[1]This has a reference to the Śruti *tad yo yo devānām* ...

हिरण्यगर्भवद्यस्मात्क्रम्यादेरपि संगतिः ।
ब्रह्मात्मलक्षणासाध्वी तेनेयं कल्पना कृता ॥१७६२॥

Since in the case of insects etc. also there would be the same situation, viz. they are characterized by being of the nature of the Brahman, as in the case of Hiraṇyagarbha, therefore (you have) conceived a wrong notion. [1762]

In first three *pāda*s of this verse, there is, according to SP, the leading principle mentioned earlier in SV.

संसारितात्रिशिष्टैव मोक्षादर्वाक्षु भूमिषु ।
ब्रह्मा विश्वसृजो धर्म इत्यादिवचनान्मनोः ॥१७६३॥

In the lower states (of beings) before the state of liberation the nature of being transmigratory is not something special (or uncommon with Hiraṇyagarbha) — this, on the basis of Manu's statement *brahmā viśvasṛjo dharmaḥ* ...[1] [1763]

This refutes the possible argument: All *jīvâs*, except Sūtra, cannot attain liberation. But all of them have to be experiencing the results of the performance of Dharma.

[1] *Manusṛti* 12.15.

विद्यां चेत्यादिमन्त्रो ऽपि न समुच्चयबोधकः ।
परस्परविरोधित्वान्न सहावस्थितिस्तयोः ॥१७६४॥

[Verses 1764-1770 point out that *vidyāṃ ca* and *sambhūtiṃ ca* do not have *samuccaya* as their purport.]

And even the Mantra, *vidyāṃ ca* ...[1] is not conducive to the understanding of a combination; they (*vidyā* and *avidyā*) cannot exist together, for, (their stay together would) involve mutual contradiction. [1764]

[1] Cf. *Īśopaniṣad* 11ab; *Maitrāyaṇyupaniṣad* 7.9.

क्त्वायोगात्पूर्वकालत्वमविद्यायाः प्रतीयते ।
स्वाभाविकं कर्म मृत्युर्विद्या शास्त्रीयमुच्यते ॥१७६५॥
मृत्युः स्वाभाविकं ज्ञानं शास्त्रीयं संभवस्तथा ।
शास्त्रीयेणेतरत्तीर्त्वा विद्ययामृतमश्नुते ॥१७६६॥

From the use of suffix *-ktvā* it is understood (or seen) that ignorance belongs to some earlier moment of time. Performance of natural action is called Death. And (actions) prescribed by Śāstra is called *vidyā*. [1765]
Death consists in natural knowledge and birth in that (which is) acquired from Śāstra; one, having crossed over everything else (than Śāstra) by means of Śāstra, obtains immortality. [1766]

The first line explains the word *mṛtyu* in *vināśena mṛtyuṃ tīrtvā*; the second, the word *sambhūti* in *sambhūtiṃ ca vināśaṃ ca*; cf. *Īṣopaniṣad* 14.

नाविरतो दुश्चरितादिति चागमिकं वचः ।
तपसा कल्मषं हन्ति विद्ययामृतमश्नुते ॥१७६७॥

It is not that a person has not stopped from ill-action — such is the statement from the Āgama.[1] He destroys the ill by means of penance and attains immortality by knowledge. [1767]

[1]This is *Kaṭhopaniṣad* 2.24.

तस्मात्समुच्चयाशेह कार्या नाक्षरसंश्रयात् ।
अप्रमाणं ब्रुवाणस्तु नास्माभिर्विनिवार्यते ॥१७६८॥

Therefore, one should not entertain here[1] a hope (to prove that there is combination) by resorting to Śruti (texts, lit. letters) as the authority, and, one who declares unauthoritative (these) theories, is not refuted (lit. warded off) by us.[2] [1768]

This concludes the refutation of *samuccaya* proposed by Bhartṛprapañca.

[1]That is, in respect of liberation.
[2]That is, we pay no heed to him.

तस्माद्व्युत्थाय कर्मभ्यः प्रत्यक्प्रवणबुद्धयः ।
प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यविज्ञानान्निर्वान्तीत्येष निश्चयः ॥१७६९॥

Therefore, having risen above ritual activities, those who have their intellect inclined towards the inner self, put an end to (the transmigratory existence) by means of the knowledge of the true nature of the inner self. This is the decision. [1769]

This is Sureśvara's assertion of his own positing consequent upon the few preceding verses.

अपुण्यपुण्योपरमे यं पुनर्भवनिर्भयाः ।
शान्ताः संन्यासिनो यान्ति तस्मै मोक्षात्मने नमः ॥१७७०॥

Salutation to him whose nature is liberation and whom approach they who have renounced all action, who are calm (in mind), who are not afraid of re-birth and (who are in the state) in which merit and demerit have ceased to exist. [1770]

न चेह लोकशब्देन कश्चिदन्यो ऽभिधीयते ।
परात्मनः स्वशब्देन विशेषणसमन्वयात् ॥१७७१॥

[Verses 1771-1779 point out the want of reason in understanding from *ātmānam eva lokam upāsīta* the world of Hiraṇyagarbha as the result of ritual activity.]

Further, none else (than the Ātman) is expressed by the word *loka* in this (passage), for, there is the proper connection of the qualifier, the word *sva*, (only) with the highest Ātman. [1771]

SP and NKL point out that, by not understanding the word *loka* in the sense of the highest Ātman, one would invite two undesirable faults: *prakṛtahāni* and *aprakṛtaprakriyāpāta*.

आत्मानमेवेति तथा चात्मशब्दो विशेषणम् ।
लोकस्य ग्रहणं तस्मान्न कर्मसमवायिनः ॥१७७२॥
विद्याप्रकरणे चोर्ध्वमात्मनैव विशेषणात् ।
येषां नो ह्ययमात्मेति कार्यलोकनिवृत्तये ॥१७७३॥

And also (the phrase) *ātmānam eva* ... and the word *ātman* are qulifiers.[1] Therefore, the use of (the word) *loka* is not in respect of one who is inseparably associated with ritual activity
[1772]
and because, later,[2] in the context of knowledge, there is specification by the words *ātmaiva* and by the phrase *yeṣāṃ no hy ayam ātmā*, with a view to the removal of (the word) *loka* which (has the sense of what is) of the nature of some effect.[3]
[1773]

[1]Add: of *loka*. SP gives reason for this: (In language) *sva* and *ātman* are synonymns.

[2]Cf.BU 4.4.22: *sa vā eṣa mahān* and *yeṣāṃ no ('yam ātmāyaṃ lokaḥ)*.

[3]This doing avoids *pūrvāparavirodha* (internal contradiction). Here SP adds: *saṃdigdhasya vākyaśeṣān nirṇayo bhavatīti nyāya(ḥ)*— this is implied by *hi*.

अस्माद्ध्येवेति लिङ्गाच्चेल्लोको ऽन्यः स्यात्परात्मनः ।
स्वलोकस्यार्थवादत्वान्नैवमप्युपपद्यते ॥१७७४॥

If it be held that *loka* is distinct from the highest Ātman on the basis of the *liṅga*, viz. *asmād dhy eva* ..., this also is not reasonable, because the word *svaloka* is an Arthavāda 'eulogistic statement'.
[1774]

The basis of this verse is an argument: The word *loka* is not
n the sense of the highest Ātman, since it occurrs in the context
f the origin of the desired fruit and is therefore a *liṅga* 'indicator'
of the fruit). This is refuted on the ground that the sentence
smād dhy eva ... is an Arthavāda and therefore the word *loka*
an 'indicator' in the Arthavāda and, as such, it cannot prove

stronger than the context, viz. that of *mokṣa* 'liberation'. Cf. SP: *arthavādastham liṅgaṃ na prakaraṇād balavat[taram]*.

साधनान्तरसंभाव्यं यावत्संभाव्यते फलम् ।
कृत्स्नं तदात्मनो लोकात्सिद्धमस्येति नूयते ॥१७७५॥

Whatever result is imagined as what is to be produced by other means (also), all that gets established from *loka*, the Ātman (for this one[1]) — so is it[2] praised. [1775]

This explains the character of *asmād dhy eva* ... as an Arthavāda.
[1]Namely, the knower of the Ātman.
[2]That is, *svaloka*.

यो ऽकाम वाक्येन ह्ययमेवार्थ उच्यते ।
सर्वं कर्माखिलमिति स्मृतेरपि शुभं वचः ॥१७७६॥

This very thought is expressed by the sentence *yo 'kāmaḥ* ...[1] and, further, there is also an auspicious[2] statement of the Smṛti *sarvaṃ karmākhilaṃ* (*pārtha jñāne parisamāpyate*).[3] [1776]

[1]Cf. BU 4.4.6: *yo 'kāma āptakāma āptakāmaḥ*.
[2]*śubham* indicates the sense of it: All action is significant (lit. great).
[3]*Gītā* 4.33cd.

यद्यकृत्स्नो ऽपरिज्ञानाज्ज्ञानात्कात्स्न्र्यं समश्नुते ।
आत्मशब्दप्रयोगो ऽयं तदा लोके समञ्जसः ॥१७७७॥

If (*loka* is incomplete owing to the incomplete) knowledge (about its meaning) and which attains completeness by means of (complete) knowledge (of its context), (only) then this use of the word *ātman* would be reasonable in relation to *loka*. [1777]

This explains the purpose of the *sāmānādhikaraṇya* of *loka* and *ātman*, for, that (viz. *sāmānādhikaraṇya*) makes the meaning of *loka* clear.

अन्यथाव्याकृतावस्थाल्लोकादिति वदेच्छ्रुतिः ।
ब्रह्मलोकनिरासार्थं वचः स्यात्सविशेषणम् ॥१७७८॥

Otherwise, the Śruti would have said 'from the *loka* in the unmanifest state' and the statement would have been worth specification for setting aside the thought of the sphere (i.e. state) of the Brahman. [1778]

This is later on mentioed in BU BU 4.3.32 and 33.

नान्यस्मिन्प्रकृते ऽन्यो ऽर्थो विरहय्य विशेषणम् ।
ग्रहीतुं सुधिया शक्यो वैश्वानरवरादृते ॥१७७९॥

It is not possible for an intelligent person to accept any meaning other than that which is relevant by setting aside its qualifier except with the boon (received through) the favour of Agni[1]. [1779]

[1]This is once again a reference to Bhartṛprapañca's having won a boon from Fire. But, this time, Sureśvara is more penchant. He almost ridicules Bhartṛprapañca for having understood *loka* in the sense of Sūtrātman and this involved internal contradiction — through Agni's favour(!)

Verses 1780-1805 explain the meaning of BU 1.4.16.

उक्तेन वचसा तावत्स्वाराज्यं विदुषो ऽवदत् ।
कथं नूपकरोत्यज्ञो देवतादीनिति भण्यते ॥१७८०॥

[In verses 1780-1793, Sureśvara explains how a non-learned person serves gods etc.]

To begin with, the Śruti has declared the *svārājya* 'kingdom of heaven' (for a knower of Brahman) by the earlier portion of the text (lit. statement[1]). Now is stated (an answer to the question:) 'How indeed does an ignorant person serve gods and others?'. [1780]

[1]That is, *ātmānam eva* ... This points to what is discussed in the previous section of the Vārtika, viz. 'the learned attains *svārājya*'.

वर्णाश्रमाभिमानी सन्नतत्त्वज्ञः पराङ्मतिः ।
कानेषो ऽवति पशुवत्कर्मभिः कैश्च सर्वदा ॥१७८१॥

How does this person who has a pride in his caste and order of life and who does not know the true nature of that (Brahman) and whose thought (mind) is directed away (from the Brahman), ever render service[1] like an animal? (and) by what actions? (and) whom? [1781]

The question in the second line of verse 1780 is amplified here.
[1]This is the meaning of the verb root √*av* 'to favour, to be of service to' (Vedic usage).

सर्वेश्वरेशिता तावत्पूर्वश्रुत्योपवर्णिता ।
यथा त्वज्ञस्य पारार्थ्यं तथेदानीं प्रपञ्च्यते ॥१७८२॥

As regards the mastery of the ruler of all, it is declared in (lit) the earlier Śruti;[1] now, in the same way is explained at length the subservient character of an ignorant man. [1782]

[1]Cf. BU 1.4.10; BUBV 1571ff.

अज्ञातात्मा ह्यविद्योत्थसंघातो देहलिङ्गवान् ।
आत्मलोकाभिधानाभ्यां देहान्तो ऽत्राभिधीयते ॥१७८३॥

This one, who has not known the true nature of the Ātman, who is a conglomeration which has arisen from ignorance and is, as such, possessed of a (gross) body and a subtle (body), and is inside all these bodies, is mentioned here by the two names Ātman and *loka*. [1783]

यागादिकार्यं देवादेर्देहलिङ्गद्वयादृते ।
नान्यथा युज्यते यस्मादतस्तद्वानिहोच्यते ॥१७८४॥

Since the performance of action such as a sacrifice etc. cannot be extended unto the gods except with the two bodies, gross and subtle, therefore, here is mentioned here[1] the one who is possessed of that[2]. [1784]

[1]That is, in the sense *atho ayaṃ vā*.
[2]This refers to *dehaliṅgadvaya*.

कर्मणानार्जितो यस्मान्न कश्चिदुपकारकृत् ।
गृही देवादिभिस्तस्मादार्जितो ऽभूत्स्वकर्मभिः ॥१७८५॥

Since no householder that renders service (to gods and others)[1] is obtained by gods and others, unless he is obtained[2] by (his earlier) ritual performance, therefore (the sacrificer) came to exist by his own performances. [1785]

This points out: *aśeṣaprāṇikamārjito dehadvayavān eva sarvabhogyasyatayā lokādiśabdārthaḥ* (SP).
[1]That is, a sacrificer, others refer to the *pitṛ*s and the *ṛṣi*s.
[2]That is, he has come to exist as a human being possessing a gross body (after he possesses) a subtle body.

देवादयो ऽपि गृहिणा तद्वदेव स्वकर्मभिः ।
आर्जिता एव विज्ञेयास्तन्निमित्तफलेक्षणात् ॥१७८६॥

And gods and others also are obtained[1] by a householder in the same way; i.e. by his own performances; this should be known since there is noticed the result of that cause[2]. [1786]

[1]*ārjitāḥ* = *ā-arjitāḥ*; *ā* is not absolutely necessary.
[2]That is, *svakarma*.

कर्त्रेह यत्कृतं कार्यं तद्भोगायावकल्पते ।
अकृताभ्यागमो यस्मात्कृतनाशश्च नेष्यते ॥१७८७॥

Whatever action is performed by an agent, it results into his[1]

enjoyment because it is not desired to accept what is not produced and the annulment of what is produced. [1787]

This explains the word *tannimittaphalakṣaṇāt* in the preceding verse.

[1]It refers to gods, men.

कर्तृत्वं चास्याविद्यातो न स्वतः कर्तृतात्मनः ।
कर्तैव भोक्ताप्यज्ञः स्याद्विद्यायां द्वयमप्यसत् ॥१७८८॥

And, on the part of this (Ātman[1]), the character of an agent (of some action) comes from ignorance; Ātman does not become an agent (of some action) on its own. This ignorant one is also the enjoyer[2], as he is an agent (of some action); but when there is knowledge (of the Brahman) both these[3] are unreal. [1788]

[1]This refers to *dehaliṅgavān* mentioned in verse 1783 above.
[2]The enjoyer of pleasure and pain which are the result of his activities.
[3]It refers to *kartṛtva* and *bhoktṛtva*.

अभुक्तस्याप्युपात्तस्य ह्यविद्यापिहितात्मनाम् ।
आत्मयाथात्म्यविज्ञानात्कर्मणो ऽतः क्षयो भवेत् ॥१७८९॥

There is therefore the destruction of ritual activity in the case of them who are wrapped in ignorance — even of that activity which one has performed and whose fruit one has not enjoyed by (one's having acquired) the knowledge of the true nature of the Self. [1789]

This answers away a stand taken on a Smṛti passage *nābhuktaṃ kṣīyate karma kalpakośitair api* [a variant in line no. 2200 (in app. 1, no. 16) under *Mahābhārata* 13.37.17-19 in Poona critical ed.].

सर्वं सर्वस्य कार्यम् स्यात्सर्वं सर्वस्य कारणम् ।
असंहतं मिथो नालं जडं वस्तु प्रवर्तितुम् ॥१७९०॥

All can be (related to) all as the effect, all can be (related to) all as the cause; no non-sentient things can perform activity unless they are mutually combined. [1790]

The Sāṃkhya idea of *saṃghāta-parārthatva* may be noted here. The NKL edition reads text as *sarvaḥ sarvasya ... syāt, sarvaḥ sarvasya kāraṇam* ... but this does not make specific difference in interpretation. However the reading in AnSS edition may be preferred, because of the reference to *jaḍa vastu* in the second half.

सर्वः सर्वस्य भोक्तैव चित्प्राधान्यविवक्षया ।
बाह्योपरक्तबुद्धीनां भोगश्चिदवसानता ॥१७९१॥

All beings are enjoyers of all (other) beings and things, since there is a desire (on the part of the Śruti) to point out the principal significance of the sentience. (And) an enjoyment of those, the knowledge about whom is tinted with that notion of (them as) external and ends in (their acceptance by) sentience. [1791]

मधुब्राह्मणविद्यायामिदमेव प्रवक्ष्यते ।
वस्त्वैकात्म्यप्रसिद्ध्यर्थं प्राधान्यातियत्नतः ॥१७९२॥

In the lore of the Madhu Brāhmaṇa this very thing will be stated in order carefully to establish the uniqueness of the (real) thing as the principal (in significance). [1792]

एवं सत्ययमात्मेति संहतो जगदात्मना ।
लोको भोज्यः पशुर्ज्ञेयो देवादेरुपकारकः ॥१७९३॥

This being so, the statement *ayam ātmā* ... means that the entire conglomeration of the world is an object of enjoyment by the Lord of the universe and it is (to be considered) an animal subservient to gods and others. [1793]

देवादिभिरुपात्तो ऽयमित्येतद्गम्यते कुतः ।
अस्यार्थस्य प्रसिद्ध्यर्थं स यदित्यादि भण्यते ॥१७९४॥

[Now follows in verses 1794 -1799 the explanation of *sa yaj juhoti*.]

(A question may be aked:) How is it understood that this[1] is taken up by gods and others (for enjoyment)? In order to establish this matter, it is said *sa yad* ... [1794]

In verse 1792 above, reference was made to a passage in the Madhu Brāhmaṇa so that one compares the thought of this Brāhmaṇa with one in that Brāhmaṇa; but here is adduced a statement from the Brāhmaṇa itself, viz. *sa yaj juhoti* ...

[1]This refers to *ātmā lokaḥ* in verse 1783.

यो देवतां समुद्दिश्य द्रव्यत्यागः स उच्यते ।
याग आसेचनाधिक्याद्धोमाख्यः स्यात्स एव तु ॥१७९५॥

That which is being given away as sacrificial material intended for a deity is called *yāga*; but the same is known by the name *homa* when there is more of pouring (into the fire) etc. [1795]

yāga is merely giving and may be connected with all objects, *homa* seems to refer to what is liquid and poured into the fire.

लोकत्वस्य विधेयत्वाद्यज्जुहोतीत्यनूद्यते ।
नानूक्तिं केचिदिच्छन्ति देवाद्यार्जितसिद्धये ॥१७९६॥

The words *yaj juhoti* ... are an Arthavāda, since the state of being a *loka* is to be effected by this (performance). (Yet) some[1] do not accept (lit. desire) Anuvāda for the sake of establishing that (the result of the sacrifice) is what is acquired by gods and others.[2] [1796]

[1]This refers to Bhartṛprapañca and his followers.
[2]Add: through the performance.

नावश्यकार्यता चैषां सिद्धातो ऽन्यत्र मानतः ।
नित्यत्वाद्धेतुवचनं न युक्त्यातो ऽवगम्यते ॥१७९७॥
यच्चाप्यहरहर्वेदमनुब्रूते प्रयत्नवान् ।

ऋषीणां तेन लोको ऽयं गृहस्थो भोज्य उच्यते ॥१७९८॥

(The answer to this is:) These do not have to be performed necessarily since they are obtained from (i.e. heard[1]) elsewhere as obligatory; therefore there is no statement of them as the cause is under- stood by reasoning [1797]
and that a person, making every effort, repeats the Veda day after day[2] (and therefore) thereby are expressed the *loka* of the *ṛṣi*s and the householder as an object of enjoyment.[3] [1798]

The verse 1798 explains *yad anubrūte tena ṛṣīṇām*.

[1]Cp. *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 5.2.2.1, also CU 8.15.1: *sa khalv evaṃ vartayan yāvadāyuṣam brahmalokaṃ sampadyate*.

[2]This refers to the recitation of the Brahma-yajña formula, it is for the repayment of the debt to the *ṛṣi*s. This explains 'and others' in verse 1796.

[3]*bhojya* explains *loka*.

उत्तरेष्वपि वाक्येषु समाना योजनेक्ष्यताम् ।
अक्षराणां न तत्रास्ति वस्तु किंचित्तिरोहितम् ॥१७९९॥

In the subsequent sentences (of the Śruti) also should be accept- ed (lit. seen) similar employment[1]. There is not any thing[2] kept concealed in the Vedic texts (lit. letters). [1799]

There is no other purport in those words. One cannot doubt that it is so. This has reference to the Śruti *yat pitṛbhyaḥ* ...; again to justify 'and others'.

[1]Supply: of words. That is, the use of the words in the same sense.

[2]Namely, other import.

यस्मात्सर्वाणि भूतानि सर्वदोपकरोत्ययम् ।
अविनाशमतस्तानि तस्येच्छन्त्यात्मदेहवत् ॥१८००॥

[Verses 1800-1805 are an explanation of *yathā ha vai svāya lokāya* ...]

Since this[1] (person) ever renders service to all beings and the elements; therefore, they wish for him non-destruction like that of their own bodies. [1800]

The idea is that of give-and-take between men and gods and others — all is indicative of *avidyājanitavyavahāra*.

[1]It refers to sacrificer.

स्वकर्मार्जितसंभोगदायित्वे ऽस्ति न कश्चन ।
देवादीनां विशेषो ऽत्र गृहस्थस्वात्मदेहयोः ॥१८०१॥

There is not any particular distinction (or speciality) among gods and others in respect of bodies of their own and those of the sacrificers, with regard to granting (i.e. producing) whichever enjoyment is obtained by their own activities. [1801]

This justifies the word *svadehavat* in the preceding verse.

ब्रह्मविद्याहुताशेन विनाशो ऽस्याप्यकर्तृता ।
अयं नाशो महानस्य ह्यन्यः शक्यश्चिकित्सितुम् ॥१८०२॥

The destruction of this one (viz. the sacrificer) by fire in the form of the lore of the Brahman is also (of the nature of) his becoming a non-agent (of any activity); this destruction of this (sacrifice) is indeed great; any other (destrunction) can be thought of (as curable). [1802]

अतः श्रुतिवचो न्याय्यं तस्मादेषामितीरितम् ।
मा भूत्सर्वस्वहानिर्नो ब्रह्मयाथात्म्यविद्यया ॥१८०३॥

Therefore is declared the statement in the Śruti, (and) that is justifiable, viz. *tasmād eṣām* ...; (this is intended to convey:) Let there not be the loss of all of his (means etc.) by (or through) the acquisition of the lore of the knowledge of the true nature of the Brahman. [1803]

This explains why gods protect the sacrificer, as understood in

the preceding verse.

अवश्यमृणवत्कृत्यं यावज्जीवादिवाक्यतः ।
यथोक्तं विदितं वेदे तथा स्मृतिवचःसु च ॥१८०४॥

[Verses 1804-1805 explain the sentence *tad vā etad viditam mīmāṃsitam*.]

Certainly it is understood from the sentence *yāvajjīva* ... etc. that there is invariably (ritual) activity (of a human being) who is indebted (to gods and others), as known in the statement of the Veda and also in the statements of the Smṛtis. [1804]

This refers to the statement of what are called the five great sacrifices which a householder is required to perform every day. Refer to SP and NKL for the Śruti and the Smṛti and SP for the sentences from *Gītā*

अवदानविधौ तच्च विशेषेण विचारितम् ।
ऋणं हेत्यर्थवादेषु तस्मात्कुर्याद्यथोदितम् ॥१८०५॥

And that is discussed in relation to the injunction regarding cutting of oblations at a sacrifice (and) in the supplementary repetitive statements like *ṛṇaṃ ha* ...; therefore one should do what is told.[1] [1805]

tad vā etad viditam is explained in verse 1804 and *mīmāṃsitam* in verse 1805. NKL gives a short and yet clear explanation; SP brings out at length the notion of Mīmāṃsā.

[1]In the context of the injunction, the statement *jāyamāno vai brāhmaṇaḥ* ... is a supplementary statement. Refer to *Taittirīya Saṃhitā* 6.3.10.5.

Now follows up to the end, i.e. verse 1853, the explanation of BU 1.4.17.

प्रवृत्तौ च निवृत्तौ च यथोक्तस्याधिकारिणः ।
स्वातन्त्र्ये सति संसारसृतौ कस्मात्प्रवर्तते ॥१८०६॥

In the case of a person who is eligible, as stated (before), there is freedom[1] in respect of both undertaking (an activity) and keeping from (it); then, why is it that he begins to act in this transmigratory world?[2] [1806]

This explains *ātmaivedam* ... (BU 1.4.17).

[1]This refers to the capacity either to perform an activity or to keep from it.

[2]That is, how does he undertake the performance of ritual activity?

न तु विध्वस्तनिःशेषसंसारानर्थवर्त्मनि ।
निवृत्तिलक्षणे वाच्यं केनायं प्रेर्यते ऽवशः ॥१८०७॥

But, it should not be asked: By whom or what he, the helpless one, is incited to take to the path where the entire mass of undesirable things of the transmigratory world are destroyed, viz. that which is called keeping from activity? [1807]

This is complementary to the preceding verse, in the form of a question. This sets aside the notion of one's natural inclination towards the path of keeping from activity.

[1]The AnSS edition has *preryate vaśaḥ*, a wrong reading. NKL reads correctly— supported by SP's paraphrase *paratantravat*. We have adopted it.

रक्षन्ति ननु देवास्तं न विशिष्टाधिकारिणम् ।
ते ऽपि रक्षन्ति यत्नेन न च सामान्यमानुषम् ॥१८०८॥

But, (it may be argued,) gods protect him (viz. the human being) and not the one with some special eligibility[1] and, further, they do so with (special) care; (the answeris:) (But) not any common being. [1808]

This is in answer to the question in verse 1806 above. The first three lines are expressive of a doubt; the fourth, of the answer.

अन्यथा कृतनाशः स्यादकृताभ्यागमस्तथा ।
सामान्यनररक्षायां तस्मादेतदनुत्तरम् ॥१८०९॥

If it were otherwise, that would mean annulment of what is performed and acceptance of what is not performed. Therefore, this[1] is well said, namely, it is for the protection of any common being. [1809]

The idea is: If performance etc. were meant only for a Brahmacārin, that should mean his performance secured the protection for himself and there was no need of gods' help. These two are *kṛtanāśa* and *akṛtabhyāgama* respectively. That means: They expect even a common man to perform rituals.

[1]Namely, gods protect all men alike.

नाप्यविद्येति वक्तव्यं तस्या ध्वान्तैकमात्रतः ।
मिथ्याधीमात्रहेतुत्वात्प्रेरकत्वं न युक्तिमत् ॥१८१०॥

Also it should not be said that it is ignorance (which incites a person to activity), since it is only (of the nature of) darkness (i.e. ignorance). And it is caused by only false knowledge and therefore its capacity to incite (a human being to activity) is not reasonable. [1810]

अनर्थपरिपाकत्वमपि जानन्प्रवर्तते ।
पारतन्त्र्यमृते दृष्टा प्रवृत्तिर्नेदृशी क्वचित् ॥१८११॥

(It might be said:) A person proceeds (to perform ritual activity) knowing (full) well (*api*) that it has the undesirable as its results (and this he does) even without his dependence (on any other); (it has to be observed that) such an activity is nowhere seen. [1811]

तस्माच्छ्रेयोर्थिनः पुंसः प्रेरको ऽनिष्टकर्मणि ।
वक्तव्यस्तन्निरासार्थमित्यर्था स्यात्परा श्रुतिः ॥१८१२॥

Therefore (it is argued), it is to be pointed out as to who incites to undesirable activity a person who desires for bliss.

In order to answer away that, therefore, there follows the subsequent Śruti[1]. [1812]

[1]Namely, that one which incites a person to act.

प्राप्ताशेषपुमर्थो ऽयं स्वत एवेह मानवः ।
निरस्ताशेषानर्थश्च तन्मोहाद्विपरीतधीः ॥१८१३॥
अनाप्तपुरुषार्थो ऽयं निःशेषानर्थसंकुलः ।
इत्यकामयतानाप्तान्पुमर्थान्साधनैर्जडः ॥१८१४॥

Here (i.e. in this world) a man, who has by himself secured the fulfilment of the entire ends of human endeavour, who has completely removed all the undesirables, and who has, therefore, contrary knowledge[1], because of infatuation (i.e. ignorance), [1813]
and who has not obtained any ends of human endeavour, is affected by all the undesirables, and therefore, the fool, desires to secure by those means the ends of (human) endeavour which were not secured. [1814]

These verses explain how a man comes to have desire that leads him towards activity, and also wrong knowledge.

[1]Or, wrong knowledge.

जिहासति तथानर्थानविद्वानात्मनि श्रितान् ।
अविद्योद्भूतकामः सन्नथो खल्विति च श्रुतिः ॥१८१५॥

And, consequently (*tathā*), not knowing all those undesirables which have resorted to his inner self, he wishes to throw them away; therefore there is the Śruti statement *atho khalv* ...[1][1815]

[1]*atho khalv āhuḥ kāmamaya evāyam puruṣaḥ* (BU 4.4.5).

अकामतः क्रिया काचिद्दृश्यते नेह कस्यचित् ।
यद्यद्धि कुरुते किंचित्तत्तत्कामस्य चेष्टितम् ॥१८१६॥

Now in the case of anyone is noticed any activity (which has proceeded) from absence of desire; for, whatever little (also)

he does is all of it the result (lit. activity) of desire. [1816]

Cf. *Manusmṛti* 2.4 with some differences; *akāmasya ... karhicit.*

काम एष क्रोध एष इत्यादिवचनं स्मृतेः ।
प्रवर्तको नापरो ऽतः कामादित्यवसीयते ॥१८१७॥

This is desire, this is anger etc. are the statement(s) by (lit. of) the Smṛti(s); therefore, it is understood (lit. concluded) that none else than desire incites (a human being to activity). [1817]

This is *Gītā* 3.37.

Verses 1818-1839 explain the meaning of 'ātmaivedam agra āsīd eka eva'.

प्राग्दाराद्यभिसंबन्धादेकाक्येव पुमानभूत् ।
ऊर्ध्वं दारादिसंबन्धात्पुत्रपौत्रादिसंयुतेः ॥१८१८॥
विस्तारितकुटुम्बं तं कस्मैचित्कश्चिदन्तिके ।
व्याचष्टे कामसंभूतं पुत्रपौत्रादिविस्तरम् ॥१८१९॥

Man was all alone before he had taken a wife because later he was connected, through his relation to (his) wife and others, with a son, grandson and others. Him, who had (thus) extended his family, someone described to someone else as influenced by desire and having an extension (of his family in) sons, grandsons and others. [1818-1819]

प्राग्दारोद्वहनात्कृत्स्नं कुटुम्बं यत्प्रपश्यसि ।
आत्मैवैकः पुमानासीन्नासीत्पुत्रादि किंचन ॥१८२०॥
आत्मप्रत्ययनिर्ग्राह्यं केवलं प्रागभूदिदम् ।
पुत्रपौत्रादिसंभिन्नं कुटुम्बं यत्प्रपश्यसि ॥१८२१॥

Whatever family you see (of a man) was all, before he took a wife, only one single man; not anyone like a son etc. was there. [1820]

Whatever you now see, viz. a family, made up of by sons,

grandsons etc., was formerly just a single (person) to be taken only in the form of the consciousness (of him). [1821]

कामाद्यशेषबीजात्माप्रज्ञातात्मैकतत्त्वकः ।
सो ऽतिग्रहग्रहाविष्टो विपरीतार्थनिश्चयः ॥१८२२॥

He (was then) one who was of the nature of the seed (i.e. origin) of desires etc., who had not known the true nature of the inner self, who was possessed by goblins with the great goblin of desire (as the preeminent among them), and who had decided (finally) the objects to be otherwise. [1822]

This explains the meaning of *saḥ* in *so 'kāmayata*.
[1]That is to say: He did not know them in their true nature.

स्वतः कृत्स्नो ऽप्यसंबोधादकृत्स्नो विपरीतधीः ।
तृष्णया प्रहितो बालः सो ऽकामयत मानवः ॥१८२३॥
कर्माधिकारहेतुर्मे जाया स्यात्कर्मसाधनम् ।
पूर्वपूर्वस्य हेतुत्वमथशब्दैरिहोच्यते ॥१८२४॥

Complete though he himself was; he was (yet) incomplete because he did not have the knowledge (of the nature of the inner self), and who had a knowledge that was otherwise (than truth), he was impelled by desire (lit. thirst), the ignorant human being, and entertained desires: [1823]
Let me have a wife, the basis (lit. cause) of eligibility to perform (any ritual) activity and (also) a helping hand (lit. means) in the activity. Each preceding (among these) has the nature of the cause (of every subsequent) — that is here mentioned by (the repetition of)[1] the word *atha*. [1824]

[1]This is the force of the plural form *athaśabdaiḥ*.

अथ प्रजात्मना तस्यां जायेय स्थास्नुकर्मणे ।
स पुत्रेणैवेति वचस्तथा च श्रूयते स्फुटम् ॥१८२५॥

(Then he thought,) 'Let me be born from her in the form of an offspring for (the performance of) the ever staying (ritual)

activity.' For (*ca*), a statement is clearly heard (in the Śruti) *sa putreṇaiva* ...[1] [1825]

[1]*sa putreṇaivāsmiṅl loke pratitiṣṭhati* (BU 1.5.17).

दैवमानुषवित्तेन संपन्नो ऽहमथोत्तरम् ।
कर्म कुर्यां यथाप्राप्तं दृष्टादृष्टार्थसिद्धये ॥१८२६॥

Now, subsequently, I have become rich with all wealth, divine and human, let me (now) perform (ritual) activity, as comes to me in a matter of course in order that I acquire both the seen and the unseen fruit.' [1826]

एतावानेव कामो ऽस्य नातो ऽन्यो ऽर्थो ऽवशिष्यते ।
साध्यसाधनरूपे हि द्वे एवात्रैषणे यतः ॥१८२७॥

Only this much[1] is his desire; therefore, there remains for him no other object of desire (to be acquired), since, in this his desire, he has only two (things), viz. what is to be accomplished and what can accomplish that (for him). [1827]

[1]This emphasises or points to the sacrificer's having a son etc. as the certain means to the acquisition of the three *loka*s: of men, of gods and of *pitṛ*s.

एषणे एव चाप्येते साध्यसाधनकल्पिते ।
पुमर्थस्यानवसितेरैकात्म्याप्रसिद्धितः ॥१८२८॥

And these two desires are thought of only in the form of what is to be accomplished and what accomplishes that; for, there is no complete accomplishing of the ends of human endeavour owing to (his) not having a acquired (or known) the uniqueness of the Ātman. [1828]

This asserts the inutility of having a son etc. in respect of the final goal of life, viz. liberation.

लाकत्रयासंगृहीतेरेतावानिति दुर्घटम् ॥१८२९॥

Since wife and others are of the nature of the means of accomplishing a man's ritual activity, therefore there is no acquisition of the ends of (human) endeavour (through them) and (it might be argued:) Since there is no inclusion of the three worlds (in the expression of the desires by the man), (the word) *etāvan* is (really) difficult to construe. [1829]

न लोकत्रयसाध्यस्य साधनैकव्यपाश्रयात् ।
आक्षिप्तसाध्यं साध्यत्वादितरत्कर्मसाधनम् ॥१८३०॥
लोकत्रयफलं यस्मादुत्पत्त्याद्यात्मकं मतम् ।
कर्मानाक्षिप्य नात्मानं तच्चापि लभते स्वतः ॥१८३१॥

(The answer is:) No. (This is not so), since what is to be accomplished, viz. the three worlds, depends only on the means of accomplishing (the same); since that is to be accomplished, as implied by dependence on the means; (and) that other is a means;[1] [1830]
since it is held that the fruit, viz. the three worlds, is of the nature of what is produced etc.[2], (and) that (fruit) also will not come into being, on its own, without implying (=depending on) activity. [1831]

[1]AnSS edition reads: *itarat karmasādhanam*, while NKL edition reads *itarat karma sādhanam*. The idea is: Having a son etc. are the means to the performance of ritual activity and that implies the three *loka*s to be accomplished thereby *necessarily*.

[2]That is, *utpatti*, *āpti*, *saṃskṛti* and *vikṛti*.

समाप्तिः कर्मणो नापि लोकत्रयफलादृते ।
अन्तर्णीतफलं तस्मादिह साधनमुच्यते ॥१८३२॥

Completion of (ritual) activity also cannot be said to have been there unless (there has resulted) the fruit in the form of the three worlds; as such, in this connection,[1] the means

Cf. *ākṣiptasādhya* in verse 1830 above.
[1]Reference is made to *lokavyavahāra*.

एषणैकैव तेनेयमुत्तरत्राभिधास्यते ॥१८३३॥
अर्थात्साध्याभिधानं स्यात्साधनाभिहितौ यथा ।
भोजने ऽभिहिते पुंसो ह्यर्थात्तृप्तिः प्रतीयते ॥१८३४॥

Therefore, only one desire will be expressed in the subsequent portion. [1833]
Evidently then there would be the mention (i.e. understanding) of what is to be accomplished, even when there is mention made of the means of accomplishing that; this is as when mention is made of a man's taking meals and which implies that there is satisfaction of (the human being) from the object (of desire, viz. food). [1834]

साध्यसाधनरूपे द्वे एषणे काम उच्यते ।
अयथावस्तुरूपत्वादात्माज्ञानैकहेतुके ॥१८३५॥

These two desires, which have the form of what is to be accomplished and what accomplishes that, are called 'desire', since they are of the nature of what is not Reality and are having only ignorance about (the nature of) the Ātman as their cause (i.e. origin). [1835]

This has a reference to *ubhe hyete eṣaṇe eva* (BU 4.4.22).

विश्वासो ऽतो ऽत्र विदुषा न कार्यः स्वप्नलाभवत् ।
व्युत्थायैवैषणाभ्यो ऽतः प्रत्यग्ज्ञानं समाश्रयेत् ॥१८३६॥

Therefore, a learned man should not trust in (i.e. depend on) this[1] as in some profit (or gain) in a dream. Therefore, having risen above all (kinds of) desire, (a person) should take recourse to the knowledge of the inner self. [1836]

[1]Namely, *sādhya* and *sādhana*, both called *kāma*.

इच्छन्नपि यतो नातो भयो विन्देदतो ऽधिकम् ।

तस्मादविद्याभूमिष्ठः कृत्स्न एतावता भवेत् ॥१८३७॥

Since, even desiring, he would not secure any more fruit than this (viz. the three worlds); therefore, resting on ignorance, he would be complete by this much.[1] [1837]

This explains *necchaṅś ca na ato bhūyān vindet ... eva tāvan manyate*.

[1]The magnitude of the three worlds is smaller than the extense of the Brahman; yet he would consider himself to be complete in all respects. Cf. verse 1839 below.

एकैकमपि जायादेर्यावन्नाप्नोति पूरुषः ।
अकृत्स्नस्तावदस्मीति जडः संभावयत्ययम् ॥१८३८॥

So long as a man does not obtain even one of wife and others (viz. son, grandson, wealth etc.),[1] he, the fool, considers himself as incomplete! [1838]

[1]See verse 1840 below.

यावदेते यथोद्दिष्टा आप्ताः स्युः कामपूर्वकाः ।
कृत्स्नो ऽस्मीति तदात्मानं संभावयति मानवः ॥१८३९॥

(But) when these, as enumerated before, are obtained (after they were) desired (by him), this human being considers himself to have been complete. [1839]

Now follows the explanation of 'mana evāsyātmā'.

आत्मजायाप्रजावित्तविद्याभिः पञ्चभिः कृतम् ।
कर्म पाङ्क्तं भवेदेवं पाङ्क्तेन च्छन्दसा मितम् ॥१८४०॥

An activity, done by a person himself, his wife, his offsprings, with his wealth, his knowledge (of the world), i.e. by or with these five, becomes Pāṅkta, since it is (i.e. can be) compared (*mita*) with the metre Paṅkti. [1840]

Paṅkti is a Vedic *chanda*s 'metre' which contains lines of five letters each. Therefore, mere similarity of the number five leads to this statement. The Upaniṣad calls *karman* also as Pāṅkta like the metre. This is one of the Brāhmaṇical tendencies to establish fanciful equation. (This is known as *bandhutā* philosophy of the Brāhmaṇa texts.)

बाह्यस्य कर्मणस्तावदात्माद्यैः पाङ्क्तोदिता ।
तेष्वसत्स्वथ पाङ्क्तत्वमुच्यते ऽध्यात्मकर्मणः ॥१८४१॥

To begin with, it was mentioned that the external activity[1] of the person himself and others[2] is Pāṅkta. Then, in their absence, there is a statement made of the Pāṅkta character of what is done within the body (*adhyātma*).[3] [1841]

This explains *mana evāsya*.

[1]This singular signifies plural; therefore, there is reference to all external activities. By 'external' is meant the physical movements of the various agents.

[2]Cf. *ātmajāyāprajāvittavidyābhiḥ pañcabhiḥ* in the preceding verse.

[3]This refers to the various internal activities — in a word, (called) *dhyāna*.

बाह्याध्यात्मिकभेदेन कर्मैतदुभयात्मकम् ।
पाङ्क्तं यथा तद्भवति तथैतदभिधीयते ॥१८४२॥

Activity is of two types, (that is) differentiated as external and what is done within a body; now is explained as to how it (i.e. the twofold *karman*) becomes Pāṅkta. [1842]

अध्यात्मं मन एवात्मा तदायत्तत्वकारणात् ।
वाग्जायादिप्रवृत्तीनां यजमानवदेव तत् ॥१८४३॥

manas which rests in the body is the Ātman, since it depends on that; (and) that is, in the same way, related to the activities of speech, wife and others; (therefore, it is) like a sacrificer. [1843]

वाक्च जायेति विज्ञेया तदधीनत्वकारणात् ।
यद्ध्यायतीह मनसा वाचा वक्ति तदेव हि ॥१८४४॥

And speech should be known as wife, for it depends on her; and *vāk* speaks indeed that which one thinks of in *manas*.[1] [1844]

This explains *vāk jāyā*.
[1]This points out the dependence of speech on *manas*.

संप्रधार्य मनो वाचा मन्त्रलौकिकरूपया ।
अथ प्रस्पन्दते ऽत्यर्थं सा क्रिया प्राण उच्यते ॥१८४५॥

manas, after having decided (the nature of some object), proceeds to activity by speech in the form of Mantras and worldly talk (only) profusely; therefore, that activity (of *manas*) is called Prāṇa. [1845]

Cf. NKL: *prāṇaśabdena kriyocyate* and SP: *ubhayanirvārtyā ceṣṭā prāṇaḥ* [*ubhaya* = *vāk* and *manas*]. Also, see the next verse.

आगमार्थं विनिश्चित्य मनसाथ प्रवर्तते ।
प्राणः प्रजेति तां चेष्टां प्राहुर्वेदविदो जनाः ॥१८४६॥

Prāṇa becomes active after *manas* has decided the meaning of what is heard;[1] therefore the persons, who know the Veda, describe that activity in words: *prāṇa* is *prajā*. [1846]

This explains the purport of *prāṇaḥ prajā*.
[1]Or, the Vedic text; traditional text.

द्विधैवाध्यात्मिकं वित्तं कार्यभेदात्प्रचक्षते ।
दैवमानुषताप्यस्य साधनत्वोपचारतः ॥१८४७॥

They describe the wealth which is dependent on the body as twofold on account of (two) distinct purposes (served by it);[1] and its nature as divine and human is also metaphorically

(so expressed) because of its being the means (towards them).[2] [1847]

[1]NKL explains: *cakṣuṣā rūpadhīḥ śrotreṇa śabdadhīḥ— iti kārya-bhedāt.*

[2]This is explained in the next two verses.

परीक्ष्य चक्षुषा यस्माल्लभते गोधनादिकम् ।
चक्षुः स्यान्मानुषं वित्तं यथायुर्घृतमुच्यते ॥१८४८॥

Since a person gets a cow and (other) wealth (only) after well examining (it) with the eye, therefore, (a human) eye is called human wealth, this is in the same way as ghee is called life. [1848]

This is the explanation of *cakṣur mānuṣam.*

Ghee brings richness to man's life; therefore, the common man says 'ghee is life.' In the same way, the eye sees the nature of the wealth and later on the man gets it. Therefore, they say that the eye is the human wealth.

दैवभावाप्तितो दैवं ज्ञानं वित्तमिहोच्यते ।
तत्साधनत्वाच्छ्रोत्रस्य श्रोत्रमाध्यात्मिकं धनं ॥१८४९॥

On account of one's acquiring the nature of a divine being, one's knowledge about the divine world is called (in this context) wealth; and because it has the ear as the means (of securing it); therefore, the ear is called divine wealth (which is resting in the body). [1849]

This explains *śrotraṃ daivam.*

बाह्यवागादिचेष्टा च या चान्तःकरणाश्रया ।
देहे ऽभिव्यज्यते यस्मादात्मा कर्म ततो भवेत् ॥१८५०॥

And since whatever activity of external organ as speech etc., that rests on the internal organ, reveals itself in the body,

and is therefore called Ātman; from that proceeds activity. [1850]

This is the explanation of *ātmaiva*.

संमितः संख्यया पादैः पाङ्क्तस्य च्छन्दसो यतः ।
पाङ्क्तो यज्ञस्ततः सद्भिः सर्वदा समुदाहृतः ॥१८५१॥

Since (the sacrifice) is comparable in number with the *pāda*s 'feet' of the metre, it is ever called by the wise as Pāṅkta. [1851]

Cf. verse 1840 above.

तत्कार्यत्वात्पशुः पाङ्क्तो यच्च किंचिच्चराचरम् ।
तच्चापि पञ्चभूतोत्थं विद्यात्पाङ्क्तमशेषतः ॥१८५२॥

Also the animal (of the sacrifice), being related to that as its object (and) whatever is movable and immovable — all that which has arisen from the five elements — the whole of it is Pāṅkta. [1852]

पाङ्क्तकर्मात्मको यज्ञो यज्ञकार्यमिदं जगत् ।
एतद्याथात्म्यतो ज्ञात्वा तदेवाप्नोत्यशेषतः ॥१८५३॥

Sacrifice is of the nature of Pāṅkta activity and this world is the product of sacrifice; (therefore) having known this in its true nature, (a man) obtains that in its entirety. [1853]

In verses 1851-1853 the text speaks of the sacrifice and its relation to bodily and other activities which are *sādhyasādhanātmaka* and therefore rooted in *avidyā*. Another point to be noted is that the character of the sacrifice as Pāṅkta is related to both ritual and philosophical thought. This explains the name of this section Puruṣavidha Brāhmaṇa.